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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis investigates the implications of the increasingly prominent 
propensity to copy as a creative practice in contemporary culture. While debates 
about plagiarism, copyright infringement, and the state of copyright inform this 
project, the focus here is on broader issues. The argument is formulated as an attempt 
at defining a cultural condition that triggers novel attitudes to creativity in order to 
explore the possibilities of a reconceptualisation of copying as a creative category. The 
aesthetic tendencies identified in this project are presented as heavily influenced by 
the emergence of new technologies. But the thesis is not an analysis of the twenty-
first century new media culture. Instead, the contemporary technological moment is 
discussed as a condition of postproduction, in an attempt to devise a historical and 
critical framework that goes beyond questions of the intersection of creativity and 
technology. By doing so, this project strives to interrogate the restrictions and 
inadequacies of the dominant categories of originality, creativity, and authorship, in 
legal and creative terms, to propose the notion of iteration as a possible alternative. 
Practices of copying are represented as a necessary condition of contemporary culture 
and a manifestation of a shift in aesthetics, here defined as the Iterative turn.  
Chapter 1 formulates a critical framework for discussing iteration and 
positions the contemporary Iterative turn in relation to developments in the visual 
arts, literature, publishing, and law. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 offer a discussion of 
representative approaches to contemporary iterative writing and possible ways of 
conceptualising the means by which they engage with notions of originality, creativity, 
and authorship. While the focus here is first and foremost on literary texts, extensive 
references are made to the arts broadly conceived: the media and media theory, 
philosophy, literary and art theory, as well as case law and critical legal studies, to 
arrive at a more comprehensive formulation of the aesthetics of iteration for the 
emergent cultural condition. In its attempt to think about the contemporary, the 
thesis posits a framework for looking beyond the established paradigms of writing.  
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‘PLAGIARISING WELL IS HARD TO DO’: AN INTRODUCTION 
 
In December 2013 Shia LaBeouf, a child-star turned performance artist, 
posted online his short film HowardCantour.com, which had debuted at the Cannes 
2012 festival to high critical acclaim. Its availability online caused a considerable 
controversy after significant similarities were exposed between LaBeouf’s film and 
Daniel Clowes’s comic Justin M. Damiano (2007). The script, many of the visuals, as 
well as dialogues of LaBeouf’s film all proved to be appropriations of Clowes’s, 
incorporated into HowardCantour.com without acknowledgement. On January 8, 
2014 LaBeouf tweeted a storyboard for his next short, Daniel Boring. ‘It’s like 
Fassbinder meets half-baked Nabokov on Gilligan Island,’ LaBeouf declared [Figure 
1].1  The storyboard was, again, a copy of a comic series and a graphic novel David 
Boring (2000), also by Daniel Clowes,2 and the statement a quotation of Clowes’s 
description of David.3 LaBeouf circulated his Daniel accompanied by a ‘cease and 
desist’ letter from Clowes’s attorney, addressing the issue of both copied works and 
calling LaBeouf to undertake ‘all appropriate and necessary steps to redress his 
wrongs.’4 
While LaBeouf complied with the cease and desist note – the relevant tweets 
were deleted, HowardCantour.com taken down – his subsequent amends turned into 
a statement on the ambiguous status of the relationship between copy and original in 
contemporary culture. His public, social-media driven apology for an act dismissed 
by the media as transgressive and infringing took the form of a complete 
appropriation stunt. None of the tweeted statements were LaBeouf’s own; instead his 
apology for plagiarism was also plagiarised and included an eclectic mix of 
unacknowledged quotations from, among others, a hip hop megastar, Kanye West, 
                                                             
1 Shia LeBeouf, Twitter post, 8 January 2014, @thecampaignbook. The post has now been 
deleted.  
2 Interestingly, appropriation is a persistent and characteristic feature of Clowes’s work as 
well. As Daniel Nicolás Ferreiro points out, ‘Clowes’s works have continually revealed echoes 
from films, paintings or literature, blended with different forms of popular culture’ [Daniel 
Nicolás Ferreiro, ‘Relational Genres, Gapped Narratives, and Metafictional Devices in Daniel 
Clowes’s David Boring’, in Relational Design in Literature and the Arts: Page and Stage, 
Canvas and Screen, ed. Rui Carvalho Homem (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2012), 185]. David 
Boring is the prime example, built around references to superhero comic books, and Star 
Trek in particular, here reworked as The Yellow Streak. Clowes’s response to LaBeouf’s 
appropriations does not, however, acknowledge Clowes’s interest in aesthetics of 
appropriation as a creative practice.  
3 see: Daniel Clowes, ‘The Velvet Gloves are off: A Boring Interview with Ghost World’s 
Daniel Clowes’, interview by  Matt Silvie, The Comics Journal, 233 (2001), 66.  
4 Michael J. Kump to Brian G. Wolf, 7 January 2014, circulated as a Twitter post, 8 January 
2014, https://twitter.com/thecampaignbook/status/420931894935834624/photo/1, and 
https://twitter.com/thecampaignbook/status/420931951462477824/photo/1.  
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the notorious Toronto Mayor, Rob Ford, and Yahoo! website comments section.5 
LaBeouf’s explanation of the nature of his art in an interview for Bleeding Cool was 
also a compilation of repurposed material:  statements by Duchamp, Kenneth 
Goldsmith, Lawrence Lessig, Gregory Betts, and Steve Jobs, among others.  
This approach resonates with echoes of Ted Berrigan’s interview with John 
Cage (1967),6 a text entirely composed by Berrigan from a compilation of statements 
by Warhol and Burroughs, among others, but attributing everything to Cage. As such, 
Berrigan’s take on appropriation is manifested not only in the act of recycling textual 
material itself but, perhaps even more importantly, in the selection of sources, all 
pointing to a carefully constructed statement on the creative possibility of the copy. 
Berrigan’s act, I argue, should not be seen as a manifestation of plagiarism. It resides 
in an aesthetic engagement with the dynamic of repetition so characteristic of 
Warhol’s silk screens and Burroughs’s cut outs, evoked in Berrigan’s text, and the 
broader attitude it exemplifies. There is a sense of an appropriation of not just the 
source but of a particular attitude to creativity that is repeated when the words of 
Andy Warhol are being flagrantly repurposed.  
 
   
FIGURE 1: SHIA LABEOUF'S STORYBOARD FOR DANIEL BORING AND DANIEL CLOWES'S 
DAVID BORING (PAGE 20) 
                                                             
5 LaBeouf’s approach to writing his apologies was first identified by a Twitter user. See: 
Molly Horan, ‘Shia LaBeouf’s Plagiarism Controversy’, Know Your Meme, accessed 10 
October 2014, http://knowyourmeme.com/memes/events/shia-labeoufs-plagiarism-
controversy.   
6 Ted Berrigan, ‘An Interview with John Cage’, Electronic Poetry Center, accessed 10 
September 2014, http://epc.buffalo.edu/authors/berrigan/cage.html.  
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LaBeouf’s plagiarism, I suggest, should be considered in similar terms, as an 
iteration of a certain persistent attitude to copying as a creative act that finds its 
manifestation in related forms of creative production, a trajectory illustrative of 
contemporary models of writing. Like Berrigan’s, LaBeouf’s sources are significant as 
manifestations of his commitment to copying as a contemporary avant-garde gesture. 
Echoing Duchamp, for example, immediately foregrounds LaBeouf’s interest in the 
ready-made. His recurring references to Lessing and Goldsmith inscribe 
HowardCantour.com, Daniel Boring, and LaBeouf’s apologies into the 
contemporary framework of debates about creativity, authorship, and copyright. 
While drawing from Lessig can be seen as a justification of LaBeouf’s acts in legal 
terms, an interest in Goldsmith’s work offers a creative and critical point of reference. 
Promoting notions of free culture and creative commons, and of ‘an updated notion 
of genius [that centres] around one’s mastery of information,’ 7  both Lessig and 
Goldsmith respectively move away from thinking about models of cultural production 
in proprietary terms and towards paradigms of creativity based on a culture of 
collecting, organising, curating and sharing content. Goldsmith is an important, 
recurring point of reference for LaBeouf, and this juxtaposition of their work positions 
LaBeouf at the centre of contemporary debates about appropriation, repurposing, and 
twenty-first century paradigms of creativity, or ‘uncreativity,’ as Goldsmith refers to 
contemporary aesthetic developments. Discussed in detail in Chapter 3, Goldsmith’s 
creative and critical works propagate a shift in the understanding of creativity for the 
current cultural moment, triggered by the emergence of now ubiquitous digital 
technology. For Goldsmith, in the contemporary context, practices such as LaBeouf’s 
assume a creative quality and are a manifestation of characteristic habits of textual 
production and dissemination; ‘it is not plagiarism in the digital age – it’s 
repurposing,’ 8  argues Goldsmith. ‘It is not plagiarism in the digital age – it’s 
repurposing,’9 suggests LaBeouf, without acknowledgement.   
This approach, LaBeouf argues, contributes to an ongoing creative project as 
an expression of ‘meta-modernist performance art.’ 10  His two artist’s manifestos, 
                                                             
7 Kenneth Goldsmith, Uncreative Writing (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 1. 
Hereafter UW.  
8 Kenneth Goldsmith, Twitter post, 2 January 2014, 
https://twitter.com/kg_ubu/status/418787567354785792.  
9 Shia LaBeouf, ‘“Authorship is Censorship” – Bleeding Cool in Conversation with Shia 
LaBeouf’, interview by Rich Johnson, Bleeding Cool, 2 January 2014, accessed 01 September 
2014, http://www.bleedingcool.com/2014/01/authorship-is-censorship-bleeding-cool-in-
conversation-with-shia-labeouf/.  
10 Shia LaBeouf, ‘Twitter as Art’, tweeted by LaBeouf in January 2014 (@thecampaignbook), 
the manifesto has since been taken down but is widely available online. See, for example: 
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positioning his work as meta-modernist and intentionally uncreative, are also 
composed by means of copying, repurposing Luke Turner’s meta-modernism 
manifesto, passed off as LaBeouf’s, 11  and excerpts of Goldsmith’s Uncreative 
Writing,12 respectively.  His recent ‘Twitter as Art’ statement is a mash-up, bringing 
together a selection of performance art manifestos by Marilyn Arsem, Scott 
Wichmann and Marina Abramvić, as well as passages copied verbatim from Painters 
Painting, a 1973 documentary. ‘All art is either plagarisum [sic] or revolution,’ 13 
LaBeouf suggests, (mis)quoting Paul Gauguin. However, the notion of plagiarism 
today, as acts such as LaBeouf’s seem to imply, requires a radical reconceptualisation.  
Where instances of creative expression are concerned, ‘all rights and remedies 
[might be] reserved’14 under the rule of copyright law, as the ‘cease and desist’ notice 
concludes, but LaBeouf’s stunt seems to imply that in the contemporary context their 
reach, enforceability, and applicability prove limited. Charges of tastelessness, 
immorality, and bad art aside, LaBeouf’s case is a reminder that the idea of culture as 
property is not an unquestionable absolute. Rather, as Jonathan Lethem contends, it 
is ‘an ongoing social negotiation, tenuously forged, endlessly revised, and imperfect 
in its every incarnation.’ 15  When the paradigms of information production and 
dissemination change with the rise to prominence of novel media platforms, so does 
thinking about authorship and creativity, a trajectory true both in the context of the 
now familiar, historical, ‘old’ technologies and as a manifestation of the contemporary 
new media cultural transformations. Projects such as LaBeouf’s contribute to a 
collective attempt at renegotiating the standards that are otherwise taken for granted. 
In this thesis my interest resides in a similar preoccupation with shifting attitudes 
towards creativity today, triggered by the emergence of new technologies that incite 
new behaviours of textual production and information dissemination while exposing 
the restrictions and inadequacies of the models applied to define, control, and 
institutionalise them – both in creative and legal terms.  
Although removed as a result of the copyright controversy, 
HowardCantour.com and LaBeouf’s tweets remain available online. This widespread 
                                                             
http://www.nydailynews.com/entertainment/gossip/shia-labeouf-bizarre-behavior-
performance-art-article-1.1587660.  
11 LaBeouf name was temporarily included in the byline of Luke Turner’s Metamodernist 
Manifesto. It is preserved on Turner’s website: http://luketurner.com/labeouf-ronkko-
turner/metamodernist-manifesto/. Turner’s manifesto, now in its original format, can be 
viewed here:  http://www.metamodernism.org/.  
12 Shia LaBeouf, ‘#stopcreating’, The New Inquiry, 20 January 2014, accessed 10 September 
2014, http://thenewinquiry.com/features/stopcreating/.  
13 LaBeouf, ‘Twitter as Art’.  
14 Kump to Wolf.  
15 Jonathan Lethem, ‘The Ecstasy of Influence’, in The Ecstasy of Influence: Nonfictions, etc. 
(London: Jonathan Cape, 2012), 101.  
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preservation and availability of the material officially deleted posits significant 
questions about the nature of the copy in the digital environment. The dynamic of 
production and dissemination of content online is foregrounded here not as a space 
of the original creation but of the inevitable copy, of its persistent proliferation, not 
only independent but, importantly, irrespective of the status of the original. The 
original as a centre and source of meaning, in the context, becomes only an illusory 
centre, as I argue in more detail in Chapter 1.  
This logic of the digital copy also finds its manifestation in LaBeouf’s complete 
act. LaBeouf got away with plagiarism, until he did not, his transgression identified 
by a Twitter user almost immediately after the release of HowardCantour.com 
online.16 If, as Warhol (appropriating McLuhan) puts it, art is what you can get away 
with, then LaBeouf’s performance is an example of how not to do art. But, perhaps, 
getting away with plagiarism is not the point here. Perhaps plagiarism in not an 
appropriate term to describe LaBeouf’s act. His uncreative practice acquires an 
altogether different status if viewed as a clear manifestation of the influence of the 
contemporary digital, networked culture on the practices of information 
dissemination and artistic expression, on the status of the copy. As Goldsmith puts it, 
‘plagiarizing well is hard to do.’ 17  Plagiarising in the social-media driven culture 
proves an impossible feat. In this context, questions that need to be raised in relation 
to plagiarism shift away from ethics and towards an aesthetics of borrowing pre-
published content. The change in attitude might be a result of increasing availability 
of all published content online and of simple, widely accessible tools that make 
plagiarism detection possible. If a ‘trial by Google’18 enables any online user to detect 
LaBeouf’s plagiarism only a few hours after his work or a statement are released 
online, then the motivations behind acts of copying must, inevitably, change. In the 
context of ubiquitous digital media plagiarism as an attempt at passing someone else’s 
ideas as one’s own ceases to be achievable. It is the sense of an impossibility of a copy 
that provokes a proliferation of copies but generated as an expression of transgressive 
creative gestures achieved though inherently uncreative acts. Plagiarism seen as such 
is not antithetical to creativity but rather, as Lethem argues, a necessary condition of 
                                                             
16 LaBeouf’s sources identified by a Twitter user point to a dynamic not only of writing but 
also detecting plagiarism now driven by new media channels of information dissemination, 
an issue discussed in more detail in Chapter 1 with reference to Helene Hegemann’s Axolotl 
Roadkill (2010). 
17 Kenneth Goldsmith, Interview by Trace William Cowen, Nailed, 8 January 2014, accessed 
18 August 2014, http://www.nailedmagazine.com/interview/interview-with-kenneth-
goldsmith-by-trace-william-cowen/.  
18 David Shields, Reality Hunger: A Manifesto (London: Hamish Hamilton, 2010), 38. 
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all writing and creativity, and organically connected to it.19 Plagiarism, then – the 
hyper-fake – is not committed for the sake of plagiarism; rather, as David Shields puts 
it, it is ‘a way to get at [the] essence of [the] real,’20 the real that is increasingly defined 
by the logic of the virtual and its reliance on acts of copying. 
There is a certain sense that LaBeouf’s complete work of plagiarism came 
together as an afterthought, an attempt at reframing an unambiguous instance of 
plagiarism as a carefully constructed performance to avoid the consequences of 
copyright infringement. LaBeouf, by choosing Goldsmith, Duchamp, or Abramović as 
his sources, makes a stand about the status of his copy as an avant-garde project. His 
self-fashioning as an experimental performance artist is a conscious choice to shift 
attention away from the illegality to the aesthetics of the act (an approach not 
dissimilar from Goldsmith’s practice, as I argue in Chapter 3). But this is exactly why 
LaBeouf’s case serves as a useful starting point for thinking about issues of 
authorship, creativity, and originality as they impinge on the contemporary art scene. 
It points to the urgency and ubiquity of the debates and to the dynamic of the 
environment that generates them. That LaBeouf has an extensive knowledge of the 
history of appropriation art is a possibility; that HowardCantour.com, released two 
years before the plagiarism controversy started, had been created to incite the 
uncreative performance that followed is likely. But there is also a chance that it is the 
exigency of the current debates about open sourcing, file sharing, copyright in the 
digital age, the ubiquity of the debates about information dissemination and 
circulation online, and the ease of accessing materials about them that collectively 
enabled a construction of LaBeouf’s defence that was only one Google search away, 
collated as a publicity rather than an artist statement. And while the approach might 
raise questions about the creative qualities of LaBeouf’s art, the controversy touches 
at the core of the contemporary cultural condition that drives the aesthetic 
developments discussed in this thesis.  
Perhaps most telling as a manifestation of an increasingly proliferating culture 
of celebrity art (Joaquin’s Phoenix’s I’m still Here, James Franco’s various artistic 
endeavours), the role of the social media information machine, ‘generational aversion 
to “giving credit”’21  fostered by habits of sharing information online, and related 
                                                             
19 Jonathan Lethem, ‘I’m suggesting [originality] is an overrated virtue’, interview by Harvey 
Blume, The Boston Globe, 4 March 2007, accessed 24 February 2013, 
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/ideas/articles/2007/03/04/qa_jonathan_lethem/?pa
ge=full.  
20 Shields, 79. 
21 Trace William Cowen, ‘Shia on the Moon: The Necessary Dissection of Howard Cantour, 
Glide Magazine, 20 December 2013, accessed 20 September 2014, 
http://www.glidemagazine.com/hiddentrack/shia-on-the-moon-the-necessary-dissection-
of-howard-cantour/.  
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popular culture consumerism, LaBeouf’s act is nevertheless interesting as a 
characteristic manifestation of what I see as a persistent contemporary tendency to 
create by means of copying pre-published content occurring at an unprecedented 
level. Acts of plagiarising a short story, an artist statement, a performance piece, 
plagiarising apologies for plagiarism, although dismissed in LaBeouf’s case as 
instances of copyright infringement and plagiarism by law and media respectively, 
should be seen, I argue, as neither. Rather, LaBeouf’s tenacious copying should be 
considered a manifestation of an emergent aesthetic attitude particularly pervasive 
today, described in this thesis as a condition of iteration.  
As I suggest, by means of qualifying Lethem’s logic, practices of copying today 
should be considered a necessary condition of the current cultural moment. While 
notions of plagiarism, copyright infringement, and iteration all imply that forms of 
authorship are defined in relation to a shared preoccupation with means of creative 
production informed by acts of copying, the base assumptions about the essence of 
creativity and originality differ significantly where the first two concepts and iteration 
are concerned. The logic of both plagiarism and copyright infringement favours 
originality of creation, where originality is synonymous with, simply, not copying (the 
legal notion of originality is discussed in more detail in Chapter 1). Iteration, on the 
other hand, recognises the creative potential of copying; iteration, as I define it in this 
thesis, is a tendency to repeat available material as a creative gesture. While copyright 
infringement and plagiarism are preoccupied with questions of whether copying has 
occurred, copying is always already implied in iteration. Thinking about creative 
practice as iterative makes necessary a completely new set of questions. It is this 
distinction, one, I argue, most prominently foregrounded in the contemporary 
context, that is assumed here as a framework for discussing contemporary attitudes 
towards creativity, as a manifestation of a shift in aesthetics defined as an expression 
of the Iterative turn.  
In line with the dominant logic, LaBeouf’s acts are a case of a ‘clear copyright 
infringement and misappropriation of Daniel Clowes’s work.’ 22  Dismissed as a 
‘blatant copy,’ and a manifestation of ‘improper and outlandish conduct,’ the 
derivative nature of LaBeouf’s ‘foolishness’ fails to comply with the copyright 
paradigms of authorship and originality. Similar thinking pervades popular 
understanding of what it means to create, echoed in the media debates about 
LaBeouf’s plagiarism, also evocative of the controversies incited by the publications 
of J.D. California’s 60 Years Later (2009), Alice Randall’s The Wind Done Gone 
(2001), and Helene Hegemann’s Axolotl Roadkill (2010) (all discussed further  in 
                                                             
22 Kump to Wolf. 
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Chapter 1).  While often considered a manifestation of an unlawful practice, 
plagiarism is not a legal term. Unlike copyright infringement, plagiarism is an ethical 
category. Although inherently transgressive, acts of plagiarism do not, in all instances, 
constitute copyright infringement. As Laurie Stearns explains,  
in some ways the concept of plagiarism is broader than infringement, 
in that it can include copying of ideas, or of expression not protected 
by copyright, that would not constitute infringement […] fundamental 
to both plagiarism and copyright infringement is wrongful copying 
from a preexisiting work. But the form, the amount, and the sources of 
the copying prohibited as copyright infringement are different from 
those of the copying condemned as plagiarism.23  
 
But, as it is often the case, the logic and the media rhetoric of plagiarism surrounding 
LaBeouf’s performance mirror the legal understanding of copyright infringement. 
There is a sense that plagiarism is synonymous with a failure of a creative process. 
Plagiarism, as Lise Buranen and Alice M. Roy put it, ‘is perceived as a problem […]: 
“using someone else’s words without telling whose they are or where you got them”; 
“stealing other people’s ideas or words.”’ 24  Plagiarism, then, is considered 
synonymous with theft and the understanding of the notion derives, Marilyn Randall 
explains, from the Latin origins of the term, plagium meaning ‘to kidnap a person,’ 
used only with reference to children, servants or slaves, people who could be 
considered in proprietary terms. 25  The same logic translates into paradigms of 
creative production as soon as creative outputs are considered property, as defined by 
Intellectual Property law. ‘Once it becomes possible to think of literary work as 
property,’ as Deborah Halbert suggests, ‘it becomes possible to “steal” that 
property.’26  
There is a sense here a copy is almost a taboo from the point of view of both 
plagiarism and copyright infringement. However, my argument stems from an 
assumption that as technologies and economies of writing change, so does the 
inherent understanding of authorship and the dominant attitudes towards both 
creativity and plagiarism. We find ourselves now, as I suggest in this thesis, at a 
transitional cultural stage – at the Iterative turn – characterised by the propensity to 
                                                             
23 Laurie Stearns, ‘Copy Wrong: Plagiarism, Process, Property, and the Law’, in Perspectives 
on Plagiarism and Intellectual Property in a Postmodern World, eds. Lise Buranen and 
Alice M. Roy (New York: State University of New York Press, 1999), 9.  
24 Lise Buranen and Alice M. Roy, Introduction to Perspectives on Plagiarism and 
Intellectual Property in a Postmodern World, eds. Lise Buranen and Alice M. Roy (New 
York: State University of New York Press, 1999), xv-xvi.  
25 Marilyn Randall, Pragmatic Plagiarism: Authorship, Profit, and Power (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2001), 61.  
26 Deborah Halbert, ‘Poaching and Plagiarising: Property, Plagiarism, and Feminist Futures’, 
in Perspectives on Plagiarism and Intellectual Property in a Postmodern World, eds. Lise 
Buranen and Alice M. Roy (New York: State University of New York Press, 1999), 111.  
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copy as an expression of a creative practice. Perhaps, this contemporary persistence 
of acts of copying, of which LaBeouf’s performance is only one of many examples, 
should be seen as a shift, to borrow from Marcus Boon, ‘in relation to the forces that 
constitute that taboo.’27 If copying emerges as an increasingly prominent avenue of 
creative expression, then perhaps the base assumptions of creativity need to shift 
accordingly. This thesis proposes one possible way of thinking about creativity in 
response to these assumptions. My interests here reside not in instances of plagiarism 
or copyright infringement per se, but rather in the cultural condition that triggers the 
proliferation of acts of copying, a condition that affords their reconceptualisation as a 
creative, aesthetic category. This approach grows out of a realisation that to recognise 
an instance of plagiarism, copyright infringement, or an example of iteration as 
plagiarism, infringement, or a creative act, is to pass judgement in line with dominant 
tenets, social, cultural, legal, political, and economic norms and presuppositions that 
motivate these judgements. Hence, it is the texts of culture, as well as, and perhaps 
most importantly, the dogmas and the judgements they breed that contribute to my 
argument. What I am interested in is both the cultural moment of the emergence of 
iteration as a creative practice and the possibility of transforming the paradigms of 
thinking about the established paradigms of creativity, the possibility of transforming 
models of creativity as much as judgements about their expression and, by extension, 
the critical apparatus for conceptualising them.   
In Chapter 1 I set out a framework for the broader project in an attempt to 
define the Iterative turn and position it in relation to current visual arts, literary, 
publishing, and legal landscapes. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 offer a discussion of approaches 
to contemporary iterative writing and possible ways of conceptualising the means by 
which they engage with notions of originality, creativity, and authorship 
characteristic of the Iterative turn. While I focus first and foremost on literary texts – 
an interest key to defining the contemporary preoccupation with copying that is 
language rather than image based (in contrast to, for example, the influential Pictures 
Generation of the 1970s, a trajectory discussed in Chapters 1 and 3) –  I draw 
extensively from the arts broadly conceived: the media and media theory, philosophy, 
literary and art theory, as well as case law and critical legal studies to arrive at a more 
comprehensive formulation of the aesthetics of iteration for the contemporary 
cultural condition. As such, the core literature of this thesis, both creative and critical, 
is drawn from a range of disciplines. But hybridity of discourse, I suggest, is a feature 
                                                             
27 Marcus Boon, In Praise of Copying (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), 
101.  
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of creativity today and a successful critical framework for discussing it requires 
equally hybrid tools.  
Literary texts discussed in this thesis are all inherently uncreative, all 
composed by means of copying, or rather, as I suggest, by iterative means. None of 
them, I argue, should be understood as instances of plagiarism or copyright 
infringement – although some, as Chapter 1 shows, are problematic from the legal 
point of view. My analysis is developed with reference to three experimental creative 
approaches to writing which I consider illustrative of a range of key aesthetic attitudes 
that dominate the contemporary avant-garde poetic scene. Erasure, discussed in 
Chapter 2, is a method of creative writing reliant on redacting source texts, erasing, 
crossing out, or blacking out fragments to create poetry. Transcription (Chapter 3) is 
a method of writing that relies on the retyping of complete texts verbatim, as 
literature. Similarly to erasure and transcription, code-generated poetry in Chapter 4 
relies on sourcing pre-published content to create new works of literature but 
composed by engaging languages and tools of computer programming.  
My reasons for focusing on the contemporary avant-garde are twofold. 
Practical considerations cannot be underestimated. As I show in Chapter 1, the 
mainstream culture, still grounded in the familiar and safe understanding of 
authorship as an inspired, singular act, driven by the logic of increasingly problematic 
copyright models and publishing practice built on profit margins (and significantly 
impacted by the legal paradigms), cannot accommodate the experimental and 
subversive impulses that define the Iterative turn. While dominant literary forms 
remain too constrained by the prevailing apparatus, marginal in economic and legal 
terms, the contemporary avant-garde emerges as a particularly prominent space in 
which to shape the emergent aesthetics. As this thesis will show, there is a sense of 
permissiveness to creatively engage with paradigms of authorship, originality, and 
creativity in ways that break with the ‘norm’ to arrive at new models of thinking about 
creating today, pronounced among experimental writers. The avant-garde authorship 
and publishing, both historically and today, exist on the fringes of market or 
institutional structures. And while the established values of ‘originality’ and 
‘authorship’ are constitutive of the institutional frameworks, the status of the avant-
garde allows a certain disregard for established standards, flaunting the rules without 
institutional implications but with major potential to influence the very institution it 
contests. Hence, this thesis describes the contemporary, iterative avant-garde as a 
cultural force, one that can be represented in Foucauldian terms, as symptomatic of 
broader power struggles inherent in cultural formation. Foucault writes:  
| 11 
 
 
rather than analyzing power from the point of view of its internal 
relationality, it consists of analyzing power relations through the 
antagonism of strategies. For example, to find out what our society 
means by sanity, perhaps we should investigate what is happening in 
the field of insanity. And what we mean by legality in the field of 
illegality.28  
 
It is the insanity and illegality of the iterative avant-garde that should be seen as a 
trigger of the Iterative turn as the foundation for a more universal transformation of 
paradigms of creativity. The avant-garde seen as such becomes synonymous, as 
Goldsmith puts it, with a copyright loophole,29 where breaking the rules emerges as a 
rule itself, offering means of interrogating the familiar models that shape the 
contemporary creative landscape.  
But my preoccupation with avant-garde texts is also grounded in the logic of 
the avant-garde itself. There is arguably an inherently avant-garde approach implied 
in any attempt to transform established creative paradigms. The concept of the avant-
garde (or ‘advance guard’) points quite aptly, as Matei Călinescu suggests, to a ‘sharp 
sense of […] nonconformism, courageous precursory exploration.’ 30  It evokes an 
orientation towards radically new. It is as a site of possibility and exploration that the 
avant-garde principles remain particularly relevant now, fundamental to defining the 
possibilities of a turn in aesthetics. Echoing the attitudes of the earlier avant-gardes, 
the poetic avant-garde for the twenty-first century will be presented here as primarily 
preoccupied with notions of authorship, the possibilities as well as constraints of the 
current cultural moment for devising new ways of thinking about what it means to 
create. The history of the avant-gardes is presented here as a history of changing 
attitudes towards authorship, a framework that informs both the overall conceptual 
framework for my argument and individual discussions of representative 
contemporary avant-garde forms. This relationship to historical avant-gardes is 
important and, as I suggest, a defining feature of the current neo-neo-avant-garde 
aesthetics. The logic of the Iterative turn resides not only in an interest in repetition 
and reproduction of texts, but, most importantly, in a repetition of earlier avant-garde 
gestures, in a repetition of both texts and attitudes at the same time, as suggested in 
Chapter 1. The formal experimentation with repetition is a symptom that can only be 
realised fully when both the repetition of form itself and that of an attitude that incites 
it converge, where attitudes become form. The thesis presents poetic forms that, as I 
                                                             
28 Michel Foucault, ‘The Subject and Power’, Critical Inquiry, 8.4 (1982), 780.  
29 Kenneth Goldsmith, interview by Marcus Boon (unedited transcript), Bomb, 117 (2011), 
accessed 28 April 2014, http://bombmagazine.org/article/6071/. 
30 Matei Călinescu, Five Faces of Modernity: Modernism, Avant-Garde, Decadence, Kitsch, 
Postmodernism (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003), 95.  
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show, are not new, but they repeat those devised by the earlier avant-gardes under 
the guise of and as a response to contemporary new media developments. It is 
important to think of these contemporary avant-gardes as unoriginal, as iterations. It 
is precisely this iteratibility that becomes the defining feature of iterative writing 
today.  
Such an understanding of writing at the Iterative turn informs my discussions 
in Chapters 2, 3, and 4, positioning each instance of contemporary experimental 
poetics in relation to the avant-garde practices it evokes. As such, my reading of 
contemporary erasure is grounded both in similar 1970s literary experiments in 
works of Ronald Johnson and Tom Phillips, as well as related visual arts examples, 
e.g. Robert Rauschenberg’s Erased de Kooning Drawing (1953) and Marcel 
Broodthaers’s appropriation of Stéphane Mallarmé’s ‘Un Coup de Dés’/ ‘A Throw of 
Dice’ (1969). Transcription is presented as following on from the Pictures Generation, 
Andy Warhol’s art and philosophy, and developed as a reiteration of broader 
assumptions of conceptualism in art as it developed in the 1960s. John Cage’s 
performance scores and the project of Fluxus serve as a reference point for reading 
code poetics. My interest here is not in ‘great artists,’31 or ‘mature poets’32 who steal 
because of a sense of superiority and institutional approval, escaping the negative 
implications so inherent in accusations of plagiarism purely on the basis of a  
judgement passed because of who they are and not what they do.33 Rather, my focus 
is on texts that are a manifestation of a much more salient attitude as a manifestation 
of an emergent aesthetic form for the contemporary Iterative turn. 
Despite its admittedly wide scope, this thesis is not a survey or an attempt at 
an exhaustive representation of the contemporary avant-garde literary scene – a 
recent monograph, Nobody’s Business: Twenty-First Century Avant-Garde Poetics 
(2013) by Brian M. Reed does just that. Instead, my interest here resides in proposing 
an intellectual framework for interrogating and rethinking contemporary models of 
authorship and originality through the lens of key developments in experimental 
poetics today. But Reed’s study offers a useful reference point for positioning my 
understanding of the current shift in aesthetics in relation to the dominant 
approaches to contemporary writing. Nobody’s Business is representative of the 
prevailing stand that associates the contemporary propensity for uncreative writing 
with a shift in aesthetic attitudes. But Reed’s understanding of this shift resides in a 
                                                             
31 ‘Bad artists copy, great artists steal.’ Attributed to Pablo Picasso.  
32 ‘Immature poets imitate, mature poets steal’ [T.S. Eliot, ‘Philip Massinger’, in Essays on 
Elizabethan Drama (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World: 1932), 143].  
33 I paraphrase M.H.Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp: Romantic Theory and the Critical 
Tradition, (New York: OUP, 1953).  
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move away from allusive, lyrical poetry, and towards a poetics that is anti-intellectual, 
to poetry as anti-poetry. Reed does not dismiss contemporary writing on the basis of 
its alleged anti-intellectualism. Rather, he sees the approach as a manifestation of 
contemporary aesthetics: ‘the radical gesture of negation […] its blank indifference to 
literary history, its scorn for conventional markers of craft, its disdain for polish and 
perfection’ are the very attributes that, Reed suggest, make uncreative writing 
appealing.34 Foregrounding deskilling as a feature of writing today is a popular means 
of thinking about instances of writing discussed in this thesis. But it is a stance, I 
argue, that misses the point and is driven by an interrogation grounded in the wrong 
set of framing questions.  
My argument, similarly to Reed’s, grows out of the recognition of a shift in 
contemporary aesthetic attitudes, but, I suggest, it cannot be accurately described 
when considered in line with Reed’s and related frameworks. I argue here against 
approaches such as Reed’s, as I present the change in creative attitudes not as a turn 
away from skill but towards an alternative skill set. This writing by alternative means 
is, I argue, deeply and self-consciously rooted in literary and aesthetic histories, as 
manifested in the association of contemporary iterative poetics with earlier avant-
gardes. Iterative writing should be seen as a complex system of creative practice and 
critical thought. While for Reed works of authors such as Travis Macdonald (Chapter 
2), Kenneth Goldsmith (Chapter 3), or Nick Montfort and Stephanie Strickland 
(Chapter 4) are valuable as a manifestation of contemporary attitudes, the attitudes 
themselves are seen as ‘lacking in more forthrightly lyrical, hence more old-fashioned 
feeling poetries.’35 Unlike Reed, I present examples of such writing as an expression 
of a new form in its own right, complex, sophisticated, lyrical, and affective, but one 
that requires an alternative intellectual framework in order to be recognised as such. 
Texts discussed here seem ‘lacking’ in skill, affect, and lyricism only if the familiar 
categories of literariness are applied, categories that fail to describe the contemporary 
cultural moment and the aesthetic attitudes it breeds. As such, this thesis is an 
attempt at arriving at possible alternative models for thinking about writing the 
Iterative turn. It is an attempt at writing the new when a new set of categories has not, 
as yet, been established.  
In his recent book, Patrick Greaney refers to examples of such creative 
copying, both historical and contemporary, as quotational practices. According to 
Greaney, quotation is a historicising method. By repeating the past, it evokes the 
                                                             
34 Brian M. Reed, Nobody’s Business: Twenty-First Century Avant-Garde Poetics (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 2013), xii. 
35 Ibid, xiv. 
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possibilities of ‘the past’s unrealized futures.’36 For Greaney, Walter Benjamin’s The 
Arcade’s Project (1927-1940), the 1970s poetry and artist books of Marcel 
Broodthaers, and Vanessa Place’s or Kenneth Goldsmith’s contemporary conceptual 
poetics all exemplify a quotational approach to writing. I suggest that Greaney’s take 
is too general and too narrow at the same time to successfully account for the 
contemporary ubiquity of copying as a creative practice. A distinction has to be drawn, 
I argue, between historically similar creative experiments and contemporary practices 
to account for their persistence and the distinctive characteristics of the cultural 
condition that triggers them. I posit that, in the contemporary context, copying and 
repeating texts manifests a broad, pervasive, cultural tendency. An attempt to engage 
with questions of the past, memory, and the archive and to interrogate their 
possibilities is only one issue addressed today by uncreative writing (a question also 
explored in this thesis, with reference to erasure writing in Chapter 2). As such, a more 
inclusive but historically specific category is needed to accurately describe the 
emergence of the creative practices discusses here. As I suggest, writing by means of 
rewriting is more accurately described today as an iterative rather than a quotational 
practice.  
For Ezra Pound and T.S. Eliot, for example, quotation, reference, and 
attribution are key to constructing their meticulously referential poetics; for Berrigan, 
mentioned above, copying is a collagist gesture, bringing together disparate 
fragments to create unambiguously recycled, though new, texts. But what 
characterises such copying as a quotation or a collage is a commitment to bringing 
attention to the source, recognising and reinforcing the authority of the quoted author 
and text. The elements of a collage, as Craig Dworkin puts it, ‘always maintain a 
certain autonomy, and they resist the subsumation of one by the other.’37 Today, I 
suggest, the impulse to copy is informed by a different strategy. As Robert Fitterman 
explains, the focus today is on new contexts rather than new texts that practices of 
copying generate (I discuss this trajectory in more detail in Chapter 1). While ‘collage 
brings appropriated materials together, via the composition of the artist, to a singular 
expression’ the iterative writer today takes an unmodified source to reframe it ‘in 
order to call attention to its new context, to cull meaning from the shift,’ in the process 
promoting ‘the instability of language as it pours into these new contexts.’38 This 
                                                             
36 Patrick Greaney, Quotational Practices: Repeating the Future in Contemporary Art 
(Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2014), x.  
37 Craig Dworkin, Reading the Illegible (Evanston, Ill: Northwestern University Press, 
2003), 14. 
38 Robert Fitterman, ‘Identity Theft’, in Rob the Plagiarist: Others Writing by Robert 
Fitterman 2000-2008 (New York: Roof Books, 2009), 15.  
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distinction is key to thinking about writing today as iterative rather than quotational. 
A call for quotation suggests, as Lethem observes, ‘realms where standards of accurate 
citation are necessary and sensible,’39  it implies creativity that complies with the 
dominant strategies and systematised thinking in line with academic, legal, or 
publishing standards. Iteration, on the other hand, is a space that invites an 
interrogation of these very standards, a space of creative subversion and innovation, 
a space of a turn in aesthetics. While quotation is inherently referential and 
committed to dominant creative paradigms, iteration happens outside the quotation 
marks. Writing understood in line with Fitterman’s logic makes the act of quoting of 
secondary importance to instead create new situations, to ‘investigate uncertainty, 
which in turn, investigates new ways to potentially realize our place as text artists in 
a network culture.’40 What I am interested in is this possibility of the potential for 
alternative thinking. 
As such, texts discussed here are presented as both creative and critical, as 
tools to reflect on the creative condition of contemporary culture. Their self-reflexive 
iterability can be seen as a method of not just writing poetry but also theorising the 
very paradigms of writing. This is writing that, to borrow from Marjorie Perloff, ‘is 
neither lyric poetry nor literary theory or cultural criticism but an inspired blend of 
all three.’41 At the iterative turn, writing a poem and writing criticism can both be 
performed by employing the same gestures, where copying is a manifestation of 
formal and aesthetic preferences and a critical tool – an attitude manifested in 
Lethem’s ‘Ecstasy’, Shields’s Reality Hunger, and Fitterman’s Rob the Plagiarist, all 
referred to above. ‘Here,’ Peter Jaeger maintains, ‘theoretical research is not 
something that is applied to a text by a critic; it is instead a tool for mediating the 
production of text.’42 But, as Dworkin observes, ‘what were, for [the] modernists, 
isolated instances of literary daring or dramatic special effects, have become for their 
successors the very procedures by which entire books are written,’43 books of poetry 
and criticism alike. The conflation of critical and creative writing as a defining feature 
of the Iterative turn is an issue foregrounded most explicitly in Chapter 4. In its 
attempt at investigating the possibilities of writing criticism at the Iterative turn, it 
goes beyond a discussion of yet another iterative form of writing. Instead, Chapter 4 
poses an extended conclusion to my argument in its move towards a new model of a 
                                                             
39 Lethem, ‘Ecstasy’, 121.  
40 Fitterman, ‘Identity’, 15.  
41 Marjorie Perloff, Differentials : Poetry, Poetics, Pedagogy (Tuscaloosa, Al : University of 
Alabama Press, 2004), 263.  
42 Peter Jaeger, “But Could I Make a Living From It”: Jeff Derksen’s Modular Form”, 
Canadian Literature, 203 (2009), 39. 
43 Dworkin, Reading, xxii. 
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hybrid, distributed form of writing that engages questions of the intersection of theory 
and poetry, reflections on the compositional practice and the broader contemporary 
culture, in order to make visible the cultural processes behind them. 
Writing that might seem ‘anti-intellectual’ is presented here as a project 
heavily invested in critical thought and its own criticism. This approach is implied in 
my framing notion of ‘iteration,’ itself an appropriation of Jacques Derrida’s term, as 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 1. Thinking about writing today through this 
reference to Derrida is aimed as an indication of a propensity for theory that manifests 
itself in contemporary iterative poetry. In my approach, I build on both Jaeger’s and 
Dworkin’s understanding of the conflation of theory and poetics today. Dworkin sees 
contemporary experimental poems as texts that ‘help us to think through certain ideas 
more fully, many of these works constitute not merely illustrations, but literal and 
concrete enactments of theoretical concepts.’44 In line with this assumption, I read 
erasure as an expression of Derrida’s écrtiture sous rature, transcription as event 
informed by paradigms of the impossibility of its repetition, in line with Deleuze’s, 
Derrida’s, and Badiou’s definitions, and interpret code with reference to theories of 
performativity. But approaching texts discussed here as and through theory serves a 
double function. It is a way of formulating a possible theory of poetic forms in order 
to, at the same time, interrogate the praxis driving the processes of their authorship. 
Here, as Pierre Bourdieu asserts, ‘the production of discourse (critical, historical, etc.) 
about the work of art is one of the conditions of production of the work.’45 This project 
is speculative, in the same sense that any attempt at theorising a contemporary, 
emergent aesthetics is exploratory and aimed at devising an alternative strategy for 
thinking about creativity with regard for conditions under which writing today takes 
place. In my argument, the very concepts of authorship undergo a deconstruction, 
using the tools most appropriate for the purpose, i.e. the language of deconstruction. 
The theoretical inclinations evoke an engagement with the possibilities of a turn, 
where not just creation but the interrogation of its possibility and related methods 
come to the fore, where poiesis transforms into autopoiesis, as argued in Chapter 4.46  
                                                             
44 Ibid. 
45 Pierre Bourdieu, The Field of Cultural Production (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011), 35.  
46 Emerging at the time frequently described as ‘after theory,’ this propensity for theory at 
the Iterative turn might seem unusual and an unlikely development. But perhaps this 
tendency is a characteristic manifestation of the philosophy of iteration and should itself be 
seen as an iterative gesture that contributes to contemporary aesthetics. If, as discussed in 
Chapter 3, the avant-garde today is a neo-neo-avant-garde that repeats earlier avant-gardes, 
then inherent in this repetition must also be an iteration of the characteristic neo-avant-
garde engagement with the contemporary debates at the time of the so called high theory, i.e. 
the language poet’s interest in semiotic possibilities of language as defined by post-
structuralism, or the widespread preoccupation with Roland Barthes’s notion of the death of 
the author.  
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Today, the context that triggers iterative thinking is digital. As Lev Manovich 
suggests, it is technology, more than any critical impulse that should be seen as a 
driving force behind developments in modern paradigms of creativity. As a vehicle of 
progress and innovation, technology, then, becomes inherently associated with the 
logic of the avant-garde, perhaps as its tool. For Manovich, it is the computer software 
that manifests a form in which the avant-garde project is being realised in the twenty-
first century; ‘on the one hand, software codifies and naturalizes the techniques of the 
old avant-garde. On the other hand, software’s new techniques of working with media 
represent the new avant-garde of the meta-media society.’47 But Manovich’s avant-
garde loses its radical potential, it recycles for the sake of recycling; ‘it is no longer 
concerned with seeing or representing the world in new ways but rather accessing and 
using previously accumulated media in new ways.’48 Although I argue with Manovich 
that means of recycling and re-contextualising content to create new works should be 
considered a contemporary creative paradigm, I see Manovich’s perceptions of the 
logic of information as dangerously reductionist. I argue for the inherent critical 
potential carried by this new media avant-garde that emerges at the intersection of 
principles of the historical avant-garde and new technological developments. As such, 
the framework developed here is influenced by but not limited to the digital 
environment. Instead, the contemporary digital culture is considered as a contextual 
framework, an apparatus that exerts a significant impact on the dynamic of creative 
practices both online and offline. It is the backlash of the Internet copy-paste culture 
of ubiquitous sharing rather than that culture itself that forms the context for my 
argument, assumed as an attempt at defining a universal shift in thinking about 
creative practice today. Digital technologies are referred to here as a Heideggerian 
essence of technology rather than as technology itself. As such, preference is given to 
the notion of ‘postproduction’ over ‘digital culture’, following Nicolas Bourriaud in his 
attempt to describe the contemporary cultural condition. While contemporary digital 
technologies heavily inform the dynamic of the postproduction culture, the 
technology is only one aspect of this much more comprehensive cultural ecology and 
of the processes that inform the contemporary aesthetic shift this thesis strives to 
define. The postproduction framework is adopted here as a means of firmly 
positioning iterative writing in a distinct cultural moment and is discussed in detail 
in Chapter 1.  
                                                             
47 Lev Manovich, ‘Avant-garde as Software’, University of California repository, 2002, 
Accessed 18 September 2014, 
http://www.uoc.edu/artnodes/espai/eng/art/manovich1002/manovich1002.pdf, 11.  
48 Ibid, 8. 
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This thesis is not written in praise of plagiarism or copyright infringement. It 
also does not posit a defence or an indictment of projects such as LaBeouf’s. It is an 
attempt at reconceptualising the concept of the copy for contemporary creative 
culture, building on notions such as Goldsmith’s uncreative writing, and Perloff’s 
unoriginal genius.49 My attempt is not to argue for the abolition of authorship, I do 
not see ‘authorship as censorship,’50 in line with LaBeouf’s proclamations. The author 
and notions of authorship remain at the core of this thesis, only reconceptualised to 
accommodate the methods of contemporary writing. Mine is an attempt at arriving at 
possible ways of redefining the definitions of authorship, creativity, and originality 
that forms the core of my argument. The need for such a debate is triggered, I argue, 
by a change in the widespread approach towards the means of production of 
knowledge. Today, as Shields suggests,  
copies have been dethroned; the economic model built on them is 
collapsing […] copies are no longer the basis of wealth. Now 
relationships, links, connection, and sharing are. Value has shifted 
away from a copy toward the many ways to recall, annotate, 
personalize, edit, authenticate, display, mark, transfer, and engage a 
work. Art is a conversation, not a patent office.51  
 
The model more appropriate for contemporary practices requires a move away from 
‘the Western philosophical tradition defining the autonomous individual as the 
source of all knowledge,’ 52  and towards a mode that is built on collaboration, 
distribution, and multiple authorships. This shift is reliant on a recognition of the 
constructedness of the dominant notions of authorship. According to Goldsmith ‘we 
are moving from authorship to non-authorship’53 and LaBeouf’s film seems to be an 
expression of the attitude. His ‘plagiarised’ HowardContour might not acknowledge 
the sources, but it also does not make claims to authorship. While 
HowardContour.com is a film by Shia LaBeouf, the director, the credits do not 
include any information about the authorship of the script. But the lack of the clearly 
defined authorial framework, I suggest, still points to a model of authorship, only 
established in line with a different set of categories of authorship and creativity. 
LaBeouf’s short emerges as a hybrid expression of authorship that is distributed, its 
dynamics enabled by the tools and practices of content creation, curation, and sharing 
in the postproduction environment and should be viewed as such. Goldsmith’s non-
                                                             
49 Marjorie Perloff, Unoriginal Genius: Poetry by Other Means in the New Century 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2010). Hereafter UG.  
50 LaBeouf, ‘Twitter as Art’. 
51 Shields, 29.  
52 Lisa Ede and Andrea Lunsford, Singular Texts/Plural Authors: Perspectives on 
Collaborative Writing (Carbondale, Il: Southern Illinois University, 1992), 73. 
53 Goldsmith, Interview by Cowen. 
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authorship is authorship by other, open source, digital, means; it is authorship in an 
expanded field that relies on acts of selecting, arranging, and curating content to 
create new works. This thesis investigates the possibility of arriving at a critical 
framework for conceptualising such practice as a dominant rather than marginalised 
and infringing approach. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 1 
THE ITERATIVE TURN  
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THE ITERATIVE TURN: AN INTRODUCTION 
 
As Stewart Home puts it, ‘first there were modernists, then there were post-
modernists, now there are plagiarists.’ 54  Although hyperbolic in his attempt at 
defining changing attitudes towards creativity as they emerge in their respective 
cultural moments, in this statement Home points to a distinctive aesthetic shift, one, 
I suggest, of increasing prominence today. There is a sense here that plagiarism is an 
aesthetic category that has a literary history and that this history has a very clearly 
defined direction. Home’s plagiarism emerges as historically contingent and 
following on from modernism and postmodernism. But if plagiarism can be seen as a 
natural successor to modern and postmodern thought and practice, then by 
implication, both modernism and postmodernism have to be understood as 
conditioned upon a codification of practices related to plagiarism, if not plagiarism 
itself.  
What Home seems to imply, then, is that clear affinities can be drawn between 
dominant models of cultural production in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries 
and an ongoing creative commitment to acts of copying. From modernist allusion,55 
through postmodern parody and pastiche,56 to contemporary practices at the core of 
this thesis, there is a sense of a historical continuum that resides in thinking about 
modes of reproduction and repurposing materials that is evoked in Home’s trajectory, 
with a marked historical increase in prominence of implications of copying for 
creative practice that reaches a characteristic focal point today. Whether described as 
plagiarist gestures, manifestations of remix or appropriation cultures, or what I 
describe here as an expression of the contemporary Iterative turn, the increasing 
notoriety of writing by means of reusing pre-published content posits challenges with 
                                                             
54 Stewart Home, Plagiarism: Art as Commodity and Strategies for its Negotiation 
(London: Aporia Press, 1987), back cover. 
55 Although allusion is not an exclusively modernist category, it is typically associated with a 
modernist writing tendency to reference in works such as James Joyce’s Ulysses or T.S. 
Eliot’s The Waste Land. In his 1923 review of The Waste Land Edgell Rickword described 
Eliot as ‘a writer to whom originality is almost an inspiration, borrowing the greater number 
of his best lines, creating hardly any himself.’ [Edgell Rickword, Review of ‘The Waste Land’, 
TLS, in TLS, ‘Then and Now’ series, 4 June 2009, accessed 10 September 2014, 
http://www.the-tls.co.uk/tls/reviews/other_categories/article758583.ece]. As Eliot himself 
explained in ‘The Metaphysical Poets’: ‘Our civilisation comprehends great variety and 
complexity, and this variety and complexity, playing upon a refined sensibility, must produce 
various complex results. The poet must become more allusive, more indirect, in order to 
force, to dislocate if necessary, language into meaning.’ [T.S. Eliot, ‘The Metaphysical Poets’, 
in Selected Prose of T.S. Eliot, ed. Frank Kermode  (New York: Hardcourt Brace Jovanovich, 
1975), 65]. Elsewhere he wrote: ‘not only the best but the most individual parts of [a poet’s] 
work may be those in which the dead poets, his ancestors, assert their immortality most 
vigorously.’ [T.S. Eliot, ‘Tradition and the Individual Talent’, in Selected Prose of T.S. Eliot, 
ed. Frank Kermode (New York: Hardcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975), 38] 
56 The postmodern interest in parody will be discussed later in this chapter.  
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respect to categories in which to consider the practice. Today, at the time of 
ubiquitous information technologies, acts of writing, reading, and responding to the 
attitudes towards both prove an increasingly ambiguous feat. At the time when, on 
the one hand, the availability and accessibility of information is far greater than ever 
before and the development of information technology encourages a culture of 
communal creativity and free appropriation, increased efforts are also being put into 
place to introduce often controversial means of control of what has varyingly been 
described as a democracy and an anarchy (recent examples of Stop Online Piracy Act 
(SOPA) in the United States and attempts at an international ratification of Anti-
Counterfighting Trade Agreement (ACTA) are a case in point). The mounting tensions 
between the propagators of the creative remix culture and the defenders of traditional 
copyright law generate contrasting rhetoric of tradition v. innovation, stability v. 
change, and print v. digital culture. This chapter is an attempt at describing these 
exact dynamics to argue that the tensions are particularly prominent today. In a 
convergence of theoretical, literary, and legal discourses my discussion here is an 
attempt at explaining the characteristics of this cultural framework as a trigger for the 
Iterative turn in literature, to contextualise my inquiry into iterative writing in 
Chapters 2, 3, and 4. As I argue, writing by means of appropriation, borrowing, 
plagiarism – writing by iterative means – finds its particular moment in 
contemporary culture and emerges not as a transgressive practice but rather as a 
characteristic attitude towards creativity manifestated in currently proliferating, 
emergent forms of writing.  
 
1.1. APPROPRIATING ORIGINALITY 
 
On April 25, 2013 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 
rather unexpectedly, ruled largely in favour of Richard Prince who, in 2011, was found 
guilty of copyright infringement for using photographs created by Patrick Cariou, 
collated and published in his Yes, Rasta book in 2000. This particular instance of 
Prince’s controversial appropriation practice came to light when Cariou’s exhibition 
plans were challenged by a gallery owner rejecting his images as an exhibit that had 
already ‘been done’.57 As Judge Deborah A. Batts noted, except for publication and 
through private sale, Cariou, the sole copyright holder, has neither previously 
exhibited his images nor issued licences or given consent for the image use. Although 
the images might not have been done under Cariou’s name, they have been, 
                                                             
57 Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337 (2011).  
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nevertheless, exhibited, in an altered though identifiable form, appropriated by 
Prince and incorporated into his Canal Zone exhibit at the Gagosian Gallery in 2008.  
Utilising forty-one of the Yes, Rasta photographs, the Canal Zone series relied 
heavily on Cariou’s work, with twenty-eight out of twenty-nine pieces incorporating 
Yes, Rasta images. The appropriation methods employed in the Canal Zone ranged 
from both analogue and digital collages and mash-ups to image and size 
manipulation, with some composed solely of Carious’s works, others incorporating 
elements of material appropriated from other authors [Figure 2].  
 
 
FIGURE 2: PATRICK CARIOU, YES, RASTA AND RICHARD PRINCE, CANAL ZONE 
 
Prince’s exhibit attracted widespread attention and extensive media coverage, and 
proved a commercial success. As Batts noted,  
as a result of the exhibition and related marketing efforts, 8 of the 
canal zone paintings sold for a total of $10,480,000.00 […] Seven 
other Canal Zone paintings were exchanged for art with an estimated 
value between $6,000.000.00 and $8,000.000.00. […] Gagosian 
Gallery sold $6,7840.00 worth of Canal Zone exhibition catalogues.58  
 
As such, the Yes, Rasta series gained prominence not as Yes, Rasta by Patrick Cariou 
but as Canal Zone by Richard Prince. As a result of Prince’s appropriation, the status 
of Cariou’s work changed – adding complexity to the dynamic implicitly established 
                                                             
58 Ibid. 
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between the source and appropriated work in similar ‘derivative’ art practices. 
Prince’s act of appropriation equalled Cariou’s expropriation to trigger a resulting re-
assignation of the status of the ‘original’ work. Paradoxically, Prince’s source 
materials – Cariou’s originals – have grown to be disregarded as derivative, as that 
which had already been done. And although the provenance of Prince’s work is 
undisputed here, and the reliance on Cariou’s work is openly acknowledged by Prince, 
the conflated rhetoric of celebrity capitalism and artistic originality contribute to a 
creative economy that discredits Cariou’s work as unoriginal in the eyes of the gallery 
owner and the general public. Although Prince’s appropriation art relies on 
engagement with acts inherently antithetic towards prevailing social and legal 
conventions of authorship, the gallery owner’s attitude proved a clear manifestation 
of the exact approaches to creativity that Prince openly questions and subverts, an 
overt acknowledgement of Prince as a singular celebrity author, favoured over Cariou 
– to borrow from Abrams – ‘not for what he made but what he was.’59  
What transpires is a clear discrepancy between approaches to the so-called 
‘appropriation’ practices within the artistic and legal contexts that stems from a 
disjunction between cultural and legal concepts of authorship. As an aesthetic 
category, appropriation exists as a long-standing method of subversive artistic 
production, where reusing existing material serves as a tool of artistic commentary, 
social critique, a means of making a political statement.60 Appropriation is an avenue 
                                                             
59 Abrams, 248. 
60 Surprisingly, given the ubiquity of the practice in modern, postmodern, and contemporary 
culture, little comprehensive scholarship on the history, theory, or artistic manifestations of 
appropriation exists. As Jan Verwoert puts it, ‘appropriation can be understood as one of the 
most basic procedures of modern art production’ [Jan Verwoert, ‘Apropos Appropriation: 
Why Stealing Images Today Feels Different’, Art and Research: A Journal of Ideas, Contexts 
and Methods, 1.2 (2007), accessed 2 February 2013, 
http://www.artandresearch.org.uk/v1n2/verwoert.html]. The term ‘appropriation’ as I use it 
here refers to cultural practices in which already authored material is used as a means of 
creating new works. While appropriation is a broad concept, and includes techniques 
ranging from collage, cutting and pasting, rephotography, to digital sampling and remixing, 
appropriation needs to be distinguished from related practices of adaptation and allusion. 
Julie Sanders’s Adaptation and Appropriation (2006) offers a brief overview of the two 
practices but seems to build on the general lack of a more specific theory and history of the 
latter to conflate it with acts of adaptation. Only vaguely defined, for Sanders, appropriation 
should be understood as an extended or sustained adaptation [Julie Sanders, Adaptation 
and Appropriation (New York: Routledge, 2006), 32]. As such, Sanders’s is a rebranded 
exploration in intertextuality, rather than a comprehensive study of appropriation in the 
arts. A volume dedicated to appropriation in the visual arts is available in the 
MIT/Whitechapel Gallery Documents of Contemporary Art, but, true to the format adopted 
in the series, the volume offers a brief introduction to appropriation and an anthologised 
collection of texts relevant to understanding the tendency [see: David Evans (ed.), 
Appropriation (London and Cambridge MA: Whitechapel Gallery and MIT Press, 2009)]. 
But, ‘the history [and theory] of appropriation […] remains to be written’ [Nicolas Bourriaud, 
Postproduction, Culture as Screenplay: How Art Reprograms the World, trans. Jeanine 
Herman (New York, Lukas and Sternberg, 2002), 25. Hereafter PCAS]. While this thesis 
does not focus on writing either, thinking about appropriation in a variety of its historical 
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of commenting on contemporary culture at large, and the critique of hyper-capitalist, 
consumer simulacra culture itself, so prominent in the 1980s, lies at its inception. 
Read in the legal context, however, artistic appropriation proves highly inappropriate 
and tends to be considered on a par with copyright infringement, as Judge Batts’s 
2011 decision illustrates. Such reasoning is deeply rooted in two interdependent 
principles that govern copyright legislation. Copyright assumes inherent correlation 
between copyright protection and originality of a work, while protection afforded by 
copyright is always determined by the requirement of originality. As Nadia Walravens 
explains, ‘it is possible to refute a work of art’s “work” status if its originality cannot 
be shown by its author.’ 61  The legal notion of originality, however, remains an 
ambiguous and under-defined concept that lacks unified approach in different legal 
systems. Under the U.S. Copyright Act, originality and fixation62 are the only two 
requirements for copyrightability; in France the notion of originality is often linked 
to authorial expression and works are proclaimed original if they bear marks of 
author’s personality; in British law every work is considered original if it is not a copy; 
on the international scale, the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) 
Berne Convention63 does not define originality at all.64 
 What is clear, however, is the inherent correlation that copyright draws 
between the figure of the author and work’s originality. Characteristically, the 
assignation of the status of the original work of art relies on and is subject to authorial 
contribution. The legal notion of originality resides in legal preoccupations with the 
author as the origin of the work. It is the possibility of an unambiguous assignation of 
authorship rather than qualities of creativity and novelty that are at the core of legal 
understanding of an original work. As Peter Jaszi and Martha Woodmansee put it, 
                                                             
guises serves as a starting point and significantly informs my understanding of the 
contemporary Iterative turn.  
61 Nadia Walravens, ‘The Concept of Originality and Contemporary Art’, in Dear Images: 
Art, Copyright and Culture, eds. Daniel McClean and Karsten Schubert (London and 
Manchester: Institute of Contemporary Arts and Ridinghouse, 2002), 171. 
62 Although fixation is not a requirement under the Berne Convention, the U.S. law requires 
that the work be fixed in a tangible medium of expression to obtain copyright protection.  
63 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, or the Berne 
Convention, is an international copyright agreement which operates as a multilateral system 
of reciprocal copyright privileges. Although copyright remains a local right, the signatories of 
the Convention recognise a set of basic rights and privileges. These include: the obligation to 
recognise the copyright of works of authors from other signatory countries in the same way a 
member state recognises the copyright in works produced by its own citizens; the obligation 
to provide strong minimum standards for copyright, i.e. the length of protection by 
copyright. [Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 9 September 
1886]. 
64 My key legal reference throughout the thesis will be to the U.S.A copyright law, due to the 
origin of the majority of my primary sources. Where relevant, however, references will be 
made to other legislative systems and an effort will be made to place the debates in an 
international context.  
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‘words […] “belong” to the individual who “originated” them.’65 Such thinking as the 
key doctrinal features of copyright today still resides in and continues being shaped 
by Romantic aesthetics, influenced by the Lockean model of property and late 
eighteenth-century theories of personhood that gave rise to the figure of the author 
as a unique, inspired, individual genius, creating in vacuum.66 Such categorisation 
can be problematic; as Anne Barron stresses, copyright takes no interest in the genius 
                                                             
65 Peter Jaszi and Mart Woodmansee, Introduction to The Construction of Authorship: 
Textual Appropriation in Law and Literature (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1994), 
2.  
66 The author understood as such should be understood, Martha Woodmansee explains, as 
‘the product of the rise in the eighteenth century of a new group of individuals: writers who 
sought to earn their livelihood from the sale of their writings to the new and rapidly 
expanding reading public’ [Martha Woodmansee, ‘The Genius and the Copyright: Economic 
and Legal Conditions of the Emergence of the ‘Author’’, Eighteenth-Century Studies, 17.4 
(1984), 426]. The changing dynamic of the publishing market at the time triggered the need 
for writers to be able to establish ownership of their writing that took form in copyright law. 
But the sense of entitlement to be named the owner of a work was in itself new and a 
manifestation of the characteristic, emergent thinking about creative process. Moving away 
from the earlier, Renaissance and neoclassical understanding of writing as craft and the 
writer as ‘a vehicle or instrument […] a skilled manipulator of predefined strategies’ 
[Woodmansee, 427], eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century thinking about authorship 
focused on internalised inspiration, i.e. inspiration that was an inherently singular 
experience, coming not from outside or above, but from within the writer. This is a shift that 
Foucault also points to in ‘What is an Author?’ (1969). Locating the emergence of the author 
in the eighteenth century, Foucault argues that ‘the coming into being of the notion of the 
‘author’ constitutes a privileged moment of individualisation in the history of ideas.’ [Michel 
Foucault, ‘What is an Author?, in The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rubinow (London: Penguin 
Books, 1984), 101. Hereafter WWA]. In such a context, inspiration ‘came to be explicated in 
terms of original genius, with the consequence that the inspired work was made peculiarly 
and distinctively the product – and the property – of the writer’ [Woodmansee, 427]. The 
definitions of property that give rise to this paradigm, and the early copyright laws, drew on 
the Enlightenment notions of individualism, autonomy, and rights, to arrive at a model of 
exclusionary ownership of an authored work that dominates copyright today. This 
understanding of authorship as an act of original creation paralleled Locke’s view of property 
and its origin: ‘whatsoever then he removes out of the State that Nature hath provided, and 
left it in, he hath mixed his Labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and 
thereby makes his Property’ [John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government, ed. Thomas 
P. Peardon (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1952), 306]. The modern notion of the author, and 
the paradigms that dominate copyright, reside in this propriety model that associates 
authorship with an inspired individualism, as an expression of labour that originates with 
authorial genius. ‘Over the history of Anglo-American copyright,’ Jaszi explains, ‘Romantic 
“authorship” has served the interests of publishers and other distributors […] it played a [….] 
role in shaping legal doctrine’ [Peter Jaszi, ‘The Author Effect: Contemporary Copyright and 
Collective Creativity’ in The Construction of Authorship: Textual Appropriation in Law and 
Literature, eds. Peter Jaszi and Martha Woodmansee, (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 
1994), 34]. It is important to point out, then, that although modern copyright developed at 
the time of the rise of professional author as well as of the proliferation of the Romantic 
thinking about creativity, the law, as Kathy Bowrey puts it, ‘was relatively unsympathetic to 
either of these changes to the writer’s social status’ [Kathy Bowrey, ‘Who is paining copyright 
history’ in Dear Images: Art, Copyright and Culture, eds. Daniel McClean and Karsten 
Schubert, (London and Manchester: Institute of Contemporary Arts and Ridinghouse, 
2002), 259]. Rather, early copyright was preoccupied with book trade and the privileges of 
book publishers. The author in the light of the early copyright emerged, to borrow from Mark 
Rose, as a proprietor, who would sell the copyright on transfer of the book – the property – 
to the bookseller [Mark Rose, ‘The Author as Proprietor: Donaldson v. Becket and the 
Genealogy of Modern Authorship’, Representations, 23 (1998), 51-85]. 
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factor, i.e. imagination, inspiration, ideas, or the aesthetic value of the work. Instead, 
copyright focuses on their expression. It is the inherent reliance on the singularity and 
uniqueness of authorship as manifested in the legal anxiety of influence that remains 
key in determining the conceptual framework of copyright’s approach to artistic 
practice. Formulated as such, however, copyright thinking proves unaccommodating 
at best and hostile in most cases, when faced with numerous artistic developments 
that have arisen in the course of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. The 
inadequacy of such a framework to approaching creativity at large, and contemporary 
creative cultures in particular, reverberates especially vividly when cases such as 
Cariou v. Prince emerge, but has been a subject of a continuous debate for a few 
decades now. As Jaszi and Woodmansee stress, ‘with its emphasis on originality and 
self-declaring creative genius, this notion of authorship has functioned to marginalise 
or deny the work of many creative people […] copyright does not extend to works that 
are not “original”,’ 67  and originality as conceived of in legal terms immediately 
excludes practices such as appropriation from copyright protection as derivative, as 
an act of piracy, defacement or copyright violation. Combined with commercial 
pressures and the proprietary, economic aspects of the rights to copy, the notion of 
authorship that emerges when legal considerations of contemporary art are 
concerned exposes copyright’s bias towards works of singular authorship as 
expressions that unambiguously comply with law’s understanding of the distinct art 
forms that it recognises and protects.68 Because it is art forms, specific expressions of 
authorial production, clearly categorised, rather than art and aesthetics more broadly 
that copyright is set up to protect, expressions of ideas, not ideas themselves. Law 
assumes clearly defined generic boundaries, ‘a work [as] an objectification,’69 where 
any aberration from the established categories proves problematic.  
                                                             
67 Peter Jaszi and Marta Woodmansee, ‘The Ethical Reaches of Authorship’, South Atlantic 
Quarterly 95:4 (1996), 947-977.  
68 Act 2.1. of the Berne Convention defines artistic works in the following way: ‘The 
expression “literary and artistic works” shall include every production in the literary, 
scientific and artistic domain, whatever may be the mode or form of its expression, such as 
books, pamphlets and other writings; lectures, addresses, sermons and other works of the 
same nature; dramatic or dramatico-musical works; choreographic works and 
entertainments in dumb show; musical compositions with or without words; 
cinematographic works to which are assimilated works expressed by a process analogous to 
cinematography; works of drawing, painting, architecture, sculpture, engraving and 
lithography; photographic works to which are assimilated works expressed by a process 
analogous to photography; works of applied art; illustrations, maps, plans, sketches and 
three-dimensional works relative to geography, topography, architecture or science.’  
69 Anne Barron, ‘Copyright, Art, and Objecthood’, in Dear Images: Art, Copyright and 
Culture, eds. Daniel McClean and Karsten Schubert (London and Manchester: Institute of 
Contemporary Arts and Ridinghouse, 2002), 291.  
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But the dynamic that governs contemporary appropriation, and conceptual 
and avant-garde art practices more broadly, resides in an aesthetic logic that relies on 
a reconceptualisation of the established categories of artistic production. Ideas, rather 
than their expressions, take centre stage in contemporary art, especially with the 
emergence of conceptualism (and, as Joseph Kossuth proclaimed, all art (after 
Duchamp) is conceptual art). 70  While, for example, the 1988 U.S. Copyright Act 
‘prohibits protection of any idea, procedure, process or discovery,’71 conceptualism 
favours ideas over art objects. At the heart of conceptual art practice is the notion of 
the dematerialisation of the art object, where, as Sol LeWitt proclaimed, ideas 
themselves become works of art. 72  In such a context, the very idea of authorial 
execution as the paramount copyright requirement becomes problematic. The 
assertion also contrasts rather unfavourably with the legal fixation requirement. Key 
to the proliferation of contemporary art practices, conceptual thinking remains 
antithetical to copyright thinking; conceptual art’s interest in ideas rather than their 
expression proves an antagonism when viewed from the copyright’s point of view, and 
seems to call for a system that favours creativity over originality.  
With the understanding of the ontological status of art work and the artist 
interrogated particularly radically over the course of the last century, ambiguity turns 
into an aesthetic dominant of the twentieth- and twenty-first-century arts, a cultural 
framework that defies copyright thinking. The law’s inherent rejection of ambiguity 
means that the two approaches remain incongruent. Copyright, even when engaging 
with contemporary art practices, still remains insistent on the same, familiar, 
categories, reliant on the singular, objectified, fixed expression of an idea. Even if 
updated and reformulated in response to cultural change, copyright reform primarily 
affords protection of new forms of expression only, e.g. introducing copyright 
protection of photographs in 1908. It does not respond to the changing aesthetic 
attitudes, and as such proves, as Barron observes, incapable of accommodating 
contemporary visual art, ‘for it excludes any art practice that resists its own 
reification.’73  
But this disjunction that marks the parallel histories of aesthetic and legal 
developments, although problematic, limiting and an inevitable constraint on artistic 
experimentation, can also be conceived of as a vehicle of change, though change 
                                                             
70 Joseph Kosuth, ‘Art after Philosophy’, in Conceptual Art: A Critical Anthology, eds. 
Alexander Alberro and Blake Stimson (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1999), 164. 
71 U.S. Const. art 17, §102(b). 
72 Sol LeWitt, ‘Sentences on Conceptual Art’, in Conceptual Art: a Critical Anthology, ed. 
Alexander Alberro (Cambridge MA: The MIT Press, 2000), 107. 
73 Barron, 291.  
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approached differently from the presuppositions that U.S. Constitution makes on 
copyright’s role in promoting progress. Seen as such, copyright’s inherently 
deterministic, conservative and inward-looking nature becomes a trigger for 
subversive art in its attempt to question and oppose the confines of the official 
discourse and practice. From early twentieth century DADA and Marcel Duchamp’s 
readymades, Tristan Tzara’s poems out of the hat, 1960s conceptualism, Fluxus and 
Oulipo, later developments in appropriation and pop art, through to Neoism and The 
Situationist International, the history of twentieth-century avant-gardes could be 
described as a history of subversive takes on creativity, originality, and authorship. 
Acts of appropriation, and aesthetic experimentation more broadly, inevitably emerge 
as a result of or a response to particular dominant attitudes towards notions of 
creativity. As such, direct correlations can be drawn between the emergence of the 
early twentieth-century avant-gardes and the parallel, unprecedented expansion of 
copyright globally, all emerging, as Jaszi observed, at the period marked by ‘extreme 
valorization of the individual point of view, associated with both Romanticism and 
Modernism.’74  Those developments were exemplified by, among others, the 1908 
Berlin revision of the Berne Convention, implementation of the 1909 Copyright Act 
in the U.S.A., and the 1911 Copyright Act in the U.K.75  Similarly, the 1961 Rome 
                                                             
74 Peter Jaszi, ‘Is there such thing as postmodern copyright?’, Tulane Journal of Technology 
and Intellectual Property, Fall 2009, 108.  
75 The 1908 Berlin revision of the Berne Convention was significant in that it emerged as a 
response to the rapidly changing cultural landscape and the rise to prominence of new 
technologies. The 1908 revision recognised photographs, choreography, and works of 
architecture, as well as recording right for music and cinematographic right, not previously 
protected by copyright. The United States would not recognise the Berne Convention until 
1989. As such, the key developments in copyright in the U.S. were unilateral but, as Paul K. 
Saint-Amour stresses, of high significance in the international scene. While earlier 
legislation lay foundations for the U.S. copyright it is the 1909 act that played a particularly 
important role at the time. ‘Of the United States, one can say that on or about July 1, 1909 
the character of cultural production changed’ [Paul K. Saint-Amour, Introduction to 
Modernism and Copyright (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 8].The act had a huge 
impact on the makeup of copyright law, from the scope of protectable works to the definition 
of authorship itself. While the 1909 act extended the term of copyright protection, it refused 
to adopt the fifty-year post mortem auctoris rule that became a new standard with the 1908 
Berlin revision of Berne Convention. The act, like the Berlin revisions, also responded to the 
rise in new technologies, to introduce a right of mechanical reproduction and a compulsory 
licence system that allowed production of new recordings of any work after its authorised 
premiere subject to a payment of royalties. The innovation of the 1909 Act also included the 
notion of work-for-hire that significantly expanded the legal definition of the author. The 
introduction of the doctrine moved away from the temporary assignation of copyright to the 
requirement of its relinquishment to the employer who would become a sole copyright 
holder; ‘the word “author” shall include the employer in the case of works made for hire.’ 
[Act of 4 March 1909, Sec. 62]. Of major significance to the later development of copyright 
was an introduction of a new right – a right to copy. As a result of the 1909 Act, copyright 
holders were entitled not just to print, reprint, publish, and vend their works but also to copy 
them; ‘any person entitled thereto, upon complying with the provisions of this Act, shall have 
the exclusive right: (a) To print, reprint, publish, copy, and vend the copyrighted work’ [Act 
of 4 March 1909]. While, the 1909 Act stressed the independence of U.S. copyright from the 
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Convention, the 1967 Stockholm revision of the Berne Convention, the 1976 U.S. 
Copyright Act, and the 1956 Copyright Act in the United Kingdom76 all emerged at a 
backdrop of a particular cultural moment. This was a time when Barthes wrote ‘The 
Death of the Author’ (1968), Foucault lectured on ‘What is an Author?’ (1969), when 
‘postmodernism’ was being defined on pages of October journal, and when those 
philosophical assertions found their applications in aesthetics and poetics. ‘Indeed, 
the avant-garde – with its processural, appropriative, and collaborative proclivities,’ 
says Stephen Voyce, ‘evolves alongside an intellectual property scheme whose 
reliance on deliberate misinterpretations of authorship experimental writers [and 
artists] work to challenge.’77 
Where contrasting legal and aesthetic attitudes towards originality emerge, 
the notion of authorial intention proves of paramount importance as well. While the 
1960s witnessed a clear shift towards anti-intentionalist attitudes to interpretation 
(with Barthes and Foucault as key thinkers redefining the writer-text-reader 
relationship),78 the law remained reliant on establishing a relationship between the 
                                                             
Berne Convention, the 1911 Act in the U.K. was designed to harmonise with the international 
treaties. It introduced the fifty-year p.m.a. term of copyright protection and codified fair 
dealing as non-infringing means of copying for private study, research, criticism, review, or 
newspaper summary [Copyright Act, 1911, Geo. 5, ch. 46, § 2.1.].  
76 The 1961 Rome Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms 
and Broadcasting Organisations for the first time extended copyright protection from the 
author of a work to the producer if the media, i.e. cassettes, records. Similarly to the early 
twentieth-century developments, the Rome Convention was drawn in response to the 
technological change and the ubiquity of reproduction and recording technologies such as 
cassette recorders. The 1967 Stockholm revision of Berne convention addressed issues of 
broadcasting further, to grant shift the focus of licences from profit-making to the 
communication to the public. The 1967 revision also introduced the general right to 
reproduction for the first time. The same preoccupations with changing technologies and the 
shifting nature of information production, reproduction, and dissemination triggered by the 
emergence of television, sound recording technology, photocopiers, and radio dictated the 
expansion of U.S. and U.K. copyright in 1976 and 1956 respectively.  
77 Stephen Voyce, ‘Toward an Open Source Poetics: Appropriation, Collaboration and the 
Commons’, Criticism 53.3 (2011), 409. 
78 The question of authorial intention has been a source of one of the dominant debates in 
textual studies throughout the twentieth century. The so-called intentionalist approaches to 
authorship grow out of and continue the Romantic tradition of authorial individualism, 
where the author and author’s intention are key to interpreting and understanding a text. 
Echoes of this approach reverberate in M.H. Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp (1953) but it 
was most explicitly and famously explored in E.D. Hirsch’s Validity in Interpretation (1967). 
Hirsch argues that the author’s intention should be seen as the ultimate determiner of 
meaning, as ‘the meaning is an affair of consciousness of words […] to banish the original 
author as the determiner of meaning was to reject the only compelling normative principle 
that could lend validity to an interpretation’ [E.D. Hirsch, Jr., ‘In Defence of the Author’, in 
Intention and Interpretation, ed. Gary Iseminger (Pennsylvania: Temple University Press, 
1995), 13-14]. Non-intentionalist thinking about paradigms of authorship founds its most 
explicit manifestations in postmodernism. However, a move away from the author as the 
sole source of meaning is clear in early twentieth-century thought as well, and has been of 
interest to T.S. Eliot in his ‘Tradition and the Individual Talent’ (1919). For Eliot, ‘no poet, no 
artist of any art work has his complete meaning alone.’ [Eliot, ‘Tradition’, 38]. This is a 
stance at the core of New Critical thinking, echoed most overtly in W.K. Wimsatt and 
| 31 
 
 
authorial intention to create a ‘work’ and the work itself, still prominent today. The 
notion surfaces particularly explicitly in the context of fair use cases, such as Cariou 
v. Prince. In determining whether an application of a copyrighted work can be classed 
as fair use, its transformative nature is taken into consideration. To be classed as 
transformative, the ‘derivative’ work has to engage with the appropriated text via 
commentary or criticism. It has to add new forms of expression or new meanings and 
insights to an appropriated source. Seen as such, a work of appropriation art can be 
considered original only as an expression of an act ascribed to an individual author 
whose intention is to engage in active critique of the source. And although, as Batts’s 
summary judgement reads, ‘the requisite level of creativity is extremely low […] The 
vast majority of works make the grade quite easily, as they possess some creative 
spark, “no matter how crude, humble or obvious” it might be,'79 Prince’s Canal Zone 
did not make the mark. Even when considered under the fair use doctrine, Prince’s 
work was deemed not original enough, not (obviously and crudely?) transformative 
to warrant a status of a legitimate expression of authorship. While fair use aims to 
establish a more accommodating model of copyright, one that expands the scope of 
copyright protection to allow for (limited) unauthorised use of copyrighted material, 
the provisions are nevertheless heavily rooted in the now inadequate notions of 
authorship and originality, and severely limited as such.80 Within this framework 
authorial intention, so eagerly rejected in arts and literature since Barthes and 
Foucault, remains significant, as Prince’s 2011 testimony and subsequent reasoning 
behind the 2013 Courts of Appeal verdict both prove. According to the summary 
judgement: 
                                                             
Monroe C. Beardsley’s ‘The Intentional Fallacy’ (1946). As Wimsatt and Beardsley argue, the 
‘design or intention of the author is neither available nor desirable as a standard for judging 
the success of a work of literature […] judging a poem is like judging a pudding or a machine. 
We demand that it works […] a poems should not mean but be’ [W.K. Wimsatt and Monroe 
C. Beardsley, ‘The Intentional Fallacy’, The Sewanee Review, 54.3 (1946), 469]. In its move 
away from the author as the source of meaning of a text, Wimsatt and Beardsley rejected the 
kind of Romantic thinking about creativity that still dominates copyright today. What the 
anti-intentionalist stance favours is a sense of an autonomy of a text. ‘The poem is detached 
from the author at birth and goes about the world beyond his power to intend about it or 
control it’ [Wimsatt and Beardsely, 470]. It is this detachment of a text from its origin that 
becomes problematic for copyright. While the notion of anti-intentialism should not be seen 
as synonymous with ‘the death of the author’, Roland Barthes’s ‘The Death of the Author’ 
(1968) is one possible manifestation of the anti-intentionalist thinking. Strong commitment 
to anti-intentionalism and a move away from the author as a tenet of meaning is 
characteristic for post-structuralist and postmodern projects and finds its most explicit 
manifestation in the works of Derrida and Foucault. The paradigms of authorship associated 
with the postmodern take will be discussed later in this thesis, as a means of contextualising 
the contemporary debates.  
79 Cariou v. Prince, 784.  
80 Fair use is defined in the U.S. Constitution (17 usc § 107) as ‘use of a copyrighted work […] 
for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies 
for classroom use), scholarship, or research.’ Fair use is not an infringement of copyright. 
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Prince testified he had no interest in the original meaning of the 
photographs he uses […] that he doesn’t really have a message he 
attempts to communicate when making art […] In creating the 
paintings, Prince did not intend to comment on any aspect of the 
original works or on the broader culture. Prince’s intent in creating the 
Canal Zone paintings was to pay homage or tribute to other painters, 
including Picasso, Cezanne, Warhol and de Kooning and to create 
beautiful artworks which related to musical themes and to a post-
apocalyptic screenplay he was writing which features a reggae band.81  
 
Prince’s stance inevitably conflicts with the founding assumptions of copyright; the 
violation of the fair use doctrine seems to reside here not in the potential misuse of 
the copyrighted material itself but in the authorial intention, or rather lack thereof, to 
appropriate in line with the recognised standards. For Batts,  
it is apparent that Prince did not intend to comment on Cariou, on 
Cariou’s Photos, or on aspects of popular culture closely associate with 
Cariou or the Photos when he appropriated the Photos, and Prince’s 
own testimony shows that his intent was not transformative within the 
meaning of Section 107 […] there is vanishingly little, if any, 
transformative element […] the transformative content of Prince’s 
paintings is minimal at best.82  
 
Rejecting Batts’s reasoning, the verdict of the 2013 Court of Appeals centres 
around an interrogation of the intentionalist rhetoric in the 2011 decision, to shift 
interest from an author to a work itself: 
the fact that Prince did not provide those sorts of explanations in his 
deposition […] is not dispositive. What is critical is how the work in 
question appears to the reasonable observer, not simply what an artist 
might say about a particular piece or body of work. Prince's work could 
be transformative even without commenting on Cariou's work or on 
culture, and even without Prince's stated intention to do so. Rather 
than confining our inquiry to Prince's explanations of his artworks, we 
instead examine how the artworks may "reasonably be perceived" in 
order to assess their transformative nature.83  
  
The Second Circuit take on Prince’s practice opens space for a broader, more flexible 
treatment of the notion of transformative use by recognising the impossibility and 
futility of attempting to establish, and subsequently to rely on, ‘the highly 
manipulable question’ of authorial intentions.84 
The 2013 verdict of the Court of Appeals is important and has been cited as 
contributing significantly to a doctrinal shift and the development of a new paradigm 
in approaches to fair use, foregrounding, as Gilden and Greene stress, ‘the 
                                                             
81 Cariou v. Prince, 784. 
82 Ibid.  
83 Cariou v. Prince, 714 F. 3d 694 (2013).  
84 Andrew Gilden and Timothy Greene, ‘Fair Use for the Rich and Fabulous’, Chicago Law 
Review Dialogue, 80.88 (2013), 96.  
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malleability of originality and authorship rhetoric within copyright law’ and ‘a 
welcome shift in the purely author-focused jurisprudence that precedes it.’85 This 
departure from the reliance on authorial intention as a determining factor in 
copyright also carries an underlying interrogation of the fixation requirement and the 
characteristic form-idea dichotomy that dominates copyright. The potential to 
question the notion of exclusive copyrightability of the expression of an idea that this 
shift brings about enables legitimisation of not just appropriation art but of avant-
gardes more broadly.  
Whether legitimisation is an advantage to conceptual and appropriation art is 
a separate, though important question. The avant-garde, by definition, positions itself 
in opposition to the mainstream, on the margins of the established culture and the 
establishment driving it forward, counter to the institution and hence as an 
institutional critique. As such, the legal category of originality seems antithetical to 
avant-garde thinking. Originality as a legal notion is applied by judicial as well as art 
institutions as a tool for identifying and evaluating art. But if institutional critique – 
and hence a critique of methods and criteria of evaluating art – resides at the core of 
avant-garde practices, then the avant-garde project, by implication, has to emerge 
outside of the framework of institutional thinking about art, in opposition to the legal 
paradigms of originality and, perhaps, instead as an attempt at altering their 
established criteria. The avant-garde is only possible because of this condition of 
possibility and the state of indeterminacy that drives the avant-garde project. 
Appropriation’s subversive power to interrogate – its avant-garde status – relies on 
the preservation of this disparity between cultural and legal categories of creativity. 
While, to quote Seth Siegelaub, ‘any form of art which becomes established becomes 
establishment,’86 avant-garde can only subvert if and when the legal and cultural 
institutions reject it as unlawful. The legitimisation of the practices, then, might not 
necessarily prove such a happy development from the point of view of aesthetics. 
What will become of the avant-garde and its potential to subvert, critique and 
question if the avant-garde practice is approved, embraced and, subsequently, 
regulated by the law? Regardless of the aesthetic status, however, the shifting legal 
attitudes towards practices such as appropriation mark an acknowledgement of 
                                                             
85 Ibid, 98, 100.  
86 Seth Siegelaub, an interview by Ursula Mayer, in Six Years: The Dematerialization of an 
Art Object from 1966 to 1972, ed. Lucy R. Lippard (Berkeley, CA: University of California 
Press, 1997), 126. 
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significant changes in a broader cultural landscape, to recognise the prolonged impact 
of the subversive art practice on the aesthetic attitudes today.87  
 
1.2. POSTPRODUCTION CONDITION: A TURN TOWARDS ITERATION 
 
These attempts at refocusing the interpretation of fair use principles in the 
context of appropriation art, from creator to audience and from intent to 
interpretation, reverberate with echoes of a similar shift from the Romantic 
conceptions of authorship to the poststructuralist, reader-oriented debates and the 
internationalist/non-internationalist struggles that dominated the creative arts scene 
already five decades ago. As such, this shift towards audience-focused inquiry into fair 
use cases implies a copyright transition now gradually entering the realm of 
postmodern condition of the death of the author. But while the law seems gradually 
to embrace the postmodern philosophy and aesthetics, the realm of aesthetics today 
has taken yet another turn, from the 1980s simulacral, exhausted culture of the 
postmodern hyper-capitalist dystopia to the digital, ‘cut and paste,’ remix culture in 
the era of postproduction. Coined by Nicolas Bourriaud as a term indicative of the 
current cultural moment that follows on from modernism and postmodernism, 
postproduction emerges as a cultural condition defined by a contemporary 
environment of excess that encourages novel approaches to creativity. For Bourriaud, 
postproduction epitomises the contemporary, and offers a means of presenting ‘an 
analysis of today’s art in relation to social changes, whether technological, economic, 
or sociological.’ 88  But this contemporary culture of surplus derives from and 
manifests itself through an excessive information production, dissemination and 
manipulation characteristic for the contemporary digital culture and not the excessive 
consumerism of postmodern hyper-capitalism that triggered appropriation aesthetics 
as it developed in the 1980s. This characteristic approach exemplifies, I suggest, the 
changing nature of appropriation as the mode developed from the 1980s to its 
manifestations today, where the aesthetic transformation is driven by a move away 
                                                             
87 Considered within such a framework, Prince is hardly a marginalised, independent avant-
gardist. His celebrity status, numerous solo exhibitions in leading art galleries and museums, 
as well as lucrative sales of his work position him firmly among the highly privileged 
bourgeois of the visual arts world. However, his practice itself, with its explicit echoes of the 
anti-establishment sympathies, the creative methods applied, and the way these reverberate 
with the normative discourse of law, make Prince’s case a particularly fitting springboard for 
discussing avant-garde gestures in the copyright context. Appropriation, even in its high-
society manifestations, still enjoys a status of an ever problematic anti-establishment 
cultural rebel and is definitely viewed as such by the copyright legislation.  
88 PCAS, 8. 
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from the overload of things to information overload as a defining features of 
creativity. 
The contemporary copy-paste culture that Bourriaud poses as a pre-condition 
of the postproduction moment inherently subsumes self-conscious acts of 
appropriation as the dominant creative mode of today. ‘It is no longer a matter of 
elaborating a form on the basis of a raw material,’ Bourriaud writes, ‘but working with 
objects that are already in circulation on the cultural market, which is to say, objects 
already informed by other objects. Notions of originality […] and even creation […] 
are slowly blurred in this new cultural landscape.’89 The negotiation of consumption-
production dynamic implied in Bourriaud’s statement lies at the core of his 
postproduction thinking. His postproduction Web is an environment synonymous 
with what Christopher Schmidt describes as a ‘waste media capitalism,’ 90  an 
environment characterised by an abundance of language as an object of widespread, 
constant consumption and production online. It is driven by the excess of 
information, spam dominance, by digital trash discarded even before it is utilised (but 
in this cultural landscape it is also possible to compose poetry out of spam).91 But, 
today, ‘the overproduction is no longer seen as a problem, but as a cultural 
ecosystem.’92 However, the nature of the material consumed and produced online 
alters the nature of this capitalism. In the digital context, technologies come to be 
defined in terms of processes of reproduction rather than production. Within a 
culture of information consumerism, governed by what Goldsmith defines as ‘re-
gestures,’ 93  i.e. reblogging, retweeting, the nature of information circulation and 
processing presupposes a ‘scrambling of boundaries of consumption and 
production.’ 94  This is a culture that, as Bourriaud stresses, ‘denies the binary 
opposition between the proposal of the transmitter and the participation of the 
receiver [...] the producer is only a transmitter for the following producer.’95 As such, 
any act of consumption simultaneously turns into an act of production, eradicating, 
                                                             
89 PCAS, 7.  
90 Christopher Schmidt, ‘The Waste Management Poetics of Kenneth Goldsmith’, SubStance, 
37.2 (2008), 37.  
91 I am referring here to the so-called spam poetry, spoetry, texts composed by appropriating 
subject lines of spam emails. Spoetry differs from the Spam Lit, a movement committed to 
making spam literary. Texts associated with Spam Lit are composed out of snippets of text 
available in the public domain and sent out as spam emails. The public domain sources are 
used to make attribution difficult. 
92 PCAS, 39.  
93 Kenneth Goldsmith, ‘The Bounce and the Roll’, Harriet: a poetry blog, 16 April 2011, 
accessed, 10 February 2013, http://www.poetryfoundation.org/harriet/2011/04/the-
bounce-and-the-roll/.  
94 PCAS, 19.  
95 Ibid, 40.  
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to turn to Bourriaud again, ‘the traditional distinction between production and 
consumption, creation and copy, readymade and original work.’96 
What transpires, then, is a notion of creativity that turns copying into a 
creative paradigm. But copying in the postproduction environment assumes a 
hyperbolised structure of reproduction; ‘everything digital is a copy,’ 97  Carolyn 
Guertin contends. Driven by models of digital re-creation, postproduction is 
characterised by proliferation of copies of copies, copies without originals. Mark 
Poster points to a similar feature of digital information production. For Poster, an act 
of digital mediation can only produce reproductions, not copies of originals but rather 
copies as simulacra, i.e. copies that have no originals.98 A characteristic propensity for 
the fake is implied in this understanding of the virtual culture and, as Marie-Laure 
Ryan points out, the term ‘virtual’ itself encompasses two distinct concepts: ‘the 
largely negative idea of a fake, illusionary, non-existent, and the overwhelmingly 
positive idea of the potential, which connotes productivity, openness, and diversity.’99 
As Ryan explains (quoting Pierre Lévy), ‘the virtual is not at all the opposite of the 
real. It is, on the contrary, a powerful productive mode of being, a mode that gives 
free rein to creative process.’100 Hence, the derogative culture of copying turns into 
what could be described as a poetics of plagiarism, a different kind of creativity, 
distinct from what we traditionally understand by the term, flaunting the convention 
and speculating about the potential of the fluidity and the openness of the source. 
Here, the new text remains at the same time a deconstructed, displaced old text in a 
new context, linking, to repeat after Derrida, repetition to alterity.101 In such a cultural 
frame iteration becomes a cornerstone of creativity.  
This preoccupation with creative possibilities inscribed into acts of reusing 
material is, of course, as Bourriaud himself admits, ‘nothing new.’102 The affinities of 
the postmodern and postproduction practices are significant. The task of the early 
twenty-first century is in the end, as Bourriaud stresses, ‘not to start from zero or find 
oneself encumbered by the store-house of history, but to inventory and select, to use 
                                                             
96 Ibid, 13.  
97 Carolyn Guertin, Digital Prohibition: Piracy and Authorship in New Media Art (London: 
Continuum, 2012), 21.  
98 Mark Poster, The Mode of Information: Poststructuralism and Social Context 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007), 9.  
99 Marie-Laure Ryan, ‘Cyberspace, Virtuality, and the Text,’ in Cybertext Textuality: 
Computer Technology and Literary Theory, ed. Marie-Laure Ryan (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1999), 89. 
100 Pierre Lévy, quoted in Ryan, ‘Cyberspace’, 90.  
101 Jacques Derrida, ‘Signature Event Context’, in Limited, Inc., trans. Samuel Weber and 
Jeffrey Mehlman, ed. Gerald Graff (Evanson, Il: Northwestern University Press, 1988), 7. 
Hereafter SEC. 
102 PCAS, 8. 
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and download.’103  As such, the contemporary digital impulse brings forward new 
concerns; similar forms, similar approaches to uncreative practice, already explored 
at different stages of the twentieth century, arise in the culture of postproduction 
through an engagement with and in response to the new digital hegemony, to address 
a different range of questions, distinct from the preoccupations of the postmodern 
predecessors; ‘if the downloading of forms (these samplings and remakes) represents 
important concerns today, it is because these forms urge us to consider global culture 
as a toolbox […]. Instead of prostrating ourselves before works of the past, we can use 
them.’104  
A sense of a repetition of a system of thought and aesthetics that is implied in 
such an understanding of postproduction turns the notion into a self-consciously 
iterative concept, a particularly fitting framework for defining what I see as a shift 
towards iteration in creative thinking today. What distinguishes Bourriaud’s 
understanding of the culture of the copy from the earlier related debates is a very clear 
cultural context and its affinities with contemporary reproduction technologies. This 
assumption is implied in the term itself. Postproduction is a technical expression used 
in television, film, and video. It refers, as Bourriaud explains, to processes applied to 
recorded material, after it has been produced, e.g. montage as an inclusion of other 
visual or audio sources, subtitling, voice-overs, and special effects. ‘As a set of 
activities linked to the service industry and recycling, postproduction belongs to the 
tertiary sector, as opposed to the industrial or agricultural sector, i.e., the production 
of raw materials.’105 Implied here are clear affinities between processes of repetition 
and technologies that enable them, where the possibility of recycling, of iteration, is 
contingent on the technological context. This contingency informs the notion of 
postproduction and points to the meaning of the prefix ‘post’ itself – ‘post’ meaning 
after the act of primary production.106  
This interest in technologies as a characteristic feature of postproduction 
thinking offers a conceptual framework for discussing developments of authorship 
and originality through association of aesthetic and legal developments of the 
concepts with technological change. A wide range of phenomena that contributed to 
defining the so-called remix culture emerged over the past two decades. Sampling in 
                                                             
103 Ibid, 93.  
104 PCAS, 95.  
105 Ibid, 13.  
106 Bourriaud is primarily interested in such a meaning of ‘post’ in postproduction. But the 
very clearly defined cultural context of postproduction points to another possible 
understanding of the notion – ‘post’ meaning historically after the moment of industrial 
production of modernism and after the excessive production that defined the hyper-
consumerist moment of postmodernism.  
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popular music and the rise in popularity of music file sharing led to battles on a 
cultural, theoretical, economic and legal levels. For instance, the closing of Napster, a 
peer-to-peer music sharing service, following a copyright lawsuit in 2001, saw a 
parallel rise to prominence of creative commons agreements, open source software 
and related Free Culture discourse as propagated by Laurence Lessig and Richard 
Stallman.107 The arrival of digital photography, video and e-books as well as related 
modes of copying and dissemination of all of the above, alongside the significant rise 
of new media and social networking platforms that often rely on generating content 
by copying, pasting, and linking to existing content, has created a culture where 
‘ctrl+C’ and ‘ctrl+V’ emerge as not only commonplace but in fact preferred modes of 
textual production. Generating Twitter content and securing an active, expansive 
follower base does not require an ability to produce new text but to instead, select, 
curate and share in 140 characters, according to recognised conventions. This 
approach is significant in that it contributes to a novel understanding of both what it 
means to author a text and of what we understand as a text (and with MLA, APA, and 
Chicago all recently formulating standards for bibliographic citations of Tweets, 
Twitter seems to have gained a status of an officially legitimised, approved textual 
source).  
Such legitimisation of particular creative techniques, and the resulting shifts 
in the status of an author can, historically, be attributed to technological change. 
Elizabeth Eisenstein draws links between the rise of a figure of a professional artist 
                                                             
107 Ideas of free software were originated by Richard Stallman in his GNU Project to establish 
a paradigm of sharing for software writers and users. The GNU Operating System Software is 
available for everyone to modify and distribute, but, Stallman explains, ‘no distributor will be 
allowed to restrict its further distribution. That is to say, proprietary modifications will not 
be allowed. I want to make sure that all versions remain free’ [Richard Stallman, ‘The GNU 
Manifesto’, GNU Operating System, accessed 12 September 2014, 
http://www.gnu.org/gnu/manifesto.html]. Although the non-commercial aspects of 
Stallman’s project are related to its principles, it is the understanding of liberty that comes 
with a freedom to use, reuse and modify the source that is of the essence: ‘Free Software 
means that the software users have freedom. (The issue is not about price)’ [Richard 
Stallman, ‘Philosophy of GNU Project’, GNU Operating System, accessed 12 September 
2014,  http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/philosophy.html]. Stallman’s thinking resides in a 
recognition that ‘there is no intrinsic right to intellectual property […] all intellectual 
property rights are just licences granted by society’ [Stallman, ‘The Manifesto’]. As Stallman 
stresses, the ease of copying in the digital environment should be used as a creative 
possibility. But as the models of copying change in relation to book publishing environments, 
so should the related models of licensing change, to reflect the altered paradigms of cultural 
production. Lawrence Lessig’s Free Culture movement and Creative Commons Licences it 
propagates build on and develop Stallman’s philosophy. Although even the most progressive 
creative commons licences are still limited by and contingent on copyright frameworks, 
focusing on protection of fixed expressions rather than processes, they nevertheless allow 
more flexibility in construction of authorship. [Lawrence Lessig, Free Culture: The Nature 
and Future of Creativity (New York: Penguin Books, 2004), 7].  
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and the development of the printing press;108 Eva Hemmungs-Wirten points to the 
rise of photocopying technologies in the 1970 as a paradigmatic shift in understanding 
of means of reproduction, and, as a result, notions of authorship; 109  futurism 
developed as a reaction to increased mechanisation in the early twentieth century 
and, similarly, contemporary notions of creativity need to be considered through the 
lens of the contemporary increasingly digitised culture. Today, Fitterman and Place 
argue, ‘production (industrial age) [becomes] replaced by simulation (information 
age).’ 110  The trajectory that emerges precludes a particular relationship between 
technology and creativity where advancements in reproduction technologies 
inevitably result in association of creativity with acts of copying. As modes of 
information, (re)production and dissemination become more advanced and 
necessary technologies more accessible, notions of creativity and copying gradually 
converge to eventually emerge as interchangeable terms. As Benjamin predicted, in 
the age of post-mechanical reproduction the work of art becomes ‘designed for 
reproducibility’111 rather than for the aura of its manifest singularity. This is not to say 
that a propensity for originality is abandoned when increasingly more advanced 
technologies emerge; rather, the attitudes to originality alter as technologies develop. 
The change brought about by the contemporary technological shift, increasingly 
blurring boundaries between copyright infringement and originality, emerges as a 
particularly fraught issue from the point of view of copyright. The technological 
changes always triggered aesthetic shifts, with copyright law adapting as a result. As 
Lessig puts it, ‘the law would reach as far as the technology for “copying” would 
reach.’ 112  But, Bowrey observes, ‘whilst copyright expanded to incorporate new 
productive technologies and protect the copyright in the works produced by these 
means, there was not necessarily an associated rise in respect for the new skills and 
artistic practices related to technological “progress.”’113 
‘Where we are now, in a postproduction period, is beyond what we call “art of 
appropriation”, which naturally infers an ideology of ownership, and moving towards 
a culture […] of the constant activity of signs based on a collective ideal: sharing.’114 
                                                             
108 Elisabeth L. Eisenstein, The Printing Press as the Agent of Change (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1982).  
109 Eva Hemmungs-Wirtén, No Trespassing: Authorship, Intellectual Property Rights, and 
the Boundaries of Globalization (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004).  
110 Robert Fitterman and Vanessa Place, Notes on Conceptualism (New York: Ugly Duckling 
Presse, 2009), 32. 
111 Walter Benjamin, ‘The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction’, in 
Illuminations, ed. Hannah Arendt (London: Pimlico, 1999), 219. Hereafter TWOA. 
112 Lawrence Lessig, Remix: Making Art and Commerce Thrive in the Hybrid Economy 
(London: Bloomsbury, 2008), 269.  
113 Bowrey, 266.  
114 PCAS, 9.  
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And although, contrary to Bourriaud’s proclamation, issues of ownership still remain 
at the forefront of contemporary debates on authorship, creativity and originality, the 
affirmation of the cultural shift from postmodern to postproduction culture is 
significant. Within such a framework the nature and status of ownership of 
intellectual properties become increasingly more ambiguous. When the Internet is 
the source – the ever-changing, constantly edited, inherently fluid virtual grab-bag of 
sources and resources – both the nature of the appropriated material and categories 
that define the practice itself change. The fluid, digital environment unsettles the 
familiar categories of creative production to, as a result, foreground their malleability. 
The postmodernism-postproduction distinction is, however, one that legal 
scholarship does not make in order to, instead, rather tenuously, uncritically and 
superficially, label all ‘derivative’ art practices as postmodern, without much 
investment in postmodern aesthetic and philosophical preoccupations. But the 
postmodernism-postproduction dichotomy, and the trajectory that marks the 
development of appropriation art from the 1980s to the present, is important here 
and key to defining the attitudes towards practices similar to Prince’s in experimental 
arts, as they are proliferating at present. Read in that context, the 2013 Richard Prince 
verdict is also crucial in that it is indicative of changing legal thinking triggered by the 
contemporary technological shift. A postmodernist, to paraphrase Deborah Halbert, 
when brought to court, would inevitably lose. 115  Today, as Richard Prince’s case 
proves, a postproduction artist stands a chance of a more sympathetic treatment.  
 
1.3. THE ESSENCE OF TECHNOLOGY AT THE ITERATIVE TURN 
 
Reading contemporary reproduction strategies in their current technological 
moment, Bourriaud’s is an attempt at identifying a broader cultural tendency that 
emerges under a unique, contemporary cultural condition, an attitude that I see 
manifested in the emergence of the Iterative turn as defined in this thesis. As 
Bourriaud explains, ‘today certain elements and principles are reemerging as themes 
and are suddenly at the forefront, to the point of constituting the “engine” of new 
aesthetic practice.’116 The same sense of contemporary culture that relies on iterative 
gestures evoked in Home’s trajectory manifests itself clearly in Bourriaud’s 
postproduction thinking. The aesthetic paradigms of both Home’s plagiarist culture 
and Bourraiud’s postproduction condition presuppose a dominance of inherently 
derivative practices, relying on the repurposing and recycling of the abundance of 
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available material proliferating and constantly generated online, a dynamic that 
influences habits of cultural production and consumption also outside of the 
immediate confines of the Web and strictly technology-oriented contexts.  
This is a key assumption, indicative of a particular thinking about technology 
that informs the dynamic of the Iterative turn. If contemporary reading and writing 
habits develop as a result of the ubiquity of digital environments that transform and 
influence our behaviours also outside of the digital sphere, then acts of creativity 
today can be conceived of as a manifestation of the Heideggerian ‘essence of 
technology’ and not of the technology itself. This is a distinction which informs 
Heidegger’s inquiry in ‘The Question Concerning Technology’ – not a question of 
technology per se, but of what Heidegger refers to as Wesen, the essence of 
technology: ‘by no means anything technological.’ 117  ‘Technology,’ Heidegger 
explains, ‘is not equivalent to the essence of technology […] the essence of a thing is 
considered to be what the thing is.’118 In line with Heidegger’s thinking, it is the 
changing understanding of the very conception of technology, of what technology is, 
rather than simply of the changes in the apparatus of technology that should be seen 
as a trigger for a shift in aesthetic attitudes in their respective cultural moments. As 
Žižek puts it, the ‘essence of technology’ does not designate a complex network of 
machines and activities; rather it is a manifestation of a particular attitude towards 
reality; ‘technology,’ Žižek comments, ‘is the way reality discloses itself to us in 
contemporary times.’ 119 Today, then, we operate by means of Heideggerian essence 
of technology, which, as a dominant attitude, ‘structures the way we relate to 
reality.’120  
The problem for Heidegger is not the existence of technology – or its 
manifestation in a variety of forms it assumes – but rather a propensity for and 
orientation towards technology and technological thinking, a certain technological 
imagination that finds its manifestations in an aesthetic project. The framework 
within which contemporary iterative practices are best considered, I suggest, should 
be based on this concept of technology as an essence rather than simply viewed as a 
response to changes in technology themselves. Of course, the technological 
developments and thinking about technology that Heidegger posits are inherently 
interdependent. It is impossible to speak of the essence of technology without 
                                                             
117 Martin Heidegger, ‘The Question Concerning Technology’, in The Question Concerning 
Technology and Other Essays, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Garland Publishing, 1977), 
4. Hereafter QCT.  
118 Ibid, 3.  
119 Slavoy Žižek, Event: Philosophy in Transit (London: Penguin Books, 2014), 31.  
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considering technology in instrumental terms, while any manifestation of 
technological progress is contingent on the conceptualisation of the essence of 
technology:  
because the essence of technology is nothing technological, essential 
reflection upon technology and decisive confrontation with it must 
happen in a realm that is, on the one hand, akin to the essence of 
technology and, on the other, fundamentally different from it. 121 
 
‘Such a realm,’ Heidegger suggests, ‘is art.’122 In order to think about creativity in the 
contemporary postproduction moment, a model of technological thinking is required 
that goes beyond the restricted definitions of technology viewed in purely 
instrumental terms. The notion of the essence of technology invites a broader, more 
adaptable and comprehensive approach to conceptualising the nature and role of 
technology today. Technology as essence cannot be defined as a specific machine or a 
tool, but rather should be seen as a more general concept of making, inclusive of 
processes of artistic production. As Heidegger puts it,  
if we speak of the ‘essence of a house’ and the ‘essence of a state,’ we do not 
mean a generic type; rather we mean the ways in which house and state 
hold sway, administer themselves, develop and decay – the way in which 
they ‘essence’ [Wesen].123  
 
If we speak of an essence of digital technology, it is not the specific applications, 
devices, or Internet browsers that we address, but a broader attitude towards the ways 
in which we engage with the means of information production and dissemination in 
an environment in which all of these technologies influence creative practices.  
This is a trajectory that has its roots in what can be described as Heidegger’s 
taxonomy of technology. Heidegger draws a distinction between modern technology 
and its traditional equivalent. While, for Heidegger, the modern technology restricts 
the definition of the technological to that which is purely instrumental, the traditional 
technology, or technē, typically encompasses manifestations of skill, art, or craft. 
Technē is a category used to denote both the creative and the instrumental practice; 
it is, Heidegger writes, ‘the name not only for the activities and skills of the craftsman, 
but also for the arts of the mind and the fine arts. Technē belongs to […] poiēsis; it is 
something poietic.’124 It is in the affinities between technē and technology that the 
nature of the essence of technology resides. Technē is both technology and poiēsis, 
technē as a technique perhaps, where technology assumes a sense of a method of the 
arts, turning itself into an aesthetic tool. The function of technology conceptualised 
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in such terms can perhaps be more accurately described as the ‘technology-function,’ 
analogous to Foucault’s notion of the ‘author-function.’ While the ‘author-function’ 
‘does not refer, purely and simply, to an actual individual, since it can give rise 
simultaneously to several selves, to several subjects – positions that can be occupied 
by different classes of individuals,’125 the ‘technology-function’ can serve as a matter 
of certain orientation towards technology as a wide-ranging cultural attitude. It 
involves an extensive engagement with processes of making and producing and is not 
a manifestation of a singular machine or tool.  
What is of particular significance to my argument here is the possibility 
afforded by thinking about technology as essence to explore the dynamic of alterity, 
subversion, and change, the dynamic of the Iterative turn. Technē, unlike modern 
technology, is inherently non-instrumental; the essence of technology is a matter of 
constant change. As Heidegger argues, the world is set in place (gestellt), and the 
modern technology as a tool and a means to an end, is what Heidegger describes as 
an Enframing (Gestell). While Enframing is characterised by an attempt at regulating, 
securing, using technology as a means of setting in place, the emphasis of technē is on 
engaging with technology in non-instrumental terms, on unsecuring and unsettling 
the familiar categories and paradigms. The use of technology that informs 
contemporary aesthetic practice described in this thesis should be seen as the essence 
of technē rather than of technology per se. The engagement with technology that 
informs iterative writing practices can be considered as a response to an ever-
increasing technological move towards Enframing, a response to an effort to regulate 
the arts, to secure the technē in purely instrumental terms. The aesthetic premise of 
iterative creative acts resides, I suggest, in the possibilities of thinking about 
technology and creativity as technē, where creative process emerges as a result of 
unsecuring and unsettling the familiar, dominant categories. While Heidegger sees 
Enframing as the essence of modern technology, I suggest that turning towards 
technē, with allowances for digital thinking, offers a more accurate framework for the 
contemporary context. As such, the creative thinking at the contemporary 
postproduction moment should be seen as governed by the essence of technology 
(Wessen) rather that by its Enframing (Gestell). In this approach, any act of digital 
reproducibility, assumes an aesthetic rather than instrumental function. It becomes 
an end in itself, governed by its own logic of iterative aesthetics rather than by the 
rules of technodeterministic pragmatism. The iterative aesthetic, with its subversive 
take on mechanisms of technology, becomes a space where the possibilities of technē 
as a creative paradigm are recognised and realised. The approach to creativity, 
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similarly to Heideggerian essence of technology, can be read, to borrow from Samuel 
Weber, as an unsettling process, a movement not towards Enframing the world, 
setting it in place, but towards dismantling or unsecuring it.126 
Such understanding of the essence of technology as a flexible and fluid 
category, as a cultural state that is coming to presence,127 is inscribed into my notion 
of the Iterative turn. Thinking about the contemporary change in technology 
emerging in the postproduction moment as ‘a turn’ allows for an acknowledgement 
of a certain sense of continuity in thinking about practices of appropriation in the 
variety of their historical guises, always informed by the essence of technology, and 
changing as a result of shifting conceptions of technology in their respective cultural 
moments. A turn does not imply a break away from the older models of technology or 
creative practice – Home’s plagiarism, for example, develops from rather than rejects 
the postmodern and modernist projects – but as an unsettling process that has 
generative qualities at the same time, as a Heideggerian ‘turning.’ Heidegger speaks 
of a turning as that which comes to pass within Enframing. As Heidegger writes, ‘if a 
change in Being – i.e., now, in the coming to presence of Enframing – comes to pass, 
than this in no way means that technology […] will be done away with.’128 A change in 
the coming to presence of a new aesthetic paradigm in no way means that earlier 
creative models will be done away with. Rather, the coming to presence of a new 
conception of technology is characteristically driven by what Heidegger describes as 
the ‘change of its destining.’129 The change, as a turn, or turning, manifests itself ‘out 
of the arrival of another destining.’130 A change in the Enframing, in the technological 
apparatus, a development of new technological possibilities, i.e. the ubiquity of the 
digital tools and methods, results in a turning not just in the technology itself, but in 
the essence of technology, in its conception and the attitudes towards an altered 
technological reality that emerge as a result. In the turning, as Heidegger commented 
on a shift in his own philosophy, ‘everything is reversed,’ but nevertheless it is ‘not a 
change of standpoint.’131 Rather, it is a change conceived of as a turning point132 that 
                                                             
126 Samuel Weber, ‘Theatre, Technics and Writing’, 1-800, 1 (1989), 20, n. 8.  
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132 My description of change as a turning point is a reference to Heidegger’s statement in his 
letter to William J. Richardson which, in the German original, reads: ‘Das Denken der Kehre 
ist eine Wendung in meinem Denken.’ The notion of ‘die Kehre’ mentioned here has been 
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allows for a shift in established paradigms in response to the change in the conception 
of technology. The turning, then, emerges from a pattern of discontinuities with what 
comes before it – appropriating in postproduction moment differs from the related 
modernist and postmodern acts – but the conception of technology and the related 
aesthetics that emerge as a result of the turning are interpretable from within and 
through a relationship to earlier projects and concerns.  
Hence, what is manifested in the contemporary postproduction turn towards 
digital technology and iteration is a transformation in the attitudes towards forms of 
knowing (and technē, as Heidegger explained, is linked with the word epistēmē – 
‘both words are names for knowing in the widest sense’).133 ‘Such knowing,’ Heidegger 
suggests, ‘provides an opening up. As an opening up it is revealing,’134 indicative of 
epistemologies of contemporary aesthetics, revealing shifting paradigms of creative 
thinking and alternative approaches to originality that emerge at the backdrop of such 
a conceptual framework. For Heidegger, technology is a way of revealing (das 
Entreben) of that which it brings forth, i.e. letting a thing disclose itself rather than 
simply producing or manufacturing an object in purely instrumental terms. ‘What is 
instrumental in technē,’ Heidegger writes, ‘does not lie at all in making and 
manipulating nor in the using of means, but rather in the aforementioned revealing. 
It is as revealing, and not as manufacturing that technē is bringing forth.135 Creative 
acts such as Prince’s, overtly reliant on repurposed material, are a manifestation of 
such an assumption, openly disclosing themselves, their methods and sources to draw 
attention to their distinctive aesthetics, to alternative models of thinking about 
creativity today. It is not the manipulation of sources, making by means of remaking, 
that is at the core of iterative creative work, but rather the revealing of the making as 
remaking. Conceptualised as such, works such as Prince’s, or texts later described in 
this thesis, should not be considered instances of plagiarism or copyright 
infringement but are better described, I suggest, as iterative acts and a manifestation 
of the contemporary Iterative turn. Iteration as it manifests itself at the 
postproduction moment can be seen as an expression of what Bourriaud describes as 
                                                             
varyingly translated as ‘a turn,’ ‘a turning,’ or ‘a reversal,’ and the statement itself has been 
translated with references to a ‘turning point’ and ‘change.’ William J. Richardson translates 
the statement as: ‘The thinking of the reversal is a change in my thought’ [reprinted as 
Martin Heidegger, Preface to Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought, William J. 
Richardson (New York: Fordham University Press, 2003), xviii]. In contrast, Emad Parvis’s 
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Wisconsin Press, 2007), 111]. See note 41, p. 214 on Parvis’s comment on his translation. 
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a ‘configuration of knowledge, which is characterised by the invention of paths 
through culture.’136 Here Heideggerian thinking and Bourriaud project converge to 
form a notion of an Iterative turn that is indicative of shifting aesthetic attitudes and 
emergent means of conceptualising them.  
An extension rather than a synonym of copying and appropriating, I see the 
notion of iteration as a broad and flexible concept akin to, or perhaps itself a 
manifestation of, the Heideggerian essence, an essence of making by means of 
transgressing the familiar notion of authorship and creativity that turns into a 
creative act, one that is revealing of the paradigms of creativity constructed by 
iterative means. My understanding of the notion is based on Derrida’s concept of 
iterability as defined in Signature, Event, Context (1988). The word ‘iter’ means 
‘again.’ The logic of iterability is the logic of repetition. But iterability also inheres 
change. As Derrida explains, the term ‘iter’ most likely derives from ‘itra,’ or ‘other’ in 
Sanscrit. Hence, ‘everything that follows can be read as the working out of the logic 
that ties repetition to alterity.’137 Repetition is that which, for Derrida, alters. The 
principle of iterability assumes alterity as a condition of otherness, difference or 
change. Iterability implies a repetition, but a repetition with a différance rather than 
a repetition of the same. As such, iterability emerges as a category particularly 
relevant to describing the dynamic of technological and aesthetic turns, where a 
change, a shift in tools, practices, and attitudes, involves both a move away from the 
earlier paradigms and a repetition of the earlier paradigms at the same time.138 Hence, 
each turn, regardless of the cultural condition that defines it, is always an iterative 
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and the relationship between Heidegger’s and Derrida’s thought. Derrida’s could be 
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familiar terms of creativity, originality, and authorship. Following Derrida, the logic of the 
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possibility of rebuilding’ [Paul de Man, ‘The Rhetoric of Blindness: Jacques Derrida’s 
Reading of Rousseau’, in Blindness and Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric of Contemporary 
Criticism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), 140]. 
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process, repeating and altering earlier aesthetic models and systems of thought in a 
chain of constant change of charged differences.  
The contemporary turn should be seen, I suggest, as an iterative turn in such 
a broad sense. It should be understood as evocative of the modernist and 
postmodernist commitment to repetition associated with certain propensity for 
technological change as an aesthetic dominant. At the same time, this current 
Iterative turn is a turn towards iteration as a creative method and form that defines 
the cultural and aesthetic dynamics today. As a response to the postproduction 
condition, iteration, or the essence of iteration, perhaps – a general attitude towards 
reappropriating earlier paradigms of aesthetic thinking for a cultural moment – 
translates into specific forms of expression that assume repetition as a model of 
creativity. Here the principles of an iterative turn in general, and of a turn towards 
iteration triggered by the current cultural moment converge at the Iterative turn. In 
Heideggerian terms, the contemporary Iterative turn combines an essence of iteration 
and an Enframing of iteration at the same time, or, as Derrida would have it, an 
example of iteration in general – a condition of iterability – and a singular iteration 
in itself. Seen as such, iteration should be considered both a method of creative 
practice and a historical category of aesthetics. The contemporary turn that this thesis 
defines emerges as a result of a conflation of the two models, always intertwined in 
the contemporary iterative thinking, where the condition of iterability as an attitude 
to creative practice, finds its momentum and a manifestation in related iterative 
forms. Seen as such, iterability turns into a law of not only repetition itself but of 
postproduction creativity more broadly. While the possibility of a repetition of a 
particular creative form or mode of expression is always a probability, it is the specific 
context of the postproduction moment, I suggest, that creates a condition for the 
Iterative turn to manifest itself most explicitly. That is to say, iteration as a creative 
paradigm reveals itself in the mode of revealing that is most suited to it.  
At the Iterative turn, the function of reproduction technologies is not simply a 
matter of technological reproducibility as a means to an end, but rather an end in 
itself. At the Iterative turn, an act appropriating already authored content turns into 
an expression of iterative thinking. Today, it is not simply an aestheticisation of 
technology or technologisation of aesthetics that are at stake. The ubiquity of 
contemporary digitalisation means that distinctions between the technological in the 
instrumental sense and the digital aesthetics are increasingly impossible to draw, with 
digital technology assuming a role of all-encompassing digital culture. It is in such a 
context that the Iterative turn emerges, a moment in which both technology and 
aesthetics are at a turning point, turning away from earlier paradigms without 
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rejecting them, and turning into one another as technē. Here, the process of digital 
reproduction loses its instrumental, purely functional associations, to assume its own 
all-pervasive iterative logic. Where the question of the aura139 is no longer a creative 
concern, the iterative project that emerges as a result of reconceptualised attitudes 
towards technology transforms the ‘danger’ that acts of copying typically pose to 
creativity into a form of liberation from it, a ‘saving power,’ 140  transforming 
plagiarism into iteration, copying into a paradigm of creativity itself.  
 
1.4. (UN)CREATIVE WRITING 
 
Over the past decade similar thinking about the creative possibility of a copy 
has gained momentum in the experimental literary scene. Movements such as 
conceptual writing and flarf assume uncreativity as a creative method while poets 
associated with them assemble, copy, and repurpose texts to create new works of 
experimental literature. As Kenneth Goldsmith defines it, conceptual writing  
employs intentionally self and ego effacing tactics using uncreativity, 
unoriginality, illegibility, appropriation, plagiarism, fraud, theft, and 
falsification as its precepts; information management, word 
processing, databasing, and extreme process as its methodologies; and 
boredom, valuelessness, and nutritionlessness as its ethos.141  
 
                                                             
139 I refer here to Walter Benjamin’s notion of the ‘aura’. The aura is an aesthetic category, a 
way of describing particular qualities of art that Benjamin saw waning in modernity as a 
result of increasing mechanisation of society. The aura of a work connotes its singularity and 
qualities such as authority, authenticity, and originality grounded explicitly in the Romantic 
understanding of creativity. As Benjamin argues, the aura disappears in the modern age, as a 
result of the possibilities of reproducibility that proliferate. Benjamin associates the notion of 
originality with an artwork’s unique presence in space and time and argues that a 
reproduced piece loses the quality of originality exactly because it is always removed from 
the auratic original, because in reproduction the origin is always absent, and so the work 
loses the quality of originality, authenticity, and authority. Benjamin writes: ‘the presence of 
the original is the prerequisite to the concept of authenticity’ [TWOA, 214].  
140 This statement is a reference to Heidegger’s notions of danger and saving power. 
Heidegger understands modern technology as danger, danger to man, danger to Being, 
technology in its instrumental sense, as Enframing, ‘endangers the relationship to the 
essence of truth’ [QCT, 33]. Enframing, Heidegger explains, ‘banishes man into that kind of 
revealing that is ordering. Where this ordering holds sway, it drives out every other 
possibility of revealing. Above all, Enframing conceals that revealing which, in the sense of 
poiēsis, lets what presences come forth into appearance’ (27). But, for Heidegger, the danger 
always harbours the possibility of transformation, of a turn, there is a possibility of liberation 
in every danger. Heidegger writes: ‘where Enframing reigns, there is danger in the highest 
sense. But where danger is, grows/The saving power also’ (28). In line with Heidegger’s 
argument, acts of copying emerge as antithetical to paradigms of creativity and as inherently 
creative acts at the same time. Copying assumes creative qualities exactly because it is 
dismissed as ‘danger,’ by law, by publishing standards, by prevailing notions of creativity and 
authorship.  
141 Kenneth Goldsmith, ‘Journal, Day One: Conceptual Poetics’, Harriet: a poetry blog, 22 
January 2007, accessed 20 May 2012, 
http://www.poetryfoundation.org/harriet/2007/01/journal-day-one/. Conceptualism in 
writing will be discussed in more details in Chapter 3. 
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The core idea behind flarf poetry derives from a recognition of a generative textual 
potential that online search engines can offer. Flarf poems are composed or, maybe, 
more accurately, compiled, in the process that has been described as Google-
sculpting, in which a poet uses the Internet search engine to generate results 
subsequently collaged or mashed up into a poem.  
While reliance on such techniques – similar to the related developments in 
visual arts – has been extensively explored by the long-twentieth-century avant-
gardes, digital technologies significantly expand the possibility of experimenting with 
textual appropriation. Conceptual poets, for example, self-consciously position 
themselves in the long line of avant-garde traditions, to fashion the uncreativity as ‘a 
poetics of the moment, fusing the avant-garde impulse of the last century with the 
technologies of the present, one that proposes an expanded field for twenty-first 
century poetry.’ 142  Calling for new responses to the current immersive digital 
environment, the paramount questions put forward by conceptualists reside in an 
attempt to interrogate the status of creativity in the age of digital reproduction;  as 
Goldsmith puts it, ‘what does it mean to be a poet in the Internet age?’143  I associate 
this tendency to question the creative status quo and related emergence of uncreative 
poetics with the current postproduction moment that creates a particularly fertile 
ground for the growing interest in and subsequent proliferation of the text-based 
appropriation on the unprecedented level. Under the postproduction condition, the 
situation of creative writing changes. For poets such as Goldsmith innovation and 
experimentation become synonymous with a range of techniques of textual 
manipulation, organisation, and appropriation. As Goldsmith contends, acts of 
‘replicating, organizing, mirroring, archiving, hoarding, storing, reprinting, 
bootlegging, plundering, and transferring’144 manifest the contemporary attitude to 
creativity to replace originality as the emblematic aesthetic paradigm.  
While instances of writing by such iterative means will be discussed in much 
more detail in the following three chapters, I would like briefly to introduce examples 
of uncreative writing here by way of defining the attitude that they manifest. 
Goldsmith’s works, for example, include appropriations of recorded everyday speech 
and overheard conversations as well as retypings of printed or broadcast news. 
Regardless of the source, Goldsmith’s works assume an idea of a repetition and, 
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hence, a copy as a textual dominant. For instance, his Day (2003) – discussed in 
Chapter 3 – is a transcription of the entire issue of The New York Times from 
September 1, 2000, word for word, inclusive of all content; commercial ads, cinema 
listings, bar codes, and photo captions are all included.  
Like Goldsmith, Vanessa Place works with appropriated texts. Her Tragodia 
trilogy (Statement of Facts (2010), Statement of the Case (2011), Argument (2011)) 
repurposes legal documents of sex offence cases to present them as poetry. For Place, 
‘authorship doesn't matter. Content doesn't matter. Form doesn't matter. Meter 
doesn't matter. All that matters is the trace of poetry.’145 This rejection of authorship, 
and a manifestation of a conceptual take on authorship at the same time, reverberates 
clearly with echoes of Rauschenberg’s statement on his portrait of Iris Clert. ‘This is a 
portrait of Iris Clert if I say so,’146 declared Rauschenberg in 1961; Tragodia is poetry 
because Vanessa Place says so. Place’s text is particularly interesting in the context of 
my discussion and explicitly foregrounds the characteristic divergence of conceptual 
and legal thinking. The contextual transition, from a legal file to a small press poetry 
volume, provokes a shift in generic categorisation of the text. This transformation 
from legal to poetic discourse raises questions of objectivity of both, one driven by the 
commitment to seemingly unambiguous, factual truths, the latter grounded in 
subjectivity and affect. The appropriation of the exact same discourse to exercise the 
expressive possibilities of either or both blurs boundaries between objectivity and 
subjectivity, between truth and poetic licence, to uncover the contingency of language, 
its unreliable nature. Here, the nature of authorship changes. Although there is only 
one author involved here – Place is a conceptual poet as well as a practising appellate 
criminal defence attorney and in her poetic experiments utilises her own briefs as 
sources – Vanessa Place the creative writer and Vanessa Place the writer of legal 
documents enjoy a markedly different status. A discrepancy between categories of 
authorship as conceived of by disparate discourses of law and poetry emerges. This 
transition from law to poetry particularly explicitly foregrounds the constructedness 
of any act of authorship, here reliant solely on the contextual framework, not the 
discourse and form of expression but on the declaration of a text as law or as poetry 
alone. A peculiar marriage of creative conceptual and legal assertion surfaces, with 
context turning into the singular normative factor used to determine the status of the 
text, evocative of Goldsmith’s understanding of contemporary creative practice, 
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conceptualising context as the new content.147 Although, from copyright’s point of 
view, it is the expression and hence the content that matters, here the nature of Place’s 
expression is inescapably bound and determined by the context. In fact, in case of 
Place’s practice, only the context informs and determines the generic classification. 
The treatment of the very same expression of thought and ideas as either law or poetry 
presupposes a differentiation in the limits of copyrightability of both. In fact, the shift 
from law to poetry results in a reconceptualisation of the text’s copyright status. 
Although appellate briefs can be copyrighted, they are usually treated as public 
material, available for circulation in the public domain once filed in court. 
Uncopyrighted, the text of legal documents as legal documents, repurposed as poetry, 
unambiguously warrants copyright protection and is published copyright to Vanessa 
Place.148  
Among Place’s other projects is a Twitter-based retyping of the entire text of 
Gone with the Wind (1936), by Margaret Mitchell, 140 characters at a time, where the 
technological constraint – the character limit – turns into a poetic constraint and a 
formula for composing recycled, highly fragmented works of literature. Social media 
also play an important role in Simon Morris’s Getting Inside Jack Kerouac’s Head 
(2010), a retyping of Kerouac’s On the Road (1957). Morris’s work, however, 
published as a paperback designed to look exactly like the Penguin edition used as a 
source, is and at the same time is not an exact copy of the novel [Figure 3]. Similarly 
to Place’s Twitter-based experiment, the original medium that Morris employs 
emerges as a form of textual constraint, destabilising the copy and as a result the 
linearity and readability of the text, to foreground the form and the process rather 
than the content. Getting Inside Jack Kerouac’s Head is a reprint of Morris’s blog 
devoted to retyping Kerouac’s novel, one page at a time. As such, the paperback 
version of the project follows the logic of blog publishing, to preserve the reversed 
order in which blog posts typically appear, foregrounding their commitment to the 
new as a characteristic feature of this publishing method. While Morris worked his 
way through On the Road a page per blog post, in a traditional, linear fashion, from 
the first page to the novel’s closing sentence, Morris’s reader is faced first with what 
Morris read and re-typed last. Reading Morris means reading the last page of On the 
Road first. Such active engagement with the dynamic of social media that dictates the 
form of these works serves as a significant manifestation of the affinities of writing, 
and creativity more broadly, with technology today. Place’s Gone with the Wind and 
Morris’s On the Road not only adopt the dynamic of the digital textuality as a 
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conceptual dominant but actively engage with the media that contribute to the 
proliferation of those tendencies themselves. This approach to engaging with 
technology draws attention to the inherent discrepancies between originals and their 
copies, foregrounding alterity rather than similarity, as if repeating Derrida’s 
characteristic association of repetition with a difference. 
           
FIGURE 3: SIMON MORRIS, GETTING INSIDE JACK KEROUAC'S HEAD (2010) AND 
JACK'S KEROUAC, ON THE ROAD, PENGUIN EDITION (2000) 
 
Echoes of Bourriaud’s postproduction aesthetics reverberate clearly in 
Goldsmith’s, Place’s and Morris’s projects. Theirs seems an appropriate response to a 
new condition of writing, negotiating not only the abundance of available material, 
ready to be repurposed, but also foregrounding the transition from postmodern to 
postproduction modes of appropriation – from objects to texts, from things to 
information. ‘Faced with unprecedented amount of available text,’ Goldsmith writes, 
‘the problem is not needing to write more of it; instead we must learn to negotiate the 
vast quantity that exists.’149  This hyperbolically derivative aesthetics as a creative 
methodology emerges as a mode of information management, a curatorial rather than 
authorial practice – a trajectory addressed in more detail Chapter 3. As if repeating 
after Bourriaud, Goldsmith’s, Place’s, and Morris’s aesthetic question for the 
contemporary culture is no longer ‘what can we make that is new?’ but, instead, ‘how 
can we make do with what we have? […], how can we produce singularity and meaning 
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from the chaotic mass of objects, names and references that constitutes out daily 
life?’150 
1.5. COPYING AS A POSTMODERN GESTURE: J.D. CALIFORNIA, 60 YEARS 
LATER: COMING THROUGH THE RYE 
 
If the task of contemporary poets is to reuse, recycle and reappropriate, then 
Day, Tragodia and Getting Inside Jack Kerouac’s Head all exemplify legitimate 
expressions of authorial practice. And while numerous experimental works of 
literature do breach copyright, the great majority escape the attention of copyright 
holders. The difference in the interest that similar creative attitudes generate, within 
visual arts and literature, mainstream publishing and the avant-garde, seems to 
reside in the economic rather than legal aspects of this practice. While Prince’s 
celebrity status is also associated with lucrative sales of his work, avant-garde poets 
live, as Goldsmith puts it, ‘in an economy of no economy.’151 Theirs is an economy that 
presupposes intellectual rather than financial gains. And although Goldsmith’s 
philosophy and practice might seem to diverge – his work has earned him a teaching 
post at the University of Pennsylvania, a residency at The Museum of Modern Art 
(MoMA) as well as a White House reading – his rise to fame in the creative scene is 
an exception rather than a rule. Regardless of such marks of recognition and 
institutionalisation of conceptualism and related practices, the profits from 
appropriation literature as compared with appropriation art (in some cases – those 
of legal interest) remain minuscule. But such a divergence of cultural and market 
capital seems indicative of the level of creative liberty at stake. The avant-garde 
gesture in writing, as Lethem observes, tends to be understood as such.  
It’s not plagiarism, and it’s also not copyright infringement, or not in 
any way that anybody’s going to get excited about. The truth has mostly 
to do with the cash on the barrelhead. […] When Kathy Acker grabs a 
piece of – well, usually she grabbed Melville or Dickens, first of all, that 
stuff is in public domain – but even if she borrowed a writer who was 
technically still copyrighted, there’s not a lot at stake financially. A 
publisher is not going to think, ‘We are selling fewer of X because she 
borrowed Y for her odd little avant-garde novel.’152  
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To put it bluntly, there is no money in avant-garde poetry. Marginal in economic 
terms, experimental writing remains insignificant in copyright terms. Here copyright 
emerges as, first and foremost, an economic right, with avant-garde as a 
manifestation of, as Goldsmith puts it, a copyright loophole.153  
As such, legal discussions of literary appropriation today evolve around two, 
now seminal, cases – Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin and Co. and Salinger v. 
Colting, both caught up in legal disputes because of the status and popularity of either 
the author or the text appropriated. Suntrust Bank centred on Alice Randall’s The 
Wind Done Gone (2001), a revision of Mitchell’s Gone with the Wind written from 
the point of view of slaves and servants on the plantation of Tara. The Mitchell estate 
saw Randall’s novel as derivative and infringing, while Randall herself conceived of 
her work as a response to and a comment on a text that constitutes the wider cultural 
landscape.154 The Salinger case emerged as J.D. Salinger’s response to a publication 
of Fredrik Colting’s (writing as John David California) 60 Years Later: Coming 
Through the Rye (2009), billed as a sequel to Salinger’s classis novel, The Catcher in 
the Rye (1951). The case was an attempt at enjoining Colting and his publisher from 
‘manufacturing, distributing, shipping, advertising, promoting, selling or otherwise 
disseminating the book […] in or to the United States.’155 Although both Suntrust and 
Salinger are important and indicative of legal thinking that is antithetical to 
paradigms of creativity that emerged in the wake of postmodernism, I will briefly 
focus on Salinger as a more recent case that builds on the Suntrust ruling.  
60 Years Later is a first-person narrative told, just like The Catcher in the Rye, 
from the point of view of omnipresent Holden Caulfield, renamed as Mr C, making 
extensive use of the characteristic features of Holden as depicted by Salinger. Colting’s 
protagonist has memories of events from The Catcher, engages with the same 
acquaintances as Salinger’s Holden; he has many of the same adventures, and uses 
the same vocabulary and tone. 60 Years Later is, as Colting puts it, ‘just like the first 
novel, he leaves, but this time he’s not at prep school, he’s at a retirement home in 
upstate New York […] it’s pretty much like the first book in that he roams around the 
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| 55 
 
 
city, inside himself and his past.’156 The key difference between the two texts resides 
in the temporal shift and Colting’s introduction of Salinger as a character, portrayed 
as an author who tries to kill Holden to free himself from his protagonist, but, unable 
to do so, sets him free instead. Salinger, as a copyright holder, raised literary, 
copyright, and fair competition issues with respect to Colting’s novel, and claimed 
infringement of both the character of Holden and the novel overall, as an unlicensed 
derivative work. Colting’s fair use defence and his claims that 60 Years Later is a 
parody were all rejected. As the court noted, ‘it is hardly parodic to repeat the same 
exercise […], just because society and the characters have aged.’157 Similar arguments 
were used in Salinger v. Colting and Cariou v. Prince, both ruled in the first instance 
by Judge Deborah Batts in district court. Evocative of the approach to Prince’s work, 
Colting’s novel was deemed not transformative enough, lacking in critical 
commentary with respect to the source is appropriates; ‘just because a work ‘recast[s], 
transform[s], or adapt[s] […] an original work into a new mode of presentation, […] 
does not make the work “transformative” in the sense the first fair use factor.’158 The 
addition of Salinger as a character, although recognised by the court as ‘something 
new,’ was treated as insufficient to render the sequel transformative. As the Brief for 
Plaintiff-Appellee reads:  
that character is not a tool Colting uses to critique either Holden or 
Catcher. Certainly Colting may write literary criticism of Catcher 
comparing its events to biographical material about Salinger; he may 
write criticism about Holden drawing parallels between Salinger’s like 
and Holden’s; but that is not what he did. Rather Colting recounts and 
embroiders upon the ‘biography’ of a fictional character. Taking 
fictional ‘facts’ or characters and placing them in another context is not 
‘transformative.’159 
 
Pervasive here is the characteristic dependence on the Romantic ideas of authorship 
that inevitably limits the availability of fair use defence and, hence, the scope of 
recognised creative practices.  
From the literary point of view, Coting’s is a standard approach, one rooted in 
widely acknowledged and now firmly established literary traditions of 
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intertextuality160 and metafiction161 but not recognised as such by the court that gave 
preference to a quantitative comparison of the two novels.162 For Batts and similarly, 
later, for the Court of Appeals, all that mattered was that the two novels show 
similarities that were so substantial that Colting’s appropriation could not be 
considered a manifestation of a transformative fair use. The struggles to classify 
Colting’s novel in a manner that would allow for a fair legal treatment were unrelated 
to literary categories at stake. Instead, the case centred on a legal terminological 
debate in an attempt to define 60 Years Later as a parody or a sequel to determine 
the nature of authorship and originality in the work. But, in law these categories 
diverge from related literary definitions. Parody should be considered a form of 
intertextual allusion. It employs, as Margaret A. Rose explains, ‘the devices of its 
original while laying them bare.’ 163  For Linda Hutcheon, parody ‘is related to 
burlesque, travesty, pastiche, plagiarism, quotation, and allusion, but remains 
distinct from them.’ 164  And ‘while the act and form of parody are those of 
incorporation, its function is that of separation and contrast.’165 
The legal definition of parody resides in its differentiation from satire, where 
the two are viewed as unambiguously defined binary categories. Satire, as understood 
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by U.S. copyright law, assumes a more comprehensive function as a tool of critiquing 
and commenting on all aspects of society. It is too general and ambiguous a category 
to be recognised as fair use and so not protected by copyright.166 The function of 
parody, on the other hand, is to critically engage with a specific work. Such intentional 
focus on the critical commentary of a clearly defined text allows for an unambiguous 
assessment in line with the requirements of transformative use, and so is considered 
fair use and an acceptable practice. But the creative reality is much more complex 
than law would have it, the boundaries between satire and parody more fluid, and 
their relationship complex. As Hutcheon explains, satire frequently uses parodic art 
forms, while parody is interested in the text that is ‘imitated’ not only because of the 
qualities of that text itself, but also, as Simon Dentith put it, ‘to gain purchase in the 
modern world.’167 Where legal and literary thinking about parody do overlap, is in 
their shared preoccupation with the ‘intention to parody.’ But while law’s 
understanding of the parodic act is limited to a transformative use of a very specific 
work, and that work alone, Hutcheon points to a more inclusive creative possibilities 
afforded by acts of parody in literature. ‘When we speak of parody,’ Hutcheon writes, 
‘we do not just mean two texts that just interrelate in a certain way. We also imply an 
intention to parody another work (or a set of conventions).’168  
In Salinger, similarly to Cariou, the issues of copying from the source proved 
problematic not simply because of the act itself, but as a result of authorial intention, 
to comment, or not, on the material appropriated. This reasoning is based on a 
conjecture that courts can not only rely on but also definitely determine authorial 
intention, a stance antithetical to the attitudes assumed in any attempt at writing at 
the wake of postmodernism, and creative and philosophical thinking that gave rise to 
intertextuality. The discrepancy in the attitudes is particularly apparent when 
considered with respect to parody’s characteristic place in the literary culture. The 
narrow legal definition ignores the highly charged cultural negotiations involved in 
different approaches to writing by means of rewriting to describe any text that legally 
reuses other texts as a parodic rendering. What makes the legal approach particularly 
problematic is the fact that ‘parody,’ as Linda Hutcheon explains, ‘is a perfectly 
postmodern form […] for it paradoxically incorporates and challenges that which it 
parodies.’169 The postmodern attitude is completely disregarded in the copyright’s 
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appropriation of parody as a creative category. Any attempt at recognising an instance 
of creative practice as a manifestation of parody in legal terms always emerges in a 
conflicting framework. Paradoxically, legal understanding of parody inevitably 
inscribes a work of parody into a framework of a Romantic paradigms of authorship 
and related conceptions of originality, paradigms that parody works to subvert and 
question. In its attempt to deal with creative practices that are inherently associated 
with the subversion of such creative paradigms, practices that, as Hutcheon put it, 
force ‘a reconsideration of the idea of the origin and originality that is compatible with 
other postmodern interrogations of liberal humanist assumptions,’ 170  copyright 
creates a framework that is implicitly flawed, inherently contradictory, and 
inadequate with respect to creative practices that have been proliferating for over half 
a century now.  
Unlike parody and satire, copyright law considers sequels irrespective of the 
manner in which they engage with original texts. Sequels fall into the category of 
derivative works and so give copyright holders the right to authorise as well as to 
prohibit their publication. But, perhaps most tellingly, a sequel is considered in purely 
economic terms as it offers potential of a publication for profit and, as such, can affect 
the market value of the original. In other words, 60 Years Later as a sequel can not 
only impact on the sales of The Catcher itself but it also prevents Salinger from 
potentially authorising other sequels or writing a sequel himself, making profit from 
these hypothetical publications, regardless of whether he did or did not intend to do 
so.171 60 Years Later as a parody, on the other hand, would be considered legally 
acceptable. While an unauthorised sequel is a copyright infringement, a parody, 
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described in Margaret Mitchell’s Gone with the Wind. It is not authorised by the Stephens 
Mitchell Trust, and no sponsorship or endorsement by the Mitchell Trust is implied.’ 
Copyright page in Alice Randall, The Wind Done Gone (Boston and New York: Houghton 
Miffin Company, 2002).  
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paradoxically, exists as Linda Hutcheon describes it, as ‘an authorised 
transgression.’ 172  The result of the strikingly divergent copyright treatment of 
parodies, satires, and sequels, is a widespread tendency to seek a post-hoc 
classification of works that reuse pre-existing material as parodies regardless of the 
manner in which they engage with their sources, a stance also unsuccessfully 
attempted by Colting. But the limited scope for reusing, adapting, and appropriating 
works already in circulation is indicative of the wider copyright attitude towards 
practices that diverge from the familiar, unambiguous models of singular authorship. 
As Kate O’Neill puts it, ‘Salinger wrote a wonderful book and launched an enduring 
literary character; Colting wrote an amateurish take-off that would probably not have 
gained any notice but for its evocation of Salinger and Holden Caulfield.’173 Questions 
of literary quality and judgement aside, O’Neill’s is a stand typical for and illustrative 
of legal take on of practices such as Colting’s. From a legal point of view, an act of 
writing by means of rewriting emerges as ‘an amateurish take-off,’ ‘a wholesale 
piracy,’174 or, as Judge Guido Calabresi described it, ‘a dismal piece of work.’175 It can 
only be rejected as derivative and infringing.  
Even though the initial, preliminary injunction granted by Batts was vacated 
by the Court of Appeals, calling for further investigation, the case was subsequently 
settled out of court in December 2010. In line with the settlement conditions, the 
novel is currently not available on the American market but sold outside of the U.S.A. 
and Canada. However, its current U.K. edition reflects the ruling and its marketing 
has changed. While its original cover styled 60 Years Later as a ‘sequel to one of our 
most beloved classics,’176 the current edition instead describes it as ‘an Unauthorised 
Fictional Examination of the Relationship Between J.D. Salinger and his Most 
Famous Character.’177 There is no indication that the edition currently available is 
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altered in any way, and the copyright page does not list details of the publication date 
post the lawsuit. 178  This shift in publishing attitude is important. While such a 
manipulation of legal categories enables a lawful distribution of the novel, it also 
inscribes it into a framework of categories of authorship that are inappropriate. It 
does not allow for iterative thinking as creative to construe it as purely derivative and 
infringing.  
1.6. COPYING AS A POSTPRODUCTION GESTURE: HELENE HEGEMANN, 
AXOLOTL ROADKILL 
 
A similar approach to publishing a work controversial from the point of view 
of copyright was assumed by Ullstein Verlag, a publisher of Helene Hegemann’s 
Axolodtl Roadkill (2010), a text, I suggest, driven by postproduction rather than 
postmodern thinking so prominent in Colting’s approach. My focus in this thesis is 
not on postmodern aesthetics and literary practice. But the debates about the 
postmodern categories of parody and the legal inability to successfully accommodate 
them are key to distinguishing between what I see as an inherently contemporary 
postproduction, iterative writing practices from related postmodern gestures. 
Hegemann’s project serves as a useful case in point. I am interested in a juxtaposition 
of Colting’s and Hegemann’s approaches to writing as a means of delineating the 
distinction between postmodern and postproduction approaches to authorship, 
originality, and acts of repetition.  
Hegemann’s novel, published in Germany in 2010 to a widespread critical 
acclaim, faced accusations of plagiarism after Deef Pirmasen, a blogger, identified a 
range of works Hegemann cited in the novel without acknowledgement. The main 
source Hegemann drew from extensively was a blog, airen.wordpress.com, later 
published as a novel Strobo (2009) by SuKuLTuR, Berlin. A sample passage from 
Hegemann’s novel reads:  
a rococo building closer to the Turkish part of Schönenberrg that the 
gay part and only a hundred yards away from the two branches of Lidl 
                                                             
178 This, again, is a result of the settlement conditions. As Publisher’s Weekly notes: ‘In 
addition, the settlement agreement bars Colting from using the title “Coming through the 
Rye”; forbids him from dedicating the book to Salinger; and would prohibit Colting or any 
publisher of the book from referring to The Catcher in the Rye, Salinger, the book being 
“banned” by Salinger, or from using the litigation to promote the book’ [Andrew Albanese, 
‘J.D. Salinger Estate, Swedish Author Settle Copyright Case, Publishers Weekly, 11 January 
2011, accessed 23 February 2011,  http://www.publishersweekly.com/pw/by-
topic/industrynews/publisher-news/article/45738-j-d-salinger-estate-swedish-author-
settle-copyright-suit.html]. The agreement is final and terms are confidential and so the 
document is not currently available. Interestingly, the current edition, although avoiding the 
term ‘sequel’ in favour of ‘unauthorised fictional examination’ is still dedicated to Salinger, 
and uses the banned subtitle.  
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with the best opening hours in the city […] corridor with black wood 
and mirrors.179 
 
As compared with the original source: 
 
A rococo building, inside dark wood and mirrors, located closer to the 
Turkish part of Schönenberg than the gay part […] one of the two Lidl 
stores with best opening hours in Berlin.180 
 
In the official statement issued in response to the plagiarism claims 
Hegemann declared:  
The plagiarism accusations – how it all works in terms of legislation, I 
unfortunately don't exactly know. Personally […] I consider my 
behaviour and my work method completely legitimate [...] There is no 
such thing as originality anyway, just authenticity.181 
 
The distinction that Hegemann draws between that which is original and that which 
could be considered authentic is particularly telling. Hegemann’s approach towards 
working with borrowed material emerges as an authentic, creative project, a 
manifestation of an attitude towards writing that not only allows for but is reliant on 
acts of appropriation as creative acts. The first edition of Axolotl Roadkill was a clear 
manifestation of this attitude. It drew freely and without acknowledgement from 
numerous sources, most extensively from Aireen's Blog but included referenced 
quotations from one established author, David Foster Wallace. In a statement printed 
alongside Hegemann’s, her publisher, Ullstein Verlag, contended that Hegemann 
identified Wallace’s work as the only source of quotations that required a reprint 
permission, which was sought accordingly. As Ullstein declared, ‘the responsibility of 
a young, talented author who grew up within the Internet culture of “sharing” can be 
arguable. The position of Ullstein Verlag is unequivocal: all quotations have to be 
acknowledged and their use approved by their authors.’182 Ullstein’s reference to the 
Internet and the dynamics of content production and dissemination online as 
influencing the attitudes towards creativity is particularly telling and points to a wider 
project that this thesis attempts to put forward.  
                                                             
179 Helene Hegemann, Axolotl Roadkill, trans. Kathy Darbishire (London: Corsaire, 2012), 
195. Hereafter ARKD.  
180 Airen.wordpress.com later published by SuKuLTuR, Berlin, in ‘Quellennachweis und 
Danksgang’, in Helene Hegemann, Axolodtl Roadkill, trans. my own (Berlin: Ullstein Verlag, 
2010), 205. Hereafter AR.  
181 ‘“Axolotl Roadkill”: Helene Hegemann und Ullstein Verlegerin Dr. Siv Bublitz antworten 
auf Plagiatsvorwurf’, trans. my own, in BuchMarkt, 7 February 2010, accessed 25 January 
2011, http://www.buchmarkt.de/content/41393-axolotl-roadkill-helene-hegemann-und-
ullstein-verlegerin-dr-siv-bublitz-antworten-auf-plagiatsvorwurf.htm.  
182 Ibid. 
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A clear manifestation of the divergent creative and legal attitudes, the novel, 
currently in its fourth edition, now comes with an appendix listing sources of all 
quotations Hegemann used. As the introductory note to the works cited reads 
‘fragments of […] quotations (from books, songs, films, blogs, etc.) are incorporated 
in the text, as verbatim or modified quotations, or inspiration.’ 183  The compiled 
references bring to the fore Hegemann’s creative method, stress the novel's derivative 
nature and its reliance on appropriated material. However, no references are included 
in the main body of the text, and quotations are not printed in quotation marks. 
Instead, the appendix provides a list of all sources, arranged by the work from which 
each quotation was lifted, rather than simply in the order they appeared in the novel. 
Additionally, each quotation from the appropriated source is printed alongside a 
corresponding passage from Axolotl Roadkill. The appendix opens with a list of all 
excerpts from Airen's blog, followed by a list of ‘further quotations (partly modified 
and, in the case of some excerpts, dissipated over longer passages)’184 including texts 
by Malcolm Lowry, Jim Jarmusch quoting Jean-Luc Goddard, Kathy Acker, David 
Foster Wallace, Maurice Blanchot, and The Zombies. Additional sections of the 
appendix include quotations from private correspondence, excerpts from emails, 
overheard conversations and further quotations lifted from the Internet, including 
readers' comments posted online in response to interviews with Hegemann, as well 
as a list of ‘thank yous’ and some references to authors that served as an inspiration 
but whose texts were not directly incorporated into the novel.  
Paradoxically, the detailed reference and acknowledgement list proves flawed. 
Page numbers listed in the appendix are incongruous with the main body of the text 
and there is a consistent discrepancy of two pages (quotations that the appendix lists 
as printed on page 199 are to be found on page 197, etc.). Although clearly an 
unfortunate editorial oversight, the misprint seems, in an interesting way, to serve as 
an extension of and a chance commentary on Hegemann’s uncreative game. This 
particularly fitting disjunction foregrounds a peculiar juxtaposition of the significance 
and at the same time futility of the references, of the copyright standards and 
constraints they impose on the contemporary notions of creativity and authorship. 
From academic and legal points of view, the appendix is essential. The references are 
significant in that they serve as a means of inscribing the novel within a frame of 
norms and established intellectual property standards and not because of how and 
what they contribute to (or detract from) the creative practice itself. While satisfying 
the official framework of the legislative safety net and recognised publishing and 
                                                             
183 AR, 203.  
184 Ibid, 206. 
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academic norms, the references seem to carry little relevance to the interest the novel 
is generating and to the text itself. Here references lead, literally, nowhere; once the 
text becomes a work cut to fit the established paradigms, no attention seems to be 
paid to the sources. In such a framework no distinction can be made between 
plagiarism and creative practices of appropriation and intertextuality. In a property-
driven copyright economy, appropriation inevitably turns into a form of plagiarism. 
A model for cultural production and a mode of artistic exploration so prominent since 
the inception of postmodernism, appropriation remains too far removed from the 
legal assumptions and copyright's understanding of notions of authorship, 
authenticity, and originality to be regarded a legitimate practice, with art and 
normative reality conflicting on the ideological level. Postmodernism might have 
adopted the concept of playing against the rules as a rule of creativity (an approach 
also very much prominent in today’s new media-induced aesthetics), but, to return to 
Halbert, ‘when brought to court the postmodernist will (evidently) lose.’185  
Understood as such, plagiarism, like authorship, is an exclusionary category 
and remains a question of ethics rather than aesthetics. Hence, Hegemann’s creative 
exercise proves an example of a conscious breach of ethical guidelines that underpin 
the normative standards of contemporary creativity. The framework does not leave 
space for subversive experimentation, turning every work into a subject of 
unambiguously defined, unified and at the same time unifying set of rules and 
regulations. Informed and directed by such standards, our collective cultural 
conscience inevitably condemns Hegemann’s practice as transgressive and immoral. 
The contemporary understanding of what it means to author a text, to create a work 
of art, remains determined by the prevailing, Romantic image of an artist as an 
inspired genius conflated with property-oriented notions of authorship and 
originality. The reference list as it appears in the fourth edition of Axolotl Roadkill 
might serve purely as a means of fulfilling legal requirements but, at the same time, 
its inclusion could be seen as an attempt at placing the novel within a frame of twenty-
first-century mash-up culture. Consciously giving prominence to Hegemann’s 
plagiarisms, such a contextualisation foregrounds the approach not as a transgression 
but as a conscious creative choice; not as a negation of authorship but a mode of 
authorship in its own right.  
It seems highly unlikely that the initial omission of relevant references could 
be put down to Hegemann’s ignorance in the field of copyright legislation that she 
eagerly stressed when the novel was first published. Her frequent comments on the 
nature of her creative practice as well as the sources she drew from clearly indicate an 
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awareness of both creative and critical developments in appropriation arts, notions of 
collage and intertextuality. Her particular tribute to Kathy Acker could not go 
unnoticed in the context. 186  Interestingly, the latest edition of Hegemann’s novel 
concludes her list of quotations with the following statement:  
This novel follows the aesthetic principles of intertextuality and, as 
such, can contain further quotations. Ullstein Verlag have 
endeavoured to acknowledge all the rights’ holders that the publisher 
are aware of. Owners of any copyrighted material included in the book 
that remains unacknowledged are requested to contact the 
publisher.187 
 
Through this approach, Ullstein shift the responsibility for accurate 
acknowledgement of sources from the author who cites to the author of the citation 
itself. And although the statement serves as no more than a manifestation of the 
necessary precaution measures, it also proves indicative of the complex and subjective 
nature of appropriation and related practices that places plagiarism first and foremost 
in the eyes of the beholder.188  
This attitude is echoed in one of the passages in the novel itself, a self-
conscious commentary on the nature of composition and aesthetic practice at stake:  
‘Berlin is here to mix everything with everything […] I steal from 
anywhere that resonates with inspiration or fuels my imagination […]. 
Films, music, books, paintings, cold-cuts poetry, photos, 
conversations, dreams …’ 
‘street signs, clouds …’ 
‘light and shadow, that’s right, because my work and my theft are 
authentic as long as something speaks directly to my soul. It’s not 
where I take things from – it’s where I take them to.’ 
‘So you didn’t make it up?’ 
‘No. It’s from some blogger.’189  
 
Traces of Hegemann’s transgressive practice might have been hidden in the first 
edition of the novel, but only hidden in plain sight, overtly referenced in the passage 
above. As at direct metatextual commentary, the passage is significant in that it points 
to a multilayered nature of Hegemann’s appropriation. But it also serves as a 
reflection on the contemporary iterative culture more broadly. Commenting on this 
excerpt in an interview for The Observer Hegemann pointed out that, although listed 
in the appendix as one of the fragments lifted from Airen’s blog, this particular 
quotation originally comes from Jim Jarmusch engaging in an act of appropriation, 
quoting Jean-Luc Goddard. As such, Axolotl Roadkill positions itself in a long 
tradition of appropriation and intertextuality; this is not simply Hegemann quoting 
                                                             
186 The appendix includes the following statement: ‘Particular thanks to Kathy Acker’.  
187 AR, 209.  
188 I borrow this notion from Marilyn Randall in Randall, Pragmatic Plagiarism, vii. 
189 ARKD, 5. 
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‘some blogger,’ it is, instead, Hegemann, quoting Airen, quoting Jim Jarmush, 
quoting Jean-Luc Goddard: ‘what I was accused of “stealing,”’ commented 
Hegemann, ‘has already been stolen,’190 multiple times.  
A similar contextualisation as afforded by the appendix in the fourth German 
edition seems to lack in the recent English translation of the novel, published by 
Corsair, London in 2012 and translated by Katy Derbyshire. Unlike the original, the 
translation does not include a comparable, detailed index. The comprehensive 
passage-by-passage compilation of derivative material and sources printed by 
Ullstein in 2010 is limited here to a brief acknowledgement. 191 With the editorial 
approach, the character of the appendix changes, turning it into a list of sources 
disguised as an extended ‘thank you’ note. The English appendix does refer to Airen’s 
text as a source but does not specify the extent of this contribution. Interestingly, the 
English edition lists Airen’s work in its print form only, as a novel Strobo. The 
reference to the blog, a key source for Hegemann, is omitted (in contrast, the German 
appendix refers to the blog as the primary material but acknowledges the later print 
publication). Kathy Acker, alongside most sources listed in the German edition, also 
features in the English translation. However, certain omissions occur: the note on 
intertextuality is not included, quotations from private emails, overheard 
conversations or forum comments all fail to merit a mention. As such, the English 
edition only references traditional, tangible material, unambiguously subject to 
copyright protection. This exclusion of any digital or intangible references, sources 
that do not immediately fall into the traditionally understood copyright categories, 
immediately significantly alters the cultural frame that seems to determine the 
creative dynamic behind Axolotl Roadkill, removing the novel from the context of the 
contemporary digital copy-paste aesthetics that the text foregrounds, of its inherent 
textuality as intertextuality, driven by iterative thinking. The editorial approach 
inevitably construes a different interpretation, a different approach to the text; on the 
one hand shifting focus away from the controversy that surrounded the novel when it 
was first published and turning attention to the text itself, but at the same time, I 
argue, detracting from a crucial aspect of the aesthetic practice guiding Hegemann’s 
                                                             
190 Helene Hegemann, in Kate Connolly, ‘Helene Hegemann: “There’s no such thing as 
originality, just authenticity”’, The Observer, 24 June 2012, accessed 7 January 2013, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2012/jun/24/helene-hegemann-axolotl-novelist-
interview?INTCMP=SRCH.  
191 The two approaches to the way sources are acknowledged in both the English and German 
editions stem from the underlying differences that predicate the two legal systems within 
which the novels were published; civil law that favours author’s moral rights in Germany, 
and common law in the U.K. The latter traditionally lacks provisions for extensive protection 
of author’s rights of personality and recognises moral right as alienable, i.e. allowing authors 
to weave their rights.  
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creativity. The reconceptualisation of the appendix potentially misplaces the novel as 
a result, removes it from the creative frame of the twenty-first-century approaches to 
iteration as a creative practice, heavily rooted in the Internet culture, with its inherent 
permissiveness to draw from a range of materials (‘I steal from everywhere’), a culture 
of all-encompassing ‘re-gestures.’192  
Hegemann’s case was settled out of court and surfaced as a result of a media 
response rather than as legal precedent. However, the updated edition points to a very 
characteristic and pervasive thinking about originality and creativity in which legal 
and popular opinions seem to converge. These remain in a paradoxical opposition to 
the familiar, ubiquitous ‘copy-paste’ gestures, rejected and condemned when applied 
in what is understood as a traditional creative context. Practices of reproducing and 
repurposing find their manifestations in literary texts that assume a particularly 
unacceptable place in the popular cultural conscience, if applied as outlets for acts of 
authorship. Authorship and originality conceptualised as such are always inevitably 
associated with expressions of a Romantic genius, a paradigm in stark opposition to 
the increasingly prominent figure of a writer as a remixer engaging in iterative rather 
than derivative gestures. It is a shift in the understanding of the familiar paradigms 
that is necessary to reconceptualise them for the Iterative turn, opening space for 
experimentation and change, for practices that unsettle the familiar categories and 
trigger a shift in creative thinking. This dynamic reverberates clearly when Colting’s 
and Hegemann’s approaches to writing are juxtaposed. The difference between 
thinking behind the two projects resides, I suggest, in the authors’ approaches 
towards framing their practices. While it is hard to say whether Colting’s is an 
iconoclastic gesture, or, perhaps, an ignorant one, Hegemann positions her work 
firmly within a clearly defined avant-garde framework and in the context of the 
contemporary digital culture. As such, Hegemann’s novel pertains to postproduction 
aesthetics while Colting’s, with his reliance on rhetoric of parodic rewriting, so 
prominent in his defence, repeats the all too familiar logic of postmodernism. 
Colting’s is an instance of metafictional writing through, Hegemann’s is a strikingly 
different project. What the two have in common, however, is the context of the 
mainstream, commercial publishing that emerges as synonymous with an inherent 
impossibility of subversion. The related publishing practices applied in both cases as 
means of inscribing the novels into an established legal framework – including the 
appendix in Hegemann’s case, incorporating a new cover blurb in Colting’s – are 
indicative of the indiscriminate and narrow scope of legal thinking. In a typically 
avant-garde manner, the space for the proliferation of iterative gestures can only 
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emerges on the fringes of the legal and publishing apparatus, in works such as Place’s 
or Morris’s, engaging with the kinds of writing that, as Nick Thurston puts it, ‘happen 
on the outside of literature (and other forms of knowledge).’193 
Thurston’s statement is a description of a conceptual framework behind the 
work of IAM, Information as Material, an independent publisher based in York, U.K., 
run by Thurston and Simon Morris, and a publisher of Morris’s Getting Into Jack 
Kerouac’s Head. But, I suggest, IAM’s publishing praxis can be seen as a 
manifestation of the broader dynamics of the Iterative turn, and Thurston’s statement 
a framework particularly fitting in the context of my juxtaposition of mainstream and 
avant-garde publishing today. IAM’s work is illustrative of what I see as a 
characteristically iterative thinking, concerned, among others, with the possibilities 
of text in ‘the ever-accelerating floods of textual over-production in an always already 
digital age.’194 As Thurston explains, IAM is interested in the exploration of what 
Rachel Malik calls ‘the horizon of publishable’195 to develop an alternative model of 
‘publishing as praxis,’ one that can accommodate writing by alternative, iterative 
means: 
Working towards a model of publishing as praxis has depended on 
carrying over these relatively horizontal, unstable and unprofitable 
principles for collective work into the practice of another kind of 
editorship. The result is that information as material has a focused and 
centred editorial collective that holds open […] a space for a peculiar 
kind of writing […]. Information as material is a […] vehicle that 
enables a certain kind of unconventional but highly literate writer to 
write books rather than just texts – i.e., to implicate the process of 
reproduction in the conscious process of artistic production (what we 
commonly call composition).196 
 
In other words, in the context of publishing as praxis, attitudes to publishing and 
creativity converge; here attitudes become form. In Thurston’s model of literary 
production, reproduction becomes an essence of an artwork, ‘a precedent of artistic 
production,’ 197  to question and negate the traditional production-reproduction 
paradigms and models of authorship, and, instead, to ‘explore an understanding of 
composition as process of reproduction-as-production.’ 198  This approach, in an 
                                                             
193 Nick Thurston, ‘Publishing as Praxis of conceptualist reading performances’, Journal of 
Writing in Creative Practice, 6.3 (2013), 422.  
194 Thurston, ‘Publishing’, 422.  
195 Rachel Malik, ‘Fixing Meaning: Intertextuality, Interface, and the Horizons of the 
Publishable’, Radical Philosophy 124 (2004), cited in Thurston, ‘Publishing’, 422.  
196 Thurston, ‘Publishing’, 422.  
197 Ibid, 423.  
198 Ibid.  
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inherently iterative fashion, ‘exaggerates the collapse of authorship as an original 
creative act into an authorial act constituted by its reproducibility.’199 
This is a model of writing that assumes iteration as a creative paradigm, one 
that mainstream publishing cannot conceptualise or accommodate. Thurston sees 
self-publishing as an alternative that allows for writing on the margins and against 
the normative framework. But it is not an act of self-publishing itself that is key here, 
but rather the commitment to a publishing gesture that is open to and allows for 
iterative thinking. This possibility of iteration is inscribed in Thurston’s 
understanding of self-publishing as a means of reconceptualising the status of the self 
in publishing, and hence a change in the notion of the author. ‘In this model,’ 
Thurston explains, ‘the self takes a responsibility for working to produce a different 
kind of publishable text and a different culture of publication, and it does so from 
outside the mainstream as a positive choice.’200 Unlike vanity presses, self-publishing 
as understood by IAM is an avant-garde project, operating on the fringes of the 
mainstream publishing industry to explore the possibilities of subverting and 
unsettling the familiar categories of literary production. While Hegemann, even if 
writing as a self-consciously avant-garde, postproduction author, remains 
conditioned by the norms of publishability, Place or Morris operate on the outside of 
the normative framework, in a space where the attitudes so characteristic for the 
Iterative turn manifest themselves most explicitly. At the core of the turn 
conceptualised as such is an interrogation of the limits of creativity and the possibility 
of modifying questions of authoriality. As a result of the turn towards iteration the 
questions shifts, as Thurston puts it,  
from ‘who wrote that text?’ to ‘who is taking responsibility for that 
text?’ It explores the productive potential of the literary author as a 
self-subject […] by asking for, of, and about a different kind of ‘who’ – 
a who whose new responsibility is also expressed by the change of 
tense between the two questions, which drags retrospection back into 
present action.201  
 
This understanding of writing, authorship, and publishing emerges as a space where 
two models of thinking about iteration converge; where a certain propensity to repeat 
earlier attitudes and aesthetic paradigms translates into a related creative form. 
Viewed as such, the limit of iterability seems to reside only in the limit of the 
publishable.  
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1.7. THE ITERATIVE TURN: WHEN ATTITUDES BECOME FORM 
 
It is worth returning to Salinger’s Catcher to discuss this divergent dynamic 
not just in law and literature but also in mainstream and small press, avant-garde 
publishing, the latter seen as a space where possibilities of exploring iterative thinking 
are particularly potent (avant-garde, is in the end, a copyright loophole, to return to 
Goldsmith). Perhaps because of Salinger’s reluctance to engage in the contemporary 
iterative culture and because of his self-proclaimed, and now legally prescribed, status 
as a singular, Romantic, author-genius, his Catcher now exists in an extensive web of 
iterative aesthetics, with 60 Years Later available as only one example. Worth 
mentioning here is Richard Prince’s 2011 project engaging with Salinger’s novel in a 
radical appropriation gesture. As an act that not only manifests the iterative creative 
attitude but also serves as an explicit commentary on copyright constraints and Judge 
Batts’s rulings in both Prince and Salinger cases, The Catcher in the Rye, a novel by 
Richard Prince (2011) is a reproduction of Salinger’s, presented as Prince’s. Prince’s 
Catcher is a facsimile reproduction of the first edition of Salinger’s Catcher in the Rye 
(1951) [Figure 4]. The two volumes are identical, only the author’s name is replaced on 
the front cover and the reproduced dust jacket does not include Salinger’s photo. The 
text originally printed on Salinger’s cover is also retained in Prince’s Catcher, with 
Prince’s name printed instead of Salinger’s. The cover reads: ‘Anyone who has read 
Richard Prince’s New Yorker stories, particularly A Perfect Day for Bananafish, 
Uncle Wiggly in Connecticut, The Laughing Man, and For Esmé–with Love and 
Squalor, will not be surprised by the fact that his first novel is full of children.’202 
Here, the act of appropriation turns into a more comprehensive gesture of complete 
expropriation; what is repurposed is not only this particular book but the entirety of 
Salinger’s oeuvre, his complete authorial persona.  
                                                             
202 Richard Prince, The Catcher in the Rye (New York: American Place, 2011), back cover.  
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FIGURE 4: RICHARD PRINCE, THE CATCHER IN THE RYE (2011) AND J.D. SALINGER, 
THE CATCHER IN THE RYE (1951) 
 
Even the design of Prince’s publisher’s logo mimics that of Little, Brown and 
Co.’s, the publisher of the 1951 edition he appropriates. In fact, a comparison of the 
two logos is telling here. The logo used in Prince’s Catcher is, in fact, the new Little, 
Brown creation, only adopted by the publisher in 2009 rather than its 1951 equivalent. 
203 Prince’s, then, is an appropriation of a later reprint of the 1951 edition, rather than 
of the original first, as Prince suggests. The 1951 Little, Brown and Co. logo, as it 
appeared in the original edition of Salinger’s novel, differed significantly from the one 
used today and does not feature in Prince’s volume [compare Figure 5, Figure 6, and 
Figure 7]. What Prince must have appropriated as his source is a 2010 reprint of the 
1951 edition, available as part of a J.D. Salinger box set of four books, a widely 
accessible mass market publication [Figure 7].204  
                                                             
203 A Brief History of Little, Brown, and Co., Little, Brown and Company, accessed 20 may 
2013, http://www.littlebrown.com/175.html.  
204 The copyright page of this edition of The Catcher reads: ‘Published by Little, Brown and 
Company, July 1951, Text reset September 2010.’ I am indebted to Eric Doeringer for 
sharing information about the edition used in his 60 Years Later project that made tracing 
Prince’s source possible. 
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FIGURE 5: J.D. SALINGER, THE CATCHER IN THE RYE, FIRST EDITION, 1951 AND ITS 
TITLE PAGE, WITH THE ORIGINAL 1951 LITTLE, BROWN, AND CO. LOGO  
 
 
FIGURE 6: THE TITLE PAGE OF RICHARD PRINCE'S THE CATCHER IN THE RYE (2011), 
APPROPRIATING THE NEW, 2009, LITTLE, BROWN, AND CO. LOGO 
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FIGURE 7: J.D. SALINGER BOX SET, 2010, INCLUDING THE CATCHER IN THE RYE 2010 
REPRINT OF THE 1951 EDITION, WITH THE NEW, 2009, LITTLE, BROWN , AND CO. LOGO 
 
This is a telling gesture, evocative of Prince’s broader attitude towards 
creativity and authorship, overtly devaluing Salinger’s volume, foregrounding the 
widespread tendency to fetishise first editions and this particular novel itself, as well 
the celebrity status both Salinger and Prince enjoy. As Prince puts it:  
that [The Catcher in the Rye] is just a favorite book. I'm aware of the 
implications. It's kind of the Disneyland of book publishing. You don't 
mess with images from Disney. You don't near it. And [The] Catcher 
in the Rye is also on lockdown; it's almost become an institution, it's 
very sacred. It's very rare to get a great first-edition copy.205 
 
But Prince is an institution himself. In his hands, a mass-produced reprint of 
Salinger’s novel turns into a highly coveted and expensively priced art object, turning 
the critique of the fetish of the book into a self-conscious statement on the 
fetishisation of Richard Prince, the artist, and the art market more broadly. Here 
distinctions between high art and mass market production are blurred, an approach 
reflected in the sales of Prince’s Catcher. Printed in 500 copies, Prince’s ‘novel’ 
retailed for $65, with some copies sold for a discounted $40 in Central Park, New 
York, from a provisional stall set up by Prince [Figure 8]; further copies marketed for 
                                                             
205 Richard Prince, Interview by Kim Gordon, Interview, accessed 07 June 2014, 
http://www.interviewmagazine.com/art/kim-gordon-richard-prince/#_.  
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a few hundred dollars, with signed books sold for $2,000 and more, these price 
brackets set to reflect on and double the value assigned to Salinger’s first editions, 
signed and unsigned respectively – first editions of which Prince’s volumes were not 
even a reprint.206  
The only addition to repurposed source material here is Prince’s copyright 
disclaimer: ‘This is an artwork by Richard Prince. Any similarity to a book is 
coincidental and not intended by the artist. © Richard Prince.’207 By breaking all the 
copyright rules, Prince, at the same time, abides by the rules of copyright. His 
copyright note recognises the work’s derivative nature but immediately posits itself 
as intentionally transformative to unambiguously refute potential accusations of a 
copyright breach. Prince here juggles the copyright rhetoric in a manner evocative of 
case law, pointing, it would seem, to its subjective, ambivalent processes and its 
inability to control the current state of iterative aesthetic affairs.           
 
FIGURE 8: JAMES FREY WITH A COPY OF RICHARD PRINCE'S THE CATCHER IN THE 
RYE IN CENTRAL PARK, NEW YORK 
 
Eric Doeringer’s 60 Years Later: Coming Through the Rye (2012) is another 
useful example, a project that appropriates both a specific work of appropriation – 
Colting’s 60 Years Later – and an appropriation gesture in Prince’s Catcher. Evoking 
                                                             
206 Three years after its publication, copies (unsigned) of Prince’s Catcher sell for $1,200.00 
[abebooks.com, accessed 8 August 2014, 
http://www.abebooks.com/servlet/SearchResults?an=Richard+Prince&sts=t&tn=Catcher+i
n+the+Rye,], while copies of the first edition, first printing of Salinger’s novel start at 
$1,800.00. First edition, later 1951 reprints start at as little as $150 [abebooks.com, accessed 
8 August 2014  
http://www.abebooks.com/servlet/SearchResults?an=Salinger&bi=0&bx=off&ds=30&fe=o
n&kn=Little+Brown+1st+printing&recentlyadded=all&sortby=17&tn=Catcher+in+the+Rye
&x=50&y=11].  
207 Prince, The Catcher, copyright page.   
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Prince’s 2011 project and referencing the Salinger v. Colting case, Doeringer’s is a 
reprint of Colting’s novel. It is an unauthorised appropriation of an unauthorised 
sequel. But, as Doeringer’s copyright page reads, this is ‘an unauthorised sequel to 
Richard Prince’s appropriation of The Catcher in the Rye. Any similarity to the book 
is coincidental and not intended by the artist. © Eric Doeringer.’208 Doeringer’s work 
might look like Colting’s volume, it might be a copy of Colting’s text, but it is, 
Doeringer claims, an appropriation of Prince’s piece. Prince’s influence is not purely 
conceptual, as acknowledged in this disclaimer – itself iterative, an appropriation of 
Prince’s disclaimer, printed in his Catcher – but manifested in a number of 
paratextual references. The publisher’s logo that Doerringer uses, for example, is an 
appropriation of Prince’s appropriation of Little, Brown, and Co.’s logo, used to 
replace the black bird of Windupbird, Colting’s publishers [Figure 11]. All references 
to Salinger in Colting’s novel are substituted for reference to Prince, e.g. Colting’s 
dedication, ‘to J.D. Salinger, the most terrific liar you ever saw in your life,’ reads ‘to 
Richard Prince, the most terrific liar you ever saw in your life,’ in Dorringer’s work. 
The same logic informs the appropriation of the text on the back cover; Colting’s 
examination of a relationship between J.D. Salinger and his character is transformed 
here into a meditation on Prince and his most famous character [Figure 9 and Figure 
10].  
        
FIGURE 9: J.D. CALIFORNIA, 60 YEARS LATER AND ERIC DOERINGER, 60 YEARS LATER, 
FRONT COVERS 
                                                             
208Eric Doeringer, 60 Years Later : Coming Through the Rye (New York : Copycat 
Publications, 2012).  
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FIGURE 10:  J.D. CALIFORNIA, 60 YEARS LATER AND ERIC DOERINGER, 60 YEARS LATER, 
BACK COVERS 
 
Conflating the discourse and symbols used on the dust jackets of Colting’s 
novel and Prince’s work, and repurposing both in a single act of appropriation of 
appropriation, Doeringer’s 60 Years is illustrative of the dynamic of authorship that 
is realised in a familiar Barhesian gesture, where each text assumes a form of an 
extensive tissue of quotations only reconceptualised for the contemporary culture of 
hyperbolic iterative gestures. Here, the abundance of texts, more or less interesting, 
the proliferation of copies of copies, assumes a quality of a creative gesture. The 
complex structure of appropriated authorship that Doeringer constructs – is his 60 
Years an appropriation of Prince’s, Salinger’s, Colting’s work? All of them, only some 
of them? – emerges as a particularly evocative manifestation of ‘the voice that loses 
its origin’ when the new, appropriated ‘writing begins.’ 209  Reading Doeringer via 
Barthes should not be seen as a rather overfamiliar exercise in theory of reading and 
writing after poststructuralism (even if its echoes are apparent), but, I suggest, a 
means of drawing attention to legal categories of originality. As mentioned earlier, 
originality in legal terms is defined in relation to the author as origin and takes no 
interest in in novel or creative thinking. But, if such an approach to writing assumes 
                                                             
209 Roland Barthes, ‘The Death of the Author’, in Image-Music-Text, trans. Stephen Heath 
(London: Fontana Press, 1997), 141. Hereafter DOA.     
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the iterative form, where writing begins when the voice loses its origin, then the legal 
category of originality cannot apply. Without an ‘origin’ it is impossible to speak of 
originality in the legal sense. Such an approach to thinking about the source text and 
its authorship is a clear manifestation of the contemporary iterative thinking with a 
propensity to exchange, reuse and appropriate material regardless of where it came 
from. The complexity of the structure of attribution and appropriation in Doeringer’s 
work seems to echo potential challenges of assignation of authorship in the 
postproduction context, where texts are constantly copied, pasted, deleted, reblogged, 
and retweeted, disseminated in a manner that often removes the copy from the origin 
and, hence, makes attribution a challenge. But here attribution and recognition of the 
origin are also not a primary concern. As such, Doeringer’s is not simply a yet another 
appropriation piece but, I suggest, a work that emerges as a manifestation of a 
particular creative attitude, one that marks a tendency in creative practice in which 
very specific thinking about paradigms of authorship and creativity is expressed in a 
radical form, where attitudes become form.210  
                                                             
210 My description of contemporary iterative gestures as a manifestation of attitudes that 
become form draws on a title of perhaps the most formative exhibitions of conceptual art, 
Live in Your Head: When Attitudes Become Form, curated by Harald Szeeman and 
exhibited in 1969 in Kunsthale Bern, Germany. Szeeman’s exhibit was key is 
reconceptualising the role of the curator (a trajectory relevant to my discussion of author as 
curator in Chapter 3). It took particular interest in elevating artistic process over product 
and in exhibition practice as a linguistic medium. It proved foundational both as an event 
and a conceptual model. As Scott Burton explains, ‘the exhibition gather[ed] a number of 
artists whose works have very little in common yet also a great deal in common. The 
similarities are less stylistic than intellectual. […] The difference between painting and 
sculpture has gone (following that between poetry and prose in verbal art) […] art and ideas 
are becoming indistinguishable […] words are looked at, pictures are read, poems are 
‘events’, plastic or visual art is ‘performed’’ [Scott Burton, ‘Notes on the New’, Live in your 
Head: When Attitudes Become Form, exhibition catalogue, 22 March 1969 – 27 April 1969 
(Kunsthale Bern), non. pag]. It was the particular attitude, manifested in the new art of the 
time, that was key to formulating the form of the exhibit. A similar conceptual gesture, I 
suggest, is being reiterated today, at the contemporary Iterative turn, where an attitude 
inflicted by an inherently simulacral culture of ‘copy-paste’ manifests itself in proliferation of 
iterative creative forms. Interestingly, that approach towards expressing contemporary 
aesthetic sensibilities through acts of iteration has found its manifestation in a contemporary 
iteration of Szeeman’s exhibit. Curated by Germano Catelan and exhibited in Venice in 2013, 
When Attitudes Become Form: Bern 1969/Venice 2013 reconstructed the original exhibit to 
posit it as both a copy of the 1969 show and an original exhibit in its own right. Catelan’s 
gesture is significant here as a means of appropriating the dictum of Szeeman’s exhibit as a 
framework for discussing contemporary Iterative turn. Repeated in 2013, Catelan’s Attitudes 
transformed Szeeman’s Attitudes into a readymade, a source text like any other, that can be 
repurposed and recontextualised in space and time. As a project particularly relevant to my 
thinking about iteration, it points to an implicit currency of the 1960s gesture as it remerges 
at the Iterative turn.  
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FIGURE 11: SPINES OF SALINGER'S THE CATCHER IN THE RYE (1951/2010), PRINCE'S THE 
CATCHER IN THE RYE (2011), COLTING'S 60 YEARS LATER (2009), AND DOERINGER'S 60 
YEARS LATER (2012), SHOWING THEIR RESPECTIVE LOGOS 
 
Prince’s and Doeringer’s appropriation projects have not, to date, proven 
controversial from the copyright’s point view. And neither has Vanessa Place’s 
Twitter-based attempt at copying every single word of Mitchell’s Gone with the Wind. 
All three are potentially much more problematic than Colting’s or Randall’s attempts 
at writing through, unquestionably derivative, openly unoriginal, and not 
transformative at all. There might be a significant market value attached to both 
Salinger’s and Mitchell’s novels (and the parodies or sequels that follow) as widely 
regarded and recognised cultural capital, but the unlikely economic potential of 
radical avant-garde gestures keeps these three works outside of copyright’s scope and 
interest. Prince’s Catcher might be selling for a high price, but its marginal appeal and 
lack of mass market value place it, from copyright’s point of view, alongside other 
marginal works, of little interest to copyright holders. From the literary standpoint, 
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the two legal cases discussed in this chapter remain rooted in the same discourse that 
dominated postmodern discussions of appropriation in literature, focusing on parody 
and pastiche as key notions, reliant on appropriated fragments, conscious and overt 
commentary on the source and marked differences between the appropriated text and 
its intertext. Morris, Place, Doeringer, and Prince all engage in more radical literary 
appropriations, their hyperbolic transcriptions and retweeted novels reformulate the 
nature of the engagement with the appropriated text as governed by the dynamic of 
the postproduction landscape. These are instances of Federman’s pla[y]giarim,211 
rather than manifestation of plagiarism, examples of a game, a performance for the 
Iterative turn, and should be treated as such. ‘The challenge for the twenty-first-
century writers is,’ as Stephen Voyce comments, ‘how to create aesthetic objects that 
problematize, baffle and defy the enclosures of intellectual property regimes.’ 212 
Novels such as Hegemann’s, and experimental avant-garde projects such as Morris’s, 
Place’s, Doeringer’s, should all be seen as a response to the challenge that Voyce 
describes, as manifestations of the same iterative thinking evocative of a shifting 
attitude to paradigms of creativity and authorship. However, because of publishing 
limitations driven by legal constraints, such subversive gestures cannot be fully 
explored in the context of mainstream publishing, by means of engagement with more 
traditional literary forms, where conservative thinking about models of authorship 
dominates. Any attempt at experimenting with acts of iterative writing in such a 
context becomes subject to formal constraints that detract from their critical, creative 
potential. As such, it is within the avant-garde circles rather than through cases such 
as Salinger and Suntrust that the contemporary paradigms of authorship and 
creativity can be interrogated, while avenues for the exploration of the possibilities of 
alternative copyright thinking open up.  
But can these renegotiated modes of authorship that are currently emerging 
fit into the copyright framework in its current form? These practices emerge on the 
fringes of copyright driven by a certain sense of permissiveness to reuse and 
reappropriate that the contemporary postproduction landscape seems to encourage. 
Voyce characteristically associates these contemporary uncreative practices with the 
rise to prominence of decentralised, non-proprietary modes of authorship and 
information dissemination, propagated and supported by open source software, the 
Free Culture movement and increasing implementation of creative commons 
agreements. ‘Like open source programmers,’ Voyce observes, ‘those poets and artists 
                                                             
211 Raymond Federman, ‘Imagination as Plagiarism [An Unfinished Paper]’, New Literary 
History, 7.3 (1976), 565. 
212 Voyce, 420.  
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who make such tactics the hallmark of their creative practice had had to organise 
activist networks in opposition to intellectual property regimes.’213 With the rise to 
prominence of platforms such as UbuWeb (an open access repository of all things 
avant-garde, curated by Goldsmith) and publishers such as IAM, the discourse of 
creative commons pervades the avant-garde literary scene today. The poetic economy 
of no economy, hence, emerges as a privilege that ensures creative freedom to 
experiment and subvert, relying on accessibility and online visibility as tools for 
dissemination of works created on the fringes of the creative establishment; ‘if it 
doesn’t exist on the internet,’ says Goldsmith, ‘it does not exist.’214  
If it does exist online, however, it proves everyone’s to repurpose, copy, paste 
and appropriate, so it would seem. The increasing sense of entitlement to appropriate, 
a rather utopian, communal sense of non-ownership that pervades digital thinking 
today, increasingly ties in with a sense of permissiveness to do so in the creative 
circles. As an example, in 2012 Don Share, the Editor of Poetry magazine, one of the 
most established periodicals in the poetry world, tweeted a link to a blog called 
AMF.215 The platform was devoted to turning the entire 2012 (centenary) run of the 
magazine issues into works of experimental poetry, erasing, translating, collaging, 
turning language of Poetry into the language of code, among other iterative methods 
[Figure 12]. Share’s approach can be seen as a manifestation of a broader cultural 
tendency. The model put forward by contemporary avant-gardes discussed here 
requires a relinquishment of ownership, repudiation of authorship to then enable 
subsequent acts of authorship with a différance – a trajectory that makes 
appropriation’s reliance on acts of expropriation particularly explicit. But such a 
framework also serves as a destabilising mechanism. The avant-garde projects 
discussed in this and the following chapters put into question the dominant, 
normative ideas of authorship and as a result interrogate the relationship between 
author and text traditionally understood, with the widespread tendency to foreground 
the illusory, utopian view of originality, as defined by legal doctrine. However, as 
Goldsmith observes, ‘by opposing creativity as commonly accepted — in a sense by 
constructing a negative notion of creativity — perhaps we can breathe new life into 
                                                             
213 Ibid, 409.  
214 Kenneth Goldsmith, ‘If it doesn’t exist online, it doesn’t exist’, 27 September 2005, 
Electronic Poetry Centre, accessed 9 August 2014, 
http://epc.buffalo.edu/authors/goldsmith/if_it_doesnt_exist.html. 
215 Don Share, Twitter post, 6 May 2012, https://twitter.com/Don_Share.  
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this practice.’216 This attitude informs text and practices discussed in Chapters 2, 3, 
and 4.  
 
      
FIGURE 12: POETRY MAGAZINGE, JANUARY 2012 COVER AND ITS ERASURE FROM AMF BLOG 
 
 
 
                                                             
216 Kenneth Goldsmith, ‘Petty Theft: Kenny G Gives A’s for Unoriginality’, interview with 
Anne Henochowicz, The Daily Pennsylvanian, 18 November 2004, accessed 9 August 2014, 
http://wings.buffalo.edu/epc/authors/goldsmith/goldsmith_petty_theft.pdf. 
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PART 1: WRITING UNDER ERASURE 
 
On their website, alongside standard sections informing their readers about 
authors they work with and published books, Wave Books – an independent press 
based in Seattle, WA – also include a tab called ‘Erasures’. ‘Erasure,’ as the website 
reads, ‘is a process by which you can take any text and from it, create a poem.’217 A 
flash application included on the Wave Books webpage enables textual production by 
such means. Set up as an erasure engine, encouraging Wave Books readers to generate 
their own texts, the application offers a number of sources to be edited and erased, 
including, among others, fragments of Henry James’s The Bundle of Letters, 
Aristophanes’s Clouds, and an excerpt from an anonymous History of Insects. As an 
example, the following fragment of Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason is 
available:  
 
FIGURE 13: WAVE BOOKS ERASURE ENGINE, SAMPLE SOURCE TEXT (IMMANUEL KANT, 
CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON) 
 
Subject to the erasure process, it generates poems such as ‘Law of Reason’ by KB: 
                                                             
217 Erasures, Wave Books, accessed 11th July 2012, http://erasures.wavepoetry.com.  
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FIGURE 14: 'LAW OF REASON', A SAMPLE ERASURE POEM, WAVE BOOKS ERASURE ENGINE 
 
or ‘Kantian Love Poem’ by a user ShakM (with 167 other uploaded to date):  
 
FIGURE 15: 'KANTIAN LOVE POEM', WAVE BOOKS ERASURE ENGINE 
 
The archive currently comprises 4117 poems.218 The earliest submission dates 
back to March 2006 and coincides with Wave Books’s publication of Mary Ruefle’s A 
Little White Shadow (2006). Ruefle’s book is a poetry volume and an art project at 
the same time, created by Tippexing out significant sections of an obscure nineteenth-
century book of the same title. The publication is a facsimile reprint of Ruefle’s 
manuscript, preserving the typography and the unusual design. In the erasure 
process, the entire volume is subject to appropriation, including the title page, with 
the original author’s name whited out and Ruefle’s handwritten in its place [                      
                                                             
218 Figure as of November 9, 2014.  
| 84 
 
 
Figure 16]. While much could be said about the poetics of Ruefle’s text, what I am 
primarily interested in here is its form. Ruefle’s commitment to erasure reflects its 
increasing prominence and popularity today. This chapter focuses on erasure as an 
iterative practice – a method that involves both acts of repetition and alteration of a 
source to create a new text – and presents it as an inherently contemporary form of 
writing that engages in questions that motivate changes in attitudes towards creativity 
at the Iterative turn. While the first part of the chapter sets out the premises of erasure 
in general, the second part is an attempt at arriving at an alternative model of 
authorship for thinking about erasure today. In my attempt at formulating a theory 
of the genre, I focus on instances of writing described here as ‘documents under 
erasure’ to suggest notions of memory and archivisation as a framework for defining 
erasure as a creative practice.  
 
 
 
                      FIGURE 16: MARY RUEFLE, A LITTLE WHITE SHADOW, TITLE PAGE 
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2.1. ERASURE: THE THIRD MIND AESTHETICS 
 
Although a form that speaks particularly explicitly to the current cultural 
moment, erasure has a literary history. The technique used to create A Little White 
Shadow brings to mind two earlier textual experiments, Tom Phillips’s A Humument 
(1973)219 and Ronald Johnson’s Radi os (1977). Phillips’s work is, as the author puts 
it, a treated document based on William Mallock’s A Human Document (1893). In A 
Humument, pages of A Human Document are transformed. The original text is 
covered with images which obscure the content but leave a selection of words visible; 
words that create the text of A Humument [        Figure 17]. Authorship here emerges 
as a manifestation of an interplay between the processes of reading and writing, an 
approach explicitly echoed in the Wave Books online app. Characteristic of the 
process of authoring by such means is a significant shift in form. An act of erasure 
transforms the familiar linearity of a book into an exploration into the possibilities of 
experimenting with the printed page. As Phillips himself described it: ‘[the] story is a 
non-linear narrative [...] a dispersed narrative with more than one possible order, 
more like a pack of cards than a continuous tale.’220 The fragmented story of A Human 
Document, composed as a scrapbook of letters, journals, and memorabilia of two 
lovers is, in Phillips’s hands, recreated as a new fragmented, non-linear, hypertext-
like narrative, a story of Bill Toge, created in a process of an overtly discursive 
interplay between the text and its intertext, or, as A Humument reads, ‘that odd 
broken novel [...] the narrative art of the third creation.’221  
Phillips references William Burroughs’s and Brion Gysin’s concept of the 
Third Mind of collaboration here, an independent entity that arises from a friction 
between two inherently different sets of creative methods and aesthetic approaches:  
The Third Mind [...] represents the experimental stage. It is not the 
history of a literary collaboration but rather the complete fusion in a 
praxis of two subjectivities, two subjectivities that metamorphose into 
                                                             
219 A Humument was initially only available in a 1973 exhibition edition, first published in a 
trade edition in 1980. It still enjoys such a double status. As a work of literature, it is 
currently available in its 5th paperback edition (published in 2012). As a visual arts piece, it 
remains widely exhibited. Examples include a recent Life’s Work at MASS MoCA 
(Massachusetts Museum of Contemporary Art), which run in 2013-2014 and included over 
1000 pages from the 1st as well as the most recent, 5th edition of A Humument. A selection of 
the original 1970 pages is currently archived at Tate Britain, classed as artworks and 
available in the Prints and Drawing room [see for example: 
http://www.tate.org.uk/art/artworks/phillips-no-title-p-271-p01526]. 
220 Tom Phillips, ‘Notes on A Humument’, in A Humument: A Treated Victorian Novel 
(London: Thames and Hudson, 2012), non pag. 
221 Tom Phillips, A Humument: A Treated Victorian Novel (London: Thames and Hudson, 
2012), 5. Hereafter HTVN. 
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a third; it is from this collusion that a new author emerges, an absent 
third person, invisible and beyond grasp, decoding the silence.222  
 
A manifestation of Burroughs’s and Gysin’s thinking, authorship in A Humument 
should be understood as a product of this third subjectivity. The text is a hybrid 
creation of the abstract third person, writing, by analogy, a text that is a fusion of 
stories and sensibilities. As Phillips’s comments:  
a hidden hero emerged from behind the columns of the text to interact 
with the novel's real protagonists, and to make a contrast to them in 
class and style. Mallock's first name was William. He does not look like 
someone you would call Bill, so this would be a good name for his 
commonplace alter ego. When I chanced on 'bill' it appeared next to 
the word 'together' and thus the distinctly downcast and blokeish 
name Bill Toge was born. It became a rule that Toge should appear on 
every page that included the words 'together' and 'altogether' (as 
indeed befits a doppelganger).223 
 
This is writing characterised by a certain sense of reading between the lines, or, 
perhaps more accurately, against the lines, rather than as a result of a rejection and 
destruction of the source text and the book as an object. Seen as such, Phillips’s 
method of treating the novel subsumes acts of repetition and removal at the same 
time, where the creative process is based on a conflation of the possibility inscribed 
in the iterability of a text and the aesthetics of alterity.  
In A Humument the familiar models of narrativity are rejected, positioning it 
very firmly within the experimental arts and literary scene contemporaneous with 
Phillips’s early experiments. Phillips’s creative practice evokes, among others, works 
of Raymond Queneau (i.e. his Cent mille milliards de poèmes/A Hundred Thousand 
Billion Poems (1961) or Exercises in Style (1947)). His ‘pack of cards’ approach brings 
to mind Marc Saporta’s Composition No. 1 (1962) and B.S. Johnson’s The 
Unfortunates (1969), both examples of books in a box, comprising a set of loose pages. 
The act of erasing a page in the 1970s also conjures similar experiments in visual arts, 
with most prominent examples including Robert Rauschenberg’s Erased de Kooning 
Drawing (1953) [Figure 18] and Marcel Broodthaers’s appropriation of Stéphane 
Mallarmé’s ‘Un Coup de Dés’/‘A Throw of Dice’ (1969) [Figure 19]. While 
Rauschenberg removes an image to create an erased work of art, 224  Broodthaers 
                                                             
222 William S. Burroughs and Brian Gysin, The Third Mind (New York: A Saver Book/The 
Viking Press, 1978), 17-18. 
223 Phillips, ‘Notes’. 
224 In his piece Rauschenberg restages an earlier DADA gesture, a performance in which 
André Breton erased lines of a picture immediately after Francis Picabia had drawn them 
(1920). The aesthetics of Broodthaers’s blacked out page can be seen as a reference to Man 
Ray’s ‘Lautgedicht’ (1924). ‘Lautgedicht’, a sound-poem, is composed of black bars only. 
These are of different length, implying the length of words they cover, and are organised in 
four stanzas. The acts of removing, erasing, and blacking out content in the mid-twentieth 
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works according to principles of remediation, transforming a work of literature into a 
work of art by means of erasure. Broodthaers’s piece is an ‘image’, as a subtitle to the 
work reads, created by replacing lines of Mallarmé’s poem under the same title with 
black blocks sized and organised in line with Mallarmé’s instructions for its layout 
and font. As Johanna Drucker puts it, ‘Broodthaers reduces “Un Coup de Dés” to its 
structure […] he elevates the structure of the work to a concept worthy of study in its 
own right.’225 Broodthaers’s interest in the form rather than the content brings to the 
fore the propensity for working with a blank, erased space that seems to have emerged 
at the time.  
 
        FIGURE 17: TOM PHILLIPS, A HUMUMENT (2012), PAGE 4 
                                                             
century repeat the earlier avant-garde acts, immediately inscribing the erasure aesthetics 
into the history of the avant-gardes. Contemporary erasure can be seen as a continuation of 
the recurring engagement with such avant-garde gestures and a manifestation of avant-
garde thinking for the postproduction moment. The possibility of reading iterative writing 
practices today as a manifestation of neo-neo-avant-garde aesthetics is discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 3.  
225 Johanna Drucker, The Century of Artist Books (New York: Granary Books, 2004), 115.  
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FIGURE 18: ROBERT RAUSCHENBERG, ERASED DE KOONING DRAWING (1953) 
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FIGURE 19: MARCEL BROODHAERS, ONE OF THE 12 PLATES OF A THROW OF DICE 
(1969) 
 
 
Although a clear manifestation of an emergent aesthetic tendency, A 
Humument defies an unambiguous historical contextualisation. For Phillips, A 
Humument is a lifelong project, started in 1966 and still in progress today, currently 
available in its fifth edition, published in 2012. The work is constantly revised, defined 
by processes of iteration and alterity, with each edition offering a new rendering of 
the first publication. All subsequent versions of A Humument introduce distinct 
iterations of the original, ‘changing now now,’226  adapting the earlier treatments, 
frequently echoing the cultural moment against the backdrop of which each given 
adaptation of Mallock’s text is created (e.g. the current 2012 volume references 
contemporary social media culture the events of 9/11) [        Figure 17]. As a result of 
Phillips’s ongoing treatement, each page of the original is gradually replaced by its 
altered version, in a multi-layered palimpsestic process of erasures upon erasure 
upon erasures, multiplying gaps as well as references, as if asking, after A Humument, 
‘is book game?’227 The page here emerges as an unstable space of meaning, both visual 
and textual, while any possibility of its alteration is, as Dworkin suggests, always 
implied in the source text.228 A Humument, as Phillips points out, has never ended, 
and as such, I suggest, could be treated as an exploration in the possibility of iteration 
                                                             
226 HTVN, 158.  
227 Ibid, 257.  
228 Dworkin, Reading, 135. 
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as a creative project. The repetition of a text destroyed under erasure becomes a 
positive, productive force, or, as Paul de Man puts it, ‘the unmaking of a construct’ 
governed by a deconstructive implication of ‘the possibility of rebuilding’229 inscribed 
into a seemingly negative act. The model of creativity defined as such grows out of an 
assumption that ‘the changes are the method.’230  
 
 
FIGURE 20: A HUMUMENT: PAGE 1 FROM 1973 EDITION AND FROM THE MOST 
RECENT, 2012 EDITION 
  
Like A Humument, Ronald Johnson’s Radi os is a text created by treating and 
adapting another text, a ‘rewriting by excision’231 of the first four books of the 1892 
edition of John Milton’s Paradise Lost. Unlike Phillips’s project, an art book and a 
textual experiment at the same time, Johnson’s places textuality at its core. Radi os 
emerges as a result of textual removal; the majority of its source is erased, while the 
remaining words and phrases form the body of the poem. As Steve McCafferey 
describes the process, ‘in Formalist terminology, [Johnson] applies a specific device 
                                                             
229 de Man, 141.   
230 HTVN, 11.  
231 Radi os is widely described as a ‘rewriting by excision,’ though this phrase is rarely 
referenced. It is a rephrasing of an alternative title of Radi os – ‘Poem excised Paradise Lost’ 
– introduced by Johnson himself. See: Peter O’Leary, a letter to Ron Silliman, Silliman’s 
blog, 29 March 2003, accessed 08 September 2014, 
http://ronsilliman.blogspot.co.uk/2003_03_23_archive.html.  
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of “finding and extracting.”’232 Although Johnson is not interested in treating the 
pages of his source text in the way Phillips does, typography still plays a significant 
role in his project. All the phrases that Johnson chooses to preserve remain on each 
page exactly where they were originally printed in Paradise Lost, forming a network 
of clusters of texts and blank spaces, a map to navigate this peculiar type of 
intertextuality [Figure 21]. While ‘remapping the space of dis-covered page,’ as 
Dworkin puts it, ‘the treated texts rechart the contours of its layout with clusters of 
text.’233  
Johnson applies the same erasure technique to all but one of his pages. 
Inserted as an epigraph to Radi os are the opening sixteen lines of Book One of 
Milton’s epic, also repeated and erased, but erased with a difference, or, perhaps more 
accurately, with a différance.234 The same source text that is subsequently repurposed 
to compose the opening section of Radi os is used in the epigraph, but where the first 
page of Johnson’s poem is composed solely of text and blanks left by the erased script, 
the epigraph includes a transcript of the entire passage lifted from Milton. However, 
all the text that is later erased by Johnson is here greyed out, with only the words that 
Johnson retains in his poem printed in black font [              Figure 22]. Milton’s original 
text as printed in the epigraph remains on the page but fades into the background, 
still visible, still legible, but only just; marking, I argue, Milton’s inescapable presence 
within Johnson’s subsequent pages and the inherently iterative nature of erasure as a 
                                                             
232 Steve McCafferey, ‘Corrosive Poetics: The Relief Composition of Ronal Johnson’s Radi 
os’, Pretexts: Literary and Cultural Studies, 11.2 (2002), 124. 
233 Dworkin, Reading, 128.  
234 Différance is a term coined by Derrida meaning both ‘to defer’ and ‘to differ.’ Derrida’s 
différance points to a number of features that govern the process of production of meaning. 
Derrida understands words as always deferred, i.e. as signs of which meaning is never 
completely apparent, unless defined in relation to other words, from which they differ. This 
is a dynamic that is explicitly evoked in A Humument, and in erasure writing more broadly, 
where writing emerges as a result of a deferral in the relationship between the source and 
erased text, but is only possible if difference between the two is apparent. Characteristically, 
Derrida talks about the notion of différance in terms of what he describes as ‘spacing’: 
‘Différance is the systematic play of differences, of the traces of differences, of the spacing by 
means of which elements are related to each other. This spacing is the simultaneously active 
and passive (the ‘a’ of différance indicates this indecision as concerns activity and passivity, 
that which cannot be governed by or distributed between the terms of this opposition) 
production of the intervals without which the "full" terms would not signify, would not 
function’ [Derrida, Positions, 21]. It is out of the work of spacing that differences are 
produced, where differences are held both within space and within time. When read in 
relation to Derrida’s notion, erasure can be seen as a mediation on the Derridean work of 
spacing, its literal rendering, where not just the words themselves but the spaces between 
them assume generative, productive qualities. It is within the space of the gaps on the page 
that the meaning is produced. The spatio-temporal structure of spacing as defined by 
Derrida is echoed most explicitly in Phillips’s broader project, where the work of spacing is 
an ongoing process, with the gaps transforming not only in the physical space of a page but 
also in time, changing with each subsequent edition.  
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writing technique. An act of erasure, Johnson seems to suggest, is always an act 
repetition, always inevitably a manifestation of iterative thinking.  
 
 
 
FIGURE 21: RONALD JOHNSON, RADI OS, P. 5 
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              FIGURE 22: RONALD JOHNSON, RADI OS, EPIGRAPH 
 
Johnson’s approach reverberates clearly with Luca Foss’s remarks on his 
Variation I of Handel’s Concerto Grosso, which Johnson references in his ‘Note’ to 
Radi os: ‘groups of instruments play the Larghetto but keep submerging into 
inaudibility […]. Handel’s notes are always present but often inaudible. The inaudible 
moments leave holes in Handel’s music (I composed the holes).’235 Subsuming echoes 
of Foss’s influence on his own creative practice, Johnson engages in a similar method, 
only substituting acoustic inaudibility for scriptural illegibility, in a textual reiteration 
of Handel-Foss dynamics, foregrounding the absent-presence of Milton on a page. As 
McCaffery puts it,  
by way of retinal tracking and excavation of the latent other poem Radi 
os ‘quotes’ the inaudible Milton, the Milton that is not Milton’s thereby 
bringing to textual apposition Rimboud’s famous ontological claim 
that ‘I is an other’ linguistically reformulated as ‘Text holds also an 
Other.’236  
 
McCaffery’s approach is evocative of the Third Mind thinking, pointing to a complex 
structure of textual production. Here, Milton composed Paradise Lost, Johnson, 
‘composed the holes,’237 and the Third Mind of this collaboration shaped Radi os. The 
Radi os Milton might not be Milton’s, as McCafferey points out, but it is still, 
                                                             
235 Ronald Johnson, ‘A Note and a Dedication’, in Radi os (Chicago: Flood Editions, 2005), 
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inevitably, Milton, altered, a ‘reduced, alembicated form of Paradise Lost,’238 a hybrid 
that is Johnson’s Milton, but Milton nevertheless. This, however, is not a feature of 
erasure as a creative method in general, as I will argue later in this chapter, but a 
characteristic quality of Johnson’s approach to erasure and his source text. Milton’s 
presence, like Handel’s in Foss, remains prominent in Johnson’s work. Hence, as Eric 
Sellinger points out,  
Radi os is anything but eccentric. […] [Johnson’s] poem places him 
squarely at the crossroads of two major Milton-reading traditions: the 
British romantic misprisons of Wordsworth and Blake, and the 
American romantic response in Poe and Emerson.239  
 
Sellinger’s statement points to Johnson’s declaration included in the opening note to 
the text in which the author describes Radi os as ‘the book Blake gave me 
[Johnson].’240  This approach places Radi os in a line of works continuing in the 
tradition of the source text, rather than transgressing and deconstructing it.  
However, such thinking about the nature of Johnson’s engagement with his 
source is problematic where the form of Radi os is concerned. Overtly experimental 
in their approach to the verse form, the pages of Radi os seem more evocative of the 
representative works of twentieth-century avant-gardes than those of the Romantics. 
As a strategy of both reading and writing, the paragramatic take on textuality inherent 
in erasure writing challenges the normative referentiality of language in a 
characteristically avant-garde fashion. By approaching a page of a source text as a 
platform for creative practice Phillips and Johnson, to various degrees, erase or 
overwrite the original, obscuring the text, rendering most of it illegible, and at the 
same time pouring new meaning into the reframed, remaining fragments. They 
engineer novel linguistic relationships built out of the pre-inscribed syntactic 
structures. As such, a text created by means of erasure is, in a characteristically 
postmodern sense, always already written. With their treatments of Milton and 
Mallock, Johnson and Phillips respectively engage in a process of simultaneously 
rewriting and ‘misreading’,241 to adopt Ihab Hassan’s term, and as such their erasures 
can be considered representative of radical subversive experimentation characteristic 
of postmodern poetics of the time. Hassan defines ‘misreading’ as one of the formative 
attributes of postmodernism, as opposed to the prevailing modernist hermeneutic 
preoccupation with interpretation. Similarly, Brian McHale identifies erasure as an 
                                                             
238 McCafferey,’Corrosive’, 125.  
239 Eric Selinger, ‘“I Composed the Holes”: Reading Rona Johnson’s “Radi os”’, 
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inherently postmodern practice, as an expression of the broader ontological 
instability of postmodern poetry, exemplifying postmodern poetry’s tendency 
towards what he refers to as ‘spaciness […] an attenuation of the verbal text and its 
progressive infiltration by ever greater volumes of white space.’ 242  Through their 
‘corrosive poetics,’243  to adopt McCafferey’s term, Johnson and Phillips also echo 
Cage’s and Mac Low’s diastic reading through procedural writing.  As such, they fall 
into the broader frame of postmodern experimental revisionism dominating their 
contemporary literary scene. With their resistance to grand narratives as well as fixity 
and constraints of the canon their writing represents, as one of Phillips’s meta-
erasures reads, ‘a generation in love with chancy art.’244  
Seemingly postmodern in its take on textuality, writing by erasure also 
reverberates clearly with the modernist aesthetics of fragmentation, of automatic 
collage writing, of poetry that could be described, after Perloff, as continuing ‘in the 
Pound tradition.’245  This is writing that is quotational, to return Greaney’s term, 
always implicated in or committed to referencing the unambiguously defined source. 
Erasure as practised by Phillips and Johnson destroys and reaffirms the source text 
at the same time. For Phillips and Johnson writing by erasure is not just writing 
through but a dialogic process of reading-(re)writing in a dynamic interplay of a text 
and its intertext. The erased text conceptualised as such serves as an immediate 
acknowledgement of the source, a peculiar conceptual footnote to it, and as such 
proves reminiscent of Eliot’s meticulously hyperbolic footnoting in The Wasteland 
and Pound’s poetic approach, both heavily reliant on citation strategies. To cite Travis 
Macdonald, commenting on Pound’s method:  
Ezra Pound might have travelled freely across the borders of 
appropriation, borrowing heavily from Homer and a host of others. 
Yet, even Pound’s imperative (‘make it new’) was more a matter of 
historical incorporation and homage than a truly revisionist gesture.246  
 
The same thinking about the nature of engagement with a source reverberates in 
Macdonald’s understanding of Pound’s citationality and Sellinger’s description of 
Radi os, both pointing to acts of iteration as a means of writing on rather than writing 
though or against an appropriated text.  
                                                             
242 Brian McHale, ‘Poetry under Erasure’, in Theory into Poetry: New Approaches to the 
Lyric, ed. Eva Müller-Zettelmann and Margarete Rubik (Amsterdam and New York: Rodopi, 
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243 McCafferey, ‘Corrosive’, 125.  
244 HTVN, 29.  
245 Marjorie Perloff, ’The Sound of Poetry’, PMLA 123 (2008), 753. 
246 Travis Macdonald, ’A Brief History of Erasure Poetics’, Jacket 38 (2009), accessed 03 
March 2012, http://jacketmagazine.com/38/macdonald-erasure.shtml.   
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The difficulty of reading erasures by Johnson and Phillips as either 
unambiguously modernist or postmodern practice resides in a differentiation 
between distinct approaches to citation as a creative tool. The former is based on the 
meticulous, conservative structure of reference as a means of following in a tradition 
of the source text, the latter a more open and subversive writing through, citing in a 
manner of Gertrude Stein rather than Ezra Pound (as Stein wrote: ‘I could never bring 
myself to use […] quotation marks, they are unnecessary, they are ugly, they spoil the 
fine line of writing and printing’). 247  What transpires from this collage of 
contradictory critical voices is a sense that erasures according to Phillips and Johnson 
seem to reside rather uncomfortably in their cultural moment. The very scant body of 
available criticism addressing both texts fails to find an adequate aesthetic framework 
for this creative approach as it emerged in the 1970s. And although Phillips seems an 
easier case here, almost immediately and exclusively approached as, first and 
foremost, a visual artist, Johnson’s practice proves more problematic. His work is on 
the one hand experimental, subversive and intertextual enough to be considered 
postmodern (though anthologists of postmodern American poetry are reluctant to 
include Radi os), transgressive on the formal level to the extent that makes Johnson’s 
writing akin to that of Olson’s and Mac Low’s, but at the same time too canonical, too 
conservative, too much about Milton and continuing in the Miltonic tradition, to be 
recognised as such, too modernist in its approach to fragmentation and appropriation 
of the canon to fit the avant-garde climate of the 1970s. I would like to suggest that 
this disjunction can be addressed by looking at the current proliferation and rise in 
prominence of erasure writing as a creative technique. Importantly, Ruefle’s 
contemporary erasure by Tippexing, and erasures generated by the Wave Books 
online engine, openly follow the avant-garde practices described above and already 
explored over 40 years ago by Johnson and Phillips. ‘This situation has [...] already 
been announced,’ to borrow from Derrida, ‘why is it today in the process of making 
itself known as such and after the fact?’248  
More than just an echo of those two texts discussed above, I argue, Wave 
Books’s engagement with erasure writing represents an interest in a currently 
proliferating approach that I will refer to here, after Fitterman and Place, as creativity 
by erasure.249 Alongside a selection of other contemporary, radical takes on iterative 
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writing, which will be discussed later in this thesis, erasure is increasingly being 
adapted as an expression of a tendency for repetition, appropriation, and the 
aesthetics of copying in contemporary writing, as discussed in Chapter 1. The 
emergence and proliferation of erasure writing in the last decade is a manifestation 
of postproduction sensibilities. ‘The form speaks directly to the moment in which we 
live,’ as Sean Bishop declares,  
every day, we are overwhelmed with information, and we have to 
excerpt that information to make a story. Complete and unchallenged 
narratives are almost never given to us anymore, or rather, we’re [...] 
less and less inclined to accept them.250  
 
The avant-garde experiment that Johnson and Phillips instigated in the 1970s, 
alongside literary developments such as concrete poetry, found poetry, and literary 
appropriation in general, seem to have found a more appropriate cultural moment, to 
become re-appropriated as widely recognised creative practices that offer tools of 
cultural critique particularly relevant today. As Goldsmith suggests, commenting on 
what he sees as the contemporary rediscovery of concretism:  
it’s taken the web to make us see how prescient concrete poetics was 
in predicting its own lively reception half a century later. [...] what has 
been missing from concrete poetry was an appropriate environment in 
which it could flourish. For many years, concrete poetry has been in 
limbo: it’s been a displaced genre in search of a new medium. And now 
it’s found one.251 
 
The twenty-first-century interest in erasure reverberates clearly with the same 
cultural dynamics. Thus, today, the nature of erasure specifically, and appropriation 
more broadly, requires a reconceptualisation of these practices to include the 
proclivity of the current cultural moment, and my reading of twenty-first-century 
creativity by erasure resides in the approach as an underlying framework. In 
Derridean terms, writing by erasure now acts as ‘not only the system of notation [...] 
but the essence and the content of these activities themselves,’252 a manifestation of 
the essence of digital technology driven by the contemporary frame of the overarching 
‘copy-paste’ models of textual production and information dissemination.  
Commenting on a contemporary collection of erasure poems, Janet Holmes’s 
The MS of MY Kin (2009), Ron Silliman recently raised questions of value and 
innovation embedded in writing by erasure as it proliferates at present, asking 
whether contemporary iterations of the technique carry forward ‘in the same 
                                                             
250 Sean Bishop, an Interview by Wendy Xu, iO Poetry, 1.2 (2011), accessed 16 January 2012, 
http://iopoetry.org/archives/684.  
251 Kenneth Goldsmith, ‘From (Command) Line to (Iconic) Constellation’, UbuWeb Papers, 
accessed 10 November 2014, http://www.ubu.com/papers/goldsmith_command.html.  
252 OG, 9.   
| 98 
 
 
innovative spirit as the works that initiated them, or perhaps represent something [...] 
different.’ 253  Questions of reverence for and exigency of – as Silliman rather 
dismissively puts it – ‘an “erased” edition of every major work of English language’254 
aside, I would like to suggest that the latter is in fact the case, that erasure today 
emerges as a form characteristic of the Iterative turn and so should be seen as 
inherently contemporary. As Dworkin argues,  
even identical modes of illegibility255 produce a wide variety of unique 
local effects. [...] The formal elements of a text signify in specific, 
politically and historically inflected ways. [...] Form must always 
necessarily signify but any particular signification is historically 
contingent and never inherently meaningful a priori.256 
 
It is the foundations of the current cultural moment, residing in the transition of 
discursive practices from the printing press to digital textuality that, as I have already 
argued in Chapter 1, can be seen to affect the development of contemporary 
subjectivity also beyond the immediate confines of the digital environment. Erasure 
at the Iterative turn proliferates as a response to a particular technological thinking, 
to the essence of technology in its contemporary articulation. ‘In the last half-century,’ 
Macdonald contends, ‘under the mounting informational influences [...] the use of 
appropriation as a poetic tool has moved from the outskirts of abject plagiarism to a 
semi-accepted practice.’257 The challenges of thinking about erasure as it emerged in 
the 1970s, the discrepancy between paradigms of modernism and postmodernism 
manifested in Johnson’s and Phillips’s work, now blend into a complex, hybrid 
aesthetics of what Perloff describes as twenty-first-century modernism,258 ‘the new 
poetics,’ comfortably appropriating both postmodern subversion and modernist 
formalism, both converging in a postproduction, iterative aesthetics of today. It is the 
contemporary manifestations of erasure that are of particular interest to my argument 
here; texts triggered by a shifting attitude towards creativity at the Iterative turn, as 
discussed in the following sections of this chapter. I approach erasure as an 
expression of a clearly defined cultural moment to offer a framework for thinking 
about emergent paradigms of authorship.  
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2.2. ERASURE AT THE ITERATIVE TURN 
 
Janet Holmes’s 2009 poetry collection, The MS of MY Kin could be quoted as 
a representative example of contemporary erasure writing. The volume is an 
appropriation by erasure of Emily Dickinson’s 1861 and 1862 poems. As Holmes 
explains, the dating of the source is significant. Dickinson’s poems used in The MS go 
back to the first years of the United States Civil War, and were selected to provide a 
springboard for a creative response to another war – America’s invasion of Iraq. This 
approach is a manifestation of writing that, in a typically Derridean fashion, borrows 
from a heritage to deconstruct a heritage. Repeated and altered by means of erasure, 
Dickinson’s meditation on creativity, the inner flame that motivates the writing 
process in her ‘The Lamp Burns Sure Within’, for example, transforms into Holmes’s 
statement on oil politics and contemporary struggles for access to Middle Eastern 
resources, often identified as the key cause of the Iraq War. The two poems read:  
 
The Lamp burns sure – within – 
Tho’ Serfs – supply the Oil – 
It matters not the busy Wick – 
At her phosphoric toil! 
 
The Slave – forgets – to fill – 
The lamp – burns golden – on 
Unconscious that the oil is our – 
As that the Slave – is gone. 
Holmes’s Iraq war references are subtle, but echo clearly throughout the collection. 
The historical and conceptual framework is also acknowledged in the author’s ‘Notes’, 
identifying people and events referenced in the poems, ranging from the very general 
(‘soldiers, terrorists, occupiers, insurgents, and combatants on both sides’) to 
incredibly specific (Holmes names President George W. Bush, pilots of aircrafts on 
9/11, Osama Bin Laden, and Donald Rumsfeld, among others).259 
But it is not just the subject matter that is carefully contextualised in The MS 
of MY Kin. Holmes positions her work in line with the tradition of writing by erasure 
and eagerly references Phillips and Johnson as her sources of inspiration, proclaiming 
a particular affinity with the latter. There is a sense of a negotiation of idiosyncrasies 
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The Lamp burns sure – within – 
Tho’ Serfs – supply the Oil – 
It matters not the busy Wick – 
At her phosphoric toil! 
 
The Slave – forgets – to fill – 
The lamp – burns golden – on 
Unconscious that the oil is our – 
As that the Slave – is gone. 
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of history and poetry that converge in the experimental form of an erased poem. As 
Holmes explains:  
Erasure had seemed almost a parlor game to me in the past; it seemed 
too easy to have meaning. […] But what I discovered was a deep sense 
of collaboration in the process. I had to negotiate Dickinson’s 
language, history, and […] spiritual life, and found it immensely well 
suited to our own situation in what now seem to be the early years of a 
long, horrifying war. […] The voice is neither Dickinson’s nor my own: 
it is a third thing I use to unloose my anger.260 
 
Holmes, like Phillips before her, references the nature of the Third Mind of 
Collaboration that creativity by erasure brings to the fore. This thinking about writing 
as a form of repetition that is collaborative, that gives rise to a third subjectivity and 
relies on the possibility of iteration and alteration of the source text at the same time, 
explicitly resonates in Holme’s understanding of erasure writing. Writing by means 
of erasure, for Holmes, is an inherently iterative practice. It is driven by a 
commitment to repetition and involves, first, a retyping of the complete poems by 
Dickinson to then white out fragments of the text: ‘they [the words] are there,’ Holmes 
explains, ‘but they don’t show up when printed.’261 In a manner evocative of Johnson’s 
appropriation of Milton, Holmes’s is a repetition of the complete source text that 
assumes not only a hybrid subjectivity, but a hybrid form as well, with erasure 
structured as an act of textual removal and a graft at the same time, of a trace and a 
supplement.  
Such an absent-presence of words on a page also manifests itself in Yedda 
Morrison’s Darkness (2012), an erasure of the first chapter of Joseph Conrad’s Heart 
of Darkness (1899). The design of Morrison’s volume creates an illusion of a script 
read with an eraser, with slightly uneven smudges marking strokes of the erasing 
reader-writer’s hand preserved on all pages [Figure 23]. This approach is evocative of 
Rauschenberg’s gesture. His de Kooning drawing bears noticeable traces of both ink 
and crayon; marks of the act of erasure itself. Neither Morrison nor Rauschenberg 
produce a complete blank. Instead, their blank spaces are a constant reminder that, 
as Dworkin puts it, ‘there are no real absences, only replacements, one layer upon 
another.’ 262  Here, blank spaces replace language or an image in the process of 
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meaning making. Morrison’s take on Heart of Darkness is a manifestation of this 
approach. In her project, the author focuses on leaving behind only words and phrases 
which reference the natural world. This ‘linguistic excision of all things human [...] a 
biocentric reworking of the original text,’263 as Morrison describes it, brings to the 
fore questions of how source texts reassert themselves in the process of erasure 
writing, in the ‘luminous space,’264 as Darkness reads, on the erased page. Erasure 
here emerges as a source of a new origin, in the process of iteration repeating 
something that has already been said and that which has not, as yet, been articulated 
at the same time, engaging in the past and the future of writing simultaneously.  
 
 
FIGURE 23: YEDDA MORRISON, DARKNESS 
 
Reading Darkness results in a realisation that, as Dworkin puts it, ‘what 
counts as “the natural world” is far from self-evident, and Morrison’s erasures open 
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to a range of philosophical and ethical questions.’ 265  I am less interested in the 
ecocritical undertones of Morrison’s work than in her engagement with a broad range 
of questions on the nature of composition and the way language is (re)produced and 
circulated. These issues are reflected in the author’s collaboration on the Not Content 
project. Set up as a gallery residency in Los Angeles Contemporary Exhibitions 
(LACE) in 2010, Not Content brought together a number of installations curated by 
Les Figues Press to explore ‘the ways in which language functions within public and 
private spheres and within the tenuous space between these real and imagined 
realms’ and to interrogate ‘what is unsaid beneath the saying and said within a 
silence?’ 266  Alongside Morrison, participating writers included Craig Dworkin, 
Johanna Drucker, and Vanessa Place, among others. Morrison’s residency focused on 
turning the process of erasing Conrad’s Heart of Darkness into an act of public 
collaborative authorship. Morrison’s installation comprised a text of Heart of 
Darkness painted on the gallery walls, inviting the visitors to erase words and phrases 
they saw as relating to imperialism and the natural world, in line with the conceptual 
framework employed in Darkness. By foregrounding creativity by collaborative 
means, Morrison’s project turns into a poignant meditation on questions of the third 
mind, even more apparent here than in the individual erasure poetry volumes. A 
certain sense of an impossibility of attribution emerges from this collaborative 
erasure that subsumes a multiplicity of voices, all contained in one erased text. This 
is a subjectivity transformed, expressed in a hybrid process that involves reading and 
writing in equal terms, and, through a juxtaposition of both, raising questions about 
the stability of textual origins, and, hence, of originality. Here, to borrow from Spivak, 
‘each act of reading the “text” is a preface to the next.’267 
A similar, marked self-reflexivity also features prominently in Jen Bervin’s 
volume Nets (2004), a collection of erased Shakespearian sonnets. As one of the Nets 
poems reads, the collection remains ‘anchored’268 in the source text, which remains 
‘present-absent,’269 in a marked way ‘vanishing or vanished’270 at all times. Bervin’s 
words emerge from ‘the deep vermilion figures of [...] [a] shadow’271 of Shakespeare’s 
text, literally surrounded by nets of the source text, the faded, greyed-out language 
out of which Bervin’s selection of words emerges in black print, employing the method 
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Johnson used in his epigraph to Radi os [Figure 24]. ‘I stripped Shakespeare’s sonnets 
bare to the “nets,”’ Bervin writes, ‘to make the space of the poems open, porous, 
possible – a divergent elsewhere.’272 The interplay of the fading text of the original 
and the black font of Bervin’s poems invites a collaboration between the two, engaging 
in a dialogic exchange between Bervin and Shakespeare, in a perpetual erasure to 
come, erasing Shakespeare who, at the same time, to borrow from Harold Bloom, ‘will 
not allow you to bury him, or escape him, or replace him.’273  
 
 
FIGURE 24: JEN BERVIN, NETS, PAGE 45 
 
Though overtly acknowledging her inescapable influence – an approach 
particularly relevant where a text of such pervasive cultural prominence is concerned 
– Bervin, like Morrison and Holmes, moves away from a reading-writing by erasure 
as exemplified by Johnson in Radi os. This is where, I would like to suggest, a marked 
difference can be discerned between the practice of erasure adapted by contemporary 
authors and that of Johnson and Phillips. Rather than focusing on re-reading the 
source, providing a confined commentary on and an elaborate footnote to the original 
text, contemporary erasure writers engage with the pre-inscribed frame of familiar, 
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canonical discourse to reappropriate the sources and create new, stand-alone works 
rather than intertexts heavily dependent on and closely interlaced with the original. 
Johnson uses Milton to create a work that could be described as Johnson’s Milton, in 
which Milton still remains at the core of the erasure. In contrast, Bervin, Morrison, 
and Holmes engage with Shakespeare, Conrad, and Dickinson respectively to create 
contemporary poetry volumes by Bervin, Morrison, and Holmes. These new, original 
works treat a source as a creative springboard that presupposes an intrinsic level of 
engagement with the old but at the same time instigates a propensity for innovation 
and experimentation. ‘After form,’274  both constructing and at the same time de-
constructing the fixity and stability of the canonical core, these twenty-first-century 
erasures entice an engagement with both broad significant contemporary questions 
as well as the dynamic of the Iterative turn. Unlike Johnson’s negative poetics of loss, 
as described by McCafferey, Holmes, Morrison, and Bervin engage in a poetic play of 
différance. Instead of perpetuating the set of values advocated in the sources, as 
Johnson does, these contemporary writers simultaneously preserve and deconstruct 
it, to find those moments in the re-appropriated discourse that enable them to 
transgress the system of values exemplified by it, to transpose and translate them into 
the value of their own and their own time. The writing generated as a result opens the 
fixity of the source to the possibilities of new meaning. The contemporary context of 
postproduction culture affords a certain level of permissiveness for experimentation 
and appropriation beyond its familiar limits. As such, Bervin’s poetry, just like 
Morrison’s and Holmes’s, enables, as Philip Metres observed, a re-reading of the 
dynamic governing the relationship between tradition and modernism. In other 
words,  
rather than simply engaging in a poetic deconstruction of Shakespeare 
[...] Bervin’s text seems to perform an elegiac rendering of the ‘post-
literary’ moment itself. In an age in which literature itself seems to be 
part of residual culture [...] and ‘Shakespeare’ functions as tattered 
banner under which cultural conservatives like Harold Bloom battle 
the evils of political correctness and postmodernism in the academy 
[...] Bervin’s text breaks the urns of the sonnets into their fragmented 
parts, thus rendering the ghostly whole wholly ghostly.275 
 
2.3. WRITING SOUS RATURE 
 
By acknowledging and at the same time repudiating the traditional text, 
Rueffle, Morrison, Holmes, and Bervin all produce difference out of sameness, 
                                                             
274 Bervin, Nets, 13.   
275 Philip Metres, review of Nets by Jen Bervin, Jacket 25 (2004), accessed 12 July 2012, 
http://jacketmagazine.com/25/metr-berv.html.   
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presence and absence at the same time, both in a physical-typographical terms and 
through their approach to questions of authorship and the proprietary nature of a 
text. Theirs is a strikingly self-reflexive page,276  an experiment with form and an 
exploration of its expressive possibilities. Their writing can be said to operate sous 
rature, under erasure, as Spivak translates Derrida’s term in her preface to Of 
Grammatology (1976). Fittingly, Gregory Ulmer sees grammatology – ‘a science of 
the effacement of the trace’277  – as a ‘theory of writing as citation.’278  For Ulmer 
citation ‘does not reproduce the real, but constructs an object (its lexical field includes 
the terms “assemble, build, join, unite, add, combine, link, construct, organise”) […] 
in order to intervene in the world, not to reflect but to change reality.’279 Understood 
as such, writing sous rature turns into a framework particularly fitting a discussion 
of erasure writing today; it emerges as a vehicle of change that unsettles and 
destabilises the familiar paradigms, effacing a trace, propagating writing that is 
iterative rather than creative.  
Writing sous rature is a method employed by Derrida, understood as a process 
of writing a word, crossing it out, and leaving both printed on a page280 to suggest that 
something proves both ‘inaccurate yet necessary to say.’ 281  In this approach the 
authority of the text is put into question and attention is brought to its provisional 
nature. Thinking about writing sous rature gives prominence to the conceptualisation 
of the (unoriginal) origin as a trace, that which is not there, a presence and an absence 
at the same time, always arrived at in a process of a creation of a context for 
simultaneous production and erasure of discourse. As Derrida puts it,  
                                                             
276 I borrow the phrase from Louis Lüthi’s On the Self-Reflexive Page (2010). The volume is a 
history of self-reflexive pages of sorts, documented in an iterative act, and published as a 
volume of reprinted pages from a number of works that foreground experimentation with 
the possibilities of a printed page. Lüthi’s sources are as varied as Sterne’s Tristram Shandy 
(1759-67), Mark Danielewski’s The House of Leaves (2000) and William H. Gass’s The 
Tunnel (1995). 
277 TPOG, xlviii. 
278 Gregory Ulmer, ‘The Object of Post-Criticism’, in The Anti-Aesthetics: Essays on 
Postmodern Culture, ed. Hal Foster (New York: The New Press, 2002), 100. 
279 Ibid, 97. 
280 Derrida’s understanding of sous rature as a sign that has been crossed out is based on 
Heidegger’s ‘Being’ that has been crossed out on the page. But, as Spivak explains, there is a 
difference between Heidegger’s and Derrida’s method of putting words under erasure: 
‘“Being” is the master-word that Heidegger crosses out. Derrida does not reject this. But his 
word is “trace” […] a word that cannot be a master-word, that presents itself as the mark of 
an anterior presence, origin, master […] Heidegger’s Being might point at an inarticulable 
presence. Derrida’s trace is the mark of the absence of a presence, an always already absent 
present, of the lack at the origin that is the condition of thought and experience’ [TPOG, xv, 
xvii]. It is Derrida’s questioning of origins that I am particularly interested in here as a 
framework for thinking about erasure writing. For Derrida origin, and, hence, originality (if 
originality is to be understood as a manifestation of textual origins, as discussed in Chapter 
1) emerge as a trace, where origins are always put into question, erased, perhaps, and where 
the authority of texts is recognised as provisional.  
281 TPOG, xiii-xiv.  
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this interweaving results in each ‘element’ [...] being constituted on the 
basis of the trace within it of the other elements of the chain or system. 
This interweaving, this textile, is the text produced only in a 
transformation of another text. Nothing, neither among the elements 
nor within the system, is anywhere ever simply present or absent. 
There are only, everywhere, differences and traces of traces.282  
 
Just like Derrida’s sign sous rature, the contemporary approach to writing by erasure 
remains guided by the constant preservation and at the same time effacement of the 
sign, reversing, displacing and dismantling it, in order to ‘reconstruct what is always 
already inscribed,’ 283  writing by erasure as writing as tracing. Here, reading the 
blank284 is as important, if not more so, than reading the text itself. The space on the 
page signifies as a trace of the source text, of that which is not there, and as a signifying 
structure in its own right. As Derrida suggests, ‘spacing is not a simple negativity of a 
lacuna but rather the emergence of the mark.’285 Or, as Dworkin puts it, ‘rather than 
decrease the signifying ability of the text by making portions of the print illegible, […] 
erasures merely replace one set of signs with another equally significant set.’286 
If, as Derrida explains, writing is always a structure of signs under erasure, ‘a 
gesture effacing the presence of a thing and yet keeping it legible […] always already 
inhabited by the trace of another sign which never appears as such,’ 287  then the 
examples of writing by erasure discussed in this chapter become an essence of what 
writing in general in fact represents. Turning into an exaggerated form of a Barthesian 
tissue of quotations, writing by erasure enables writers to openly acknowledge the 
layers of influence embedded in any act of writing, refuting the Romantic notions of 
genius. When read in line with Derrida’s concept, the designation of the original texts 
turns into a nucleus of a plethora of possible new meanings, replacing the provisional 
closure embedded in the familiar notions of a literary work, fixed in the materiality of 
print and the inherent limitations of a bound, complete volume. A commitment to 
questioning the origins of texts – and hence their originality – allows for a shift in the 
                                                             
282 Derrida, Positions, 26.   
283 TPOG, lxxvii 
284 Edmund Jabès’s dictum – ‘read the blanks’ – reverberates explicitly in such thinking 
about erasure writing. As Jabès wrote: ‘A sound – uttered by whom? – and then nothing./ A 
word – written by whom – and then a blank. / Listen to the nothing. Read the blank’ 
[Edmund Jabès, reprinted in The Book of Margins, trans. Rosemary Waldrop (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1993), xi]. Here the eraser is more important than the pencil, 
the sound created in an interlude more significant than the music, an attitude evocative of 
Cage’s broader project and his experience of working with Schoenberg: ‘One day when I was 
studying with Schoenberg, he pointed out the eraser on his pencil and said, ‘this end is more 
important than the other’’ [John Cage, ‘Indeterminancy’, in Silence: Lectures and Writings 
by John Cage (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1961), 270].  
285 SEC, 10.  
286 Dworkin, Reading, 143.  
287 TPOG, xli, xxxix. 
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approach to the relationship between the source text and its iteration. When 
understood as an expression of Derrida’s sous rature, ‘the relationship between the 
reinscribed text and the so-called original text is not that of patency and latency, but 
rather the relationship between the two palimpsests.’ 288  Or, as Derrida puts it, 
‘reading [and writing] resembles those X-ray pictures which discover, under the 
epidermis of the last painting, another hidden picture: of the same painter or another 
painter, no matter.’289 Moving away from the finite nature of writing, authorship, and 
originality in copyright terms, in writing erasure, as in composition sous rature, ‘all 
conclusions,’ Spivak writes, ‘are genuinely provisional and therefore inconclusive, [...] 
all origins are similarly unoriginal.’290 As such erasure as a creative technique can be 
seen as an extension of the statement, a manifestation of Goldsmith’s uncreative 
writing as an expression of the open, provisional and infinite nature of language-play 
that Derrida advocates. This is a language that, in a form of an erasure of now 
canonised text, ‘bears with itself the necessity of its own critique,’ as Derrida 
contends, ‘a discourse which borrows from a heritage the resources necessary for the 
deconstruction of that heritage itself.’291 The same sense of unoriginality that does not 
imply a lack of originality in aesthetic terms but only a removal from an origin of a 
work or a text – from its author – reverberates here and in my discussion of iteration 
in Chapter 1. As a project committed to a reconceptualisation of the value of writing 
and a means of arriving at alternative models of thinking about creativity, iteration 
emerges as an inherently deconstructive practice, with erasure as one manifestation 
of such thinking. If, as Spivak explains, ‘the desire of deconstruction may itself 
become a desire to reappropriate the text actively through mastery, to show the text 
what it “does not know,”’ then erasure, and iteration more broadly, can be read as an 
embodiment, in poetic terms, of the project of deconstruction.292  
 
 
                                                             
288 Ibid, lxxv. 
289 Derrida, quoted in TPOG, lxxv-vi. 
290 TPOG, xiii. 
291 Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1978), 282.  
292 Using Derrida’s writing as a framework here is appropriate not just because of a useful 
range of terms and concepts but also because his writing is self-consciously iterative. His 
Dissemination, for example, is a collage of texts, or, as the editor’s note Dissemination reads: 
‘the ‘present’ essay is but a tissue of ‘quotations.’ Some are in quotation marks. Generally 
faithful, those taken from Nombres [Numbers] by Phillippe Sollers are written, unless 
otherwise indicated, both in quotation marks and in italics’ [Jacques Derrida, 
Dissemination, trans. Barbara Johnson (London: Continuum, 2011), 315]. The text consists 
of a selection of fragments from Numbers and Derrida’s frame text.  
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PART 2: DOCUMENT UNDER ERASURE  
 
It is worth returning to Janet Holmes as a means of contextualising a 
characteristic way of thinking about erasure, on which I will focus in the remainder 
of this chapter. Holmes’s interest in erasure technique in The MS of M Y Kin has 
deeply political undertones. As the author comments:  
I myself had had a very difficult and unsuccessful time trying to write 
about the war and was seeking a way to do it. Her [Emily Dickinson’s] 
writing opened up a way for me, and seemed to permit a collaboration 
with my intentions.293 
 
This choice to write under erasure was, Holmes declares, an act of desperation,294 an 
attempt to deal with an inability to speak in the wake of a traumatic event. Echoes of 
Lyotard’s take on the notion of trauma as a metaphor for the crisis of representation 
echo in Holmes’ statement. Trauma, as understood by Lyotard, prevents closure and 
as a result requires alternative ways of remembering, or rather of dealing with the 
constant presence of the traumatic event in cultural history. 295  And although, as 
Aleida Assman points out, ‘words cannot capture the trauma […] it is precisely such 
traumas that are in need of language, although it is not the language of memory and 
narrative,’296 but rather, I suggest, the fragmented language of writing sous rature. 
Erasure, I argue, is a form that can be seen as both a poignant representation of such 
an expressive void and a mode of writing that opens up new avenues for speaking of 
the traumatic experience; sous rature as a manifestation of language that, to 
paraphrase Spivak, is inadequate yet necessary.297 Erasure, then, evokes ‘the reality 
of a history that in its crises can only be perceived in unassimilable forms.’298  
This inability to find language, to speak of a historical trauma of the Iraq war 
in Holmes’s case, is an issue pervasive in erasure writing. For authors such as Travis 
Macdonald and M. NourbeSe Philip, whose works will be discussed in this section, 
                                                             
293 Janet Holmes, ‘The Weight of What’s Left [Out]: Six Contemporary Erasurists on Their 
Craft’, interview by Andrew David King, The Kenyon Review, 6 November 2012, accessed 10 
January 2013,  http://www.kenyonreview.org/2012/11/erasure-collaborative-interview/.  
294 ‘Free Verse: Erasure Poetry Festival’, The Walker Art Centre, 7 April 2011, accessed 12 
February 2013, http://archive-org.com/page/587027/2012-11-
05/http://www.walkerart.org/channel/2011/free-verse-erasure-poetry-festival. 
295 J. F. Lyotard, Heidegger and “the Jews”, trans. Andreas Michel and Mark S. Roberts 
(Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1990).   
296 Aleida Assman, Cultural Memory and Western Civilisation: Functions, Media, Archives 
(Cambridge: CUP, 2011), 248.  
297 TPOG, xiv.  
298 Cathy Caruth, Trauma: Explorations in Memory (Baltimore and London: John Hopkins 
University Press, 1995), 156.  
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erasure becomes a mode of ‘poeticising the political.’299 However, whereas Holmes’s 
sources are literary – she reads-writes the Iraq war into the lines of Emily Dickinson’s 
poetry – Macdonald and Philip resort to non-literary materials as their sources, 
creating poetry out of documents and court cases and, as such, ‘reclaiming the 
political as a source for aesthetic work.’ 300  Seemingly unassimilable forms here 
become, by means of erasure, assimilated as an aesthetic material. What follows is an 
attempt at devising a theory of what I see as a sub-genre of erasure writing, here 
described as a ‘document under erasure.’ What differentiates writing under erasure 
in general from documents under erasure is the nature of the source, the latter 
drawing from the repositories of the archive, history, and politics to articulate them 
in poetic terms. As I suggest, focusing on instances of erasure as a manifestation of 
iterative documentary poetics offers a means of negotiating paradigms of authorship 
and creativity at the Iterative turn.  
2.4. TRAVIS MACDONALD, THE O MISSION REPO 
 
Travis Macdonald’s The O Mission Repo (2008) is a text I consider the key 
example of writing a document under erasure. The project is an iteration of the official 
9/11 Report documenting, as its authors assert, ‘facts and circumstances relating to 
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 [...] to provide the fullest possible account 
of the events surrounding 9/11 and to identify lessons learned.’301 Released in 2004 
by the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (also known 
as 9/11 Commission or the Kean/Hamilton Commission) at the request of President 
George W. Bush and the Congress, the report is currently widely available, both for 
purchase and as a pdf, downloadable for free from the Commission's website. It is 
accepted as a definitive account of the events of 9/11. Although, rather ironically, 
praised for its literary qualities,302 the report was strongly criticised. Accusations of 
withheld evidence have been raised against the Commission, also condemned for 
partiality, bias, and too narrow a scope, among other complaints. Benjamin DeMott 
                                                             
299 Sikram Reddy, ‘The Weight of What’s Left [Out]: Six Contemporary Erasurists on Their 
Craft’, interview by Andrew David King, The Kenyon Review, 6 November 2012, accessed 10 
January 2013,  http://www.kenyonreview.org/2012/11/erasure-collaborative-interview/.  
300 Reddy. 
301 The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks Upon the United States, accessed 02 March 2013, http://www.9-
11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf, xv-xvi. Hereafter CR. 
302 Richard Posner called it ‘an improbable literary triumph,’ while the National 
Book Foundation recognised it as a finalist in the non-fiction category of National 
Book Award 2004 [Richard A. Posner, ‘The 9/11 Report: A Dissent’, The New York Times, 
29 August 2004, accessed 15 May 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/29/books/the-
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has gone as far as to claim that the report defrauds the American nation,303 while 
David Ray Griffin, one of its most ardent critics, described the document as a lie 
characterised by extensive omissions and distortions.304 Although Griffin’s criticism 
has frequently been dismissed as representative of a long history of conspiracy 
theories that arise in the context of national tragedies, his declaration makes a point 
particularly valid as a statement on the process of the report’s compilation and proves 
strikingly relevant in the context of erasure poetics. As I argue in this chapter, the 
report itself could be read as a peculiar example of writing by erasure and The O 
Mission Repo a way of addressing its omissions and distortions; a voice with a power 
to, as The Repo reads, ‘redress/Its/lexicon/adjust the/lines within/between 
and/across.’305  
The O Mission Repo is an appropriation of the first four sections of the 9/11 
Report. The erasure comprises a ‘Preface’, or, as it is listed in the ‘Con S’ (an erasure 
of the report’s ‘Contents’), a ‘Reface’, erased by blacking out the original [Figure 25], 
and four chapters, each composed using a different erasure technique. In each case 
the choice of an erasure method is dictated by the content of the respective section of 
the report, devised, as Macdonald explains, to ‘reflect and enter into conversation 
with the content of the chapter.’306 In the process of reading and writing his way 
through the 9/11 document, Macdonald ‘adapted/ from the old to the new [...] / 
combed,’ to quote The Repo, ‘for clues/ for story.’307 Macdonald’s initial intention 
was, as he explained in an interview for Kenyon Review, to redact the entire 9/11 
Report with black bars, in the process mirroring the aesthetics of censored 
government documents. This approach brings to mind Jenny Holzer’s Redaction 
Paintings (2006), a series of silkscreen prints replicating declassified government 
documents released by the National Security Archive under the Freedom of 
Information Act (1996). Although available to the public, these documents remain 
heavily redacted, censored by the government during the declassification process. 
Holzer’s interest resides in drawing attention to means of manipulation of meaning 
and censorship of information that takes place during the war, asking, as Robert Storr 
                                                             
303 Benjamin DeMott, ‘Whitewash as Public Service: How the 9/11 Commission Report 
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puts it, ‘what do we know and when did we know it?’308 [Figure 25 and Figure 26]. As 
this chapter will show, the same preoccupations reverberate clearly in Macdonald’s 
work. 
 
 
FIGURE 25 TRAVIS MACDONALD, THE O MISSION REPO, P. XVII 
 
                                                             
308 Robert Storr, ‘Paper Trail’, in Redaction Paintings, Jenny Holzer (New York, NY: Cheim 
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FIGURE 26 JENNY HOLZER, REDACTION PAINTINGS, PP. 12-13 
 
In Chapter 1: ‘We Ave Plan’ (from ‘We Have some Planes’) the text of the 
report is struck through with a thick black horizontal line, and although not 
immediately legible, the source text still remains visible on the page [Figure 27]. The 
typography of this section creates a characteristic illusion; the lines obscure the 
removed text at the same time as preserving it on the page. Unlike the blackout of the 
Reface, this erasure method makes the text visible and invisible, legible – even if any 
attempt at reading the text would pose a significant challenge – and illegible at the 
same time. This ambiguous interplay of textual presence and absence on Macdonald’s 
pages can be read as an echo of the journey of some of the Al Qaeda members 
described in the corresponding chapter of the governmental document. Just like the 
erased text of the report Atta, Omari, Moqed, and the 16 other hijackers identified in 
the document remain, in the course of their journey to stage the attacks on the World 
Trade Centre and The Pentagon, both visible and at the same time invisible; travelling 
on public transport, subject to all official security screening, recorded and at the same 
time ignored by the security system. The report describes the journey of one of the Al 
Qaeda members in the following way:  
Nawaf al Hazmi set off the alarms for both the first and second metal 
detectors and was then hand-wanded before being passed. In addition, 
his over-the-shoulder carry-on bag was swiped by an explosive trace 
detector and then passed. The video footage indicates that he was 
carrying an unidentified item in his back pocket, clipped to its rim.309 
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These men might seem potentially suspicious, but not suspicious enough to be noticed 
at the airports of Portland, Boston, and Washington, just like the text of the 
corresponding section of The Repo, visible, legible, but not legible enough to 
encourage engagement with words underneath the black lines that partly obliterate 
it. This sense of partial (in)visibility manifests itself further in the closing sections of 
Chapter 1 of the report, revealing a significant, if unrecorded, event in the history 
preceding 9/11. As the report reads:  
the conflict did not begin on 9/11. It had been publicly declared years 
earlier, most notably in a declaration faxed early in 1998 to an Arabic-
language newspaper in London. Few Americans had noticed it. The fax 
had been sent from thousands of miles away by the followers of a Saudi 
exile in one of the most remote and impoverished countries on 
earth.310 
 
The letter served as Bin Laden’s declaration of war against America, a publication of 
fatwa issued in the name of World Islam Front, and an unambiguous statement on 
the security threat and the events to come; publically available, circulated, but not 
logged or addressed by the American intelligence. Present but at the same time 
absent.  
 
FIGURE 27:  TRAVIS MACDONALD, THE O MISSION REPO, P. 28 
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In Chapter 2, ‘The Found Error’ (‘The Foundation of the New Terrorism’) the 
visible/invisible trajectory set out in Chapter 1 is further developed. The typography 
here relies on greying out and blurring the majority of the text of the report, left on 
the page but completely obscured, creating an illusion of a blurred vision, or a text 
projected at a far distance. The few legible words preserved here are surrounded by 
the illegible text [Figure 28]. The erased content remains, similarly to the 1998 letter 
(also discussed in more detail in Chapter 2 of the report), out of focus, present but 
absent, significantly looming in the background of the events that lead to 9/11 but 
beyond reach, almost an echo of an extreme frustration that comes with an awareness 
of a present evidence that cannot be uncovered, or of a text available but 
indecipherable. 
 
 
FIGURE 28: TRAVIS MACDONALD, THE O MISSION REPO, PAGE 47 
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Chapter 2 of the report sets out a background to the events of 9/11. It focuses 
on the interplay of politics and religion in Muslim communities to explain the ways 
in which they influenced the rise to power of Bin Laden and Al Qaeda. But, 
characteristically, Islam is discussed as an unknown quantity, as the unfamiliar Other 
far removed from the Western sensibilities, a blur in itself when considered from the 
Western perspective. The attitude of the West to Islam as described in the document 
is that of incomprehension and misunderstanding. The attitude of Bin Laden and the 
Muslim extremists towards the West could be described in similar terms. The 9/11 
Report fashions Bin Laden as a heavily biased and misinformed individual, unaware 
of the reality of the West and educated to reject its values. As the report reads, 
commenting on the background of future Al Qaeda members, ‘many of these young 
men, even if able to study abroad, lacked the perspective and skills needed to 
understand a different culture.’ 311  As a result, ambiguities and contradictions 
manifested in the juxtaposition of such contrasting worldviews pervade the pages of 
the report. As an example, what Bin Laden describes as a ‘crystal clear’ fatwa,312 is 
represented in the report as a ‘self-styled,’ 313  unfounded attempt at claiming 
leadership in the Muslim world. Here, an impossibility of arriving at any shared 
meaning becomes apparent, turning, as The Repo comments, belief into ‘a condition/ 
of ignorance’314 and the attacks themselves, as well as the response and reaction to 
them, into a ‘failure of imagination,’ 315  later evoked in the blurred pages of 
Macdonald’s erasure.  
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FIGURE 29 TRAVIS MACDONALD, THE O MISSION REPO, P. 74 
 
Chapter 3, ‘Errorism Evolves’ (‘Counterterrorism Evolves’) is an erasure in the 
most established, familiar, sense, where the erased text is also completely removed, 
leaving blanks on the page to mark the space occupied by the original text. Here, 
‘the/structure/remain[s] largely unaltered/between the cracks,’316 evoking Johnson’s 
technique in Radi os. [Figure 29]. Again, a clear parallel can be drawn between the 
form of The Repo and the content of the 9/11 Report. While Chapter 2 of the report 
focuses on the ‘the growth of a new kind of terrorism, and a new terrorist 
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organisation,’ 317  Chapter 3 traces ‘the parallel evolution of government efforts to 
counter terrorism by Islamic extremists against United States.’318  The analysis in 
Chapter 3 brings to the fore a troubling image of failed governance and security 
structures; driven by false assumptions, unfounded beliefs, insufficient guidance, 
training, and technology. As the report reads, ‘the FBI lacked the ability to know what 
it knew: there was no effective mechanism for capturing or sharing its institutional 
knowledge.’319 This was, so it seems, a system of failures of imagination, a system that 
‘had many holes,’320  systematic holes that are explicitly evoked, I suggest, in the 
corresponding section of The Repo. The metaphorical holes of the report materialise 
on the pages of The Repo, where the absence described in the report becomes present 
– the blanks on the page turn into an echo and a literal rendering of the governance 
cracks and fissures set out in the 9/11 document.  
Chapter 3 of Macdonald’s erasure parallels and at the same time subverts the 
narrative created in the corresponding chapter of the report. The Repo’s Chapter 3 
aims to ‘trace the parallel evolution of/Unit.’321 It evokes the manner in which the 
report traces the evolution of counterterrorism as a parallel development of terrorism, 
discussed in Chapter 2. Unit is introduced as one of the The Repo’s protagonists, an 
alter-ego of Lad, who features prominently in Macdonald’s Chapter 2. As The Repo 
describes Unit and Lad, these ‘characters are institutions/adapted/from the old to the 
new,’322 created sous rature, in an iterative process of erasure of key terms and names 
featured in the report, with Unit, a reiteration by erasure of ‘United (States)’ and Lad 
an appropriation of ‘Osama Bin Laden.’ As such, the focus in Chapters 2 and 3 of The 
Repo on Lad and Unit respectively parallels the preoccupations of corresponding 
chapters of the report. While the report’s interest in Bin Laden’s rise to power and the 
related development of terrorism translates into an erasure focusing on Lad’s story, 
the section devoted to the augmentation of methods of counterterrorism is mirrored 
in the chapter focusing on Unit. Interestingly, this framework of apparent sameness 
opens space for an exploration in conceptual difference. It emerges as a tool of 
subversive critique formulated by iterative means. While the report sets out a clear-
cut binary division between the terrorism of Bin Laden (Chapter 2) and the resulting 
counterterrorist activities instigated by the government of the United States (Chapter 
3), placing the two in an unambiguous opposition in an almost formulaic fight of good 
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versus evil, The Repo puts this dichotomy into question. Treated under erasure, both 
‘terrorism’ and ‘counterterrorism’ are erased to create the same term, both turn into 
and are as a result explored as forms of an ‘error’. In The Repo the distinction 
established in the report disappears; activities identified as terrorism and 
counterterrorism by Kean and Hamilton can no longer be qualified as distinctive. This 
trajectory is also manifested in the titles of Macdonald’s Chapters 2 and 3; inherently 
interdependent and pointing to an organic development from the ‘found error’ 
(Chapter 2) to its unfolding in Chapter 3, in which the ‘errorism evolves’. As such, 
Macdonald’s ‘errorism’ can be considered an echo of all those developments and 
undertakings – the report’s commission becomes a source of multiple omissions, both 
terror and counterterrorism turn into an error – both a result of lapses of judgement 
and governance.  
But these omissions, distortions, compromises and procedural failings all 
converge to generate the official history. Records of oral histories of the events, as 
recounted by firefighters, paramedics and emergency medical technicians, although 
available, are omitted from the official recorded narrative. 323  By preserving only 
selected truths, convenient truths, authorised and recognised by those in power, the 
document turns into an instrument of cultural hegemony and a tool of manipulating 
knowledge. The archival project here emerges as a mode of forgetting rather than 
remembering, encouraging a collective cultural amnesia. The material which is 
recorded, disseminated and made available to the public to shape the collective 
cultural and historical conscience seems to evoke those declassified documents 
Holzer appropriates in her Redaction Paintings. But while Holzer and Macdonald 
make the erasure visible, the report is construed as a complete erasure, edited and 
formatted to erase the acts of erasure involved in censoring all the material 
marginalised in the process. Here, occlusion of information rather than access to it 
emerges as the most powerful tool.  
If, as The Repo reads, ‘The I/lacked the ability to know what it knew: there 
was no effective mechanism for/knowledge,’324 then writing sous rature could be 
considered a response to this lack; ‘a system to facilitate creation.’325 The form of 
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writing sous rature draws attention to the content of the source and the methods of 
its compilation. The blurred page of The Repo becomes a particularly striking 
rendering of what the report really is, when what remains after arduous editing are 
only those few legible words, or rather words that are approved as readily and 
appropriately legible. The transformation of the 9/11 Report into The Repo can be 
seen as a statement on the impossibility of any attempt at uncovering the events 
leading to 9/11. More broadly, it evokes the nature of archiving, archive’s 
manifestation of law’s authority, and law’s limited facility for assembling the archive. 
Viewed as such, The Repo and, as I will argue in more detail later in the chapter, M. 
NourbeSe Philip’s Zong!, both emerge as manifestations of a particularly Derridean 
distrust of the concept of history – history conceived of as ultimate reality and a 
source of authorised meanings and imposed truths. Erasure seen as such is a tool of 
accessing the otherwise unavailable knowledge and a method offering alternative 
means of remembering. In Hal Foster’s words, it is an exercise ‘in alternative 
knowledge or counter memory,’326 with a capacity to respond to the void, be it cultural 
or historical, with another void, one created by gaps on the page that hide existing 
texts and at the same time reveal new meanings. Here, to paraphrase Dworkin, the 
potential of erasure to both obliteratre and reveal becomes most apparent: ‘omissions 
within the system,’ Dworkin writes, ‘permit other elements to appear all the more 
clearly.’ 327  In Macdonald’s narrative, an attempt at reading between the lines of 
official history emerges, the alleged certainties of the seemingly objective historical 
narrative as well as any possibility of access to it are shaken. Instead, an alternative 
history surfaces, written ‘against/fact/against/form.’ 328  Through its 
acknowledgement and the same time rejection of the source, The Repo becomes 
‘the/unprecedented step of/witness,’329 a testimony not to either the official or the 
alternative history alone but one that oscillates somewhere between both, one that 
strives to ‘explain the world/in/mixed history.’330  
When considered within such a deconstructive framework, Chapter 4, ‘Re Po 
in A’ (‘Responses to Al Qaeda’s Initial Assaults’) could be viewed as a meditation on 
the constructedness of meaning and performativity of discourse. The formal qualities 
of Chapter 4 derive from a reference to the word ‘score’ as it appears in the closing 
section of Chapter 3 of the report. The passage in question reads: ‘Beginning in 1999, 
the reports of these commissions made scores of recommendations to address 
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terrorism and homeland security but drew little attention from Congress. Most of 
their impact came after 9/11.’ 331  These ‘scores’, subject to Macdonald’s iterative 
treatment, turn into a musical score in Chapter 4 of The Repo, where the erased text 
is inscribed into its lines [Figure 30]. The parallel narrative is created here by a 
semiotic manipulation of decontextualised meaning. The word ‘score’ is approached 
as a signifier read out of context, raising question about constructedness of discourse 
and reliability of information communicated via the report itself. Foregrounded here 
is the logic of signification that is implicit in all language iterated by means of erasure, 
where identical words create different meanings. Decontextualised, the erased 
discourse generates difference out of sameness, where meaning is determined by, to 
turn to Jonathan Culler, ‘double movement inside and outside previous categories 
and distinctions,’ 332  inside and outside text. Here, ‘the new context creates new 
opportunities for obnoxious behaviour’333 and facilitates possibilities for alternative 
modes of creativity and authorship to emerge.  
The musical score as a paratextual device is also of further significance here. 
There is a characteristic musical motif running through The Repo. Reducing the 
report’s ‘operations’ to The Repo’s ‘opera’, Macdonald constructs the story of Unit and 
Lad as a performance, stressing, I suggest, the artificiality of this story, any story; 
turning facts into performed acts and a political crisis into an aesthetic experience. 
Seen as such, the entire text of The Repo performs, through erasure writing, a range 
of acts of erasure inscribed into the recorded history of 9/11 and subsumed by the 
process of writing the report. Chapter 4 of the report is, in fact, peppered with 
discourse of erasure; ‘President Clinton crossed out key language he had approved in 
December and inserted more ambiguous language,’ 334  ‘dismantling of the camp 
erased a possible site for targeting Bin Ladin.’335 Treated sous rature, these events 
turn into events of writing; they transform into an opera, or ‘a drama/which 
provides/Constraints/for errorism,’336 bringing to the fore the fact that ‘the prose/had 
been misused.’337 As such, The Repo’s Chapter 4 combines the two concepts, treating 
both the report and its erasure as performances, both manipulated by and 
manipulating meaning, in the process turning erasure writing into a performative act 
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itself.338 Hence, the relationship between the report’s Chapter 4 and its iteration could 
be read as an act of performative re-writing, from operation to opera, a performance 
inscribed into a musical score, performing those acts of erasure made apparent in the 
report. Here, the play of and with the signifier becomes synonymous with writing 
under erasure.  
 
FIGURE 30: TRAVIS MACDONALD, THE O MISSION REPO, P. 108 
Characteristically, in the report sous rature, the nature of authorship and 
attribution changes. ‘The act of erasure,’ as Macdonald declares, ‘seems to transcend 
the traditional boundaries of authorship.’339 The opening line of the report’s preface 
reads: ‘We present the narrative of this report and the recommendations that flow 
from it to the President of the United States, the United States Congress, and the 
American people for their consideration.’340 Erased, the excerpt turns into ‘we the 
narrative of America.’341 This iteration triggers a shift in subjectivity and focalisation. 
The transition from the 9/11 Report to The Repo manifests a move away from the 
authority of the clearly defined, ultimate, authorial persona and towards the more 
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ambiguous, collective, communal, fluid agency of the voice that emerges in the 
process of iterative writing. The voice of ‘we the narrative’ is a subject that alters, on 
a textual level, but also symbolically; ‘the (narrative of) America’ inevitably 
transforms as a result of 9/11 events described in the report; as The Repo reads ‘we 
emerge from this/or/into this/as others.’342 The act of erasure is not limited here to 
an appropriation of the text on the page but also involves an erasure of authorship. 
The names of the 9/11 Report’s authors, featured in the preface to the document, are 
completely blacked out. And although Macdonald is listed as an author of The Repo 
on the cover, no explicit claim of authorship is made. Instead, a figure of an 
anonymous author is featured in the text, introduced as one of the three main 
characters, alongside Lad and Unit. This inclusion opens space for a range of 
metatextual comments on erasure, which feature prominently in the text. This 
approach turns The Repo into a manifesto of erasure. Foregrounding the self-
conscious engagement with the laws of the genre, The O Mission Repo ‘define[s] the 
elements of/art.’343 Erasure here is conceptualised as a method of both creative and 
critical writing. It ‘dissolve[s]/the/Author […] [the] 
story/into/analogous/States/of/criticism.’344 This removal of the figure of the author 
is an important gesture and points to an approach to textuality removed from the 
paradigmatic origins and, hence, notions of originality.  
This reconceptualization of the familiar categories of creativity is made 
possible here due to the nature of the source text. The cultural function of iteration 
changes where an extra-literary material is concerned, as does the nature of 
authorship. As Macdonald observes, ‘the very idea of language ownership is a political 
act which erasure seeks to subvert.’345 Writing documents under erasure creates an 
alternative space of authorship, or ‘protection/areas for/author to police/the 
torn/and limiting language.’346 But this form of control over the text is inherently 
ambiguous. And so is the figure of the author, claiming authorship over the erased 
text – over the holes – but at the same time disturbing and disrupting the authority 
of the document and of those who created it, policing and rioting at the same time, 
pertaining to minimalism and excess simultaneously, constantly driven by ‘the impact 
of the post,’347 post-9/11, post-copyright, the impact of postproduction condition at 
the Iterative turn. 
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Copyright issues further illuminate the relationship between the source and 
the erased text of The Repo. Characteristically, Macdonald sought no permissions to 
reproduce or adopt the report. It is his citizen rights, Macdonald claims, that allow 
him access to the material: ‘since I was not erasing a literary text, I justified the act 
with the fact that my taxpayer dollars had paid for both the compilation and 
production of the document at hand so I consider myself by all rights, part owner of 
the original 9/11 Commission Report.’348 Regardless of Macdonald’s stand, The Repo 
acknowledges its source and incorporates the following disclaimer note on the 
copyright page:  
the following document, though composed from the partially erased 
pages of The 9/11 Commission Report, does not represent the views or 
conclusions of any entity other than the “author”, Travis Macdonald. 
As an artistic adaptation of a public document, it makes no claim to 
government sponsorship, affiliation or representation of any 
sortbeyondthatofapatrioticcitizenexercisinghisindividualrighttofrees
pech.349 
 
The note is included in a response to copyright constraints and regulations that 
govern the publishing market. It is an attempt at avoiding a copyright controversy as 
a result of using, as Macdonald claims he did, a text that is protected under copyright 
law. However, Macdonald’s assumptions about potential copyright issues are 
misguided. His source document is, in fact, not copyrighted. The copyright page of 
the official version of the 9/11 Report lists only manufacturers, designers and 
production staff, copyright holders are not included. This is not at all an unusual 
approach to intellectual property rights. The 9/11 Report belongs to the category of 
texts exempt from copyright. It is a work of the United States government and as such, 
under section 105 of the Copyright Act, the work is not entitled to copyright 
protection.350 Some works issued by the U.S. government can be copyrighted, if these 
are created by an independent contractor and not a government’s employee. This is 
however not the case here. All the members of the 9/11 Commission served, at the 
time of the report’s compilation, as members of the U.S. government, making the 
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report a work of U.S. government.351 The official website of the National Commission 
explicitly states that ‘the Commission's final report is a public document. There are 
no copyright restrictions or laws governing the translation and publication of the final 
report.’352 As a result, no one can be granted exclusive publication or translation 
rights.  
Although any alterations of the original in subsequent publications have to be 
acknowledged,353 the approach builds on assumptions of fair use and fair dealing 
principles and is a courtesy request rather than a legal restriction. As such, 
Macdonald’s disclaimer is significant though not necessary and plays a role in the 
publication of The Repo for reasons other than those foregrounded by the author. 
Dealing with a source ineligible for copyright protection means issues of ownership 
are not a concern. As such, Macdonald’s declarations presenting The Repo as a 
platform for exercising his citizen, taxpayer rights and related copyright concerns 
prove misguided. Dealing with such non-literary material, however, raises a range of 
different, though no less significant, issues. Question of ethics inherent in the artistic 
licence that the practice exploits become of primary concern instead (an issue 
discussed in more detail with reference to Philip’s Zong!). The history uncovered in 
The Repo draws attention to aspects of the report and the history of 9/11 specifically 
but also points to issues inherent in the nature of collective memory and cultural 
remembering that cannot be copyrighted.  
2.5. M. NOURBESE PHILIP, ZONG! 
 
A similar sense of history instilled with error is evoked in M. NourbeSe Philip’s 
Zong!. Like The O Mission Repo, Zong! is a project of iterative documentary poetics, 
an appropriation of a case report of Gregson v. Gilbert (1783), frequently referred to 
as the Zong case, a seminal trial in the abolitionist movement against slavery and 
slave trade. Zong was a slave ship that sailed from the West Coast of Africa to Jamaica 
in 1781 with a cargo of 470 slaves. As a result of captain’s navigational errors the 
journey lasted over 4 months, instead of planned 6–8 weeks, posing challenges to the 
available resources on board. During the time, some of the slaves were taken ill, others 
removed from the ship under captain’s orders. The Gregson case centred on a 
massacre of some 150 slaves aboard the ship, though not treated as such. Under 
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contemporary maritime law slaves on board were considered cargo and all cargo was 
insured. As Philip explains, the captain’s rationale behind throwing slaves overboard, 
and thus destroying his cargo, was an attempt at arriving at the most financially 
advantageous outcome of the voyage: ‘if the African slaves on board die a natural 
death, the owner of the ship will have to bear the cost, but if they were “thrown alive 
into the sea, it would be the loss of the underwriters.”’354 Hence, Gregson v. Gilbert 
was an insurance case, an attempt ‘to recover the value of certain slaves thrown 
overboard for want of water,’355 a suit over loss of cargo, loss of property, and not loss 
of human lives.  
Zong’s! source is a two-page, 500-word report recording the case, 
subsequently subject to a range of erasure procedures; a text blacked out, whited out, 
mutilated, and cut and pasted to create a collection of poems. As Philip explains, the 
report is ‘a word store’356 where the legal text parallels ‘a certain kind of entity – a 
whole, a completeness’357 which, in the process of its iteration, ‘is rent and torn.’358 
The method is adopted here to consciously echo the experience of Africans on board 
of the ship. Zong! exemplifies writing in fragments, on the level of individual poems 
and where the volume as a whole is concerned. The text of Zong! is divided into seven 
parts (‘Os’, ‘Dicta’, ‘Sal’, ‘Ventus’, ‘Ratio’, ‘Ferrum’, and ‘Ebora’), engaging a range of 
different erasure techniques, followed by a glossary of words used in the poem, and a 
‘Manifest’, which will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter.  
The opening section, ‘Os’ (Latin for bone), comprises twenty-six numbered 
poems. ‘Os’ is the only section in the volume composed using words lifted directly 
from Gregson v. Gilbert without any further lexical modifications. All the subsequent 
sections rely on further authorial interventions and appropriations of the source, 
instances of what Philip describes as acts of ‘breaking and entering’ the text to release 
new meanings. As the sections progress, the language becomes increasingly 
disjointed and illegible, descending into incomprehension that culminates in ‘Ebora’. 
As Andrew David King puts it, ‘like bureaucratic language that empties itself of 
meaning intentionally, Zong! empties words of their meaning this way and achieves 
a sort of purity in sound.’359 ‘Sal’ (salt), ‘Ventus’ (wind), ‘Ratio’ (reason) and ‘Ferrum’ 
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(iron) represent a complex linguistic exercise. Words used to compose these four 
sections are derived from Philip’s Zong! dictionaries – compilations of words 
collected and extracted from the source text. As Philip explains: ‘I devise a dictionary 
with a list of each of the “mother” words followed by the words contained in that 
particular word – for instance, apprehension yields hen, sion, pare, and pear, to list a 
few possibilities.’360 In the process, a plethora of words is generated in languages 
other than English, ranging from French and Dutch through Arabic, Hebrew to West 
African Patois, Shona and Yoruba, all listed in the dictionary printed as an appendix 
to the poem and echoing the potential polyphony on board the Zong.  
A range of Latin terms also emerges in the process of Philip’s lexical 
extraction. These are used as titles for the first six sections of Zong!. As Philip 
explains, this choice is significant in that Latin serves as a way of emphasising the 
underlying connection with law and legal discourse in Zong!. ‘Ebora’ (Yoruban for 
underwater spirits) is the only section to escape the dominant linguistic framework. 
This choice of the title is indicative, I suggest, of the content of the section and its 
status within the volume as a whole. ‘Ebora’ is illegible, printed in faded, grey ink, 
with overlapping layers of text, printed over lines of other text [Figure 31]. These 
words negate any possibility of communication and defy conventions of reading and 
writing. They function outside the authority of the official language, law and the 
dominant legal discourse as an embodiment of the voices silenced on board the Zong, 
reflecting the impossibility of telling the story.  
In a reversal of the textual dynamic governing the first six sections, ‘Ebora’ 
struggles with an excess of language, but the increasingly busy page only generates 
yet another silence; one born out of powerless, disregarded discourse from outside 
the recognised authority frameworks. It seems to echo the polyphony that shaped the 
linguistic situation on board the Zong. ‘Ebora’, then, becomes synonymous with a 
search for meaning when language is heard but cannot be comprehended, generating 
a silence manifested not in an act of an erasure of language but through its 
supplementation. This silence echoes Blanchot’s understanding of the idea of silence 
as a voiceless cry that ‘tends to exceed language, even if it lends itself to recuperation 
of language effect.’ It is, as Blanchot writes, ‘a meaning infinitely suspended, decried, 
decipherable-indecipherable.’361 The meaning of ‘Ebora’ resides in the noise of this 
silence. The section proves a particularly explicit manifestation of the Zong’s! poetics; 
‘Zong!,’ as Philip describes it, ‘is a chant! Shout! An ululation! Zong! Is moan! Mutter! 
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Howl! And shriek! Zong! is “pure utterance.” Zong! is a song […] of the untold 
story.’ 362  ‘Ebora’ as an echo of the multiple silenced narratives can be read as 
manifestation of a memory formulated on the margins of recorded history, an 
impossible, alternative, attempt at documenting the lost oral histories of those 
silenced in the wake of the Zong massacre. The act of erasure here is associated not 
with a removal of language but rather with the impossibility of its comprehension. 
But the preoccupation with silence and its potential to signify in ‘Ebora’ is evocative 
of broader project of meaning making in Zong!. A clear parallel can be drawn between 
visual gaps on the page and silences characteristic of the story of the Zong. ‘Within 
the boundaries established by the words and their meanings there are,’ Philip writes, 
‘silences; within each silence is the poem, which is revealed only when the text is 
fragmented and mutilated, mirroring the fragmentation and mutilation that slavery 
perpetrated on Africans.’363 Erasure as a mode of writing materialises the silence; it 
turns into a visual representation of the inaudible – lending, to borrow from Foucault, 
‘speech to those traces which, in themselves, are often not verbal, or which say in 
silence something other than what they actually say.’364 
 
FIGURE 31: M.NOURBESE PHILIP, 'EBORA', IN ZONG! 
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The song, music, noise are all significant in the context. Similarly to Johnson, 
Philip derives her complex iteration methodology from classical music, pointing to 
the fugue as a useful frame for understanding the nature of her poetics. Inherent in 
the fugue compositional practice is the notion of imitation. The fugue is a ‘procedure 
of imitative counterpoint, in which the theme is stated successively in all voices of the 
polyphonic texture, tonally established, continuously expanded, opposed, and 
reestablished.’365 As such, the point of the fugue is for the voices to enter successively 
and in imitation of each other.366 Similarly, the story of the Zong as re-written by 
Philip is an exercise in repetition and imitation, a reiteration of the original text of 
Gregson v. Gilbert, of the original Zong story, and at the same time a repetition of 
each subsequent section of Zong!, where the text is continuously re-iterated. Unlike 
The Repo in which each page of the report is used once only, Zong! continuously 
reworks its source; just like the fugue, it is always expanded, continually 
supplemented, opposed and re-established. To quote Philip, ‘Zong! is a 
counterpointed, fugal anti-narrative in which several strands are simultaneously at 
work […] Zong! is a sustained repetition or reiteration of various themes, phrases and 
voices, albeit fragmented.’367  
Interestingly, in ‘Notanda’ Philip points to another meaning associated with 
the fugue; the fugue as a state of amnesia:  
it is erasure and forgetting of the be-ing and humanity of the Africans 
on board of the Zong, the legal text of Gregson v. Gilbert becomes a 
representation of the fugal state of amnesia, serving as a mechanism 
for erasure and alienation […] the original text becomes a fugal 
palimpsest through which Zong! is allowed to heal the original text of 
its fugal amnesia.368  
 
The type of amnesia to which Philip refers here, the so-called fugue state or 
dissociative fugue, is reversible. A recovery from the disorder equals an intact return 
of lost memories. As such, Philip’s Zong! can be considered an impossible project of 
mirroring this process of recovery, with repetition turning into a tool for rediscovering 
those lost memories, a repetition as a method of driving ‘the event and the memory 
simultaneously.’369  
Working with erasure technique, Philip, like Macdonald, brings attention to 
issues of impediments of language that restrict the possibility of remembering, of the 
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constraints of writing and the utopianism of the idea of freedom of expression. As 
Philip explains: 
The two page report […] sets out the fact situation and the reasons for 
the decision. When first faced with the decision […], I was convinced 
that the stories of the events that took place on board of the Zong! were 
locked in those two pages: my challenge was to figure out a way to get 
to those stories.370  
 
What transpires here is an assumption that the report is already an erased document. 
Erasure, Philip seems to suggest, is inherent to legal discourse. A characteristic mode 
of writing under constraint, legal writing relies on removing all inessential material, 
affective content and context to arrive, in Philip’s words, at ‘desiccated principle of 
law.’371 Hence, Philip’s mode of erasure, similar to Macdonald’s practice, is an erasure 
of an erasure, an attempt at dissecting ‘the layers of erasure to get to that ghostly 
palimpsest.’372 But this multilayered mode of appropriation serves as a method of 
uncovering that which might have been cancelled by the initial process of erasure, a 
method of reintroducing the emotions, feelings, and personal stories removed from 
the official report.  
This distinction between the legal and poetic discourse is helpful here and can 
be expanded, I suggest, to include different categories of personhood as a means of 
differentiating between the two approaches to writing the story of the Zong. Philip’s 
engagement with the Gregson v. Gilbert case can be interpreted as an attempt at 
questioning legal categories of personhood. If read as such, the preoccupation with 
the individual in Zong!, as juxtaposed with the anonymity of the subject in Gregson, 
marks a departure from the categories of constitutional personhood – from the 
individual as a subject of rights – to an interest in the more inclusive, fluid and open 
lyrical modes of engagement with identity and being. This shift is evocative of Barbara 
Johnson’s, taxonomy distinguishing between legal and lyric persons. As Johnson 
points out, ‘lyric and law might be seen as two very different ways of instating what a 
“person” is. There appears to be the greatest possible discrepancy between a lyric 
“person” – emotive, subjective, individual  – and a legal “person” – rational, rights-
bearing, institutional.’373 Through her juxtaposition of lyric and law Johnson (and, I 
suggest, Philip) is implicitly asking ‘whether there is a relation between the “first 
                                                             
370 M. NourbeSe Philip, ‘The Weight of What’s Left [Out]: Six Contemporary Erasurists on 
Their Craft’, interview by Andrew David King, The Kenyon Review, 6 November 2012, 
accessed 10 January 2013,  http://www.kenyonreview.org/2012/11/erasure-collaborative-
interview/.  
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372 Ibid.  
373 Barbara Johnson, ‘Anthropomorphism in Lyric and Law’, Yale Journal of Law and the 
Humanities, 10.2 (1998), 550. 
| 130 
 
 
person” (the grammatical “I”) and the “constitutional person” (the subject of 
rights).’374 Seen as such, Zong!, and erasure in general, emerge as a means of bearing 
‘this story which can’t be told, which must be told, but through not telling.’375 Writing 
in Zong! turns into a form of recovery of personhood. It is an act of assignation of 
identity to those previously de-humanised by the linguistic, cultural and political 
situation and, subsequently, by the discourse of the case report.  
Devoid of the status of a legal person, slaves on slave ships were typically 
treated solely as cargo, and although, as Sarah Dowling stresses, ‘many forms of 
actuarial listing took place on slave ships, slaves’ names were never recorded,’ 376 
placing them outside of the official discourse, outside of history, now simply a lacuna 
in the fragmented narratives of the Zong. The story of the Zong, transformed in 
Zong!, emerges as a response to that lack. Key to Philip’s approach and to Zong’s 
engagement in forms of lyrical personhood are acts of naming treated as a liberating 
force. In Zong! naming becomes synonymous with a possibility of extracting 
personhood from an impersonal, objectifying frame of legal property discourse. This 
approach is particularly prominent in ‘Os’. Characteristically, each page of the ‘Os’ 
section is accompanied by a footnote listing names of a few slaves, 228 in total [Figure 
32]. But these remain speculative, hypothetical names, derived from beyond the 
archive, from the margins of memory. They can be interpreted as names of lyric rather 
than legal persons. Where access to the actual archive and to identities of legal 
persons proves an impossibility, the actual individuals are represented as abstract, 
textual entities, surfacing as ‘footnotes floating below the text.’377 This writing which 
relies on acts of iteration and excavation at the same time can be seen as an attempt 
at saving the drowned, who inevitably (to echo Primo Levi) cannot take the place of 
the saved, even as lyric persons, always a ‘ghostly palimpsest’ to the main text of Zong! 
and, by analogy, to history.  
The archive of the recorded history – here the text of the case report – plays a 
crucial role in the possibility of dealing in counter-memory. Those unrecorded 
narratives, are never fully removed from the strands of official history; instead they 
remain, Philip seems to suggest, always present, always inscribed into the framework 
of the recorded facts, a footnote to them. Representative of that approach, all names, 
just like the entire text of Zong!, are derived from the words of Gregson case, echoing 
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the broader take on the dynamics of iterative writing. What comes to the fore as a 
result are the shared identities – the intertwined nature of legal and lyric personhood 
– and an impossibility of separating the two, here represented through the lexicon of 
the same word store. The key questions that emerge as a result pertain to the 
possibility of determining the origins of these stories; who writes them?; who writes 
these names, Philip seems to be asking, ‘is it another member of the crew? I don't 
know – it must be told; it can never be told.’378 
 
 
FIGURE 32: M. NOURBESE PHILIP, 'OS', IN ZONG! 
                                                             
378 M. NourbeSe Philip, email to author, 08 March 2013.  
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FIGURE 33: M.NOURBESE PHILIP, 'DICTA', IN ZONG! 
 
A similar act of footnoting is echoed in the subsequent ‘Dicta’ section. 
However, in ‘Dicta’ the space for notes remains blank – the footnotes are and at the 
same time are not there, they appear as blank spaces, echoing the process of naming 
in ‘Os’ while, I suggest, foregrounding its impossibility [Figure 32 and Figure 33]. No 
footnotes feature in ‘Sal’, ‘Ventus’, and ‘Ratio’, while ‘Ferrum’, the final fully legible 
section of Zong!, closes with one final footnote, listing additional twenty-two names. 
This concluding footnote differs from those included in ‘Os’ in terms of typography. 
While the initial 228 names are typed, printed in the same font as the main body of 
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the poem, the footnote in ‘Ferrum’ appears as if handwritten. The approach, I suggest, 
again mirrors the interplay of two discourses that constantly interact in Zong!; ‘Os’ 
remains heavily reliant on the language of the case report, on the voice of the legal 
persons, and so adopts all of its aspects, including the typography. The footnote in 
‘Ferrum’, on the other hand, is a manifestation of another voice or voices that gain 
prominence in sections following ‘Dicta’. As Philip explains the approach:  
The handwritten texts are snippets of someone who is writing a letter 
or letters. Sometimes I think it's the character who jumps overboard 
at the end — […] who is himself undergoing a breakdown as he realizes 
that he has crossed some inner boundary that has compromised his 
soul irrevocably. The apparent vagueness in the statement – 
"Sometimes I think…" comes from my not knowing the entire story – 
the story that can't be told, yet must be told.379 
 
The Africans are named, but their potential, speculative names, only appear as a 
footnote, marginalised in life, marginalised in Gregson, and only present in the 
margins of pages of Zong!, in the space outside the legal discourse that constitutes the 
text of the twenty-six poems together forming ‘Os’.  
 ‘No one bears witness for the witness,’380 Philip seems to repeat continuously 
after Paul Célan.381 Where there are no witnesses the selection of African names can 
only be random. They are, Erin M. Fehskens suggests, both particular and general at 
the same time,382 turning into a commentary on the impossibility of telling that Philip 
so eagerly stresses. It is an attempt at giving the voice to the silenced that immediately 
falls back on itself; Masuz, Zuwena, Ogunsheye, and 247 others, even when named, 
cannot be named and as such turn into traces of the lost individuals rather than a 
representation and a record of actual persons. The appropriation of the available, 
archival text evokes here a sense of a speculative iteration of history. To be written 
into a legal document is, in line with the constraints of the archive, to exist. An 
omission or erasure of a subject from the repository of the archive equals an erasure 
from history and memory. Seen as such, writing a document under erasure can only 
be understood as a process of re-writing the archive. Written into the pages of the 
Gregson v. Gilbert case report the slaves on board the Zong are given an extra-
archival existence, where language is created out of and outside the official language, 
                                                             
379 Philip, email.  
380 M. NourbeSe Philip, Zong!, (Middleton: Wesleyan University Press, 2008), 100. 
Hereafter Z!. 
381 The reference to Célan is important here. This quotation is included in the epigraph to 
‘Ratio’, contextualising Zong!, and pointing to a very specific way of reading the text as a 
mediation on the possibilities of witnessing and testimony. My discussion of Zong! as a 
poetic testimony, and of its authorship as an expression of an act of witnessing, builds on the 
Célan reference. 
382 Erin M. Fehskens, ‘Accounts Unpaid, Accounts Untold: M. NourbeSe Philip’s Zong! and 
the Catalogue’, Callaloo, 35.2, (2012). 
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where, to borrow from Agamben, ‘the fragile text of consciousness incessantly 
crumbles and erases itself, bringing to light the disjunction on which it is erected: the 
constitutive desubjectification in every subjectivication […] an infinite deferral,’383 a 
space of erasure.  
This supplementation, inclusion but at the same time marginalisation of the 
Africans on the page, in the story, and in the official history, echoes in an interesting 
way the dynamics of legal case analysis. As Philip explains, such an exercise involves 
careful examination of available material to uncover the kernel of a legal principle 
that guides the decision, the so-called ratio decidendi, also referred to as ratio. The 
arrival at ratio, however, means that all other opinions become obiter dicta, or simply 
dicta, which is what, as Philip contends, the Africans on board the Zong become: 
‘dicta, footnotes, related to, but not, the ratio.’384 As such, the ‘Dicta’ section of Zong! 
can be interpreted as a literary rendering of the legal process. ‘Dicta’ occupies an 
ambiguous space in the volume. It is not listed in the table of contents and serves, I 
suggest, as a transitional stage in the narrative development of Zong!. It marks a shift 
away from meaning and towards anti-meaning, from the official discourse to its 
deconstruction and obliteration. In ‘Notanda’ Philip describes the initial twenty-six 
poems in ‘Os’ as bones, while those in ‘Sal’, ‘Ventus’, ‘Ratio’, and ‘Ferrum’ manifest 
the flesh. ‘Dicta’ becomes, then, a transition from bones to the flesh, from legal to lyric 
personhood, from the clarity of the bare fact to the affect of reconstructed memories. 
As such, ‘Dicta’ is the section of the poem that is and at the same time is not there, 
characterised by blank footnotes and empty spaces, denoted only by ‘#’ where 
individual poems’ numbers appear in ‘Os’ [Figure 33]. Philip’s ‘Dicta’, then, stands for 
that which is omitted. It is an exploration in the possibility of recovering the content 
previously dismissed as obiter dicta in the Zong case. 
Philip’s interest in this interplay of the content that is and is not included 
foregrounds the inherent objectivity of legal discourse as juxtaposed with poetic 
subjectivity. To quote Philip: ‘a concern with precision and accuracy in language is 
common to both law and poetry, the law uses language as a tool for ordering […] 
poetry to disassemble the order, to create disorder and mayhem so as to release the 
story that cannot be told.’385 Poem #14 in ‘Os’ seems to echo this dynamic. Placed 
ambiguously between legal and lyric discourses, #14 follows a patter frequently 
recurring in Zong!. Here, the text is presented as a list to draw attention to the 
contrasting rhetoric of past and present [Figure 34]: 
                                                             
383 Giorgio Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive, trans. Daniel 
Heller-Roazen (New York: Zone Books, 2002), 123. Hereafter RA. 
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FIGURE 34: M. NOURBESE PHILIP, ZONG!, POEM #14 
 
While the Gregson case report only engages with that which ‘was’, Zong!, through its 
interest in the extra-legal forms of personhood, exercises a potential to speak of that 
which ‘is’. Both the case report and the poem reference that which was to determine 
the nature of what is, or, to paraphrase Greaney, to reopen cases that seemed 
closed.386 But the approaches that the two distinct discourses represent, employing 
two different epistemologies, yield markedly distinct outcomes. The constraints and 
constructedness of legal discourse and the legal categories of personhood contribute 
to a text that relies on the materiality of the evidence, embedded in the presence and 
inescapability of what was. Zong!, and the mode of writing a document under erasure 
more broadly, affords explorations in the present conceptualised as a negotiation of 
the trace.  
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Reversing the legal interpretative practice, erasure offers a means of an 
interpretation guided by the intersection of fact and fiction where fiction and emotion 
carry as much validity as facts. The account of Gregson – literally, as Philip points 
out, an account in terms of goods bought and sold – in the process of its iteration 
turns into what could be described as an affective account, shifting the focus from the 
objectivity of the fact and anonymity of the collective, to the subjectivity of the 
individual emotion. ‘The Manifest’, a closing section of Zong!, echoes this trajectory. 
The section comprises a list of items divided into seven categories: African groups and 
languages, animals, body parts, crew, food and drink, nature and women who wait. 
Each category comprises an eclectic mix of terms; among women who wait are some 
bearing typically English names, such as Rose, Grace and Mary, alongside West 
African Ans and Um; body parts are listed in English as well as Spanish, French, 
Portuguese and Dutch; animals and nature recall equally the characteristic European 
landscapes as well as their African counterparts. Traditionally, in a maritime context, 
a manifest means a list of cargo or passengers carried on a ship. It serves as a method 
of recording the inventory for customs procedures. As such, the role of a manifest is 
to log the material property on board of a ship. In her ‘Manifest’, Philip retains the 
form but subverts the nature of its content to echo her interest in the affective 
dimension of the Zong case. Her alternative ‘Manifest’ becomes an exploration in 
absences, listing the immaterial, the latent dreams and memories of those on board 
of the ship. It is a manifest of memory of both the crew and the slaves alike, who, 
represented as lyric rather than legal persons, find themselves all displaced but all 
equal; sharing the same desires and longings, regardless of their legal status. As such, 
‘The Manifest’ is an iterative mediation on the remnants that form, to borrow from 
Aleida Assman, ‘the converse image of the archive.’387 Here iterative writing emerges 
as an alternative means of entering the archive.  
Assman’s typology of modes of remembering (and forgetting) proves useful in 
defining writing sous rature. Assman derives her taxonomy of memory forms from 
the categories devised by F.G. Jürgen. Drawing from the German linguistic 
differentiation between two terms used to describe the equivalent of English 
‘memory’, Jürgen points to a distinction between Gedächtnis and Erinnerung. 
Gedächtnis is linked to knowledge and can be distinguished from Errinerung, the 
latter associated with personal experiences. Building on this duality, Assman 
differentiates between modes of active ‘functional memory,’ that of Erinnerung, and 
what she calls a ‘storage memory’, which can be classed as an expression of 
Gedächtnis. Assman’s model, I suggest, is mirrored in the relationship between The 
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Repo and the 9/11 Report, between Zong! and the Zong case. In both instances, the 
archival source texts can be considered manifestations of the storage memory; the 
oral histories of those marginalised in the process of compilation of the official 
narratives and excluded as a result are an expression of functional memory. The two 
erasures evoke that which oscillates somewhere in between the two as a latent 
memory, perhaps, the waste that accumulates outside the archive, excluded but 
always included in it at the same time. The erased archive is an assemblage of 
‘remnants […] that have not been collected […] yet form a collection that can be 
defined as the converse image of the archive.’ 388  Texts and traces, official and 
unofficial histories remain always complementary but the constraints of the 
prescribed cultural frames mean that ‘the remnants are opaque […] the remnants 
constitute evidence for another kind of history.’389 Building on this trajectory, then, 
the archive operates as a material space of history, whereas erasure turns into its other 
and a manifestation of a conceptual space of memory, where remembering occurs in 
gaps, cracks, leaks and holes. But this attempt at telling the story that cannot be told 
does not, importantly, constitute here an exercise in reparative history. Rather than 
an attempt, as Dowling observes, ‘to discover and prioritise the disappeared voices 
[…] Philip creates a contrast between different types of vocal utterance in order to 
break the association of voice with personhood,’ 390 as a result questioning the nature 
and authority of the official discourse, law, history and the language of the archive. 
The affective exploration of the past or, to borrow Assman’s term, an interest in 
‘affect-memories’ that acts of iteration make possible, bring to the fore the possibility 
of engaging with functional rather than storage memory.  
2.6. AUTHORING TESTIMONY 
 
There is no word for ‘bringing bodies back from water.’ Nothing, as Philip 
explains, ‘has as precise a meaning as the unearthing contained within the word 
exhume.’391 The drowned can never be saved, their narratives cannot be recorded, 
neither by the legal report nor in the subsequent histories, they remain witnesses of 
the events on board of the Zong devoid of any possibility to bear witness. The 
juxtaposition of the drowned and the saved as those who can and cannot bear witness 
in Zong!, and characteristically, the discourse employed by Philip in ‘Notanda’ to 
discuss the nature of both groups, echoes Primo Levi’s essays on Auschwitz in The 
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Drowned and the Saved and Agamben’s reading of Levi’s work in Remnants of 
Auschwitz. The latter, I suggest, provides a particularly striking framework for 
reading Zong! and erasures engaging with the historical, legal and archival material 
more broadly. Philip’s slaves can be seen as an echo of Levi’s drowned; the true 
complete witnesses who emerge as Philip’s ‘ghostly footnotes’392 in an untold story.  
As Agamben, via Levi, stresses, the survivors are never true witnesses; ‘the 
survivors speak in the stead, by proxy, as pseudo-witnesses; they bear witness to a 
missing testimony.’393 As such, the only true witnesses to the events on board the 
Zong are those silenced by the linguistic situation, by the law and, subsequently, by 
death itself. For Agamben, this lack that defines the nature of Zong’s! textuality is 
central to testimony: ‘the drowned have nothing to say […] they have […] no “story”, 
no “face”, and even less do they have thought,’394 they turn into the protagonists and 
bearers of those stories that cannot be told but must be told. Erasure speaks 
particularly explicitly to such a trajectory. Erasure, like testimony as defined by 
Agamben, always ‘contains a lacuna’;395 determined by its lack it makes it necessary 
to look for meaning where meaning is lacking and to inscribe signification into the 
blank spaces on the page. As an impossible testimony, erasure’s traces refer to neither 
language nor the codified signs but they prove, to borrow from Assman, inescapably 
semiotically readable, ‘as indexical signs without any underlying code.’ 396  In the 
context, the media of memory change form, from ‘“speaking” to “silent” witness that 
could be made to speak again.’397  The recognition of the signifying nature of the 
textual gaps, just like the acknowledgement of the lack as the essence of testimony, 
alters the value of the act of erasure in that it alters ‘the value of testimony.’398 In 
Agamben’s words, ‘it makes it necessary to look for its meaning in an unexpected 
area.’399 Applied as such, erasure responds to the need of finding a voice and, by 
relying on writing through someone else’s text, becomes a tool for filling in a void 
created by that inability to speak of history, politics and memories of both. Such an 
inability to speak triggers a need for an alternative way of speaking; to borrow from 
Blanchot, ‘it is upon losing what we have to say that we speak – upon an imminent 
and immemorial disaster […] we speak suggesting that something not being said is 
speaking.’400  
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An interesting trajectory arises as a result of this juxtaposition of poetry, 
history, and law. Both Macdonald’s and Philip’s erasures appropriate texts that, to a 
different extent, engage with legal issues. Apart from their treatment of the historical 
and political themes, questions of copyright are also significant here. Engaging with 
the Gregson v. Gilbert case or the 9/11 Report by means of iteration does not pose 
copyright issues and does not raise questions of authorship in the same way as 
appropriating a copyrighted edition of Emily Dickinson’s poems might. Both sources 
are exempt from traditionally assigned copyright limitations, as discussed in the 
context of The O Mission Repo. But these texts are also public in an extra-legal way, 
in that they preserve the shared, official memory of historically significant events. A 
certain sense of entitlement and permissiveness to access and use these sources 
transpires in Macdonald’s and Philip’s approach. It is, perhaps, an assumption that 
‘the taxpayer dollar’ offers universal propriety privileges. Categories of traditional 
authorship do not apply here, not simply because of potential attribution challenges, 
but because of the nature of historical memory, of shared ownership of history and 
the past preserved as a sphere of freely accessible cultural commons. In the end, every 
act of appropriation presupposes, as Jan Verwoert observes, a related act of 
expropriation. But, ‘how do you talk about latent history in proprietary terms,’401 how 
can you claim ownership of particular historical moment or of a particular historical 
feeling? Erasing a document can be seen as an attempt at (re)writing history and 
making a potentially controversial claim of authorship to a material residing 
somewhere outside the sphere of traditionally recognised proprietary categories of 
artistic production. In the context, the archive becomes a charged, contested space, 
always already owned. When considered as such, the erasure of the 9/11 Report 
becomes an act of appropriation of the poignant cultural moment and not just a 
textual exercise in iteration. Hence, both Zong! and The Repo bring to the fore 
questions of the possibility, or its lack, of writing, re-writing and authoring history – 
of history at the Iterative turn – the ethics involved in the process as well as the 
potential for questioning the archive and the authorship ascribed to acts of 
remembering, especially with respect to the collective memory of publically 
significant events.  
Philip seems to address these issues by engaging in an act of collaborative 
authorship. Evocative of Macdonald’s approach, Zong! features the figure of a 
fictional author. But while in O Mission the unnamed author also acts as one of the 
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text’s protagonists, Zong! transforms the polyphonic nature of the text into the text’s 
origin. Zong! is a co-authored text, a product of Philip’s collaboration with her 
fictional author; as the cover of Zong! reads, this is a story ‘as told to the author by 
Setaey Adamu Boateng.’ The spine of the volume mentions both Philip and Boateng 
as authors. Zong!, then, is dialogic; it focuses on iterative histories rather than a single 
history, celebrating and acknowledging the polyvocal essence of the narratives 
embedded in the remaining records of events on board the Zong. This complex 
thinking about the structure of authorship in writing a document under erasure 
openly positions Zong! in stark contrast to the implicitly monologic nature of the legal 
discourse of the case report and its unambiguous authorship. This shift in 
conceptualisation of the origins of writing that seems to define the authorial model 
for erasure poetics requires a certain re-assignation of literary categories. As an 
exploration in the possibilities of speculative archival practice, Zong! and The Repo 
deal with a collective memory, one that ‘always exists in plural,’402 as opposed to a 
historical memory preserved in the 9/11 Report and the Zong case report, the latter 
two designed to provide a universal framework for remembering an event, always 
characteristically singular. Implicit in this categorisation is an attempt at 
relinquishment and at the same time acknowledgement of authorship, an approach 
that echoes, yet again, the nature of the third mind of collaboration and the open 
source, creative commons thinking characteristic of writing at the Iterative turn.   
Boateng, I suggest, offers a possible alternative model of authorship for 
contemporary erasure. Boateng assumes a key role in narrating the testimony in a 
context where no one can bear witness. Boateng becomes an impossible attempt at 
establishing a figure of a complete witness. As such, Zong! can be read as an echo of 
an oral narrative, only written down by Philip, but ‘told’ by Boateng – a teller of those 
oral tales – a voice from outside the archive; a bearer of the stories to which the slaves 
or Philip herself, cannot bear witness and, as such, have no way of authoring. 
However, in line with Agamben’s categories, Boateng’s status is ambiguous. For 
Agamben, it is ‘impossible to bear witness […] from the inside – since no one can bear 
witness from the inside of death, and there is no voice for the disappearance of voice 
– and from the “outside” – since the outsider is by definition excluded from the 
event.’403 For Agamben, then, the survivor is the one ‘who can speak but has nothing 
interesting to say’404 while the witness ‘has seen the Gorgon,’405 representing one who 
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has ‘“touched bottom,” and therefore has much to say but cannot speak.’406 As such, 
what happened on board the Zong can only operate as an event without witness, in a 
way, an event sous rature, and so Boateng remains neither a witness nor a survivor, 
but rather a mediator between the two; a new stratum to the paradigms of witnessing 
not recognised by Agamben.  
Although the resulting text is presented as a manifestation of the third mind 
poetics, incorporating oral storytelling and contemporary poetry, its publication is 
informed by the principles of Western categories of authorship and copyright. It is 
Philip and Philip alone who remains recognised as the author and a copyright holder. 
Philip commits those stories to the page; to the copyrightable, material format, in line 
with official, legal categories of authorship, turning Boateng’s oral narratives into a 
tangible form of expression and fulfilling the standard copyright fixation 
requirements. Regardless of the restrictions of the publishing apparatus, by 
acknowledging the contribution of both Philip and Boateng, Zong! oscillates between 
the fixity and fluidity of discourse, in a space between collective and historical, storage 
and functional memories, opening an iterative space for their constant interplay. In 
this framework the dynamic of witnessing changes. The subjective nature of 
testimony is brought to the fore and a direct association between acts of authorship 
and acts of witnessing is established, echoing Agamben’s taxonomies of testimony. 
For Agamben, an act of witnessing always presupposes an act of authorship:  
we may say that to bear witness is to pace oneself in one’s own 
language in the position of those who have lost it, to establish oneself 
in a living language as if it were dead, or in a dead language as if it were 
living – in any case, outside both the archive and the corpus of what 
has already been said. It is not surprising that the witness’ gesture is 
also that of the poet, the auctor par excellence. [...] poetic word is the 
one that is always situated in the position of a remnant and that can, 
therefore, bear witness. Poets – witnesses – found language as what 
remains, as what actually, survives the possibility, or impossibility of 
speaking. [...] what cannot be stated, what cannot be archived is the 
language in which the author succeeds in bearing witness to his 
incapacity to speak.407 
 
The nature of collaborative means of textual production foregrounded in erasure also 
manifests itself clearly in the possibilities of constructing a testimony. If, as Agamben 
states, ‘testimony takes place where the speechless one makes the speaking one speak 
and the one who speaks bears the impossibility of speaking’ 408  then testimony 
becomes a category of production of meaning that is unattributable, generated from 
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within a ‘zone of indistinction,’409 where it is impossible to establish the position of 
the subject, and, as a result the witness and the author. As such, in testimony, the 
authorship is always, at least double; ‘every author,’ for Agamben (via Barthes, 
Foucault et al.), ‘is a co-author.’410 Such an approach is dictated by the survivors who 
always speak in place of the complete witness. It is a framework for the production of 
meaning based on the assumption that no speaking position has a potential to be 
exclusively owned. As such, the death of the witness is congruent, I suggest, with the 
Barthesian notion of the death of the author.  
Interestingly, Agamben notes a differentiation made in Latin between two 
words used for witness:  
testis, from which our word ‘testimony’ derives, etymologically 
signifies the person who, in a trial or lawsuit between two rival parties, 
is in a position of a third party [...]. The second word, superstes, 
designates a person who has lived through something, who has 
experienced an event from the beginning to an end and can therefore 
bear witness to it.411 
 
In this sense both Philip and Macdonald become witnesses of sorts, as does Philip’s 
imaginary author. But this is where the distinction between two categories of 
witnessing established by Agamben proves particularly applicable. Where Boateng 
and Macdonald’s unnamed authors both feature as a superstitēs, Philip and 
Macdonald as authors can only perform as testēs, recounting the events without 
witness. Framed by this lack, testimony – and like testimony, erasure – always 
presupposes a lacuna. Acts of saying and not saying coalesce in a particularly striking 
way in both testimony and erasure. Writing a document by iterative means always 
creates new lacunae to address those created by and within the document itself.  
Agamben characteristically links the etymology of the words ‘author’ and 
‘witness’ as well as ‘proprietor’:  
the modern meaning of the term ‘author’ appears relatively late [...] 
the oldest meaning of the term also include ‘vendor’ in the act of 
transferring property, ‘he who advises or persuades’ and, finally, 
‘witness’. In what way can a term that expresses the idea of the 
completion of an imperfect act also signify seller, adviser, and witness? 
[…] If testis designates the witness insofar as he intervenes as a third 
in a suit between two subjects, and if superstes indicates the one who 
has fully lived through an experience and can therefore relate it to 
others, auctor signifies the witness insofar as his testimony 
presupposes something – a fact, a thing or a word – that preexists him 
and his reality and force must be validated or certified.412 
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The authorial framework of Zong! seems to reverberate with echoes of this 
classification. There are clear correlations between acts of witnessing, the ability and 
inability to testify to the events on board the Zong, and, hence, to retell and author 
the related stories. This framework inevitably presupposes an inadequacy of 
testimony to writing history, the archive, or of any possibility of their iteration.  At the 
same time, such thinking about constraints of writing points to the significance of 
erasure as a model of writing against the official narratives.  
But the role of a witness – and if we associate witnessing with authorship, the 
author – as a proprietor also reverberates in Zong! in a twofold manner. In line with 
the late eighteenth-century legislation, the ones who are given the voice, and hence 
the authority to speak and record history, are only those who can claim property rights 
over the ship and over the slaves. As such, any possible source of testimony turns an 
act of witnessing into a proprietary act. But a process of ‘transferring property,’ as 
described by Agamben, also manifests itself otherwise in Zong!. In the transition from 
Boataeg’s orality to materiality of print executed by Philip an act of transferring 
ownership over the text also occurs. A transfer of textual property and subsequent 
acquisition of authorial rights marks the interplay between Boateng, the teller of tales, 
and Philip, the acknowledged author. What transpires as a result is a shift between 
respective modes of authorship. Those stories, even if written from the margins of the 
archive, still need to be inscribed into an official framework in order to be heard, fixed 
in the legitimising medium of print, never set to circulate freely, instead always 
subject to a form of an external authority, be it legal or literary. This duality echoes 
the structure of testimony as an act of authorship; as Agamben describes it, ‘the 
difference and the completion of an impossibility and possibility of speaking, of the 
inhuman and the human, a living being and a speaking being,’413 of a fractured but 
irreducible subject of testimony.  
If testimony is, as Agamben asserts, always the act of an author, always an 
exploration in this duality of ‘impotentiality and potentiality of speaking,’ 414  then 
authoring a document under erasure could be seen, by analogy, as a literalisation of 
this practice and hence in itself an act of authoring a testimony. Such an act of 
authorship is always an inherently iterative act. It presupposes an engagement with 
language of testimony characteristically ‘disrupted by the event, a language of 
repetition’415 and mediated through a subject construed as a lyric rather than a legal 
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the Fragments Controversy’, in Witnessing the Disaster: Essays on Representation and the 
| 144 
 
 
person. The model of authorship formulated as such relies on the third party as the 
only possible narrator. If there is no-one to bear witness and as a result to narrate 
those stories as they happened, then a document under erasure can only be written 
by a witness, and a narrator, a step removed from the original story. Conceptualised 
as such, a narrator always creates by iterative means, while change and removal of 
origins are always implied in the creative process. There only remains a possibility for 
the third party to recount the story of the Zong, of testimony as reported by testis as 
a voice of the third mind of collaboration.  
But this focus on the third party also points to a level of impartiality that 
characterises the writing process; in legal terms, it carries an expectation of neutrality. 
But, paradoxically, the impartiality and objectivity required by the official discourse 
and testimony is always an impossibility – an assertion that erasure echoes 
particularly explicitly. The authority of testimony should depend on the factual truth. 
But testimony is an ambiguous form defined by ‘the immemorial relation between the 
unsayable and the sayable, between the outside and the inside of language.’416 As such, 
testimony, and a document sous rature, instead of guaranteeing the factual truth, 
communicates the impossibility of its iteration, or, as Agamben puts it,  
its unarchivability, its exteriority with respect to the archive – that is, 
the necessity by which, as the existence of language, it escapes both 
memory and forgetting. It is because there is testimony only where 
there is an impossibility of speaking, because there is a witness only 
where there has been desubjectification.417 
 
Philip’s and Macdonald’s iterative poetic acts transform the stories of the Zong and 
9/11 from archival sources into expressions of alternative testimonies. Recovering 
meaning from the archive, both texts become explorations in the possibility of 
iteration. They represent instances of writing in a constant state of becoming a 
testimony, as textual beings taking place ‘only through [their] possibility of not being 
there.’418 As such, erasure emerges as a tool for exploring the possibility of delving 
into the unarchivable. Zong! and The O Mission Repo serve as expressions of the non-
judicial truths, texts interested in pushing the official records of the Gregson v. 
Gilbert case and the 9/11 Commission Report beyond the confines of res judica – the 
legal truth – to open it up to new, subjective, affective meanings.  
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2.7. A DOCUMENTARY TURN  
 
While subverting it, erasure that engages with documentary sources always 
remains embedded in the archive; as a lyrical form of testimony it questions its 
authority but at the same time iterates the process of archiving. Erasure’s archive, 
then, implies a departure from the traditionally understood modes of archiving and 
moves towards, I suggest, an engagement with the archive in Foucauldian terms – 
‘the general system of formation and transformation of statements’419 – an archive 
that operates as a set of rules ‘that define the event of discourse,’420 as opposed to a 
material repository of documents.421 An archive understood as a manifestation of 
Foucault’s thinking is, unlike an archive in traditional, material terms, inherently and 
infinitely iterable and iterative. I consider an interest in history and memory 
formulated as such – a preoccupation conspicuous in erasure writing – as an echo of 
similar developments in contemporary art. I refer here to an increased prominence of 
the documentary and the document as a subject of artistic expression and epitomised 
especially in Documenta 11 and 12 (with a formative influence of Okwui Enwezor’s 
curatorial and critical work) and prominent since.422 What characterises the current 
developments in the visual arts is the commitment to the documentary material, 
oscillating somewhere between a documentary and a commentary, critique and 
analysis, with ‘archival legacies […] transformed into aesthetic principles.’423 But, as 
Ezewor asserts, today ‘this relationship between past event and its document, an 
                                                             
419 AK, 130.  
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421 A correlation can be drawn between iterative thinking behind writing a document under 
erasure and Foucault’s writing practices. As Greaney observes, in 1970s and 1980s working 
with appropriated texts, quoting and compiling documentary material, was a key 
historicising method for Foucault. Texts representative of this approach include: I, Pierre 
Rivière, Having Slaughtered My Mother, My Sister, and My Brother: A case of Parricide in 
the 19th Century (1982), a compilation of documents related to Rivière’s court case, and 
Herculine Barbin, Being Recently Discovered Memoirs of a Nineteenth-Century French 
Hermaphrodite (1980), an appropriated memoir [Greaney, ix]. Foucault’s ‘The Life of 
Infamous Men’, can, in fact, be considered an outline of the principles of documentary 
appropriation writing. As Foucault describes it, ‘The Life’ is ‘an anthology of existences […], 
brief lives, chanced upon in books and documents […], singular lives, those which have 
become […] strange poems’ [Michel Foucault, ‘The Life of Infamous Men’, in Michel 
Foucault: Power, Truth, Strategy, ed. Meaghan Morris and Paul Patton (Sydney: Feral 
Publications, 1979), 76].’The Life’ is an introduction to a volume under the same title, a 
project Foucault never completed but intended as ‘a great compilation of infamy’ (82), a 
selection of ‘strange poems’ derived from a range of documents all dating from 1660-1760 
and sourced from ‘the archives of confinement, police, petitions to the king and lettres de 
cachet’ (82).  
422 Artists associated with the documentary turn include Tacita Dean, Christian Boltanski, 
Harun Farocki, Hans-Peter Feldman, among others.   
423 Okuwi Enwezor, ‘Archive Fever: Photography Between History and the Monument’, in 
Archive Fever: Uses of the Document in Contemporary Art (New York: International Centre 
of Photography and Gottingen: Steidl, 2008), 22.  
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action and its archival photographic trace, is not simply an act of citing a pre-existing 
object or event; the photographic document is a replacement of the object or event 
not merely a record of it.’424 In visual arts, this resurgence of interest in appropriation 
focusing on the archive has been described as a paradigm shift in the early twenty-
first century. I see the emergence of writing document under erasure as a literary 
response to and a manifestation of those exact developments, as their iteration, by 
textual means. In documents written under erasure, methods and forms 
characteristic of the Iterative turn converge with the aesthetic preoccupations of the 
documentary turn in visual arts.  
Jill Bennett links this rise in the interest in the document as a subject in 
contemporary visual arts to the events of 9/11. I would like to suggest that reasons for 
the developments Bennett is describing reside in a broader frame of contemporary 
culture and stem from the current postproduction condition. What contemporary 
digitalisation contributes to the way we experience reality and, hence, culturally, 
politically and historically significant events, is a marked transition from the private 
to the public. The media and technology now allow for, at an unprecedented level, an 
experience of history as it happens. The war and natural disasters today – on a par 
with reality TV – are public in that everyone has access to them, with facilities for 
interacting and potentially interfering with the event. ‘Current conflicts,’ as T.J. 
Demos observes,  
are […] thus fought on (at least) two fronts – both on the ground, with 
military might […] and in cyberspace, via media power […] jihadi 
strikes in postwar Iraq, for instance, accompany simultaneous news 
dispatches (whether emanating officially from as-Sahab, al-Qaeda’s 
media wing, or anonymously dispersed on Internet file-sharing 
sites.425  
 
We experience events that are not ours to experience, in real time, and these feed into 
our construction of history, memory, but also the self in novel ways. This is an 
information dynamic paramount to and paradigmatic of the current cultural moment 
that both enables and encourages iterative thinking. More than just a mode of 
representation, the emergence of the contemporary information culture has 
contributed to a rise of novel modes of seeing, witnessing, and inhabiting an event 
that, in turn, influence the formation of contemporary self-identities. Holmes’s 
expression of the trauma of the Iraq war in The MS of MY Kin is a distant, media 
induced experience, not less significant than the response of those who encounter the 
war more directly but a different, hybrid form of remembering the events.  
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History now, mediated through the new technologies is, as Verwoert observes, 
always there as a latency; ‘we moved from dead history to undead history’426 through 
our capacity to engage and interact with it as it develops. Seen as such, it is not 
Baudrillard’s simulacral reality that shaped the developments of postmodern 
aesthetics and appropriation but an iterative prosthetic culture that we are 
experiencing now. The notion of prosthesis is key, I suggest, to understanding the 
contemporary attitudes towards iteration embedded in the archive; a culture 
mediated through hybrid, prosthetic memories. Prosthetic memories formulated in 
the contemporary postproduction context are, as Alison Landsberg describes the 
concept, ‘memories which do not come from a person’s lived experience in any strict 
sense. These are implanted memories,’ memories triggered by ‘unsettled boundaries 
between real and simulated ones.’427 Seen as such, memories become permanently 
transferable and iterable. Where the memories are not associated with a first-hand 
experience, any possibility of assignation of memory to an individual – of memories 
as inalienable property –becomes problematic. A similar sense of subverted origins 
manifests itself in thinking about paradigms of memory and in the efforts at arriving 
at contemporary models of authorship, both addressing challenges to thinking about 
the possibilities of originality at the Iterative turn.  
How to deal with such an exposure to and assimilation of information and 
potential resulting traumas is yet another challenging question; contemporary visual 
arts and, through experimental forms of writing such as erasure, also literature today, 
are exploring means of addressing and responding to the issue. But this interest in 
the real in the twenty-first century derives not so much from a preoccupation with 
figurative forms of expression and a drive towards verisimilitude. Instead, it is, as 
Bennett describes it, marked by ‘a focus on how the event is apprehended: on 
perception and feeling as constitutive of the event itself.’428 The real approached as 
such gives rise to ‘emotive politics of events’;429 it brings to the fore the role of affect 
in engaging with the archive, as touched upon earlier in this chapter. Macdonald’s 
and Philip’s practices respond particularly explicitly to that affective turn,430 and, at 
                                                             
426 Verwoert, Tate.  
427 Alison Landsberg, ‘Prosthetic Memory: Total Recall and Blade Runner’, in 
Cybespace,/Cyberbodies/Cyberpunk: Cultures of Technological Embodiment, ed. Mike 
Featherstone and Roger Burrows (London: Sage Publications, 1995), 175.  
428 Jill Bennett, Practical Aesthetics: Events, Affects and Art after 9/11 (London and New 
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430 Critical explorations of affect have been proliferating since 2000. Theories of affect 
explore ways of understanding experience outside of the dominant paradigms of 
representation. Theoretical approaches to affect strive to organise emotions and subjective 
experiences as encounters, to associate them with typical responses. Theorists of affect 
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the same time, remain deeply rooted in the aesthetics of iteration, merging an interest 
in appropriation techniques with a preoccupation with poetics of feeling and modes 
of expressing subjectivity as a ‘determining feature of social, cultural and political 
relations.’431  
Parallel dynamics seem to influence approaches to history and memory today: 
‘through information technology and new research into the structure of the brain,’ 
writes Assman, ‘we are now experiencing a change of paradigm, by which the concept 
of a lasting written record is being replaced by the principle of continuous 
rewritings.’432 Understood in the context, an act of writing erasure as a form governed 
by affect and iteration combined, turns into an act of writing memory. Erasure, and 
especially erasure that draws from the archive for sources, yields both affect and 
iteration visible. Acknowledging both as marked by expressive qualities, it enables 
new ways of being in the event rather than simply restoring experiences of history. 
For Verwoert acts of appropriation are intrinsically linked to a particular 
understanding of history, but as perceptions of history change, Verwoert argues, 
understanding of the notion of appropriation also changes. As a paradigm shift, new 
understanding of history is, today, grounded in the contemporary postproduction 
moment, in new media technologies and the possibilities they open up. The 
contemporary digital culture is key to understanding the paradigms of documentary 
visual culture today. As Enwezor points out:  
the issue grappled here is not so much the artist’s employment of 
archival logic but rather, the artist’s relationship to images and 
instruments of mass culture or media in which the archival is sought 
out – especially in the digital arena – as part of a broad culture of 
sampling, sharing and recombining of visual data in infinite 
calibrations of users and receivers.433 
 
Erasure’s experimentation resides in the possibility of approaching the 
archive and the history from the inside. But it remains equally concerned with the 
material of the official history and the para-historical, accessible much more freely in 
the contemporary digital age. Erasure relies on presence and absence of history and 
the archive at the same time. It is a genre interested in what is outside language to 
engage with extra-historical, counter-archival and as a result extra-textual meanings. 
It is the characteristic formal possibilities of appropriating the document that render 
erasure a form that is not simply a creative practice dealing with affect but, to borrow 
Bennett’s term, one that enables ‘affective process,’434 facilitating means of instilling 
                                                             
431 PA, 20.  
432 Assman, 11.  
433 Enwezor, 23. 
434 PA, 26. 
| 149 
 
 
the affective content into the frame of objective discourse of the archive, an approach 
made possible through an engagement with an iterative process. It offers tactics for 
turning history into personal memories. Read as such, erasure emerges as a 
particularly current form of writing and a manifestation of broader contemporary 
aesthetic preoccupations. Like contemporary documentary art erasure should be 
approached as ‘an aesthetic reconfiguration of experience,’ 435  ‘reconnected,’ as 
Bennett, via Deleuze and Guattari, puts it, ‘over a lacuna rather than linked by 
continuation.’436 It is a lacuna that finds its manifestation in the pages of documents 
sous rature.  
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INTRODUCTION: WRITING TRANSCRIPTION 
 
I would like to open this chapter by returning, albeit briefly, to Jenny Holzer’s 
Redaction Paintings, as discussed with reference to erasure poetry. Holzer, I 
suggested in Chapter 2, is interested in the erasure of information, the manipulation 
of meaning, and censorship, raising questions about the issues by foregrounding the 
visual aspects of the declassified documents she incorporates into her art. Her prints 
are a striking echo of writing under erasure in visual arts. But what characterises 
Holzer’s approach to her source texts is a practice of verbatim reproduction. Unlike 
erasure writers, and unlike Robert Rauschenberg erasing de Kooning’s drawing, 
Holzer does not alter the source; her appropriation method relies solely on 
reproduction. Recalling the methods of earlier appropriations by Andy Warhol, 
Redaction Paintings are produced by silkscreening a range of declassified 
government documents. As Holzer explains, her choice of technique references 
Warhol’s Death and Disaster works437 (a reference of particular significance in the 
context of this chapter). Although relevant to my discussion of erasure practices and 
evocative of the typography of an erased page, the approach employed in Redaction 
Paintings also serves as a particularly fitting starting point for considering another 
experimental form of iterative poetics. Discussed here under the umbrella term of 
transcription writing, this take on iteration will be discussed with reference to 
representative works by Kenneth Goldsmith. Holzer’s work, I suggest, establishes an 
evocative link between erasure and transcription as creative practices.  
I consider transcription a hyperbolic form of the kind of iterative thinking that 
characterises erasure writing, one that pushes the method of poetics sous rature to 
the extreme. As a basic premise, an idea of a copy is assumed here as a creative 
paradigm. I focus on texts composed by means of transcribing other texts verbatim, 
evoking Holzer’s paintings as copies of the appropriated material. Examples of poetry 
discussed in this chapter include four works by Kenneth Goldsmith: Day (2003) and 
The Day (2009), both transcriptions of The New York Times; The Weather (2005), a 
retyping of radio weather forecasts; and Seven American Deaths and Disasters 
(2013), an appropriated media coverage of seven key moments in American history. 
While in the case of erasure alteration of the source is inherent in the method of 
copying with a différance, the boundaries between the source and a copy become less 
apparent in transcription writing. Where transcription occurs, any possibility of 
differentiating between a copy and the original is put into question. In a manner 
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reminiscent of Borgesian Pierre Menard writing his Don Quixote, an act of 
transcription produces a text that is an indiscriminate copy of its source. 438  My 
discussion of works created by means of transcription is an attempt at devising 
another possible framework for thinking about writing at the Iterative turn. I discuss 
transcription in relation to theories of the event to present it as a form that should be 
considered as an event of writing. Following on from the approach taken in Chapter 
2, this critical reading is a means of exploring possibilities of thinking differently 
about paradigms of authorship and originality at the turn, and arriving at a critical 
framework that enables this conceptual shift.  
 
3.1. KENNETH GOLDSMITH, DAY 
 
Goldsmith’s Day serves as a particularly explicit example of the possibilities 
of writing by iterative means. Day is a retyping of the entire issue of The New York 
Times from Friday, September 1, 2000. In Goldsmith’s transcription no content is 
omitted: the text of the newspaper is transcribed word for word, page by page, from 
top to bottom and left to right, following the text, any text, on the page and 
‘incorporating,’ as Judith Goldman describes the process, ‘eruptions of ad copy into 
news stories and massive entries of stock quotes.’439 Goldsmith explains:  
If an article, for example, continued on another page I wouldn’t go 
there. Instead, I would finish retyping the page I was on in full before 
proceeding to the next one. I allowed myself no creative liberties with 
the text. [...] Everywhere there was a bit of text in the paper, I grabbed 
it. I made no distinction between editorial and advertising, stock 
quotes or classified ads. If it could be considered text, I had to have it. 
Even if there was, say, an ad for a car, I took a magnifying glass and 
grabbed the text of the license plate.440  
 
Published as an 830-page volume, the text comprising Day transforms the 
characteristic typography of a non-linear newspaper page into the linear text of a book 
traditionally understood, turning reading into an act of writing, textual consumption 
into an act of literary production, and transcription into a process of re-typesetting.  
Goldsmith’s methods and technologies are worth mentioning in the context. 
Some text in Day is manually transcribed, some scanned using OCR technologies, 
                                                             
438 In ‘Being Boring’ Goldsmith declares affinities with Borges and his Pierre Menard method 
by stating: ‘I’ve thought about my practice in relation to Borges’s Pierre Menard, but even 
Menard was more original than I am: he, independent of any knowledge of Don Quixote, 
reinvented Cervantes’ masterpiece word for word. By contrast, I don’t invent anything. I just 
keep rewriting the same book’ [BB].  
439 Judith Goldman, ‘Re-thinking “Non-retinal Literature”: Citation, “Radical Mimesis,” and 
Phenomenologies of Reading in Conceptual Writing’, Postmodern Culture, 22.1 (2011), non. 
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rendering the content of Day and The New York Times identical, while the context 
and form change (in line with the typically conceptual focus on context as the new 
content). Goldsmith’s commitment to a technology-driven writing process is key here, 
indicative of postproduction sensibilities expressed in gestures similar to Place’s, 
Morrison’s or Doeringer’s, as discussed in Chapter 1. To write Day is to collect, collate, 
and rearrange language of stories already readily available, every day. ‘The daily 
newspaper,’ as Goldsmith explains,  
is really a great novel filled with stories of love, jealousy, murder, 
competition, sex, passion and so forth. It’s a fantastic thing: the daily 
newspaper, when translated, amounts to a 900 page book […] And it’s 
a book that’s written in every city and in every country, only to be 
instantly discarded in order to write a brand new one, full of fresh 
stories the next day.441  
 
Echoes of Bourriaud’s philosophy reverberate clearly in Goldsmith's statements on 
the nature of his own work and contemporary creativity more broadly. Seeing the 
current cultural landscape as inherently uncreative, Goldsmith evokes Bourriaud’s 
logic by claiming affinities with conceptual artist’s Douglas Huebler: ‘the world is full 
of objects, more or less interesting,’ Huebler observed in 1969, ‘I do not wish to add 
any more;’442 ‘The world is full of texts, more or less interesting; I do not wish to add 
any more,’443 suggests Goldsmith in 2004.  This approach, declaring a propensity for 
iteration through an iterative act, explicitly defines Goldsmith’s attitude and the 
broader logic of writing at the Iterative turn. The gesture is also key in that it 
foregrounds the contemporaneity of Goldsmith’s practice. It manifests a transition 
from postmodern to postproduction preoccupations and modes of appropriation, 
from Huebler’s objects to Goldsmith’s texts, from things to information.  
A similar approach informs Goldsmith’s take on pagination in Day – an 
appropriation of the format applied by The Times. Pages of the paper are numbered 
according to a characteristic alphanumeric model, where a letter corresponds to a 
section and a number to a page within that section. ‘A’ stands for The New York Times 
daily, ‘B’ for ‘Metro’, ‘C’ is ‘Business Day’, with ‘D’ focused on ‘Sports Friday’, ‘E’ 
referring to the ‘Weekend’ section, and ‘F’ devoted to automobiles, including classified 
advertising. This division is then reflected in Day, although chapters of Goldsmith's 
volume are titled according to the letters that correspond to each newspaper section 
rather than according to the section’s subject matter. The entire volume of Day is split 
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into chapters marked A-F, with pages referenced by a double system, each denoted by 
a page number as it reflects the pagination specific to Day itself and one that 
references the relevant page of the newspaper. As such, the transcription of page A1 
of The New York Times starts on page 11 of Day and concludes on page 16. Pages of 
Day that correspond to page A1 in The New York Times are subsequently numbered: 
11/A1, 12/A1, 13/A1, etc., to then turn into 17/A2 where the transcription of page A2 
begins. The transcription of the complete front page of the newspaper translates into 
six pages of text. The preserved content merges into a continuous flow of discourse; 
no images are retained (though captions and text that is embedded in them are),444 
font types and sizes are all unified.  
But, tellingly, this pagination method also echoes the format of Benjamin’s 
The Arcades Project. Benjamin’s volume, just like Day, is divided into sections, 
arranged according to a similar system using letters and page numbers. The layout of 
Day’s pages mirrors the characteristic typography of the Belknap Press/Harvard 
2002 English edition of The Arcades.445 In both Day and The Arcades Project page 
numbers and letters indicating a section are printed side by side, divided by a forward 
slash, and positioned vertically on the outer margin. Goldsmith’s text is split into 
short paragraphs and printed in the same font as The Arcades, evoking Benjamin’s 
fragmented, collected text [Figure 35]. This formatting, I suggest, is fundamental to 
understanding Goldsmith’s iterative practice. Day emerges as a text characterised by 
a multiplicity of iterations. Here, both content and form are a result of acts of 
repetition; the iteration is both actual – manifested on the level of appropriated 
content and its format – and conceptual – evoking similar historical gestures that 
influence contemporary iterative thinking. Presenting Day as a contemporary take on 
The Arcades Project is driven by the same attitude that informs Goldsmith’s 
appropriation of Huebler’s declaration, commenting on and performing acts of 
iteration at the same time. In both instances, the approach is a means of inscribing 
the work into a very specific cultural framework, unambiguously establishing 
conceptual writing as representative of a tradition of iterative, conceptual practice 
and thought. Presenting Day as Goldsmith’s Arcades can be seen as a comment on 
                                                             
444 This approach is important from the copyright point of view. Goldsmith treats his source 
as a repository of information and not as a collection of individually authored texts. By doing 
so Goldsmith plays against the copyright rules by complying with the rules at the same time, 
in a gesture evocative of Prince’s Catcher. Information cannot be copyrighted and is 
considered available for citing and reuse as publically available material. Images, however, 
are copyright to individual photographers or agencies. Anything that is unambiguously 
problematic from the copyright’s point of view is omitted in Day. 
445 This choice of formatting is briefly referenced by Goldsmith in Uncreative Writing but 
not discussed in detail. The only mention of the source reads: ‘I ended up making it the exact 
size and bulk of the paperbound Harvard edition of The Arcades Project’ [UW, 119]. 
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his approach to authorship that writing by means of iteration invites. Benjamin’s 
project is one of Goldsmith’s key texts: ‘in [The] Arcades Project,’ Goldsmith writes, 
‘we have a literary roadmap for appropriation.’ 446  As such, it proves essential to 
understanding the logic of his uncreative writing as an expression of authorship 
rather than as a purely automated gesture. For Goldsmith, ‘Benjamin’s own voice 
inserts itself,’447 and The Arcades is an expression of ‘the author’s synthetic skill […] 
the exquisite quality of Benjamin’s choices, his taste.’448 This is the kind of thinking, 
Goldsmith seems to suggest, that should be conveyed in any attempt at engaging with 
Day. It is what and how both Benjamin and Goldsmith select to copy, organise, and 
curate, that is vital to understanding the creative dynamic of iteration.449  
The difficulty of reading Goldsmith’s Day, then, evokes the challenge of 
engaging with The Arcades. Goldsmith’s excessive amalgamation of content produces 
a seemingly unreadable text. The issue of unreadability of works such as Day is 
indicative of characteristic attitudes towards reading as well as creative and critical 
writing practices at the Iterative turn. Goldsmith sees his work as unreadable in that 
it is written to provoke what he describes as thinkership rather than readership as a 
contemporary model of engaging with creative works. For Goldsmith (repeating after 
LeWitt, paraphrasing Yoko Ono), ‘art should exist only in the mind.’450 And there is a 
widespread credulous tendency among critics and scholars to rather uncritically 
follow Goldsmith’s declarations. No one, just as Goldsmith would have it, seems to 
have read Day. In an article discussing Goldsmith’s work, Bill Friend, for example, 
unabashedly states: ‘I haven’t read Goldsmith’s Day […]. Although I consider myself 
a big fan of his work, I’ve read almost none of it.’451 This approach to Goldsmith 
criticism results in proliferating misreadings and misinterpretations, with Day 
particularly illustrative of the tendency. Although a retyping of The New York Times 
issue from September 1, 2000, associating the volume with September 1, 2001 is a 
common mistake. J. Mark Smith’s Introduction to Time in Time (2013) and Steve 
                                                             
446 UW, 117. 
447 Ibid, 109 
448 Ibid, 113.  
449 Issues of authorship as a curatorial practice are explored later in this chapter.  
450 UW, 132. This is an assertion evocative of the principles of conceptual art. The work of 
conceptual art characteristically dispenses with retinal qualities of art; it is not to be seen but 
to be thought about. The project of conceptual writing is driven by a similar logic. It 
propagates an interest in texts composed not to be read, but in works to be thought about. 
The importance of conceptual art thought to conceptual writing is discussed in more detail 
later in this chapter.  
451 Bill Friend, ‘In the Conceptualist Vacuum: on Kenneth Goldsmith Ken Johnson “Day”’, 
Jacket, 40 (201o), accessed 23 February 2014, http://jacketmagazine.com/40/freind-
johnson-Day.shtml.  
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McCafferey’s essay included in the same volume both serve as recent examples.452 
Potential problems with such inaccuracies aside, Goldsmith’s statements on his work 
should not, I suggest, be taken for granted. As Dworkin stresses, labels and prescribed 
readings that Goldsmith’s projects (‘attention-attracting, ‘so well advertised,’)453 put 
forward always prove to some extent inaccurate. ‘And one should always remember 
Benjamin’s warning,’ Dworkin suggests, ‘never trust what writers say about their own 
writing.’454 I take Dworkin’s statement as a starting point, to engage with Goldsmith’s 
Day as a highly readable text. With subversion playing a vital role in Goldsmith’s 
literary practices, subversion also seems a critical method pertinent to approaching 
his work. In fact, repudiating pure thinkership in favour of readership when engaging 
with Day, especially when reading the book alongside its source text, renders 
particularly striking results. Reading Day, and negotiating the salient structures of its 
narrative, rather than ‘just’ thinking about it, puts Goldsmith’s assertions about his 
methodology into question and offers an insight into the nature of creativity that 
transcription as an authorial practice facilitates.  
                                                             
452 In his introduction to the volume Smith describes Day as ‘a book-length, page by page 
transcription of all the words and numbers in the Friday 1 September 2001 edition of The 
New York Times’ [J. Mark Smith, Introduction to Time in Time: Short Poems, Long Poems, 
and the Rhetoric of the North American Avant-Gardism, 1983-2008 (Montreal: McGill-
Queen’s University Press, 2013), 14]. McCafferey’s essay included in the same volume reads: 
‘Day […] testifies to a single mundane act: the transcription of all the words and numbers 
found in the New York Times edition for Friday, 1 September 2001’ [Steve McCaffery, ‘Day 
Labour’ in Time in Time: Short Poems, Long Poems, and the Rhetoric of the North 
American Avant-Gardism, 1983-2008, ed. J. Mark Smith (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 2013), 177]. 
453 Craig Dworkin, ‘Zero Kerning’, Open Letter: A Canadian Journal of Writing and Theory, 
12.7 (2005), 10.  
454 Ibid. 
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FIGURE 35: A PAGE FROM KENNETH GOLDSMITH'S DAY AND WALTER BENJAMIN'S  
THE ARCADES PROJECT 
 
Day, I suggest, is highly readable. The transcribed text of The New York Times 
might not offer a particularly riveting reading experience at all times, but it also does 
not merge into one, uninterrupted textual mass, as both Goldsmith and his critics 
seem to imply. Rather, it proves easy to follow, with each new piece of information 
treated as a separate paragraph. What the transcription of all the newspaper content 
brings to the fore is the ‘absent’ text, language that is always present on pages of the 
newspaper even if it is not typically read as such, a form of a paratext printed 
alongside the main news articles, i.e. language that forms headings, information 
about the volume and issue, advertisements, blurbs, barcode numbers, pictures’ 
copyright information, etc. Of course, the incorporation of all the otherwise marginal 
discourse into the body of Day makes for a rather singular reading experience, 
daunting, discouraging and simply boring at times (and boredom, is key to 
Goldsmith’s (un)creative philosophy). 455  But the method and the format of the 
                                                             
455 For Goldsmith boredom and illegibility are interrelated: ‘I am the most boring writer that 
has ever lived. […] My books are impossible to read straight through. In fact, every time I 
have to proofread them before sending them off to the publisher, I fall asleep repeatedly. You 
really don't need to read my books to get the idea of what they're like; you just need to know 
the general concept. […] John Cage said, "If something is boring after two minutes, try it for 
four. If still boring, then eight. Then sixteen. Then thirty-two. Eventually one discovers that 
it is not boring at all." He's right: there's a certain kind of unboring boredom that's 
fascinating, engrossing, transcendent, and downright sexy.[…] Unboring boring is a 
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transcription still contribute to a highly readable volume, potentially even more so 
than when the same text is engaged with in its original context, that is, if we take 
interest in language rather than just news and information, in all language printed on 
the page. By foregrounding the language of small print and of marginal content Day 
reverses the textual dynamic of a daily newspaper, turning unreadability into a 
potentiality of reading. Here, a barcode number, a classified advertisement, and the 
front page news are all treated with equal level of interest, as literature. 
This unacknowledged commitment to readability in Day also becomes 
apparent where the method of transcribing the main body of the newspaper’s text is 
concerned. The content of the NYT is indeed transcribed left to right, top to bottom 
but, importantly, the process also takes into account and follows the articles 
themselves. The individual page and its layout inform the texture of Day. For 
example, Eric Schmitt’s article, which opens the issue of The Times, is printed on the 
front page and subsequently continued on page A9. Similarly, its opening paragraphs 
are incorporated into A1 section of Day while its second half is transcribed within the 
A9 section on page 45/A9. In that respect, the readability of individual, reported 
stories is broken. While the approach is typical for newspaper print, it accounts for an 
unusual reading experience when encountered in a book format. This layout feature 
aside, however, the text of the transcribed articles proves easy to follow, as Goldsmith 
respects both the column and article breaks. Instead of, for example, transcribing the 
entire lines horizontally, irrespective of the column and article breaks, or retyping 
complete columns, from the top to the bottom of the page, irrespective of article 
breaks (both hypothetical approaches that would show a commitment to form and 
language alone, to ultimate unreadability, subject to automated processing without 
respect for the content), Goldsmith's transcriptions are dictated solely by the content 
of the articles he copies. As such, the text of Day follows each page, article by article, 
with all features from the top half of the page transcribed first and then followed by 
those printed on the bottom half, always retaining the left to right rule. The 
incorporation of the newspaper paratextual material also does not disturb the reading 
experience, as each new piece of information in treated as a separate paragraph 
[compare Figure 36 and Figure 37].  
Examples of Goldsmith’s manipulation of the flow of the appropriated text are 
multiple and most explicit in his approach to transcribing picture captions and words 
                                                             
voluntary state; boring boring is a forced one. […] Because I volunteered to be bored, it was 
the most exciting thing I've ever seen […] Even though I construct boring works, I wouldn't 
dream of forcing you to sit through an extended reading of my work: at least not without a 
fair warning, giving you an out, a chance for you to edit the dull parts by fast forwarding, 
leaving the room, or switching me off’ [BB].  
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embedded in images. For example, Bradsher’s article (also on the front page) includes 
an image in the bottom half the first column of a two-column text. Both the caption 
and copyright information accompanying the image are transcribed in Day but they 
follow the transcription of the entire article. They do not interrupt the flow of the main 
article, even though the position of the image within the article would suggest a break 
in the flow of the text. An image showing Al Gore on a TV screen serves as another 
case in point. The text extracted from the picture reads: ‘The White House’. The text, 
in the newspaper, however, is obscured and although there is no doubt as to the 
content of the inscription, the only letters made visible on the page read ‘The Wi ouse’ 
[Figure 36]. Rather than simply transcribing, Goldsmith manipulates the text 
appropriated. This approach seems to reflect the dynamic of reading experience much 
more than a straightforward automated process of a disengaged, indiscriminate 
copying. Although hyperbolised, requiring a particularly meticulous, thorough 
reader, obsessively committed to every word printed on the page, this is a 
manifestation of a reader’s experience nevertheless, methodically progressing 
through the pages of the paper, article by article, page by page, heavily invested in the 
content rather than rejecting it. Goldsmith might like to think of himself as a 
machine,456 a textual generator, ‘a master typist,’ and ‘an OCR demon,’457 but it is the 
fallible, subjective human contribution that informs Day. The influence of the 
authorial gesture is crucial here. It is manifested in attempts at determining the flow 
and order of the appropriated text and in related mistakes, alterations, and omissions 
that define a copy as an integral part of the transcription process.  
                                                             
456 In his approach to writing that is dependent on technologies Goldsmith frequently echoes 
Warhol’s interest in machines and technologies. The affinities between Goldsmith and 
Warhol will be discussed later in this chapter.  
457 BB.  
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FIGURE 36: THE NEW YORK TIMES, SEPTEMBER 1, 2000, PAGE A1 
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FIGURE 37: KENNETH GOLDSMITH, DAY, PAGE 11/A1 
 
A number of further discrepancies can be noted between Day and its source 
text. For example, the top of the left column on page A18 in The New York Times 
includes an advertisement which reads ‘Labour Break/Save Up To 30% During Our 
Labour Day Sale!’ 458  ‘Labour Break’ is, however, omitted in Day and the 
                                                             
458 The New York Times, 1 September 2000, A18.  
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corresponding passage reads: ‘Save Up To 30% During Our Labour Day Sale!’459 A 
transcription of an article from page E34 of the paper also does not reflect the source 
faithfully. In Goldsmith’s hands The New York Times’s ‘Cabaret Guide’ turns into a 
‘Cabaret Buide’ and ‘Hiroyuki Ito,’ an author of the accompanying photograph, 
features as ‘Hiroyki Ito.’460 Probably most notably, the entire page E24 [Figure 38] is 
missing from Day and Goldsmith’s transcription of section E23 that closes on page 
686 is followed by E25 on page 687. Whether this is an intentional omission (the TV 
listing grid constituting page E24 would prove a staggeringly laborious transcription 
project), an oversight, or perhaps a reflection on Goldsmith’s copy of the September 
1, 2000 issue of The New York Times (given the typical two-sided structure of a 
newspaper page, E24 could not be missing unless E23 was missing as well, but might 
there, perhaps, be an issue with the way E24 was printed in Goldsmith’s copy, causing 
problems with its legibility?), Day emerges as a manifestation of Goldsmith’s 
experience of that singular copy of the paper; it is Kenneth Goldsmith’s Times rather 
than The New York Times that is rendered in the process of transcription.  
 
FIGURE 38: THE NEW YORK TIMES, SEPTEMBER 1, 2000, PAGE E24 
                                                             
459 Kenneth Goldsmith, Day (Great Barrington, MA: The Figures, 2003), 80. Hereafter D.  
460 Ibid, 745.  
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Read as such, Day becomes synonymous with subjectivity and singularity of 
an act of repetition, always, as Derrida would have it, presented as repetition with 
différance. The law of repetition that governs the creative methodology of Day 
presupposes an occurrence of sameness – where there is repetition, sameness is 
inevitably manifested. But as Goldsmith's attempt at transcription seems to indicate, 
alterity always defines acts of repetition; the repetition of the same461 fails to produce 
an identical copy. The nature of Day’s copy, considered as such can be read as an 
explicit manifestation of the Derridean notion of iterability as discussed in Chapter 1. 
The juxtaposition of alterity and repetition is important here in that, for Derrida, the 
two are interdependent; alterity can only be defined through its relation to repetition, 
where the possibility of alterity and repeatability are inevitably conflated to form the 
notion of iterability. Iterability signifies a combination of repetition (that, which 
implies sameness) and difference (that which implies alterity). As such, a Derridean 
repetition, and, as I suggest, an act of conceptual literary transcription such as Day, 
effects an altered version of that which it repeats, that which links repetition to 
alterity. The act of repetition as performed by Goldsmith echoes Derrida’s model. It 
does not assume a repetition of the same, rather it complicates the boundaries 
between the copy and original to turn into a play of dissemination, that which, as 
Derrida explains, disturbs established models of authority and, hence, authorship. If 
works of iterative poetics embody Derridean ‘marks of dissemination,’ 462  then 
transcription as a creative practice applies the name ‘poetry’ to that which it 
deconstructs, wrenches apart the traditional, hierarchical opposition between literary 
and non-literary discourses, between poetry and the system of all of what is 
                                                             
461 Both Derrida and Deleuze discuss the notion of the repetition of the same/Same. For 
Derrida, it is in the repetition of the same that a possibility of something new resides (what 
he calls the invention of the other). In ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’ Derrida discusses repetition as 
contingent on sameness: if there is repetition, there is sameness; there can only be repetition 
if it is of the same, but the repetition of the same cannot be identical [Jacques Derrida, 
‘Plato’s Pharmacy’, in Dissemination, trans. Barbara Johnson (London: Continuum, 2011), 
67-185]. Derrida’s notion of the same is closely associated with his understanding of 
différance. In ‘Signature Event Context’ the notion of repetition of the same is developed as 
iterability of the mark. It is this impossibility of repetition that I am particularly interested in 
here as it is evoked in Deleuze’s thinking as well. While Deleuze distinguished between two 
kinds of repetition – the secondary repetition that emerges from the inadequacy of concepts 
and the primary repetition, which is inherently affirmative – it is the latter I will focus on 
here. Unlike the secondary repetition, primary repetition is, as Delezue puts it, ‘dynamic’; 
‘the first repetition is repetition of the Same, explained by the identity of the concept or 
representation; the second includes difference, and includes itself in the alterity of the Idea’ 
[Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition (London: Continuum, 2010), 27]. I will adopt 
Derrida’s spelling of ‘the same’ instead of Deleuze’s ‘the Same’.  
462 Derrida, Dissemination, 21.  
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customarily opposed to poetry.463 Seen as such, it turns into an essence of the Iterative 
turn.  
 
3.2. THE EVENT: KENNETH GOLDSMITH, THE DAY 
 
‘Repetition,’ writes Simon Morgan Wortham, ‘as it opens into new horizons 
[...] transforms the meaning of the term it repeats, as something on an event, 
perhaps.’464 An interesting correlation emerges here between the nature of the text 
generated by iterative acts and what Derrida describes as an event, a trajectory key, I 
suggest, to defining the methods and preoccupations of Goldsmith's uncreativity, and 
iterative poetics more broadly. For Derrida, an event is that which is singular, 
irreplaceable: ‘an event is something that vertically befalls me when I didn’t see it 
coming,’465 ‘the event’s eventfulness depends on this experience of the impossible.’466 
A Derridean event always implies a surprise, that which could not be anticipated. This 
assumption significantly influences any possibility of, in Derrida’s words, speaking 
the event; of recording and reporting of that which is happening. Rather, any 
engagement with the event is always a retrospective act. It is a mode of referencing 
the past marked by the impossibility of being fully and unambiguously reconstructed. 
If repeated, whatever form the repetition might take, the event is always characterised 
by a condition of a différance. As Derrida argues,  
the saying of the event as a statement of knowing of information, […] 
this saying of the event is always somewhat problematic because the 
structure of saying is such that it always comes after the event [...] it is 
bound to a measure of generality, iterability and repeatability, it 
always misses the singularity of the event.467  
 
This certain impossible possibility of saying the event that derives from its singular 
nature, defies any possibility of a repetition of an event in itself, its ‘unmasterable 
singularity [...] evades,’ as Wortham points out, ‘its own appropriation by any given 
language, discourse, or context.’468 Any repetition of an event, then, any attempt at 
saying or writing an event – a repetition in/through language – is inherently 
                                                             
463 This statement is a paraphrase, in Goldsmith’s fashion, of a passage from Derrida’s 
Dissemination. The corresponding excerpt reads: ‘we will try to determine the law which 
compels us […] to apply the name “writing” to that which critiques, deconstructs, wretches 
apart the traditional , hierarchical opposition between writing and writing and speech, 
between writing and the […] system of all of what is customarily opposed to writing’ 
[Derrida, Dissemination, 4]. 
464 Simon Morgan Wortham, Derrida: Writing Events (London: Continuum, 2008), 15.  
465 Jacques Derrida, ‘A Certain Impossible Possibility of Saying the Event,’ Critical Inquiry, 
33.2 (2007), 452. Hereafter ACIP.  
466 Ibid, 451.  
467 Ibid, 446.  
468 Wortham, 4.  
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characterised by alterity. When read in this context, Day becomes an explicit 
manifestation of such an impossibility of repetition. The Derridean impossibility of 
saying the event translates here into an impossibility of an exact, unaltered 
transcription of the issue of The New York Times, as made explicit in manipulations, 
alterations, and omissions that characterise Day’s textuality.  
The structure of the evental iteration that constitutes Day is also important 
here. Where Goldsmith’s attempt at re-recording the event(s) of September 1, 2000 
brings to the fore the dynamic of information dissemination and access to the event 
itself – always negotiated through the discourse of the media – ‘the saying of the event 
[presupposes] some sort of inevitable neutralisation of the event by its iterability [...] 
saying always harbours the possibility of resaying.’469 The resaying of the news from 
September 1, 2000 in Day is not so much a repetition of the event in itself as an 
iteration of the retelling of the event as mediated through the newspaper print, of an 
impression of the event, in Derrida’s terms. Characteristically, for Derrida, ‘the event 
is made up of the “thing” in itself (that which happens or comes) and the impression 
(itself at once “spontaneous” and “controlled”) that is given, left or made by the so-
called “thing.”’470  The information machine of The New York Times produces an 
impression of those events and not the events themselves. It remains always removed 
in space and time from the event itself. The issue of The New York Times from 
September 1 is as current as a newspaper can be, though still characterised by a 
certain belatedness in relation to the event it reiterates. The events reported on 
September 1, 2000 are the ‘thing’ of August 31, 2000. The ‘thing’ of September 1 only 
translates into newspaper print a day later, to be written on September 2, 2000, 
inevitably informed, to paraphrase Derrida, by the system that produces the 
information about it and the specific medium – here a newspaper – employed to 
facilitate the speaking.  
This belatedness of the evental iteration as a temporal framework that 
determines the possibilities of speaking the event manifests itself particularly 
poignantly in a juxtaposition of Day and The Day (2009), another transcription 
project by Kenneth Goldsmith. The Day is composed by exactly the same means as 
Day. It is a word-for-word transcription of an issue of The New York Times. But while 
Day focuses on a ‘Friday before Labour Day weekend of 2000 […] a slow news Day,’ 
                                                             
469 ACIP, 452.  
470 Jacques Derrida, ‘Autoimmunity: Real and Symbolic Suicides: A dialogue with Jacques 
Derrida’, in Philosophy in a Time of Terror: Dialogues with Jurgen Habermas and Jacques 
Derrida, Giovanna Barradori, trans. Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2004), 89. Hereafter ARSS. 
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when, as Goldsmith describes it, ‘just the regular stuff happened, nothing special,’471 
The Day iterates news printed in the paper on September 11, 2001. Day represents a 
day like any other, The Day is synonymous with a watershed event in modern history. 
But the events of 9/11 themselves serve only as a background to the text of the The 
Day, only present on the pages of the issue of The New York Times retrospectively. 
What is happening on 9/11 will only be said on 9/12.  
Echoes of Hans-Peter Feldmann’s 9:12 Frontpage (2002) reverberate in 
Goldsmith’s project, reflecting affinities not only with this specific visual arts example 
but also with the broader aesthetic tendencies that, as I suggest, are characteristic of 
the iterative forms of writing discussed here. The same propensity for the 
documentary source of appropriation already touched upon in the context of erasure 
writing transpires here. Feldmann’s 9:12 characteristically focuses on the impression 
of the events of 9/11 by collecting and juxtaposing a range of 151 newspaper front 
pages published on September 12, 2001, all incorporating images of the attacks on the 
Twin Towers [Figure 39]. The same or very similar images consistently reappear here, 
the repetitiveness determined by a very limited number of press agencies responsible 
for their distribution. In Feldmann’s project the structure of iteration not only 
produces a copy but is also produced by tools of reproduction, here in a form of 
globalised information dissemination mechanisms. The repetition, for Feldmann, 
manifests the very logic of the event, intensified by the contemporary information 
dissemination technologies, as if asking, after Derrida: ‘what would “September 11” 
have been without television,’472 or, more broadly, without the media. Hence, 9/11 
emerges here as a topic of particular relevance to aesthetics and poetics influenced by 
contemporary technological change and modes of information dissemination. It is not 
simply as an event of high historical significance, but one considered to be the most 
highly mediated in recent history and, hence, inherently iterative, as discussed in 
Chapter 2. This trajectory and its significance to thinking about iteration as a means 
of responding to events represented as such will be explored in more detail later in 
this chapter. 
                                                             
471 BB.  
472 ARSS, 108. 
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FIGURE 39: HANS-PETER FELDMANN'S 9:12 FRONTPAGE AS PART OF ARCHIVE FEVER - USES 
OF THE DOCUMENT IN CONTEMPORARY ART, 18 JANUARY – 4 MAY, 2008, AT THE 
INTERNATIONAL CENTER OF PHOTOGRAPHY, NEW YORK. 
 
But this multiplicity of repetitions of a repetition in 9:12 is further 
hyperbolised here. Pages of the newspapers that constitute Feldmann’s installation 
are physical copies as well as the Derridean impressions. Rather than an archive of 
the ‘original’ mediated impressions of the event – the actual newspaper pages – 9:12 
is a collection of their copies, photographs of the pages, taken against white card and 
subsequently digitally printed. As such, 9:12 is a repetition of the impression of the 
‘thing’ and a repetition in itself, a project which enacts its own iterativity. Hence, a 
multi-layered structure of repetition emerges here, similar to that formulated in 
Goldsmith's Day and The Day. If, read in the context of Derrida’s framework, the 9/11 
attacks are conceived of as the event, the news reported on September 12, 2001 as the 
delayed, impossible saying of the ‘thing’, its impression, in itself already a repetition, 
then the 9:12, like Day and The Day actualises a repetition of the impression, a 
repetition of the repetition, a copy marked by its inherent alterity, repeating an elusive 
original that defies any possibility of an act of copying. Although uncannily similar, 
often incorporating the same images, unambiguously repeating the familiar 
iconography, each repetition of the event that 9:12 puts forward is different. The 
familiar images, recontextualised, inscribed into typographies specific to each 
reproduced publication, and discussed in different languages, engender the nature of 
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alterity. Framed differently, these copies are an embodiment of iteration, of the 
impossibility of copying immanent in acts of excessive reproduction. In his approach, 
Feldmann seems to reproduce the ubiquity of reproduction itself; marking, through 
the focus on collecting and multiplicity of forms, the impossibility of accessing the 
event, the elusiveness of the original in the light of the pervasiveness of its repetition, 
as mediated, and, inevitably altered through media discourse.  
9:12, then, derives from the same temporal transference that characterises both 
Day and The Day, all twice removed from the ‘thing’ itself. Determined by the nature 
of newspaper print The Day is and at the same time is not a document of the events 
of the 9/11, it does and it does not repeat them. The events that The Day re-reports 
are not the events, or impressions of 9/11 but those of 9/10, a day before the future to 
come. The words of The Day constitute that which was being read and spoken about 
while the event of 9/11 was unveiling, rather than a report on the events of 9/11 
themselves. The ‘Metropolitan Forecast,’ for example, reports good weather in the 
lower 80s, while Arts pages comment on Michel Houellebecq’s discussion of Islam as 
a dangerous religion:  
 
Metropolitan Forecast 
 
     D8 L THE NEW YORK TIMES TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 
     Metropolitan Forecast 
     today Less humid, sunshine 
     High 79. Noticeably less humid air will filter into the metropolitan region on. Brisk 
winds from the northwest. High pressure building east from the Great Lakes will 
promote mainly sunny skies. Daytime readings will peak in the lower 80’s. 
     tonight Clear, lighter winds 
     Low 62. Skies will be clear overnight as high pressure crests near the Middle 
Atlantic Coast. Humidity will remain low, and temperatures will fall to around 60 
degrees in many spots. 
     tomorrow Mainly sunny 
     High 76. Sunshine and just a few clouds will fill the sky. Breezes will turn and blow 
from the south ahead of a cold front approaching from Canada. 
 
Islam 
     e2 the new york times, tuesday, september 11, 2001 
     ARTS ABROAD 
     Continued From First Arts Page 
     On Islam, Mr. Houellebecq went still further, deriding his estranged mother for 
converting to Islam and proclaiming that, while all monotheistic religions were 
“cretinous,” “the most stupid religion is Islam.” And he added: “When you read the 
Koran, you give up. At least the Bible is 
     Sexual tourism 
     and inflammatory 
     remarks about 
     Palestinians. 
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     very beautiful because Jews have an extraordinary literary talent.” And later, 
noting that “Islam is a dangerous religion,” he said it was condemned to disappear, 
not only because God does not exist but also because it was being undermined by 
capitalism.473 
 
Read on the morning of 9/11, Houellebecq’s is an innocent statement, a comment on 
his mother and a discussion of religion more broadly. But in the context of the 
historical framework created by events that take place later in the day, to be reported 
on 9/12, these innocuous fragments of news reports and commentary become loaded 
with meaning, facts, and affects. The pages of The Day highlight the future that was 
never to come, to quote Goldsmith, ‘full of events that never happened: sales that were 
cancelled, listings for events that were indefinitely postponed [...].’474 The rapture of 
9/11 that results in the future which is never realised emerges here, to borrow from 
Mark Currie, ‘in a condition of absolute unforeseeability.’475 As Currie writes,  
there is future we can predict, and there is the unexpected […] 
Preeminent unexpected events, such as 9/11, the tsunami in the Indian 
ocean in 2004, the financial meltdown of 2008, are moments that 
highlight our everyday reliance on and expertise in prediction.’476 
 
The event, Currie observes (echoing Derrida), is ‘the occurrence of the 
unforeseeable.’ 477  For Derrida, ‘an event implies surprise, exposure, the 
unanticipatable […] if there is an event, it must never be something that is predicted 
or planned, or even really decided upon.’478 In the case of The Day, the unexpected 
occurrence of 9/11 turns those events anticipated in the pages of the 9/11 issue of The 
Times, and never realised, into a poignant Bergsonian ‘unforeseeable nothing which 
changes everything.’479 The Day, then, is a manifestation of that which has not yet 
taken place, an effort to fix in print the non-existence of the future. It is a rendering 
of the characteristic unforeseeablitiy of the event, a feature that at the same time 
serves as a prominent criterion of what Currie identifies as newsworthiness. An event 
conceptualised as such is ‘of a kind that bestows an epochal canonicity upon the 
unexpected event,’480 the unexpected, the surprise is a category that determines the 
persistence of an event in time, history and the archive.  
                                                             
473 Kenneth Goldsmith, ‘Two Poems from “The Day”’, Poetry, July/August 2009, accessed 25 
February 2014, http://www.poetryfoundation.org/poetrymagazine/poem/237062.  The 
complete text of The Day has not, to date, been published.  
474 BB.  
475 Mark Currie, The Unexpected: Narrative Temporality and the Philosophy of Surprise 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013), 31. Hereafter TU. 
476 Ibid, 55.  
477 Ibid, 35.  
478 ACIP, 441.  
479 Henri Bergson, ‘The Possible and the Real’, quoted in Currie, 32.   
480 TU, 7.  
| 170 
 
 
Thinking about Day and The Day in the context of Currie’s philosophy of 
surprise allows for a differentiation between the textual dynamic that governs these 
two transcriptions. The implications of the iterative project put forward in The Day 
diverge from the propositions of Day because of the historical context in which this 
particular day is distinguished from any other day, bringing to the fore, yet again, 
conceptualism’s propensity for the context as an agent of meaning. This dynamic that 
marks acts of reporting on the events of 9/10 at the backdrop of the events of 9/11 
emerges as a textual embodiment of the impossibility of saying the event. Even if not 
overtly incorporated into the discourse of The Day, the events of 9/11 are inevitably 
inscribed into the pages of The Day. This iteration is determined by the structure of 
alterity. The dynamic of iteration of news is characteristically marked by ‘the dialectic 
of what is to come and what has already taken place;’481 a difference between the lived 
time and its iterative representation. The transition that an act of transcription 
engenders can be seen as a shift from what Currie describes as an open future and 
towards a closed one. The remediation from the anticipatory newspaper print to its 
iteration in the book form is a transition from the temporal openness of the future 
still to come, to a closure characterised by an engagement with history that has 
already happened. The question of foreknowledge of the event resulting from the 
temporal removal of the transcription from the event itself, as a repetition of a 
repetition, determines the reading of The Day as a document of 9/11.  
Written into such a structure of information apparatus, both Day and The Day 
should be seen as defined by an iterative relationship with the impression rather than 
the ‘thing’ as mediated through The New York Times on September 1, 2000 and 
September 11, 2001 respectively. Day and The Day embody the structure of repetition 
of an event and hence exemplify the only possible act of iteration; while the event in 
itself, the ‘thing’, defies repetition – it is, in the end, impossible, to say the event – the 
impression is always repeatable and iterable, the ‘saying always harbours the 
possibility of resaying’482 – an assertion inherent in the conceptual framework of Day 
and The Day. The impression is always inherently marked by its iterability. It is that 
which repeats and is repeatable at the same time. As such, the impression must be, by 
nature, altering the ‘thing’ which it repeats and be altered in any process of resaying 
in which it might participate. An impression is always inscribed into an iterative 
discursive structure, it is always a repetition. Hence, Day and The Day emerge as 
repetitions of a repetition, rather than of an event as such; they repeat, but repeat ‘no-
thing,’ the act of iteration that produces both texts resides in a repetition of writing. 
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As such, the act of production of Day and The Day, and acts of literary transcription 
more broadly, can be conceived of, I suggest, as events of writing, as the ‘thing’ but a 
thing of discourse. Acts of transcription defined as such perform their own textuality; 
The Day is a textual entity that, in line with Derrida’s assertion, does not just ‘say the 
event, it makes it, it constitutes the event. It is a speech event, a saying event.’483 In 
this structure of textual production a sense of alternative origins of writing emerges, 
which, in turn opens possibilities for alternative thinking about writing that is 
iterative, yet original.  
 
3.3. THE SITUATION: KENNETH GOLDSMITH, THE WEATHER 
 
The attacks interrupted what was otherwise an ordinary day in America. It is 
this rapture, the occurrence of the unexpected event that transforms a day into The 
Day, not any event, but, to borrow from Derrida, a major event. As Derrida noted, 
September 11, 2001 gave an impression of being a major event, one that ‘should be so 
unforeseeable and irruptive that it disturbs even the horizon of the concept or essence 
on the basis of which we believe we recognise an even as such.’484 Nothing is less 
certain than a major event, it is a ‘singular event through and through.’485 Derrida 
characteristically problematises the possibility of an experience of such an event and 
hence raises question about the categorisation of 9/11 as the major event. But for the 
sake of the argument, 9/11 will be here read as an example of a major event, one that 
‘inflicts a wound in the everyday course of history, in the ordinary repetition and 
anticipation of experience.’486 This is a wound that, in the case of a major event, 
‘remains open by our terror before the future and not only the past,’487 a wound as 
rapture perpetually to come.  
Rapture defines Goldsmith’s The Weather, which like Day and The Day is a 
transcription of news. The text is compiled using a year’s worth of verbatim 
transcriptions of hourly, one-minute long weather forecasts from 1010 WINS, New 
York, a local news-only radio station. The transcription opens on December 21, 2002 
and continues, as Goldsmith declares, for one year exactly. The entries are not dated 
but the volume is divided into four chapters, to reflect the four seasons. Each one-
minute broadcast bulletin, when transcribed, is transformed into a separate 
paragraph. As such, The Weather is put together in an ultimate uncreative act; 
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‘nothing, one surmises,’ and Perloff speculates, ‘is invented or added or even altered 
[...] what you see is [...] what you get.’ 488  But in The Weather a number of 
discrepancies between the source and the appropriation can be observed. Similarly to 
Day, The Weather is marked by a range of clear manifestations of Goldsmith’s 
authorial interventions that introduce an element of subjectivity and singularity into 
an otherwise seemingly objective, uncreative text – the language of the weather 
forecast. As Perloff notes, in line with Goldsmith’s declarations, The Weather should 
comprise 365 reports. Instead, only 293 entries are included (Perloff counted), ‘with 
summer being the shortest season (sixty-four entries) and winter the longest, with 
eighty-four.’ 489  Most likely, the missing reports are a reflection on Goldsmith’s 
activity, marking periods of Goldsmith’s absence from New York, his inability to listen 
to the forecast, or, perhaps, are a manifestation of simple forgetfulness and 
unintentional omissions; ‘the text assembles not the weather but Kenny’s weather, 
witnessing his comings and goings in the course of a year.’490  
The content of The Weather, then, just like that of Day, proves revealing 
where the nature of authorship is concerned. The dynamic of textual production 
inherent in acts of transcription explicitly comes to the fore. Goldsmith might invent 
nothing, create no original content, but both The Weather and Day evoke creative, 
authorial decisions that an act of transcription necessitates. These are exposed in a 
range of omissions in and distortions of the source but also transpire on the level of 
form: the size of Day corresponds to the dimensions of Benjamin’s The Arcades 
Project (a conscious decision on Goldsmith’s part); sections of Day are numbered 
according to a system devised by Goldsmith; dates in The Weather are omitted, while 
individual weather bulletins are transcribed as self-contained paragraphs. ‘The act of 
transcription,’ Goldsmith admits, ‘as a hands-off, bone-dry act of coldness is a fallacy; 
no matter what we do we leave our imprint – and a very personal imprint at that – on 
our work.’491 
The text of The Weather, similarly to Day, turns into an embodiment of the 
impossibility of transcription. But an important distinction has to be made between 
The Weather and Day with reference to their sources. It is the instability and 
unpredictability of the source material that lies at the heart of the textuality of The 
Weather. Unlike a transcription of printed source, an engagement with the spoken 
word of the radio news contributes to a poetic text that creates a very different reading 
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experience. Reframing information in both Day and The Weather destabilises the 
form of the original but renders significantly distinct results. The text of The New 
York Times, transcribed, although undeniably deconstructed and defamiliarised, 
remains inherently readable. Written words, even when appropriated in the act of 
transcription, remain words on the page, retain their readability – the typical 
vocabularies, syntax and stylistic features of a discourse formulated to be written 
down. In contrast, reading The Weather draws immediate attention to the 
decontextualisation of the text, to the inappropriateness of the discourse for the 
format in which it is presented, peppered with ‘errrs’, ‘umms’, hesitations, pauses, 
fragmentations characteristic of the spoken language here transformed into writing. 
An element of unpredictability marks the experience of working with the source used 
here, stemming from the mode of transmission of the original text but also its subject. 
The weather itself introduces an element of chance, of surprise. The weather forecast 
relies on and is determined by ‘the chanciness of the weather,’492 as Perloff puts it – 
by the chance of showers, of rain, of the sun, always inherently governed by, at the 
same time, the repetition of the obvious and the formulaic and its unpredictability. 
The situation of the weather report, then, is particularly conducive to change, rapture, 
disturbance, hence, to return to Derrida, the inscription of the event.  
Seen as such, the weather report as radio broadcast and as poetry are 
paradigmatic of the structure of iteration as an event of writing. This dynamic is 
expressed particularly explicitly in the ‘Spring’ section of The Weather:  
Oh, we are looking at, uh, weather, uh, across, uh, Iraq obviously here 
for the next several days, uh, we have, uh, actually some good, good 
weather is expected. They did have a sandstorm here earlier, uh, over 
the last twelve to twenty-four hours those winds have subsided and 
will actually continue to subside. Uh, there will be enough of a wind 
across the southern portion of the country that still may cause some 
blowing sand tomorrow. Otherwise we're looking at clear to partly 
cloudy skies tonight and tomorrow, uh, the weekend, uh, it is good 
weather, and then we could have a storm, uh, generating some strong 
winds, uh, for Sunday night and Monday, uh, even the possibility of a 
little rain in Baghdad. Uh, currently we have, uh, uh, increasing 
cloudiness, uh, forecast locally tonight, uh, it's gonna be brisk and 
chilly, temperatures getting down into the middle-thirties, and then 
some, uh, intermittent rain is expected tomorrow and tomorrow night. 
It'll become steadier and heavier late in the day and, uh, actually a 
pretty good soaking tomorrow night. Uh, temperatures getting into the 
mid-forties tomorrow, and then staying in the forties tomorrow 
night.493 
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Rather unexpectedly, in these opening passages of part 2 of The Weather, spring in 
New York arrives with a report on weather in Iraq. Triggered by the U.S. invasion of 
Iraq in 2003 the introduction of weather reports from Baghdad, alongside the daily 
New York bulletins, epitomises the structure of the event and, as a result, of a 
characteristic textuality that governs the modes of iterative textual production. It is a 
rapture in the structure of the everyday, the expected and the familiar. I would like to 
suggest that the weather forecast here can be viewed in terms of Badiou’s notion of a 
situation – an infinite and multiple place of taking place – with the Iraq war emerging 
as Badiou’s event; the exception to the situation. The taking place of the event disturbs 
the situation, it provides a rapture evocative of Derrida’s understanding of the event 
and Currie’s notion of surprise. Once the event occurs, the situation changes. WINS 
weather, in its pre-Iraq-war form, deals in the mundane, banal, local and familiar; it 
centres around the situation, within which events sometimes happen, events that 
disturb the situation.  
For Badiou, ‘an event disturbs a normal situation by not revealing the 
elements that make up its composition.’494  Such impossibility of determining the 
structure of the event also points to a challenge associated with the possibility of its 
iteration; in line with Badiou’s thinking, an event is that which is not. The Weather 
can be read as a literal rendering of such a trajectory. The Iraq war operates both as a 
presence and absence within the frame of the New York weather forecast. The event 
itself is not revealed, not introduced or spoken of by the weather reporters but its 
occurrence is explicitly marked by the introduction of the information about Baghdad 
weather. In the context, the war is not the thing but rather a form of an impression, 
to return to Derrida’s taxonomy, it is absent from the radio news and subsequently 
The Weather, but it, nevertheless, is. As a consequence of this ontological status, its 
being manifests itself here, I suggest, as a linguistic being, or an event of language to 
borrow from Agamben,495 one made particularly explicit in the context of an event of 
writing as being that is in repetition and one that is produced by it. The 
materialisation of the radio bulletin as writing brings to the fore the dynamic of the 
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discursive structure of the event. The absence of the event itself becomes particularly 
explicit when the script becomes text, read outside of the immediate context of the 
event. The temporal removal of the writing as opposed to speech determines any 
possibility of speaking of the event while laying bare the structure of its iteration.  
This construal of an event as a linguistic being is significant here as a means 
of not only approaching The Weather but also for defining the nature of transcription 
as a creative form of writing. The evental exception that generates the arrival of 
linguistic being presupposes a ‘process from which something new emerges,’496 it is, 
according to Badiou, a creation of new possibilities. What transpires, is a 
characteristic trajectory where acts of invention prove intrinsically linked to the 
emergence of an event. Through an association of evental acts with acts of invention 
a relationship between the event of transcription and the ontology of writing today 
emerges, one that establishes acts of iteration as an event of invention of a 
contemporary poetic form. The emergence of such linguistic being, of an event of 
invention that iterative poetic acts today exemplify, like the inscription of the Iraq war 
into the New York weather forecast, becomes a source of a rapture, a Derridean, a 
wound in poetics. An event is a radical break from the norms that govern the situation. 
It disturbs as much as it invents and, hence, becomes synonymous with what has been 
described in Chapter 1 as a turn. The event that causes the rapture in the weather 
forecast is clearly associated with a state of the unexpected, it evades any possibility 
of prediction, it comes from the outside of the situation but, inevitably, shapes and 
influences it. But this singular event that defines The Weather is read and applied 
here as a metaphor, or, perhaps, a performance of a similar rapture, a parallel turn in 
poetics manifested in iterative approaches to writing, turning transcription into a 
state of poetic surprise, writing into an event of writing.  
3.4. THE MAJOR EVENT: KENNETH GOLDSMITH, SEVEN AMERICAN DEATHS 
AND DISASTERS 
 
While The Weather is illustrative the event as defined by and at the same time 
defining its situation, Goldsmith’s most recent transcription project, Seven American 
Deaths and Disasters (2013), focuses on major events themselves. The volume is a 
collection of seven transcriptions of real-time radio and television reports of seven 
events recognised as pivotal moments in the recent history of The U.S. and includes 
the assassinations of John F. Kennedy, Robert F. Kennedy and John Lennon; the 
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space shuttle Challenger disaster; the Columbine shootings; 9/11; and the death of 
Michael Jackson. The opening JFK transcription, for example, draws from Dallas 
KLIF station broadcast, from November 22, 1963. The section opens with information 
about film showings in the Dallas area, thanksgiving advice, and beer advertising, 
among others. Reminders about Kennedy’s speech, ‘billed as a major event,’497 also 
feature, here exposed – similarly to the events announced on the pages of Day and 
The Day – as the future never to come. The initial report on Kennedy’s shooting 
interrupts a pop song, which immediately resumes, following a promise of reports 
about the event, as they become available. The passage reads:  
[...] (Boom) 
(Whoo-ee-whoo) 
He’ll never make me cry  
(Boom-sh-boom) 
Every time we kiss goodnight 
Feels so good to hold him tight… 
This is KLIF bulletin from Dallas. Three shots reportedly were fired at 
the motorcade of President Kennedy today near the downtown section. 
KLIF news is checking out the report. We will have further reports. 
Stay tuned. 
...up in the sky 
(And someday I know) oh-oh, yeah 
(We’ll walk down the aisle)498 
 
Further reports are broadcast in a similar context, foregrounding the juxtaposition of 
the mundane and the major event:  
Hey, be sure that you stock up for this weekend with Texas-brewed 
premium Hamm’s beer at popular Texas prices.  
And now we take you to KLIF Mobile Unit No. 4 in downtown Dallas.  
The latest information – and things are rather confused this moment 
– shots definitely were fired at the presidential motorcade as it passed 
through downtown Dallas. All squads are converging code three in the 
area of Elm and Houston in downtown. There is a tentative description 
of the shooting suspect. A man, a white male believed to be 
approximately thirty years old, reportedly armed with a thirty calibre 
rifle. How many shots were fired, how many persons, if any, were 
struck and wounded, we do not know yet. Very closed-mouthed 
officials are clamping down on the entire story. We’ll bring you what 
details are available just as quickly as they come into our possession.  
Sandra Dee has her troubles. Listen. A lot’s been said about the wild 
teenage thing. But wait till you see the scrapes my dad Jimmy Stewart 
gets into. Yikes! 499 
 
This passage is evocative of Mary Ann Doane’s understanding of media as a 
‘catastrophe machine.’ For Doane, the urgency to report a major event may disturb 
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the flow of pre-programmed information at any time. Such ‘moments when 
information bristles,’ writes Doane, ‘link us briefly to the Real.’500 Characteristically, 
the dynamic that Doane describes is evocative of the event as the unexpected. The 
opening passages of the JFK section of Seven American Deaths echo the evental 
model of The Weather. The news about the shooting emerges as an eponymous 
occurrence of the unforeseeable. The programme and the scheduled advertising 
continue as planned, but as more information becomes available, the balance shifts. 
The major event and the attempts to recount the disaster gradually take over the radio 
report, to conclude with the official news of Kennedy’s death. This alteration of focus 
can be read as a transition from the situation to the event, turning the JFK section of 
Seven American Deaths into a textual transitional stage between the approach to 
transcribing the event in The Weather and in further sections of the Disasters book, 
where focus is placed on the decontextualised event itself.  
The John F. Kennedy transcript is of particular significance to the volume. The 
assassination features as an event that marks a turning point in the North American 
history and politics but also as a defining moment in the history of the media, and 
included as such. As Goldsmith explains, ‘the modern era of media spectacle begins 
with the John F. Kennedy assassination, hence [the] choice to start the book there.’501 
Like the opening JFK section, the subsequent six passages all iterate footage of heavily 
mediated events. Such conceptual framework brings to mind Baudrillard’s discussion 
of the Gulf War. For Baudrillard, the 1991 conflict serves as an example of a new kind 
of an event and a new kind of power, which is, as Paul Patton describes it, ‘at once 
both real and simulacral.’502 As the first military operation with footage relayed live 
from the battlefront, the Gulf War exemplifies, as Baudrillard argues, a virtual war: 
war, when it has been turned into information, ceases to be a realistic 
war and becomes [...] the site of total uncertainty. We are left with the 
symptomatic reading on our screens of the effects of the war, of the 
effects of discourse about war.’503  
 
Similarly, Seven American Deaths formulates a meditation on the uncertainties of 
fact and struggles to relay information about the unexpected. The possibilities of the 
real-time reporting as evoked in the seven tragedies appropriated by Goldsmith create 
an illusion of an immediate access to real events. But what they evoke instead are 
information events, events which replace the real and by means of such substitution 
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inform the public opinion, the collective memory and understanding of history and 
politics. Just like the war described by Baudrillard, Goldsmith’s states of the 
unexpected evoke the dynamic of information production and circulation. Here, the 
Derridean impossibility of saying the event is echoed in the impossibility of the real-
time. The real events cease to reflect the reality of the event but become virtual events 
as a highly mediated impression rather than the thing of the event. This approach is 
evocative of the iterative aesthetics of Feldman’s 9:12 project. Here, it is the media 
that becomes, to turn to Baudrillard,  
the prerequisite to any […] event. We need it precisely because the 
event escapes us […] The obscene aphrodisiac function fulfilled by the 
decoy of the event, by the decoy of war. [...] We have neither need of 
nor taste for real drama or real war.504  
 
But media considered as such also becomes a prerequisite framework to an 
emergence of iterative poetics.  
This association of iteration in poetry with live media spectacle is predicated 
on mechanisms of information production and dissemination. As Jay David Bolter 
points out, in the contemporary media world the concept of real-time delivery proves 
instrumental in determining what is considered real or authentic in our culture; ‘real-
time is televisual “liveness” as refined by digital processing.’505 However, as Bolter 
stresses, it is ‘near-real-time’ rather than ‘real-time’ dynamic that characterises 
contemporary modes of media production;  
We can see distant events almost as they happen, where the gap 
between the occurrence and our consumption of the images may be 
measured in seconds, minutes, or hours. In that gap, the 
communications system (both as a technology and as a cultural and 
economic force) ‘processes’ the signal: in other words, those in control 
of the technology both manufacture and constrain the spectacle for us. 
Sometimes a matter of seconds is enough to reshape the image. 506 
 
Seen as such, real time proves an illusion of the lived experience. Regardless of the 
technological advancements, certain removal and belatedness always marks and 
defines an act of speaking an event. And it is this temporal gap that opens space for 
creative acts implied in the process of a repetition of the event. To quote Derrida,  
when people pretend today to show us live what’s happening, the event 
taking place in the Gulf War, we know that, as live and apparently 
immediate as the discourse and picture may be, […] what is shown to 
us live is already, not saying or showing of the event but its 
production.507 
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The repetition in Goldsmith’s transcription, as a repetition of a repetition, 
characteristically foregrounds this persistence of the near-real time. The temporal 
removal that characterises an act of transcription, here repeating the mediated 
impression of the 1963 or 2001 disasters in a 2013 publication, conflates the 
immediacy of news and the historical nature of its archives. ‘We think we know the 
story,’ as Vanessa Place comments, ‘but we only know the event in retrospect.’508  
An engagement with time as a means of conceptualising the poetics of 
repetition surfaces particularly explicitly in the context of a distinction that can be 
drawn between an event and a major event, and the politics of mediation, 
preservation, and archivisation of both. Unlike Day – the news from a day when 
nothing happens – a transcription of news that loses currency almost immediately, 
those major events of Seven American Deaths and Disasters remain identifiable and 
significant today. Synonymous with the everyday, the events of Day lack the historical 
persistence of the major event. The currency and the preservation of an event that 
defined The Day in collective memory resides in its emergence as the unexpected. As 
an archive of contemporary history, the records of the JFK or RFK assassinations, or 
9/11, read in 2013, are marked by a historical distance and a proximity of these events 
at the same time. This characteristic temporal framework inherent in the act of 
transcription of such archival material informs iteration as a poetic practice. The 
persistence of the major event, and, hence, the currency of news re-articulated as 
experimental poetry, can be considered a manifestation of Deleuze’s understanding 
of event time. For Deleuze, a distinction can be drawn between the event itself and its 
actualisation in particular circumstances, an approach to thinking about the structure 
of the event reminiscent of Derrida’s differentiation between the thing and an 
impression of an event. But for Deleuze, the nature of this dual logic of the event 
resides in the distinct temporal character of the event as contrasted with its 
actualisation, one manifested in a differentiation between the time of the event and 
the time of a historical event. I propose this taxonomy as a framework for thinking 
about transcription as a creative mode and a means of conceptualising instances of 
iteration as poetic acts.  
Historical time (‘Chronos’), as defined by Deleuze, is the time in which events 
occur. It is the chronological time of the archive and history; it evokes the finite, 
recorded chronology of the events of 9/11 or the Columbine shootings, only existing 
in the present, solely associated with the events as they are unveiling. The time of the 
event (‘Aion’), on the other hand, cannot be reduced to historical time. For Deleuze, 
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it operates as ‘no longer time that exists between two instants,’ but a ‘meanwhile,’509 
or, as Bennett describes it, ‘a kind of between time with its own characteristics.’510 As 
Tamsin Lorraine explains, in the time of Aion chronology is characteristically 
raptured and, as a result, ‘all events are related to all other events.’511 While Chronos 
relies on a linear conception of time, Aion is its rhizomatic counterpart. The time of 
the event, as understood by Deleuze, differs significantly from the historical time in 
which events occur in that it cannot assume the characteristic sequential evolution 
that marks the unveiling of the historical event. ‘What history grasps of the event is 
its effectuation in states of affairs or in lived experience,’ while, for Deleuze and 
Guattari, ‘the event, in its becoming, in its specific constituency, in its self-positioning 
as concept escapes History.’512 What transpires are two approaches to thinking about 
the event. While an event determined by the chronology and finitude of Chronos 
assumes the status of history, as that of the archive, the temporal framework of Aion 
can be seen as a trigger instrumental in a conceptualisation of an event as an aesthetic 
project. The latter resides in an attempt to reassemble, or to adopt Deleuze’s term, re-
actualise and inhabit the event, always irrevocably embedded in its historical 
representation. As Bennett puts it,  
an aesthetic project, in this sense, offers more than a record, a 
flashback or reconstruction; it generates a means of inhabiting and 
simultaneously reconfiguring the historical event as a radically 
different experience.513  
 
The temporal removal of the event from the historical event as determined by the 
structure of Aion, abstracts the event from the historical event. The temporal removal 
creates a new situation, a new condition under which a different, aesthetic 
actualisation of the event emerges. This is a dynamic echoing modern and 
contemporary art practices, as Bennett explains, typically identified as sites where 
‘reordering and transformation of condition of perception can occur.’514 Seen as such, 
reframing and recontextualising news as poetry can be considered a new approach to 
the event it iterates. This is an attitude to thinking the event that resides not so much 
in the interest in the event itself – not in the news of 9/11 – but rather in its 
impression, the news recontextualised and reactualised as poetry. This distinction 
relies on the dual temporal logic of the event as described above. Illustrative of such 
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dynamics, the temporal logic that governs Goldsmith’s acts of transcription isolates 
the iteration of 9/11 from 9/11 itself; Seven American Deaths is not simply a 
restorative project but a means of being in the event in a novel way, an aesthetic 
encounter with the event.  
As an iteration of the event marked by a removal from the historical event that 
it repeats Goldsmith’s act of transcription can be seen as a manifestation of an event 
in a constant state of becoming. For Deleuze, becoming is that which is never past, 
present, or future while it is also always a matter of simulacrum. It contends both a 
model and a copy at once, a dynamic characteristically echoed in Baudrillard’s 
understanding of an event today, reformulated as a media spectacle. The event seen 
as such is defined by a temporality that places it outside of the chronology of past-
present-future. While it exists as that which has already passed or is always just about 
to come, ‘in a time out of time,’ 515  the event itself, and when read within the 
framework, an act of transcription, remains, always in the state of becoming. The act 
of selection of the seven disasters that Goldsmith includes in the volume should be 
read, I suggest, as an act of subverting a chronology of the symbolic events, those lived 
in the past. The act of transcription establishes a new form of an impression of the 
event – of being in the event – it reactualises the text, to give rise to a new literary 
form. Drawing on the past, the event of writing is an event of becoming other, a 
process in which the nature of the text changes by virtue of both contextual and 
temporal shift inherent in the act of transcription itself. Conceptualised as such, a 
shift from the record of a historical event to its rearticulation as poetry, from Chronos 
to Aion, engenders change as a marker of the process of becoming. The event is that 
which repeats, but, as C. Colwell points out, ‘repeats differentially.’516 Approached as 
an event, an act of transcription, then, is a result of such mode of repetition. Where 
repetition of the same generates history, the differential repetition of the event in 
which iteration as a poetic act resides, transforms as a source of an aesthetic project 
and a marker of creativity.  
The differential repetition becomes, I suggest, a mode of production of 
meaning that affords a shift in understanding of the event presented in language. An 
event as an aesthetic project relies on generating novel ways of being in the event; the 
iteration of news as poetry creates a condition under which new perceptions, 
associations, and, hence, new forms of subjectivity and writing are formulated. A 
transcription as an aesthetic encounter with a major event is an event of infinite 
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iteration, eternally reproduced, repeated and replayed, as a Derridaen saying that 
‘always harbours the possibility of resaying.’517 The temporal removal as a condition 
of acts of poetic iteration triggers an intersection of issues of history, the archive and 
preservation of the event in time, and, conversely, of the juxtaposition of personal and 
official experiences of history. These texts, then, are filled with drama and emotions, 
but their affective dimension is affirmed not only in the transcribed content itself, but 
in the responses and approaches to the event: ‘We are defined by these tragedies – 
and more so by the spectacle emanating from them,’ Goldsmith explains.  
For younger people, the Kennedys are cold, distant historical figures 
while Michael Jackson grabs all the heat. And vice versa for the older 
people, who tend to write Jackson off as a joke. As a result, the book - 
although based on objective public events - is read and strained 
through one’s unique subjectivity.518  
 
The curatorial choices to engage with these particular seven events are embedded in 
Goldsmith’s relationship to their historical time that defines the nature of authorship 
in Seven. 519  The expression of authorial subjectivity is manifested through a 
compulsion to repeat a selection of very particular moments in history, a mechanism 
that also renders affect visible. The proliferation of now familiar scenes and images 
(albeit in textual form) converts iteration into an expression of affect itself, both 
registering and inducing affect or emotion at the same time.  
Seen as such, iterative poetics turns, similarly to erasure poetry, into a form 
that, to turn to Bennett, ‘mimics the behaviour of affect itself.’ 520  A reader of 
Goldsmith’s transcription turns into a spectator521 rather than a witness of a media 
spectacle. Rather than revealing and documenting, transcription engaged with 
documentary poetics of major events posits an inquiry into the nature of aesthetic 
experimentation with the event, of a structure of emotional event, a mode of tracing 
‘relations of closeness and distance, shifting dynamics and orientation,’ 522  or, in 
Lauren Berlant’s words, ‘it rethinks the sensing of history, and the historic.’ 523 
Transcription as a creative method embedded in the major event affords a para-
historical approach to history, it enables what Bennett describes as a ‘point-of-view 
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of the affective engagements’524 with the event. Through an association of affect with 
the Derridean impossibility of saying the major event so pervasive in Goldsmith’s 
project, transcription as a mode of responding to and expressing both affords a means 
of arriving at a new intuition about how to live in what Berlant describes as a 
heterotopic now, ‘a new ordinariness that requires a new realism.’525 Such an aesthetic 
modelling of reality evokes a realism formulated by means of a compulsion to repeat, 
but repeat differentially: ‘to be forced into thought this way is to begin to formulate 
the event of feeling historical in the present.’526  
 
3.5. THE RETURN OF THE REAL: A REPETITION 
 
As J. Crandall suggests, in the contemporary media-saturated age, ‘reality of 
representation is substituted for the representation of reality. That is, authenticity 
arises less from the authenticity of reality per se than the authenticity of the means by 
which reality is portrayed.’527 For Žižek, we are today bound by repetition as a means 
of confirming the real:  
When in the days after September 11 our gaze was transfixed by the 
images of the plane hitting one of the WTC towers, we were all forced 
to experience [...] the ‘compulsion to repeat’ [...] we wanted to see it 
again and again; the same shots were repeated ad nauseam. [...] It was 
when we watched the two WTC towers collapsing on the TV screen that 
it became possible to experience the falsity of ‘reality TV’ shows.528 
 
This assertion is also echoed in the ‘World Trade Centre’ section of Seven American 
Deaths, evocative of the iterative aesthetics of Feldman’s 9:12 project. The WTC 
transcription assumes repetition – a governing mode of media spectacle – as its 
aesthetic dominant. Unlike the iteration of the JFK media coverage, appropriated in 
its entirety from the KLIF Dallas radio, the WTC transcript draws from several 
sources to construct the record of the 9/11 disaster, opening with an initial CNN 
television report, followed by radio station coverage from a range of New York 
stations. Collated, the WTC section of Goldsmith’s volume is in itself evocative of the 
relational dynamics of the event, manifested in the twofold manner. Here, 
Goldsmith's personal relationship to the events of 9/11 is inscribed into the act of 
transcription. At the same time, the relationship of each individual media event to 
                                                             
524 PA, 32 
525 Berlant, 6.  
526 Ibid, 5.  
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further media events recording 9/11 form a singular narrative of 9/11 as composed by 
Goldsmith.  
The coverage from 9/11 proves illustrative of the impossibility of saying the 
event and the struggle to report the disaster as it is unveiling. Saturated with images 
(spoken of, not reprinted in the volume) and eyewitness reports, the WTC 
transcription highlights the broadcaster’s uncertainty as to the events they attempt to 
report:  
Yeah. Oh! Oh my gosh. The entire building … it looks like the side of 
the building has collapsed. Oh my gosh, this is horrific, absolutely 
horrific. How could that have happened? How could that have 
happened unless there was some sort of secondary explosion within 
those planes? Now this, uk, Ed, was the World Trade Center Two. Oh 
my gosh! This is … this is absolutely … 
Uh, Joe, we can’t…I can’t tell from my perspective, eh … exactly what’s 
… what’s happened here … how much of the building is still standing.  
But … but … but … but … Ed … but Ed … it looks like the side portion 
of that has totally fallen and there is just a huge cloud of dust that is 
encompassing several city blocks. Oh God … eh … eh … […] I am trying 
to look … Can you see? Is that building still there? […] 
The. South. Tower. Has. Collapsed. […] Ugh! Oh! I mean that’s ... that’s 
… that’s … That would … that would … that would … And you have to 
wonder how … Let’s just think about this logically. There is no logic.529  
  
The availability of the real-time footage, most explicit in the 9/11 transcript, offers 
means of interrogating the possibilities and limitations of expression in the face of a 
disaster. It embodies the mode of exploring the certain impossible possibility of 
speaking the unexpected. Goldsmith’s interest in the language of real-time reporting 
resides in the preoccupation with the language of Currie’s open future, or of the 
Derridean future to come. Derrida, in fact, distinguishes between the predictable 
future and the future that actually comes, the future as l’avenir and the future as 
l’arrivant. As Goldsmith noted, broadcasts depicting the assassinations of, for 
example, Martin Luther King and Malcolm X are available, but no media were present 
as the shootings took place; ‘by the time the reporters arrived on the scenes, the 
language was more flatly characteristic of standard reportage: confidently and deftly 
delivered,’530 reporting the future as l’arrivant. In contrast, the real-time reports offer 
an insight into the linguistic nature of the unexpected, an exercise in the 
(im)possibility of engaging with the future as l’avenir, and the thing of the event, 
‘highlighting,’ Goldsmith explains, ‘the broadcasters’ uncertainty as to what they were 
actually depicting.’531 The only certainty expressed in the transcribed coverage is that 
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‘something relatively devastating has happened.’ 532  Speculations abound, reports 
from eyewitnesses are interrupted by signal failures, the broken, repetitive discourse 
of reporting evokes the struggle to comprehend and speak of the events taking place. 
‘It is,’ as Seven American Deaths reads, ‘a situation beyond description. […] There’s 
almost no textbook for any of us here on the radio to figure out just what to say. There 
are no words at all to express this.’533 The struggle to represent the event is evocative 
of Derrida’s understanding of the discursive structure of the major event. 
Commenting on 9/11, Derrida talks about it as the unprecedented event, as a 
‘something’ that took place:  
we perhaps have no concept and no meaning available to us to name 
in any other way this ‘thing’ that has just happened, this supposed 
‘event’. […] we have the feeling of not having seen it coming […] we do 
not yet know how to qualify, […] we do not know what we are talking 
about.534  
 
This is an event that comes and, to quote Derrida, ‘in coming, comes to surprise […], 
to surprise and to suspend comprehension: the event is first of all that which I do not 
first of all comprehend.’ 535  This is a disaster as being that, in Blanchot’s words, 
‘escapes the very possibility of experience – it is the limit of writing […] the disaster 
[that] de-scribes.’536  
The eyewitness report plays a significant role here, illustrative of the changing 
nature of postproduction news media reporting. The stutters, the uncertainties as 
expressed at the limit of language, take centre stage in the 9/11 coverage, 
characterised by fragmented speech, significantly more hesitant and often much more 
inarticulate than in the case of earlier events transcribed. While the JFK assassination 
coverage derives from police reports and radio journalism, the 9/11 reporting collates 
eyewitness reports, mobile phone images, amateur footage, alongside professional 
reporting and official statements from New York authorities. Illustrative of this 
framework, the (almost) real-time report on the explosions in the WTC towers derives 
from, among others, an eyewitness account reporting on the disaster spectacle 
unveiling in front of her apartment window:  
We want to go to an eyewitness on the telephone right now.  
Jeanne, what can you tell us what you saw? […] Now, can you see if 
here is a lot of debris downstairs, Jeanne? 
No, because it looks like it’s inverted. With the impact everything went 
inside the building.  
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Inside? 
The only thing that came out was a little bit of the outside awning. But 
I’d say the huge … the hole is … Let me just get a better look right now 
… 
OK, go ahead.  
I’d say the hole takes about … it looks like six or seven floors were taken 
out.  
And there’s more explosions right now! Hold on! People are running 
up the street! […] All right, Jeanne, you know, let me put Jeanne on 
hold for just a moment.  
OK. How much longer are we staying on? I’m inside of a diner right 
now.  
Well, Jeanne, you know what, if you could give us a call back … I just 
… Don’t panic here on air.537 
 
This passage is particularly indicative of the contemporary modes of production of 
media content. As Lee Rodney points out: 
The prevalence of ‘amateur’ video footage in much of what now stands 
for 9/11 certainly influenced how the invasion of Iraq was subsequently 
presented in 2003. The emphasis on ‘real life’ confusion as conveyed 
in the jerky, vertiginous sequences, dirty lenses and hysterical 
commentary that came through in the camcorder tapes of the World 
Trade Center collapse gave new life to the old form of the eye-witness 
account.538 
 
Hence, Seven American presents an archive of both the events themselves and of the 
modes of media production and reporting – as they have developed from 1963 to 
2009 – that also evokes the historical developments in technologies of reproduction 
and related possibilities of iteration. Goldsmith’s transcript serves as a poignant 
commentary on the contemporary society, saturated with perpetual replays of media 
content, often turning tragic events into tainted clichés. Through textual repetitions 
of mediated impressions of those major events, Deaths and Disasters echoes the 
dynamics of media production, itself inherently reliant on acts of iteration as a mode 
of reporting. ‘All that we can hope for is […],’ Baudrillard argues, ‘that some event or 
other should overwhelm the information instead of the information inventing the 
event and commenting artificially upon it.’539 Where the news rather than the event 
itself, the impression rather the thing, assumes the function of the event, the dynamic 
of iteration, and its aesthetic and poetic manifestations, gain particular currency.  
Such focus on the discourse of mediated event offers possibilities of 
interrogating the struggle to find words to express the horrors and the resulting 
trauma witnessed in all seven cases appropriated by Goldsmith. It is ‘smooth speech 
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turned to stutter laced with doubt and fear.’540 Similar inability to find language to 
speak of a traumatic event that manifests itself in erasure poetry comes to the fore in 
the context of transcription poetics of major event. The form accentuates the 
discursive failures, while the remediation from spoken to written discourse makes the 
stutters particularly visible. But if a failure to speak in erasure writing epitomises an 
alternative mode of witnessing, a transcription of the major event punctuated by 
linguistic struggles can be read as a form of traumatic realism, to adopt Hal Foster’s 
term. Foster’s traumatic realism is an aesthetic category developed as a means of 
describing a relationship between the real and neo-avant-garde artistic practice.541 
For Foster, the trauma of modern existence results in what he describes as the return 
of the real in aesthetics. Echoes of the documentary turn, as discussed with reference 
to erasure poetics, reverberate in Foster’s interest in the present; in ‘what produces a 
present as different.’ 542  Characteristically, Foster associates the contemporary 
experience of the real – this traumatic realism – with a propensity for repetition 
inherent in contemporary art. ‘In postwar art,’ Foster explains, ‘to pose the question 
of repetition is to pose the question of the neo-avant-garde.’543  This trajectory is 
manifested particularly explicitly in Pop Art and Foster focuses on Warhol’s Death in 
America images from the early 1960 as illustrative of the notion of traumatic realism.  
Collated for Warhol’s show in Paris in 1964, Death in America images 
included silkscreens of appropriated photographs, sourced from magazines, tabloids, 
and archives. The collection included, ‘the electric chair pictures and the dogs in 
Birmingham and car wrecks and some suicide pictures’544 [Figure 40]. It is a series of 
images documenting instances of death, reprinted, driven by and at the same time 
embodying acts of compulsive repetition so characteristic in Warhol’s art. For Foster, 
Death in America images are neither simply referential nor simulacral, affective nor 
affectless, critical nor complacent, rather they simultaneously encompass the 
simulacrum and the reference, affect and its lack – an approach to thinking about 
Warhol’s acts of repetition that is consolidated in the notion of traumatic realism. 
Foster associates Warhol’s commitment to mechanical reproduction (‘I want to be a 
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machine’), 545  with his subjectivity. What is of paramount importance to Foster’s 
approach to Warhol, and of particular significance in the context of reading 
transcription as an affective, expressive genre, is his rejection of the propensity to 
draw correlations between art in the age of mechanical reproduction and inherent 
blankness, complacency and commodification of both artists and art. Instead, Foster 
argues, the commitment to a form of eternally reproduced, mediated reality that 
Warhol’s art exhibits ‘may point less to a blank subject than to a shocked one, who 
takes on the nature of what shocks him as a mimetic defence against this shock.’546 
Foster reads Warhol’s repetition in Lacanian terms to identify acts of repetition of 
trauma as the missed encounters with the real. ‘As missed,’ Foster points out, ‘the real 
cannot be represented; it can only be repeated.’547 But, as Foster, via Lacan, explains, 
the German notion of Wiederholen is not synonymous with Reproduzieren; 
repetition is not tantamount to reproduction.  
                
FIGURE 40: ANDY WARHOL, GREEN DISASTER (GREEN DISASTER TWICE) (1963) 
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This is a dynamic that, I suggest, also defines Goldsmith’s iterative textuality. 
The experience of reality in Seven American Deaths is that of a repeated reality, 
repeated and not reproduced. Reproduction would imply a repetition of the same, 
while Goldsmith’s transcription relies on acts of differential repetition. Foster’s 
Lacanian notion of repetition is important here as a framework for reading 
transcription as inherently creative. If an act of transcription is conceptualised as an 
event of writing, as that which repeats an event and triggers a textual event at the 
same time, then Goldsmith’s approach echoes the model described by Foster: ‘the 
repetitions not only reproduce traumatic effects; they produce them as well.’548 They 
function not only as repetitions of the emotions and struggles as expressed and 
recorded by, for example, the radio broadcast of 9/11 eyewitness reports, but generate 
a new set of emotions, an affective response to someone else’s trauma:  
in these repetitions [...] several contradictory things occur at the same 
time; a warding away of traumatic significance and an opening out to 
it, a defending against traumatic affect and a producing of it.549  
 
What transpires is an alternative means of dealing with the trauma of disasters in 
contemporary history and a way of speaking of them similar to Holmes’s erasure 
writing. Echoes of Derrida’s notion of a traumatic event reverberate here. For Derrida, 
the traumatism inherent in the experience of the major event,  
comes from the possibility to come of the worst, from the repetition to 
come – through worse. Traumatism is produced by the future, by the 
to come, by the threat of the worst to come, rather than by an 
aggression that is ‘over and done with.550  
 
This is a trajectory that Goldsmith and Warhol both rehearse in their respective Death 
series. The repetitiveness of the events created through textual and visual 
appropriation of major disasters lock the memories of what is repeated into an infinite 
cycle of iteration, foregrounding their iterability as well as the repetitive nature of 
history, a reminder of a repetitions to come, of prospective major events.  
Through the process of constant repetition seen as such a new form of realism 
is produced, formulated at a cross-section of the new realism to which Berlant refers 
and the New Realism as understood by Gerald Malanga; 551  the new realism as 
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traumatic realism. Similarly, as Goldsmith notes, the mode of uncreative writing 
offers what he describes as a poetic of realism, ‘reminiscent of the documentary 
impulse behind Zola’s Les Rougon-Macquart series.’ Inspired by Zola, Goldsmith 
argues, ‘the new writing is a realism beyond realism: it’s hyperrealist – a literary 
photorealism.’ 552  This association brings to mind the aesthetics of the Pictures 
Generation and photography’s propensity to appropriate that characterised aesthetic 
developments in the 1970s, as exemplified by Prince and Levine and discussed later 
in this chapter. But it is important to point out that the structure of repetition 
conceptualised as a means of reflecting the real in contemporary experimental poetics 
does not always manifest itself by means of traumatic realism. The notion of 
traumatic realism offers a pertinent framework for conceptualising the nature of 
repetition in Seven American Deaths but, characteristically, two distinct qualities of 
realism emerge in both Warhol’s and Goldsmith's work. As Charles F. Stuckey 
observed, the great majority of Warhol’s paintings, beginning in 1962, are literal 
representations of everyday objects. Stuckey positions Warhol’s works such as the 
Campbell's Soup Cans (1962) in the line of Duchamp ready-made tradition, 553 
embedded in the reality of the everyday object, of the mundane and the familiar. The 
affinities between Goldsmith's and Warhol’s art echo the Duchamp-Warhol 
association. Similarly to Warhol’s Campbell Soup, there is a clear correlation between 
Goldsmith's Day and the ready-made tradition, representative of the realism of the 
everyday. In contrast, The Day and Seven American Deaths are characterised by the 
aesthetics of traumatic realism as defined by Foster. Both approaches, however, are 
driven by and contingent on a propensity to repeat. 
 
3.6. DEATH AND DISASTERS: A REPETITION 
 
Foster’s interest in Warhol’s work is significant when considered in the 
context of Goldsmith’s Seven American Deaths. The Death in America exhibit 
discussed by Foster brought together a selection of Warhol’s Death and Disasters 
series images, directly referenced by Goldsmith in his volume. Seven American 
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Deaths and Disasters draws on Warhol’s Death and Disasters to repeat Warhol’s acts 
of repetition, by textual means. The affinities between Goldsmith and Warhol are key, 
I suggest, to understanding Goldsmith's iterative practice, both in Seven American 
Deaths and more broadly.554 Goldsmith sees Warhol as ‘the single most important 
figure for uncreative writing.’555 For Goldsmith,  
Andy Warhol was an unoriginal genius, one who was able to create a 
profoundly original body of work by isolating, reframing, recycling, 
regurgitating, and endlessly reproducing ideas and images that 
weren’t his, yet by the time he was finished with them, they were 
completely Warholian.556  
 
The same concerns and interests pervade Goldsmith’s thinking about the possibility 
of iteration as a creative act. The propensity to repeat but not reproduce for Goldsmith 
is a complete project, expressed in his individual works as well as in the manner in 
which the Warhol gesture is evoked. The aesthetic preoccupation with the newspaper 
in both Goldsmith and Warhol exemplifies this trajectory. Goldsmith draws on news 
in the same way Warhol did. Both also show the same penchant for New York sources. 
Goldsmith’s act of repeating the complete issue of a newspaper in Day, for example, 
is a clear nod in Warhol’s direction and works such as his A Boy for Meg (1962) [Figure 
41] or 129 Die in a Jet (1962) [Figure 42] both come to mind in the context.557  
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FIGURE 41: ANDY WARHOL, A BOY FOR MEG (1962) 
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FIGURE 42: ANDY WARHOL, 129 DIE IN A JET (1962) 
 
According to Simon Watney Warhol represents a new type of an artist engaged 
in a new type of artistic practice that requires a reconceptualisation of the life-art 
relationship. For Watney, the so called ‘Warhol effect’ invalidates ‘the criteria of 
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predetermined models of artistic value.’558 Read as a literary counterpart to Warhol, 
Goldsmith stands for a new type of a writer. As such, the ‘value’ of transcription as 
poetry is not inferred from the text’s originality. It is the notion of originality that 
requires a reconceptualisation in the context, to reflect similar developments in 
appropriation art. To borrow from Kosuth, writing about the value of conceptual art 
in 1969, ‘the “value” of particular artists after Duchamp can be weighted according to 
how much they questioned the nature of art.’559 Goldsmith's transcriptions echo the 
appropriation practices in literature to create ‘new propositions.’560 But engaging in 
similar iterative acts today, after Warhol, requires new ways of deploying repetition. 
What Goldsmith repeats is not just the specific source text, but also the method of 
appropriation itself. This contemporary iterative poetics surfaces as an 
acknowledgement of the singularity of the current cultural moment that resides in a 
re-appropriation of an appropriation gesture, in a repetition of a repetition, to arrive 
at a novel, current aesthetic mode.  
If, as Arthur Danto argues, Warhol’s art is to be read as a symptom of his 
media-oriented, hyper-consumerist culture at a unique historical moment,561 then 
Goldsmith’s writing, by analogy, should be considered as a manifestation of the 
current postproduction condition of excessive information production. Warhol, in 
1963 declared: ‘I want to be a machine.’562 Echoing Warhol, Goldsmith today shows 
the same propensity for automated authorship. If Warhol was a machine, producing 
machine art in the era of the photocopier, typewriter, tape recorder, and early 
computation, then Goldsmith should be seen as a digital machine, ‘a word processor’ 
(‘I used to be an artist; then I became a poet; then a writer. Now when asked, I simply 
refer to myself as a word processor’), 563  creating literature by means of digital 
reproduction. The compulsive use of things in Warhol turns into a preoccupation with 
information in Goldsmith’s case, both answering to cultural moments of excess. This 
shift echoes the transition from a postmodern to a postproduction moment as 
discussed in Chapter 1, evoked in a move away from Warhol’s art-factory and towards 
Goldsmith’s desktop computer, from a silkscreen print station or a typewriter to a 
                                                             
558 Simon Watney, ‘The Warhol Effect’, in The Work of Andy Warhol, ed. Gary Garrels 
(Seattle: Bay Press, 1989), 122. 
559 Joseph Kosuth, ‘Art after Philosophy’, in Conceptual Art: A Critical Anthology, eds. 
Alexander Alberro and Blake Stimson (Cambridge MA: The MIT Press, 1999), 164. 
560 Ibid. 
561 Arthur Danto, ‘Warhol and the Politics of Prints’, in Andy Warhol Prints: A Catalogue 
Raisonné 1962-1987, Frayda Feldman and Jörg Schellmann (New York: Edition Schellmann, 
1997), 15.  
562 Warhol, ‘What is Pop Art?’, 18. 
563 Kenneth Goldsmith, ‘I look to theory…’, Electronic Poetry Center, accessed 19 August 
2014, http://wings.buffalo.edu/epc/authors/goldsmith/theory.html.  
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networked computer. Goldsmith’s and Warhol’s reproducibility alike assumes 
technological advancements as a trigger for the development of the aesthetics of 
iteration. But while Warhol might have anticipated the possibilities of technologies to 
come, Goldsmith is realising that vision.  
For Warhol, ‘everything repeats itself.’ ‘It is amazing,’ Warhol commented in 
1997, ‘that everyone thinks that everything is new, but it’s all repeat.’564 Warhol’s idea 
of creativity is antithetical to established notions of originality. He shows no interest 
in creating anything new: ‘Why should I be original? Why can’t I be nonoriginal?,’ ‘I 
just like to see things used and reused,’ Warhol declared in 1963. ‘I’m antismudge. It’s 
too human. I am for mechanical art [...] If somebody faked my art, I couldn’t identify 
it.’565 Both statements are key, I suggest, to defining Warhol’s (and through Warhol, 
Goldsmith's) approach to the aesthetics of iteration as a differential repetition. The 
overt commitment to copying in both Warhol’s and Goldsmith's work is a 
manifestation of the impossibility of repetition of the same. Difference characterises 
Warhol’s compulsively repetitive art, both in his propensity to repeat often familiar 
images and in his use of repetition as a defining structure of his serial images.  
Warhol’s commitment to mechanical reproduction operates, I suggest, as a 
manifestation of technological imperfections. In his work, Warhol frequently relied 
on a silkscreen printing method. Screen printing is a technique which requires a use 
of a stencil to apply ink onto a substrate to transfer an image onto a desired surface. 
As Jennifer Dyer explains, silkscreening is a method that, when applied correctly, 
allows for maximum precision in repeated images. Warhol’s approach, however, 
seems grounded in a commitment to repetition of difference rather than sameness, in 
an attempt to subvert the dynamics of mechanical reproduction, by provoking 
accidents and alterations, and seeking out imperfect copies. ‘Warhol’s medium is 
often stroked across the image unevenly,’ Dyer explains, ‘or the squeegee is not 
cleaned between applications, resulting in varying densities and streaks in the 
colour.’566 There are issues with colour and sharpness, again, a result of incorrect 
execution, or instances of images completed by hand, as a consequence of medium 
insufficient to complete a stroke. Commenting on the technologies employed, Warhol 
himself noted the impossibility of arriving at identical copies: ‘I’ve had to resort to silk 
                                                             
564 Andy Warhol, ‘Andy Warhol Interviewed by K.H.’, in The Warhol Look: Glamour Style 
Fashion, eds. Mark Francis and Margery King (Pittsburgh, PA: Bullfinch Press and The Andy 
Warhol Museum, 1997), 273.  
565 Andy Warhol, ‘Warhol interviews Bourdon’, an interview by David Bourdon, in I’ll Be 
Your Mirror: The Selected Andy Warhol Interviews, ed. Kenneth Goldsmith (New York: 
Carroll and Graff, 2004), 7, 9.  
566 Jennifer Dyer, Serial Images: The Modern Art of Iteration (Zürich and Münster: LIT 
Verlag, 2011), 112.  
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screens, stencils, and other kinds of automatic reproduction. And still the human 
element creeps in!’567 To quote Dyer, ‘with Warhol, the silkscreened print becomes as 
arbitrary, random and unpredictable as paint was for the abstract expressionists 
before him.’568  
Silkscreening, similarly to transcription in Goldsmith's case, is a method that 
invites error. What Warhol created using the technique were almost-exact copies, 
rather than faithful duplicates of the reproduced originals, reconceptualising, as Dyer 
described the process, the ‘activity of actualisation as the activity of differentiation.’569 
The mistakes that mark Warhol’s attempts at reproduction – at making things the 
same – simultaneously make them different, in a process of repetition and not of 
reproduction. Thierry De Duve argues that the structure of Warhol’s repetition 
manifests Warhol’s attempt at subverting the power of mechanical reproduction. 
These technologies turn into tools that destabilise the message – the text or the image 
– reproduced by technological means. It is the standardisation through technology 
that here turns into, as Paul Benzon puts it, ‘a destabilizing aesthetic and cultural 
force.’570 Warhol, according to De Duve, ‘knew how to exploit the imperfections of the 
photo-silkscreen.’ 571  Warhol’s accidents are both incidental and intentional. The 
mistakes in application of the technology define the creative method, they become a 
marker of Warhol’s subjectivity, a punctum, perhaps, of the reproduced image. Each 
difference created by such misuse of technology is unique and unprecedented, always 
unexpected, never determined in advance. The alterations and imperfections 
characterising each iteration of the original mark the fallibility of the artist as a 
reproduction machine. As traces of the unpredictability and impossibility of 
repetition those differences constitute an act of repetition, be it of an image or a text, 
as an event itself – an act of transcription as an event of writing.  
The structure of differential repetition in Warhol’s images becomes 
synonymous with an act of creation. Similarly, inconsistencies and alterations that 
mark Goldsmith's transcriptions are a manifestation of the writing process itself. If, 
as Deleuze argues, ‘the repetition of difference is that which ‘unfolds as pure 
movement’ 572  then it can be argued that repetition, and hence a possibility of 
iteration, relies on, first, a repetition of the process of creating the thing it repeated 
                                                             
567 Warhol, ‘Warhol interviews Burdon’, 8.  
568 Dyer, 112.  
569 Ibid, 17 
570 Paul Benzon, ‘Lost in Transcription: Postwar Typewriting Culture, Andy Warhol’s Bad 
Book, and the Standardization of Error,’ PMLA 125.1 (2010), 93.  
571 Thierry De Duve, ‘Andy Warhol, or the Machine Perfected’, trans. Rosalind Krauss, 
October 30 (1984), 12.  
572 Deleuze, Difference, 27.  
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and only then of the thing itself. Seen as such, an act of silkscreen printing and an act 
of transcription both perform dual acts of iteration; an act of transcription is a 
repetition of the original creative gesture that subsequently enables and generates a 
related repetition of a textual object.  
This approach to iteration as a complex structure of repetition is important 
here and informs, I suggest, Goldsmith’s complete creative project. Goldsmith’s 
practice can be considered an attempt at turning into Andy Warhol for poetry.573 Self-
fashioning in a tradition of earlier avant-gardes constitutes Goldsmith’s new avant-
garde project. Characteristically, Warhol’s attitudes to creativity also manifest 
themselves clearly in his artistic persona. Garry Garrels points out that ‘the 
phenomenon of Warhol cannot be disengaged from the works he made.’ 574 
Christopher Schmidt also stresses a distinct performative dimension to Warhol’s 
career, explicitly expressed in his persona as a strategy and ‘an extension of the 
Warhol publicity machine.’ 575  I would like to suggest that a similar dynamic 
characterises Goldsmith’s artistic attitude. To quote Silliman, ‘Kenny Goldsmith’s 
actual art project is the project of Kenny Goldsmith.’576 Goldsmith’s performance is 
driven by acts of repetition. It is a repetition of Warhol’s performance, openly 
constructed as such, recycled and reappropriated to fit the contemporary 
postproduction frame, an attitude particularly fit for the Iterative turn. Everything 
about Goldsmith is marked by acts of repetition. His is a complete iterative project; 
his texts repeat other texts, his method, hyperbolically iterative, is an iteration of 
earlier, related practices, his artistic manifestos are formulated as appropriations of 
his precursor’s statements of avant-garde art, as if repeating Warhol’s dictum on the 
persistence of repetition by means of acts of repetition. As such, both Goldsmith’s 
attitudes and forms are a manifestation of an overtly iterative thinking, infinitely 
performing the aesthetic theory he postulates. His art becomes, to paraphrase Kosuth, 
a definition of art.577  
                                                             
573 This is implied in Goldsmith’s Uncreative Writing. In his description of the state of 
contemporary literature Goldsmith cites Lev Grossman arguing for an exigency of pop, or a 
similar project, for literature. ‘What poetry really needs,’ Grossman suggests, is a writer who 
can do for it what Andy Warhol did for avant-garde visual art: make it sexy and cool and 
accessibly without making it stupid and patronising. When that writer arrives, cultural 
change will come swiftly, and relatively effortlessly [Lev Grossman, ‘Poems for the People’, 
quoted in UW, 93].  
574 Gary Garrels, Introduction to The Work of Andy Warhol (Bay Press: Seattle, 1989), ix.  
575 Christopher Schmidt, ‘From A to B and Back Again: Warhol, Recycling, Writing’, 
Interval(le)s, ii.2-iii.1 (2008/2009), 795.  
576 Ron Silliman, blog entry, 27 February 2006, accessed 28 July 2013, 
http://ronsilliman.blogspot.co.uk/2006/02/what-does-it-mean-for-work-of-art-to.html.  
577 Kosuth, ‘Art’, 170. This is an approach evocative of the premise of the Art & Language 
movement of the late 1960s. Writing for the first issue of Art-Language Terry Atkinson 
asked: ‘can this editorial, in itself an attempt to evince some outlines as to what “conceptual 
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Goldsmith's identity as a postproduction reproduction machine is marked by 
differential acts of repetition. He repeats not reproduces, repeats differentially, the 
acts and texts of earlier avant-gardes in the contemporary digital moment, and 
actualises acts of photocopying (a manifestation of photocopying technology and 
copying of photos at the same time) as acts of digi-copying to interrogate the 
repercussion for aesthetics and poetics of the technological shift that enables and 
encourages the emergence of the Iterative turn. Thinking about Goldsmith in relation 
to earlier avant-gardes is particularly useful here. Characteristically, Peter Bürger in 
his Theory of the Avant-Garde (1984), distinguishes between what he refers to as 
‘historic avant-garde movements,’ such as DADA, constructivism, or surrealism, and 
‘all those neo-avantgardiste attempts that are characteristic for Western Europe and 
the United States during the fifties and sixties.’578 The original avant-garde project, as 
defined by Bürger, centred on attempts to criticise modernist thinking and the notion 
of the autonomy of art to abolish the separation of the aesthetic from the real. By 
means of its new realist aesthetics Warhol’s neo-avant-garde project stages, in 
Bürger’s words, ‘for a second time the avant-gardiste break with tradition.’ 579 
Goldsmith’s writing, by analogy, can be said to enact the same process for the third 
time, to emerge as a neo-neo-avant-garde, with each avant-garde moment marked by, 
I suggest, a technological turn that defines it. Bürger rejects the neo-avant-garde 
project as derivative of and antithetical to ‘genuinely avant-garde intentions,’580 with 
avant-gardes considered original and neo-avant-gardes erring on the side of imitation 
and repetition. Implied in this statement, Buchloh notes, is a highly problematic 
notion of the ‘loss of original for the present.’581 For Buchloh, such positioning of what 
he describes as ‘a moment of historical originality’ as grounded in the disparate avant-
garde movements is inadequate and reductionist; ‘we are confronted here with 
practices of repetition that cannot be discussed in terms of influence, imitation, and 
authenticity alone.’582  
Assuming Bürger’s model that conceptualises neo-avant-garde practices as a 
repetition of the earlier avant-gardes, a trajectory can be drawn between the avant-
                                                             
art” is, come up for the count as a work of conceptual art?’ [Editors of Art-Language, 
Introduction to Art-Language: The Journal of Conceptual Art, 1.1 (1969), in Conceptual 
Art: A Critical Anthology, eds. Alexander Alberro and Blake Stimson (Cambridge, MA: The 
MIT Press, 1999), 100]. The same preoccupations about the possibilities of writing 
conceptual literature seem to reverberate in Goldsmith’s work. 
578 Peter Bürger, Theory of the Avant-Garde, trans. Michael Shaw (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1984), 109, n. 4. Hereafter TAG. 
579 Ibid, 61.  
580 Ibid, 60.  
581 Benjamin H. D. Buchloh, ‘The Primary Colours for the Second Time: A Paradigm 
Repetition for the Second Time’, October, 37 (1986), 42.  
582 Ibid, 43.  
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garde, neo-avant-garde, and the contemporary neo-neo-avant-garde incarnations. 
While adopting Bürger’s trajectory as a framework for explicating the status and 
nature of contemporary iterative poetics, my argument is positioned in line with 
Buchloh’s critique of Bürger. I argue that this historical trajectory has to be taken into 
account in an attempt to define the neo-neo-avant-garde’s originality as iteration. 
Following Buchloh, ‘I want to ask whether it might not be precisely the process of 
repetition which constitutes the specific historical ‘meaning’ and ‘authenticity’ of the 
art [and poetic] production of the [neo]-neo-avant-garde.’583 Seen as such, repetition 
so characteristic for the neo-neo-avant-garde practice, described here as iterative 
poetics, is presented as not just a creative method but a defining feature of iterative 
thinking itself. A strategy of repetition that iterative poetic acts assume can be 
described, then, as a paradigm itself; as a repetition of the paradigms of the previous 
avant-gardes and a repetition as a paradigm of the contemporary avant-garde practice 
simultaneously. Assuming Bürger’s model, Goldsmith's neo-neo-avant-garde project 
is defined by a dynamic of a repetition of a repetition, through an engagement with 
the neo-avant-garde, twice removed from the ‘historical avant-garde,’ the original 
source it repeats.584 As such, the originality of the neo-neo-avant-garde can only be 
conceptualised as repetition.585 It relies on a departure from the binary differentiation 
between the copy and the original – between the fraudulent and the genuine – so 
ingrained in familiar notions of auratic originality and Romantic conceptions of 
authorship – to replace them with iteration as a creative alternative.  
                                                             
583 Ibid, 43.  
584 This is a model that, in an interesting way, evokes the structure the evental iteration 
discussed earlier; never a repetition of the event itself, of the thing, but rather of the 
impression, not of 9/11, but of the news of 9/11, always a repetition of a repetition. The logic 
of the neo-neo-avant-garde defined as such is synonymous with the logic of the Iterative 
turn. The propensity to repeat earlier iterative acts and attitudes rather than repeat an 
original is proposed here as a defining characteristic of contemporary iterative thinking. It 
finds its manifestation in a range of iterative works that engage with this structure of 
repetition that is inherently contemporary. Doeringer’s 60 Years Later, an iteration of two 
works of appropriation, as discussed in Chapter 1, is only one of many examples. Further 
works include Kent Johnson’s Day (2010) and Joe Hale’s Getting Inside Simon Morris’s 
Head (2014). Johnson’s work is an exact copy of Goldsmith’s Day, repurposed using a set of 
stickers to erase and replace Goldsmith’s name on the cover, sold as Day by Kent Johnson 
for $30, with copies signed by Johnson available for $300 (Goldsmith’s Day was marketed 
for $20). Hale’s project is a retyping of Morris’s Getting Inside Jack Kerouac’s Head. It is an 
iteration of Morris’s text and of his original gesture. Like Morris’s, Hale’s text was originally 
published on a blog, as a retyping of Morris’s retyping of Kerouac’s, a page at the time. It was 
subsequently republished in a paperback, by IAM, Morris’s publisher, in a volume designed 
to look just like Morris’s, designed to look just like Kerouac’s. In Hale’s piece, all references 
to Kerouac are replaced with references to Morris, even Goldsmith’s Introduction to Morris’s 
work is reprinted here, only making references to Morris, where references to Kerouac were 
made in the original Introduction. 
585 I borrow this trajectory from the title of Originality as Repetition symposium organised in 
New York on 13 February 1986. The event brought together critics often associated with the 
October journal circles: Roslind Krauss, Benjamin Buchloh, Molly Nesbit, among others.  
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3.7. MAKING IT NEW, AGAIN: TRANSCRIPTION AND THE VISUAL ARTS  
 
Although key to Goldsmith’s thinking, Warhol should not be considered the 
sole neo-avant-garde influence relevant to defining contemporary iterative writing. 
Similar acts of reproduction as a creative practice have consistently been recognised 
as an influential approach in the field of twentieth- and twenty-first-century art, with 
developments in the visual arts in the second half of the twentieth century especially 
relevant here. Alongside Holzer and Warhol artists such as Sherrie Levine and 
Richard Prince,586 among others, serve as particularly appropriate examples. While I 
discussed Prince’s work in Chapter 1, in the context of relevant legal debates, this 
chapter focuses on his earlier rephotography projects as a means of devising a 
historical trajectory of the contemporary Iterative attitude. Both Levine and Prince 
are typically associated with rephotography practices, popularised during the 1980s 
and 1990s as a characteristic type of appropriation art. Levine’s ‘After Edward 
Weston’ (1979) and ‘After Walker Evans’ (1981) series, for example, comprise 
photographs of photographs originally taken by Weston and Evans respectively, 
copyright to Weston and Evans and, although exact copies of the appropriated 
images, exhibited as ‘Levines’ rather than ‘Westons’ or ‘Evanses’ [Figure 43]. 
Employing similar methods, Prince’s rephotography experiments include, among 
many others, his Cowboy series (1980-2002), consisting of rephotographed Marlboro 
cigarette advertisements [Figure 44]. The primary devices that Levine and Prince 
typically employed were inherently iterative and involved repetition, intertextuality, 
simulation, and appropriation. ‘Their minimal mediation,’ Lisa Phillips points out, 
‘represented a new paradigm.’ 587  Their contestation of notions of subjectivity, 
originality, and authorship emerged as a commitment to making it new by making 
again, a trajectory that formed a standard of appropriation art and reverberates 
clearly in the related experimental poetic practices today. 
                                                             
586 Both Prince and Levine are typically associated with the so called Pictures Generation 
that emerged in the late 1970s. Their work typically addressed notions of the copy and the 
original conceptualised as a response to their contemporary media culture and increasing 
domination of the image in information and popular culture. It was characterised by a 
widespread employment of appropriation techniques. Other Pictures Generation artists 
include John Baldessari, Barbara Kruger, and Cindy Sherman, among others. Holzer has 
also been associated with the group.  
587 Lisa Phillips, ‘People Keep Asking: An Introduction’, in Richard Prince, exhibition 
catalogue, 1 May- 22 July 1992, ed. by Lisa Phillips (Whitney Museum of American Art, 
1992), 30.  
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FIGURE 43: SHERRIE LEVINE, AFTER WALKER EVANS: 4 (1981) AND WALKER EVANS, 
ALABAMA TENNANT FARMER WIFE (1936) 
 
FIGURE 44: RICHARD PRINCE, UNTITLED (COWBOY) (1989) 
 
As the selection of visual art-based examples described briefly above shows, 
reframing, repurposing and reusing material in a new environment to create art 
objects is, of course, not new. But, as Goldsmith stresses, ‘when it comes to writing, 
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these approaches have rarely been investigated.’588 In line with Gysin, commenting 
on a creative disjunction between art and writing in 1959, Goldsmith’s declaration 
presupposes a certain belatedness of literature, always, as Gysin would have it, fifty 
years behind art.589 Echoing the trajectory, Goldsmith claims affinities with a range 
of earlier developments in the visual arts, including appropriation, and conceptual art 
590 more broadly. ‘What I am doing in writing has been thoroughly and exhaustively 
explored in other fields like visual arts, music and cinema.’ But, as Goldsmith argues,  
somehow it’s never really been tested on the page. While there have 
been numerous examples of pastiche and collage writing – taking a few 
lines here, a few words there, and incorporating them into your own 
work – we haven’t seen an explosion of wholesale lifting of preexisting 
texts.591  
 
This is, however, not exactly true, and Goldsmith fails to acknowledge a range of 
appropriation writing examples in works by the Pictures Generation artists 
themselves. There is a characteristic propensity to engage with philosophical ideas 
among appropriation artists, working against the backdrop of high theory, with clear 
influences of Barthes, Foucault, and Baudrillard, among others. In fact, as Peter 
Osborne points out, the history of the conceptual arts should be considered not simply 
in the context of but in fact as a history of ideas itself. ‘More than any other form of 
contemporary art,’ Osborne argues, ‘conceptual art was a locus for the artistic 
interpretation of philosophical ideas. Critical writings by conceptual artists are as 
much a part of this history as their work.’592 It is this attitude that gave rise to a 
plethora of artistic manifestos, artist statements, sometimes also incorporating 
methods of transcription writing.  
An influential though little know example is Sherrie Levine’s 1981 statement 
on the condition of the visual arts, written as an unreferenced transcription of the 
closing paragraphs of Barthes’s ‘The Death of the Author’, substituting references to 
                                                             
588 Kenneth Goldsmith, ‘What happens when sense is not foregrounded as being of primary 
importance?’, an interview by David Mandl, The Believer, October 2011, accessed 23 
February 2014, http://www.believermag.com/issues/201110/?read=interview_goldsmith. 
589 Brion Gysin, ‘Cut-Ups Self-Explained’, in The Third Mind, Brion Gysin and William S. 
Burroughs (New York: The Viking Press, 1978), 34. 
590 A complex network of multiple strands of avant-garde strategies influenced contemporary 
conceptual writing. Following Peter Osborne’s take I use the label ‘conceptual art’ here as an 
umbrella term encompassing a range of practices, including Art & Language, appropriation 
art, ready-made, and Pop –all focused on different means of contesting the aesthetic 
definition of the artwork [Peter Osborne, Conceptual Art (London and New York: Phaidon 
Press, 2011)]. 
591 Goldsmith, ‘What happens’. 
592 Osborne, 11.  
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visual arts for references to literature. 593  As such, Levine’s statement not only 
discusses but in fact performs acts of appropriation, to question the established 
notions of authorship and originality. There are further examples of transcription 
practice in Levine’s work, such as her 1985 ‘Un coeur simple’, a short story by Gustave 
Flaubert, transcribed word for word and published as Levine’s in New Observations 
journal in 1985.594 Prince also applied appropriation procedures in writing.595 His 
‘Eleven Conversations’ (1976) comprised transcribed statements attributed to Elvis 
Presley, appropriated from the back of bubble gum cards. ‘Eleven Conversations’ was 
arranged in eleven paragraphs, each opening with the same phrase: ‘like most 
everybody else,’ in each case completed with text lifted from the cards. For example, 
the first paragraph opens with: ‘Like most everybody else I don’t like to be broke,’ 
followed by the second paragraph, which reads: ‘Like most everybody else I like be 
entertained, that means I usually watch television.’596 Here, no distinction is made 
between Prince’s own and the appropriated text, between a tarnished cliché and a 
statement of a celebrity cult figure, considered important and valuable because of the 
status of the author, because of who he was and not what he said. Like Levine’s, 
Prince’s act of appropriation has a performative dimension to it. His textual repetition 
is a manifestation and an enactment of the critical concerns at play in appropriation 
                                                             
593 Sherrie Levine, ‘Statement’, in Mannerism: A Theory of Culture, exhibition catalogue, 27 
March – 25 April, 1982, ed. David Buchan et al. (Vancouver BC: Vancouver Art Gallery, 
1982), 48.  
594 Sherrie Levine, ‘A Simple Heart (After Gustav Flaubert)’, New Observations, 35 (1985), 
15-19.  
595 As Prince points out, the origins of his appropriation practice reside in working with text: 
‘The first things I took were texts. They got published in Tricks Magazine (misspelling of the 
title as per BOMB magazine) in 1976. They were called Eleven Conversations. The texts 
were taken from the back of Elvis Presley bubble gum cards. The next year I started taking 
pictures’ [Richard Prince, ‘All Tomorrow’s Parties’, Richard Prince in conversation with 
Barbara Kruger, BOMB 3 (1982), accessed 23 February 2014, 
http://bombsite.com/issues/3/articles/63].  
596 Richard Prince, ‘Eleven Conversations’, Tracks: A Journal of Artist Writing, 2 (1976), 41. 
Prince’s ‘Eleven Conversations’ seems to anticipate contemporary iterative projects 
composed by application of data mining techniques, generating a strikingly similar effects to 
the repetitive, formulaic discourse employed by Prince. Examples include: Cory Arcangel’s 
Working on My Novel (2014), a compilation of tweets all including a phrase ‘working on my 
novel’ and published as a book: ‘Now that I have a great domain name I can start working on 
my novel […] When I am not studying or working on my novel: I read 50 Shades of Gray, 
watch HBO or Showtime, chill with friends, or party hard #Life<3’ [Cory Arcangel, Working 
on My Novel (London: Penguin Books, 2014), non pag]; Tom Jenks’s An Anatomy of 
Melancholy (Lulu 2013), a data mined, twitter-based reworking of Robert Burton’s The 
Anatomy of Melancholy (1961), created as an assemblage of every tweet using the word 
‘melancholy’ in January 2013; Twistori and We Feel Fine projects, mining twitter and a large 
selection of blogs respectively for specific phrases (anything starting with ‘I feel’ and ‘I am 
felling’ for We Feel Fine and phrases using words ‘love’, ‘hate’, ‘think’, ‘believe’, ‘feel’, ‘wish’ 
for Twistori) used to create what can be seen as a digital equivalent of Prince’s project (see: 
http://twistori.com/#i_love and http://www.wefeelfine.org/); as well as Robert Fitterman’s 
No,Wait. Yep. Definitely Still Hate Myself (Ugly Duckling Presse, 2014), a long poem 
compiling expressions of sadness and loneliness from blogs and online posts. 
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art, here focused on issues of commodity and celebrity fetishism that Pictures 
Generation responded to. The act of duplicating, as Phillips observes, the inauthentic 
voice Prince first heard on first reading the cards597 is a means of raising questions of 
theft, originality, authorship and artistic value. 
These examples evoke a particular attitude towards language in conceptual art 
circles, representative of what Osborne described as ‘the peculiar function of texts in 
the institutional context of visual art.’598 Pictures Generation writing emerges here, 
alongside Art & Language, as a manifestation of broader tendencies in conceptual art 
of the late 1960s (the so-called linguistic conceptualism, as described by Alexander 
Alberro).599 As Liz Kotz noted, the turn to language originating in 1960s art has been 
understood as a departure from visuality and from a commitment to an object in 
favour of art conceptualised as a linguistic proposition. ‘The adoption of linguistic 
models and materials,’ Kotz stresses, ‘took place alongside, and roughly at the same 
time as, the much recognised “linguistic turn” in philosophy and critical theory,’600 
the two converging to form what has been frequently referred to as idea art. However, 
regardless of their commitment to language illustrative of this aesthetic moment, 
Levine’s and Prince’s acts of iterative writing remain concomitant of the field of visual 
arts and should be treated as such, rather than as an example of an iterative poetic 
practice. Transcriptions by Levine and Prince stand as an aside, a footnote of sorts to 
their core, visual-art-based appropriation practice, perhaps a form of an artistic 
manifesto, and not an instance of experimental literature. In contrast, iterative 
writing of particular interest to my argument in this thesis makes similar gestures a 
feature of literary practice and its central preoccupation. A historical trajectory 
echoing developments in erasure poetics transpires here. Transcription, similarly to 
erasure, has clear roots in postmodern experiments with acts of textual repetition. 
But while these began as a marginalised practice in the 1970s and 1980, the models 
of iterative writing are gaining a marked momentum today. However, a clear 
distinction should be drawn between those instances of language-based art and the 
current literary experiments discussed here, instituted by what has come to be known 
as conceptual writing, briefly discussed in Chapter 1.  
Dworkin acknowledges the overt affinities between conceptual literature and 
art but stresses the need to differentiate between the two and recognise the distinct 
                                                             
597 Phillips, ‘People’, 25.  
598 Osborne, 27.  
599 Alexander Alberro, ‘Reconsidering Conceptual Art, 1966-1977’, in Conceptual Art: A 
Critical Anthology, eds. Alexander Alberro and Blake Stimson (Cambridge, MA: The MIT 
Press, 1999), xviii.  
600 Liz Kotz, Words to Be Looked At: Language in 1960 Art (Cambridge, MA: The MIT 
Press, 2010), 8. Hereafter WTBLA.  
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qualities of both; ‘to equate conceptual art and poetry because both use language,’ 
Dworkin argues, ‘is like confusing numbers with mathematics.’601 Dworkin echoes 
LeWitt’s thesis in his ‘Sentences on Conceptual Art’ here: ‘if words are used, and they 
proceed from ideas about art, then they are art and not literature; numbers are not 
mathematics.’ 602  Similarly (and as Dworkin also points out) Kosuth rejected a 
possibility of affinities between his text-based art and concrete poetry. For Kosuth 
there is ‘absolutely no relationship at all. It’s simply one thing superficially resembling 
another.’603 The interest in language in conceptual art is associated with the visual 
dimension of words rather than with their legibility. It stems from a fascination with 
words to be looked at, rather than to be read, to paraphrase Robert Smithson’s 1967 
exhibition press release.604 Although a commitment to illegibility also characterises 
conceptual writing, the approach is grounded in very different assumptions. 
Smithson exhibited LANGUAGE to be LOOKED at and/or THINGS to be READ, to 
foreground the contingency of the art object and subvert the familiar models and 
contexts of representation. Conceptual writing, on the other hand, interrogates the 
familiar models of reading and writing; it contests familiar models of literariness by 
engaging with text as literature. As Dworkin suggests, equating the methods of 
conceptual writing with those of conceptual art would require a commitment to a 
different set of methods and approaches:  
the equivalent move for poetry that wanted to model itself on 
conceptual art would be to posit a nonlinguistic object as ‘the poem’. 
That kind of conceptual poem would insist on a poem without 
words.605  
                                                             
601 Craig Dworkin, ‘The Fate of Echo,’ in Against Expression: An Anthology of Conceptual 
Writing, eds. Craig Dworkin and Kenneth Goldsmith (Evanson, Ill: Nortwestern University 
Press, 2011), xxxv.  
602 Sol LeWitt, ‘Sentences on Conceptual Art’, in Conceptual Art: A Critical Anthology, eds. 
Alexander Alberro and Blake Stimson (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1999), 107.  
603 Joseph Kosuth, ‘Art as Idea as Idea’, interview by Jeanne Sigel, in Art After Philosophy 
and After: Collected Writings, 1966-1990 (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1991), 51.  
604 Robert Smithson, ‘LANGUAGE to be LOOK at and/or THINGS to be READ’, in Robert 
Smithson: The Collected Writings, ed. Jack Flam (Berkeley, CA: University of California 
Press, 1996), 61.  
605 Dworking, ‘The Fate’, xxxvi. Such nonliguistic poems have also been produced by writers 
associated with the rise of contemporary conceptual writing. Examples include Derek 
Beaulieu’s Flatland (2007) and Local Colour (2008) as well as Goldsmith’s chapbook, 
Gertrude Stein on Punctuation (1999), among others. Beaulieu’s Flatland is an 
appropriation of Edwin Abbott’s 1884 novella under the same tittle and in which words are 
reduced to information graphs and schemas. Beaulieu explains the method in the following 
way: ‘I begun by photocopying each page […] I then identified each unique letter on the 1st 
line of each page, and traced a line – using a light-table, ink and a rule – from the first 
occurrence of each letter on the first line through the first appearance of each of those same 
letters on each subsequent line.[…] the generated result appears in a series of superimposed 
seismographic images which reduce Flatland to a two-dimensions schematic reminiscent of 
EKG results or stick reports […] by reducing reading and language into paragramatical 
statistical analysis, content is subsumed into graphical representation of how language 
covers a page’ [Derek Beaulieu, email to Marjorie Perloff, 1 June 2007, quoted in Marjorie 
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Although a departure from familiar poetic criteria characterises conceptual writing, 
it, nevertheless, preserves the interest in the discourse as an agent of meaning and in 
texts, even if not always literary, as literature. As Dworkin observes, ‘the opacity of 
language is a conclusion of conceptual art but already a premise for conceptual 
writing.’606 While conceptual art, as Lucy Lippard notes, ‘offered a bridge between the 
verbal and the visual,’607 the preoccupations of conceptual literature centre on writing 
itself.  
What conceptual literature and art do have in common, however, is an interest 
in ideas and information rather than their expression. Foregrounded in Goldsmith’s 
works is a possibility of appropriating the conceptual art thinking for literature, a 
commitment to ‘learning to ask different questions, recognising that mechanical 
expression can be equally but differently beautiful and moving.’608 Evocative of the 
emergence of conceptual art that marked a turning point in contemporary art, one at 
which ‘the conception of the artwork as an object […] was most directly and radically 
challenged,’ 609  conceptual writing strives to interrogate the familiar notions of 
literature and literary production, by employing similar, conceptual gestures. 
Resorting to a conceptual art idiom, Goldsmith frequently notes the possibilities and 
significance of the approach: ‘the implications for writing are profound,’ he argues; 
‘by swapping LeWitt’s visual concerns for literary ones, we can adopt [his] 
“Paragraphs” and “Sentences” as roadmaps and guidebooks for conceptual and 
uncreative writing.’610 In a conceptual gesture stemming from such a proposition, and 
echoing Levine’s manifesto composed by means of rewriting Barthes, one of 
Goldsmith’s writer’s statements is an appropriation of LeWitt’s ‘Paragraph’s:  
                                                             
Perloff, Afterword to Flatland: A Romance of Many Dimensions (York: Information as 
Material, 2007), 107-08]. His Local Colour engages with Paul Auster’s novella ‘Ghosts’. The 
appropriation here takes a form of hyperbolised erasure, where all words are removed, 
except for those denoting colours. These are then substituted for the colour each word 
describes, positioned on the page to replace each word. As a result no text is used, only 
blocks of colour. Similarly, Goldsmith erases all language from his Gertrude Stein. The work 
is an iteration of an excerpt from Stein's ‘Poetry and Grammar’ (1935) in which Stein 
provides a basis for the use of certain forms of punctuation over others. Goldsmith’s take on 
Stein’s text is an erasure in which only the punctuation marks from the essay remain on the 
page. What differentiates these experiments from minimalist and conceptual art and the 
hypothetical conceptual poem that Dworkin describes is the source text these writers adopt. 
Literature here remains at the core. As such, these works posit themselves as a conceptual 
response to writing but one arrived at by means of reading and engaging with literature as 
texts to be read. These are examples of hyperbolised erasure writing rather than conceptual 
art.  
606 Dworkin, ‘The Fate’, xxxvi.  
607 Lucy R. Lippard, Six Years: The dematerialisation of the art object from 1966 to 1972 
(Berkeley, LA: University of California Press, 1997), x. 
608 UW, 126.  
609 Osborne, 11.  
610 UW, 128. 
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I will refer to the kind of writing in which I am involved as conceptual 
writing. In conceptual writing the idea or concept is the most 
important aspect of the work. When an author uses a conceptual form 
of writing, it means that all of the planning and decisions are made 
beforehand and the execution is a perfunctory affair. The idea becomes 
a machine that makes the text. This kind of writing is not theoretical 
or illustrative of theories; it is intuitive, it is involved with all types of 
mental processes and it is purposeless. It is usually free from the 
dependence on the skill of the writer as a craftsman. It is the objective 
of the author who is concerned with conceptual writing to make her 
work mentally interesting to the reader, and therefore usually she 
would want it to become emotionally dry. There is no reason to 
suppose, however, that the conceptual writer is out to bore the reader. 
It is only the expectation of an emotional kick, to which one 
conditioned to Romantic literature is accustomed, that would deter the 
reader from perceiving this writing.611  
 
By comparison, the second paragraph of Sol LeWitt’s text reads:  
I will refer to the kind of art in which I am involved as conceptual art. 
In conceptual art the idea or concept is the most important aspect of 
the work. When an artist uses a conceptual form of art, it means that 
all of the planning and decisions are made beforehand and the 
execution is a perfunctory affair. The idea becomes a machine that 
makes the art. This kind of art is not theoretical or illustrative of 
theories; it is intuitive, it is involved with all types of mental processes 
and it is purposeless. It is usually free from the dependence on the skill 
of the artist as a craftsman. It is the objective of the artist who is 
concerned with conceptual art to make her work mentally interesting 
to the spectator, and therefore usually he would want it to become 
emotionally dry. There is no reason to suppose, however, that the 
conceptual artist is out to bore the viewer. It is only the expectation of 
an emotional kick, to which one conditioned to expressionist art is 
accustomed, that would deter the viewer from perceiving this art.612  
 
Repeating LeWitt’s words and Levine’s gesture at the same time Goldsmith’s 
conceptual writing is formulated as a refutation of Romantic expressivism and related 
notions of literature. This is the same approach that informs Goldsmith’s iterations of 
Huebler’s statement, constantly working with both ideas and texts of earlier avant-
gardes to inform his uncreative project, creating conceptual writing and commenting 
on it in a singular iterative act. The same propensity for a self-reflexive creative 
thinking through theory of writing is clearly manifested here. As the passage quoted 
above illustrates, the framework for debating conceptual writing today is constantly 
reiterated in Goldsmith’s creative and critical work, as if asking, after Atkinson, 
                                                             
611 Kenneth Goldsmith, ‘Paragraph on Conceptual Writing’, Electronic Poetry Center, 
accessed 30 August 2013, 
http://epc.buffalo.edu/authors/goldsmith/conceptual_paragraphs.html.  
612 Sol LeWitt, ‘Paragraphs on Conceptual Art’, in Conceptual Art: A Critical Anthology, eds. 
Alexander Alberro and Blake Stimson (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1999), 12.  
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whether such an attempt at defining conceptual writing can emerge as a work of 
conceptual writing itself.613  
By appropriating both attitudes, ideas, and works of relevant conceptual 
artists and critics of conceptual art Goldsmith firmly positions himself in a long line 
of avant-garde tradition. His iterative poetics should therefore be conceived of as a 
complete iterative act, not simply an iteration of The New York Times, of LeWitt’s 
statement, not simply an attempt at copying Benjamin’s or Warhol’s gestures, but a 
form of a Gesamtkunstwerk of iteration. In other words, writing at the Iterative turn 
should be seen, I suggest, as a manifestation of a very particular thinking about 
creativity, defined by a certain ease in appropriating, remediating, and mashing up, 
typical for postproduction condition, but also contingent on the attitude that triggers 
it.614 Here, the logic of iteration is defined by a repetition (though not a reproduction) 
of an attitude, in itself iterative, that is expressed in related iterative forms. Here, as 
suggested in Chapter 1, attitudes become form. As such, extensive references to 
conceptual art predecessors that define Goldsmith’s work should not be read as 
simply a historical footnote to his poetics but rather an inseparable element of his 
works, in itself a source text, constantly incorporated and iterated in his acts of 
repetition, where both information about conceptual art and works of conceptual art 
themselves serve as a material to be repurposed.  
3.8. CURATING TRANSCRIPTION 
 
 
FIGURE 45: RICHARD PRINCE, 'SO AS LONG AS I PAINT COWBOYS YOU WON'T SUE ME?' 
                                                             
613 See note 577 in this chapter.  
614 Goldsmith’s approach brings to mind Doeringer’s 60 Years Later, appropriating in one 
creative gesture both Colting’s text and Prince’s concept to create a new work of art, as 
discussed in Chapter 1.   
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On February 23, 2014 Richard Prince tweeted a painted image of a cowboy, 
reminiscent of his earlier rephotography series appropriating Marlboro advertising 
[Figure 45]. ‘So long as I PAINT cowboys you won’t sue me?,’615 Prince commented, 
raising questions about the paradigms of ownership and authorship that persevere in 
copyright. Evocative of Prince’s tweeted cowboy, Goldsmith’s complete project is 
driven by similar concerns. Goldsmith’s interests reside in ‘a simple act of moving 
information from one place to another [which] today constitutes a significant cultural 
act in and of itself.’616 Interrogating possibilities of iteration by means of remediation, 
Goldsmith calls himself a collector of language rather than a writer.617 His works 
described in this thesis together form a collection of information discourse, of news 
collated, reframed and appropriated as avant-garde poetry. As the most explicit 
manifestation of this attitude, Goldsmith’s current, ongoing project brings together 
an amalgamation of fragments of information about New York to compose a twenty-
first-century, New York version of Benjamin’s representation of nineteenth-century 
Paris in The Arcades Project. A major influence on Goldsmith, Benjamin, of course, 
is as a collector par excellence.618  
For Goldsmith, this interest in collecting is a manifestation of contemporary 
consumer attitudes; ‘what we are experiencing,’ Goldsmith argues,  
is an inversion of consumption, one in which we’ve come to engage in 
a more profound way with acts of acquisition over that which we are 
acquiring. […] Our primary impulse, then, has, moved from creators 
to collectors and archivists.619  
 
Today, it is the notion of collecting rather than creating content, and the related ability 
to manage and manipulate the information available, that emerges as a paradigm of 
postproduction authorship. Every act of collecting, be it of objects or information, 
inheres acts of collating, organising, managing, and archiving. Inevitably, a collector, 
or an archivist, acts as a curator of content accumulated. Curating, of course, resides 
in an ability to move, manage and arrange objects, as well as information about them, 
or, in the digital context, data or information itself. Curatorship today should be 
thought of, in Paul O’Neill’s words, as ‘a distinct practice of mediation.’ The 
perception of the figure of the curator, O’Neill explains, has changed, ‘from being a 
                                                             
615 Richard Prince, Twitter post, 23 February 2014, https://twitter.com/RichardPrince4. 
616 BB.  
617 Marjorie Perloff, ‘A Conversation with Kenneth Goldsmith’, Jacket 21 (2003), accessed 12 
January 2014, http://jacketmagazine.com/21/perl-gold-iv.html. 
618 Excerpts from Goldsmith’s take on The Arcades are currently tweeted via @CapitalNY. 
The work is due for publication by Verso in 2015/16.   
619 Kenneth Goldsmith, ‘Archiving Is The New Folk Art’, Harriet: a poetry blog, 19 April 
2011, accessed 21 February 2013, 
http://www.poetryfoundation.org/harriet/2011/04/archiving-is-the-new-folk-art/. 
| 210 
 
 
caretaker of collections – a behind the scenes organiser and arbiter of taste – to an 
independently motivated practitioner,’ 620  a source of critical discourse and ideas 
about aesthetics. The shift from Benjamin’s nineteenth-century Paris to Goldsmith’s 
twenty-first-century New York, away from Benjamin’s collector interested in 
‘transfiguration of things,’ 621  to Goldsmith’s manipulator of digitally aggregated 
language, evokes this change in attitudes. To think about writing in this context as a 
creative rather than purely derivative practice requires, I suggest, a rejection of the 
traditional notion of the Romantic author, to focus instead on modes of selecting and 
organising – or collecting and subsequently curating source material to produce new 
works. Authorship conceptualised as a curatorial practice offers a new set of 
categories for thinking about emergent writing practices that familiar notions of 
authorship, creativity, and originality fail to describe and respond to adequately. As 
such, I suggest, it offers a model for thinking about writing at the Iterative turn. The 
act of curating considered as an act of authorship, an act of authorship as a 
manifestation of curatorial activity, assume a quality of  creative acts in their own 
right; they produce as much as they record.  
Channelling this contemporary curatorial activity, a conceptual author as 
curator today is a ‘mediator,’ ‘a proactive agent in a communication chain.’622 Artistic 
and literary production viewed as such relies on models of creativity conceptualised 
as acts of organising information critically. It is a view of creativity that echoes 
Deleuze’s understanding of the notion as movement or flow within an active 
communication network. For Deleuze, ‘creation is all about mediators.’ Without 
them, Deleuze argues, nothing happened; ‘I need my mediators to express myself and 
they’d never express themselves without me.’623 Evoking Deleuze, Maria Lind sees 
curatorship as a manifestation of a similar dynamic:  
rather than being the product of the curator’s labor per se, curating is 
the result of a network of agents’ labor. The outcome should be the 
disturbing quality of smooth surfaces being stirred – a specific, multi-
layered means of answering back in a given context.624  
 
Writing as a curatorial practice, as well as curatorial practice itself, can only exist in 
an extensive network of interdependent mediators. A curator relies on an availability 
                                                             
620 Paul O’Neill, The Culture of Curating and the Curating of Culture(s) (Cambridge, MA: 
The MIT Press, 2012), 1-2.  
621 Walter Benjamin, The Arcades Project, trans. Howard Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin 
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of artworks to curate. Writing conceptual literature is similarly contingent. A writer 
such as Kenneth Goldsmith can only continue producing new content as long as there 
is content being produced elsewhere. This network interdependence is what iterative 
writing thrives on. It derives from and self-consciously interrogates the culture of 
excess, of abundance of texts, more or less interesting, generated ad infinitum and 
always available. The development of the excessive culture is a pre-condition of not 
just conceptual practice, but first, and foremost, of the iterative thinking itself.  
Such a trajectory most explicitly foregrounds the key presupposition of 
authorial agency at the Iterative turn. Goldsmith’s act of authorship relies on curating 
the already curated content. If Goldsmith curates a weather forecast, it is a weather 
forecast compiled by a meteorological agency and subsequently arranged and 
reported by a New York radio station. To think about the traditional curatorial 
framework – a museum or a gallery context – every collection comprises a set of 
objects which represent a history, an event, or a genealogy of events. Every collection 
is an effort to represent the events that happened elsewhere, to reiterate them by 
means of an exhibition, collection, or installation – through an impossible act of their 
repetition. As such, a museum is always a space not of the event itself, not the 
Derridean thing of the event, but rather a locus of the decontextualised impression of 
that event, organised within a frame of new perceptions, always inevitably subjective, 
altering the thing. An act of curating can thus be described as an act of repetition of 
an impression of an event by means of its decontextualisation. As an act of curating, 
Goldsmith’s practice iterates the logic of such curatorial repetition, while at the same 
time repeating the act of curating itself. It decontextualises the already 
decontextualised event to create a volume of experimental poetry as an impression of 
an impression, a repetition of a repetition. Goldsmith’s acts of authorship are acts of 
selection and subjective interpretation not so much of the event of 9/11, Kennedy’s 
death, or the Columbine shootings, but of any attempt at speaking and objectifying 
the event and its inherent impossibility. If such is the dynamic governing the creative 
landscape today, then it is this creative context that triggers the proliferation of 
iterative acts of writing. ‘A creative act,’ as Boris Groys argues, ‘if it is understood as 
an iconoclastic gesture, presupposes a permanent reproduction of the context in 
which it is effectuated. This kind of reproduction infers the creative act from the 
beginning.’625 It is the curatorial framework and its tools (including contemporary 
                                                             
625 Boris Groys, ‘The Topology of Contemporary Art’, in Antinomies of Art and Culture: 
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digital technologies) that facilitate the aesthetic attitudes of the Iterative turn in 
writing.   
Repetition is a defining function of a digital collection and a digital archive. 
The archival activity today is characterised by an inherent multiplication of copies, 
circulated, manipulated and eternally reproduced. Production and circulation of 
digital content relies on a proliferation of copies. As Goldsmith explained,  
from the moment we use the ‘save as’ command when composing 
electronic document, our archival impulse begins. ‘Save as’ is a 
command that implies replication; and replication requires more 
complex archival considerations: where do I store a copy? Where is the 
original saved? What is the relationship between the two?626 
 
As a curator who deals in a contemporary archive constructed as such the writer-
curator today inevitably engages in an iterative project. But, I would like to suggest, 
today’s copies are curated copies. They do not operate as as reproductions but as 
repetitions, to return to Foster. As such, the process of curating a copy today can be 
seen as a means of generating a new original rather than a process of creating another 
copy. A copy as a curated copy emerges not as a multiplication of copies, always, as 
discussed in Chapter 1, removed from the original, but as a copy that can be seen as a 
manifestation of an alternative way of thinking about paradigms of originality. In such 
a creative framework, artistic production is manifested by means of collating and 
arranging content, where, as Mary Anne Staniszewski asserts, selecting what is 
included and what is excluded is a way in which culture is produced.627  
The question of defining contemporary creative acts resides, then, in what 
Groys describes as topological inscription. Evoking conceptualism’s commitment to 
the context as the new content, Groys associates contemporary understanding of 
originality with an inclusion of a work in a particular framework or situation. For 
Groys, contemporary art (and similarly, I suggest, conceptual writing), operates as a 
reversal of repetition as a derivative act. Groys argues that a context of an exhibition 
or an installation – a curatorial act – puts a copy out of unmarked, anonymous 
circulation, into a clearly defined topological here and now. If ‘the presence of the 
original is the prerequisite to the concept of authenticity,’ 628  then the act of 
contextualising a curated object turns the object into an original. Groys’s is an 
interesting take on Benjamin’s aura. Like Benjamin, Groys stresses the necessity of 
an encounter with a work but for Groys, it is the situation of the encounter itself and 
not the presence of an original (key for Benjamin) that becomes a condition of 
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originality. It is necessary to see an exhibit and engage with a curated object. 
Similarly, it is necessary to engage with Goldsmith’s unreadable text to recognise the 
nature of its textuality (even if popular approaches to reading Goldsmith seem to 
imply otherwise). As Groys argues:  
our contemporary relationship with art cannot […] be reduced to a 
‘loss of aura.’ Rather the modern age organises a complex interplay of 
dislocations and relocations, of deteriolizations and 
reterritorializations, of deauratizations and reauratizations. What 
differentiates contemporary art [and writing] from previous times is 
only the fact that the originality of a work in our time is not established 
depending on its own form, but through its inclusion in a certain 
context, […] through its topological inscription.629 
 
In line with Groys’s trajectory, a newspaper, recontextualised and reframed as a book 
should be considered original. It is a manifestation of de-/re-auralised originality that 
enables curatorial practice as a vehicle of creativity.   
However, it is not only Groys’s model that is significant here. What I am 
interested in is his commitment to the formulation of new categories applicable to 
thinking about culture in its particular moment. The impulses that are reshaping 
attitudes towards creativity are crucial to the efforts of contemporary writing to 
become contemporary. What changes is a cultural convention. If, as Michael North 
suggests, the new medium is the new convention, and hence, in some sense a new 
form of art, then the increasing prominence of digitalisation today, the discovery of 
the new medium, is synonymous with a discovery of new possibilities, not just in 
terms of means of creative production but also in terms of categories established to 
describe them. ‘Novelty,’ North writes, ‘is supposed to be an ontological possibility.’630 
But an encounter of a new medium and the resulting aesthetic attitudes, inevitably 
require a change in an ontological system. As a result, operating by means of familiar 
categories is no longer sufficient to describe the emergent cultural moment. The shift 
from authorship to curatorship, from original to copy, as it emerges at the Iterative 
turn, also assumes a reconceptualisation of the notions at the base level. The copy as 
an alternative means of thinking about the original, within the contemporary context, 
is not just a reproduction but a curated copy in its topological inscription. Today, 
Groys suggests:  
we are unable to stabilize a copy as a copy as we are unable to stabilize 
an original as an original. There are no eternal copies, just as there are 
no eternal originals. Reproduction is as much infected by originality as 
originality is infected by reproduction. By circulating through different 
contexts a copy becomes a series of different originals. Every change 
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of context, every change of medium can be interpreted as a negation of 
the staus of a copy as a copy – as an essential rapture, as a new start 
that opens out a new future. In this sense, a copy is never really a copy, 
but rather always a new original in a new context. Every copy is by itself 
a flaneur; it experiences time and time again its own ‘profane 
illumniations’, turning it into an original. It loses old auras, and gains 
new ones. It remains, perhaps, the same copy, but it becomes different 
originals.631 
 
Thinking about creativity constructed as such requires a rejection of the established 
paradigms. Instead, it is a manifestation of an emergent set of attitudes, a space of 
exploration of creative possibilities that the Iterative turn as a transtional cultural 
moment opens up. To borrow from Terry Smith, commenting on the shifting 
curatorial scene today, this is a framework for conceptualising authorship that is 
‘emergent, imperfectly grasped, but nonetheless an interesting way of thinking about 
art,’632 and about contemporary modes of creativity more broadly. The ambiguous 
status of the contemporary copy, original, as well as the author, constantly negotiating 
attempts at production, consumption, reproduction of meaning, constantly out of 
joint, is a mark of its innovative contemporaneity.  
‘Innovation,’ Terry Smith argues, ‘is most likely to occur in zones of 
ambiguity.’633 For Smith, the strategy of contemporary art, and, similarly, I suggest, 
of iterative writing, relies on creating a context that transforms a certain form or 
thing, ‘that can make a certain form or thing look other, new and interesting – even if 
this form has already been collected.’ 634  The same preoccupation with inherent 
possibilities of contextual transformation, so prominent in Goldsmith and Groys, 
transpires here. If, as Smith explains, traditional art worked on the level of form, 
contemporary art, and instances of contemporary experimental writing, work on the 
level of context: ‘framework, background, or a new theoretical interpretation.’ 635 
Interestingly, North points to the Latin meaning of ‘to innovate’ – ‘to renew or reform, 
not to start over afresh.’636 What the invention entails is the ability to arrive at ‘new 
relations, new arrangements of pre-existing forms.’637 It is always, Groys suggests, 
‘first and foremost a repetition of tradition.’638 The novelty of Goldsmith’s project is 
exactly that. It is context bound as a manifestation of the here and now, arrived at by 
means of multifaceted iteration of texts, attitudes, and traditions. An act of collating, 
                                                             
631 Groys, ‘The Topology,’75.  
632 Terry Smith, Thinking Contemporary Curating (New York: Independent Curators 
International, 2012), 32.  
633 Ibid, 239.  
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curating, and archiving current news posits an attempt at building an archive of the 
now that immediately falls back on itself, always defined by the impossibility of the 
project, always at once too soon and too late, and hence inherently contemporary, in 
line with Agamben’s paradox.639 As a record of 9/11, The Day, for example, is defined 
by this trajectory, never engaging with the moment itself, always out of joint with the 
history it is trying to record, too soon and at the same time too late to capture the 
event it nevertheless evokes. In his attempt to reframe the here and now of news, 
Goldsmith’s work both preserves and subverts the temporality of the present and in 
this attempt turns into a form of curating the contemporary itself.  
Similar acts of engaging with the present, instead of representing, involve, 
Lind suggests, presenting, performing ‘something in the here and now instead of 
merely mapping it from there and then.’ 640  Lind describes such activity as a 
manifestation of ‘the curatorial’ as distinguished from an act of curating. For Lind, 
the curatorial is a more inventive and more critical alternative. The distinction that 
Lind makes stems from an association of curating with a practice of putting together 
an exhibition, while ‘the curatorial’ implies a methodology. The curatorial, unlike the 
practice of curating, is not bound to a specific exhibition space. Instead, to quote Lind:  
‘the curatorial’ […] takes art as its starting point but then situates it in 
relation to specific contexts, themes, and questions in order to 
challenge the status quo. And it does so from various positions such as 
that of curator, an editor, an educator, a communication person, and 
so on. This means that the curatorial can be employed, or performed, 
by people in a number of different capacities […] There is a qualitative 
difference between curating and the curatorial. The latter […] carries 
potential for change. 641 
 
The curatorial, again, relies on the possibilities that emerge with a change of context 
as a creative rapture of space of innovation. It is an intellectual framework that lends 
itself to thinking beyond the visual arts. Driven and defined by a propensity to change 
and innovate, the curatorial emerges as a vehicle of the Iterative turn.  
As Beatrice von Bismarck, Jörn Schafaff, and Thomas Weski point out, in 
recent years, concepts of curating have entered the everyday discourses of disciplines 
other than the visual arts, reverberating in approaches to dance, theatre, film, design, 
and architecture, as well as related academic research in sociology, anthropology and 
philosophy. For Bismarck et al., ‘the curatorial opens perspectives onto cultural 
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practices that insist on collectivity, changing subject and object relations, and 
dynamic hierarchies.’642 In such a framework, the traditional tasks of artists, curators 
and writers start to shift, ‘from one actor to another, from artist to curator to critic, 
and from an educational setting to an exhibiting or publishing institution,’643 from a 
writer to a writer-curator. Understood as such, the curatorial should be seen as a 
particularly significant concept to addressing the nature of creative practice, and the 
ambiguous status of authorship implicit in writing by iterative means. It is the 
commitment to the exploration of such ambiguous spaces of emergence that makes 
the curatorial particularly relevant to debating originality and innovation of iterative 
writing practices and their contemporaneity. The curatorial as a system of writing 
becomes a potential condition for the instantiation of the techniques of experimental 
writing described in this thesis, a site of erasure or transcription. While an act of 
iterative writing produces an event of writing that assumes a dual function of a 
statement on iteration and a creative iterative act at the same time, the curatorial, 
Rogoff argues, is a manifestation of a moment in which different knowledges 
interacting with one another produce something that transcends their position as 
knowledge – an event of knowledge.644 Read as a manifestation of the curatorial, an 
event of writing not only assumes the function of the event of knowledge, it makes 
explicit the condition in which it operates. It brings to the fore its mode of knowledge 
production as an event of knowledge itself. The approach, so prominent in the neo-
neo-avant-garde attitude, as discussed earlier in this chapter, is a trigger for a 
transformation of writing about writing into curating understood as an embodiment 
of the act itself, as a manifestation of the curatorial.  
The press release for the Cultures of the Curatorial conference held in 2010 
represents the emergence of the curatorial as a new creative category. It describes the 
notion of the curatorial as a concept ‘not dissimilar to the function of the concepts of 
the filmic or the literary.’645 It is this drive towards reclassification, predicated on the 
innovative yet familiar categorisation, that is of significance here. The notion of the 
curatorial is provoked, as Rogoff explains, by a need for another vocabulary, as an 
exploration of what Rogoff describes as ‘the possibility of thinking how we might 
know from a different perspective’ 646  that at the same time becomes a new 
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classification in its own right. When applied to the literary context, I suggest, ‘the 
curatorial’ turns into a category of the literary as a new paradigm of authorship. 
Rogoff sees the vocabulary of the arts and art criticism as lacking. Similarly, the 
terminology that conceptual writing inherited by its inscription into the established 
literary frameworks is misplaced. In its extraneousness, it brings to the fore the 
fleeting temporality of even the most established categories. As Rogoff puts it, ‘we 
develop vocabulary only to leave it behind and develop the next vocabulary that is 
part of the open process.’ 647  Thinking about writing as the curatorial evokes the 
course.  
Both an act of curating in a visual arts context and curating as a mode of 
writing a conceptual poem are exercises of the curatorial. And it is the curatorial as 
defined by Lindt that I posit as a framework for thinking about models of iterative 
writing today. Even if such thinking about writing does not advance a complete model 
of authorship for the contemporary moment, moving towards the curatorial as a 
means of conceptualising creative writing is a space where the potentiality of thinking 
about writing by other means can be explored, it is a structure of the new as described 
by North. Dismissing acts of iteration as plagiarism or copyright infringement, as 
illustrated by examples of Salinger v. Colting and Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Miffin 
in Chapter 1, manifests what Terry Smith describes as a conformist contemporary.648 
Appropriating the curatorial as a creative paradigm of writing offers a more daring, 
iconoclastic model for approaching the contemporary, a way of interrogating the 
complexities of the here and now and the possibilities of exploring them. For Rogoff, 
‘it is an opportunity to “unbound” the work from all those categories and practices 
that limit its ability to explore that which we do not yet know or that which is not yet 
a subject in the world.’649 
3.9. CURATING AT THE ITERATIVE TURN 
 
Interesting parallels can be drawn between the increasingly ambiguous status 
of the copy and the original that Groys describes and shifting attitudes towards 
curatorship in the visual arts today. Groys suggests that ‘contemporary art can be 
understood primarily as an exhibition practice’ and that ‘it is becoming increasingly 
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difficult today to differentiate between the artist and the curator.’650 Groys alludes to 
what has been described as a curatorial turn in arts manifested in the rise of a curator 
as a creator and meta-artist also evoked in historical transformations of museums. 
Traditionally funded by governments, museums or galleries used to operate as centres 
of administration and the governing of culture by civil servants. There is a strong 
sense of service to the dominant ideology that can be associated with the original 
museum practice. As such, the developments that have constituted the advances of 
the curatorial practice can be seen as an extension of the historical avant-gardes, with 
avant-garde commitment to institutional critique, rejection of the bourgeois 
institution of art, and the dominant aesthetic paradigms. As O’Neill explained, for 
groups such as Dadaists, the constructivists, and The Surrealists an attempt at 
subversion of exhibition design was a means of critiquing the passive experience of 
art and the exhibition space.651 Such affinities between avant-garde and the history of 
curating offer an important framework for appropriating the curatorial as a discourse 
relevant to contemporary literary avant-garde practices.  
It was only in the late 1960s, with the appearance of exhibition organisers 
working independently of museums and fixed museum posts, that curatorial practices 
started attracting attention. Seth Siegelaub’s reference to the shifting exhibition 
production conditions that made visible the curatorial mediation as ‘demystification’ 
has proven particularly influential: 
I think in our generation we thought that we could demystify the role 
of the museum, the role of the collector, and the production of the 
artwork; for example, how the size of a gallery affects the production 
of art, etc. In that sense we tried to demystify the hidden structures of 
the art world.652 
 
The demystification that Siegelaub described marked a departure from the traditional 
critique of the artwork as an autonomous object displayed as part of an exhibition, 
towards what O’Neill discusses as ‘forms of curatorial criticism in which the space of 
exhibition was given critical precedence over that of the object of art.’653 The rise of 
the curatorial criticism seen as such was explicitly grounded in the intellectual 
sensibilities of the time, the prominence of post-structuralist thought and Barthes’ 
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‘The Death of the Author’ in particular. The change in curatorial thinking at the time 
mirrors shifting attitudes towards authorship.  
O’Neill stresses, however, that it was not until the 1990s that ‘the rise of the 
curator as creator’ and related critical practices gained prominence. Evoking the 
changing attitude Jonathan Watkins, writing for Art Monthly in 1987, claimed, for 
example, acts of curating should be considered synonymous with Marcel Duchamp’s 
‘“Readymade Aided” artworks.’654 Jan Hoet’s Documenta 9 exhibit in 1992 could be 
referred to here as another useful example. Hoet’s project manifested a commitment 
to expressing the creative agency of the curator, or, as Hoet put it, a ‘curatorial artist.’ 
In the introduction to the catalogue, Hoet put forward a model of exhibition as 
discourse, authored by a curatorial artist, or perhaps, a curatorial author: ‘this 
exhibition is my text; every work that is contributed is a postulate; and the discourse 
unfolds as one walks through spaces.’655 The authorship of the text as conceived of by 
Hoet resides in the process of its compilation; it is the process and not the content 
that constitutes the creative output. This convergence of curatorship and authorship, 
models of artistic and literary production that Hoet postulates reverberate in the 
methods of conceptual writing today, as does Watkins’s readymade curatorial 
thinking. Both examples are indicative of a particular turn to discourse in curating. 
Coupled with what O’Neill referred to as ‘the ascendency of this “curatorial gesture” 
in the nineties,’ 656 these curatorial attitudes began to establish curatorial practice as 
a potential space of critique. This environment was defined by blurring boundaries 
between the critic and the curator. As Liam Gillick observes, ‘people you might have 
met before who in the past were critics were now curators.’657 Gillick describes the 
practice of curating in the 1990s as multiple activity that involved being a mediator, 
producer, interface and neo-critic. Identified by Buchloh as a ‘transition from practice 
to discourse,’ 658  curatorial activity of the 90s was rooted in the proliferation of 
curatorial anthologies, curatorial summits and symposia but was, as O’Neill stresses, 
a predominantly curator-led discourse. Although the interest might have shifted from 
the artist’s individuality to a more interactive and critical curatorial view of creative 
production, the attitudes to curatorship at the time were defined by the inherent 
divergence of artistic and curatorial gestures.  
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But the interest in discourse that Buchloh stresses not just as a supplement 
but as a substitute for practice is significant here, I suggest, and opens possibilities 
for incorporating the curatorial into literary debates. The affinities between curating 
and creative writing become particularly apparent in the context of the curatorial 
turn. Curating now increasingly strives to define itself in terms of discourse by 
establishing ‘the grammar of the exhibition.’ 659  The curatorial, conceptualised as 
such, draws metaphorical connections between language and exhibition. As Smith 
describes it, an exhibition becomes ‘an array of speech acts […] a conversational 
setting.’ 660  Today, Dave Beech and Gavin Wade declared ‘even talking is doing 
something,’661 even talking can be conceived of as an event, not an event-exhibition, 
but instead an event of writing, and one particularly indicative of the contemporary 
preoccupation with language in curatorial and creative practice, of language as a 
manifestation of a certain propensity for iterative writing as it emerges today.  
Groys argues that today ‘there is no longer any “ontological” difference 
between making and displaying art. In the context of contemporary art to make is to 
show things as art.’662 The curatorial model of writing formulated here exemplifies an 
analogous dynamic. What I see as a widespread curatorial attitude to writing could be 
seen as deriving from this history of changing attitudes to professional curatorial 
practice in the visual arts. The writer as curator emerges under the postproduction 
condition and assumes the role of a curator as the critical, creative producer of 
meaning and discourse, the curator after the curatorial turn, rather than an 
administrator cum exhibition maker. An artwork for such a contemporary curator is 
just a source of raw material utilised in the process of production of what John Miller 
describes as a ‘total artwork of the exhibition.’ 663 Similarly, Goldsmith’s works such 
as Seven American Deaths as a compilation of discursive fragments dictated only by 
Goldsmith’s choices, turn the selection of news into raw material to be arranged, 
mediated, and used to create a new subjectivity – a text as a curated literary object 
contributing to Goldsmith’s complete project as a Gesamtkunstwerk of Kenneth 
Goldsmith. While the shifting attitudes to the practice of curating and ‘the curatorial’ 
might produce a new genre of exhibition, thinking about authorship as curatorship is, 
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similarly, indicative of a generic change engendered by the emergence of 
conceptualism in literature and iterative writing more broadly.  
As Robert Cook suggested, a curator is always ‘between spaces, discourse and 
modes of thinking and doing.’ For Cook, ‘a curator is […] always not a curator.’664 In 
a similar manner, a conceptual writer is always and at the same time is not a writer, 
always negotiating familiar paradigms and methods of their rearticulation. A curator, 
and like a curator, a conceptual writer, or, perhaps writer as curator, can be seen as a 
conduit, to borrow from Cook: 
being a curator-as-conduit is to be utterly contingent and floating, 
always between forms and formations. A curator is betweenness 
incarnate. Therefore, maybe, a curator is someone who is equally not 
a curator.665  
 
Curatorship conceptualised as such is a category of creative production that operates 
in an ambiguous creative space of production of meaning rather than objects 
themselves. Writing seen as a curatorial practice is, in Cook’s words, writing as 
finding; it is ‘a practice about negotiation and betweenness. It isn’t a thing necessarily. 
It is a set of occasions […] the act of curating […] as a declaration of agency and 
desire.’666 It is, to return to North, a space of ambiguity that facilitates innovation and 
change. Here the iterative and the curatorial thinking converge as a manifestation of 
the Iterative turn. 
We are experiencing today what could be described as an incredibly pervasive 
curatorial moment not just in artistic and literary environments but also in 
widespread popular culture. The debates surrounding curatorial practice intensify 
today and, as Alex Ferguson observed, the linguistic shift and the recent appearance 
of the verb ‘to curate,’ the term originally only used as a noun, is indicative of the 
currency and vitality of the debates.667 Around ten years ago DJ-ing was the job du 
jour (and it is not insignificant that Kenneth Goldsmith, or Kenny G, has background 
in DJ-ing himself). Today, everyone is a curator. It is possible to curate a pop-up shop, 
a selection of organic food at Whole Foods; readings and magazines are now curated 
rather than organised or edited. A DJ is now a curator, and Mark Ronson curating a 
music show for Channel 4 in February 2011 is only one of many examples. ‘The title 
of curator,’ Smith explains, ‘is assumed by anyone who has a […] role in bringing 
about a situation in which something creative might be done, who manages the 
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possibility of invention.’668 Dorothea van Hantelmann recognises this skill, even art 
of selecting as a cultural practice in its own right. ‘Only with an understanding of this 
new culture of choosing,’ van Hantelmann stresses, ‘can we recognise the 
embeddedness of curatorial practice in the present socioeconomical order of Western 
societies.’669 
This juxtaposition of the ubiquity of curating in relation to its socio-economic 
context is significant and points to a broader tendency in contemporary attitudes to 
engaging with content and information. The contributors to a recent n+1 publication, 
What was a hipster (2010), associate the widespread curatorship with a rise of a 
‘prosumer’– a consumer who prefers to select artefacts rather than produce them.670 
Today, the phenomenon of prosumerism is becoming of increasing interest to socio-
economic debates focused on emerging consumer behaviours influenced by the 
networked, participatory online cultures. This offers a possible framework for 
defining the emergence of the curatorial, iterative shift in creative attitudes. As 
George Ritzer noted, the notion of prosumerism is not, as yet, extensively theorised 
or researched and has been recognised by social sciences only very recently. Earlier 
attempts at redefining consumer culture in a similar fashion include Alvin Toffler’s 
1980s discussions of the Third Wave economics of tomorrow671 as well as Marshall 
McLuhan and Barrington Nevitt’s predicted shift towards prosumer attitudes: ‘at 
electric speeds’, McLuhan and Nevitt suggested, ‘the consumer becomes producer as 
the public becomes participant role player.’672 McLuhan’s take is typically grounded 
in the future of technological and media change that runs through his writings. And 
it is the future as anticipated by McLuhan, manifested in the contemporary digital 
present, that seems to have triggered these exact changes in approaches to thinking 
about consumer attitudes that reverberate clearly in contemporary aesthetics as well. 
As Steve Collins puts it, ‘the promises of Web 2.0 have fostered a “prosumer” creative 
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class that blends media consumption with production to create new works that are 
freely disseminated online.’673 Curatorship today, then, stems from a particular kind 
of technological thinking; it is as much a manifestation of digital content curation as 
it is of curatorship in the visual arts context. The notion of consumption is being 
transformed as a result of the increased dependence on exchanges of information that 
replace the traditional, material products of labour.  
 The contemporary transition towards prosumerism is probably best 
illustrated here by means of comparing Warhol’s means of production and 
Goldsmith’s equivalent means of postproduction, where the transition is made from 
Warhol’s Factory, where the abundance of things is produced, objects of particular 
interest to hyper-consumer society, to a desktop networked computer generating a 
plethora of information. In the digital economy of user-generated content the blurring 
of boundaries between consumption and production transpires explicitly in attitudes 
towards creative acts such as Goldsmith’s. Today the binarity that relies on a 
distinction between consumer and producer breaks down. Von Hantelmann suggests 
that a selector should be considered a paradigmatic personality type in the 
contemporary consumer society. But the selection criteria that govern the choices of 
contemporary selector are no longer primarily purpose oriented, i.e. driven by 
necessity, but increasingly aesthetic and driven by subjective preferences.674 As such, 
van Hantelmann’s framework can be seen as an explanation of the contemporary rise 
in the proliferation of practices of iteration as a creative model and the related 
significance of the curatorial as a means of engaging with culture. Today, a curator 
assumes a role of ‘a virtuoso in choosing and making these choices meaningful – in 
an act that can nonetheless never be entirely rationalised, and in this sense has quasi-
artistic characteristics.’675 The process of choosing is considered not just ‘as receptive 
capacity, but as a productive and generative force.’676 In fact, a similar trajectory 
marks attitudes characterising the contemporary differentiation between author and 
reader, creator and the audience. When considered as a model for thinking about 
literary practices today, a prosumer is not just a reader who gives a text new 
interpretation, a new chain of signification, but rather a reader who, in the process of 
reading, also creates a completely new work, turning news into a poetry volume, for 
example. The post-structuralist engagement with text characterised by a 
preoccupation with the agency of the reader as a source of meaning seems 
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hyperbolised, or, perhaps, literalised, in the context. What Barthes posited as a post-
structuralist interpretative framework, in the postproduction model of creativity – in 
the prosumerist approach – turns into a model of literary production. The choice itself 
becomes recognised as a manifestation of aesthetic qualities. 
Understanding contemporary modes of consumption and production defined 
as such is evocative of Baurriaud’s postproduction philosophy and Goldsmith’s 
explanation of the logic of conceptual writing. And similar to the postproduction 
moment and related poetic and aesthetic attitudes, the activity of prosumersim tends 
to be associated with, and considered a result of, contemporary habits of managing 
information online; copying, pasting, curating a twitter feed, a blog, or a Pinterest 
page, all translating into attitudes towards reality off-line, as the Heideggerian 
essence of technology. Curating today turns into an act of responding to the 
technological possibilities that open up. And like the emergent notion of prosumer 
culture, curatorial practice in both art and writing seems to lack the vocabulary to 
successfully describe the shifting attitudes to authorship and originality that are 
currently formed. While inscribing Goldsmith’s approach to writing into the 
institutionalised, familiar context of creative writing and originality is an antagonism 
and can only lead to a misinterpretatation of the practice, thinking about authorship 
as an expression of the curatorial offers a possible alternative framework. Juxtaposed, 
conceptualism and the curatorial create a discursive network of creative attitudes 
today, as they emerge at the backdrop of prosumer-driven postproduction culture to 
propose a model of thinking about the changing nature of creativity at the Iterative 
turn. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
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INTRODUCTION: WRITING IN AN EXPANDED FIELD 
 
The 2012 MLA convention featured, as part of the programme, an exhibition 
of Electronic Literature, curated by Dene Grigar, Lori Emerson, and Kathi Inman 
Berens. ‘It may seem odd that one would curate literature,’ Grigar wrote in an 
accompanying statement, ‘for don’t we in literature call the practice of organizing 
works into a coherent focus for reading “anthologizing?”’677 This preoccupation with 
a problematic framework within which to place, disseminate, and discuss the 
emergent literary form brings my discussion of the curatorial as a model of authorship 
for conceptual writing into the digital domain. As Grigar notes, dealing with divergent 
forms of electronic literature requires a shift in textual categories. Drawing from 
notions found in the arts is, however, entirely compatible with thinking behind 
electronic literature since contemporary computational models of writing involve, as 
N. Katherine Hayles stresses, ‘sound, animation, motion, video, kinestetic 
involvement, and software functionality, among others.’678  This expanded field of 
writing leads, Barrett Watten argues, ‘to making of art in new genres, as a self-
reflexive writing practice that creates ground for new meaning.’ 679  Computer 
programming and artistic programming (a term frequently used to discuss practices 
of curating) converge in the context of such multimodal forms of writing to create a 
literary networked operation of sorts or, to borrow Jack Burnham’s term, a form of 
systems aesthetics.680  
Writing in 1968, Burnham described the state of his contemporary culture as 
a shift towards what he understood as a new aesthetic model.681 For Burnham, the 
                                                             
677 Dene Grigar, ‘Why Curating? A Curatorial Statement about Electronic Literature and 
Works on Desktop’, Rhizomes, 24 (2012), accessed 17th April 2014, 
http://www.rhizomes.net/issue24/tata.html, 4. 
678 N. Katherine Hayles, Writing Machines (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2002), 20.  
679 Watten’s notion of poetry in an expanded field builds on Rosalind Krauss’s ‘Sculpture in 
the Expanded Field’ (1979), theorising postmodern move away from fixity of genres. See: 
Barrett Watten, ‘Poetics in the Expanded Field: Textual, Visual, Digital…’, in New Media 
Poetics: Contexts, Technotexts, and Theories, ed. Adelaide Morris and Thomas Swiss 
(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2006), 336. 
680 Although typically referred to today as systems aesthetics, Burnham described his model 
as Systems Esthethics in his article published in Artforum in 1968. I will use the established, 
standardised spelling, rather than Burnham’s original [Jack Burnham, ‘Systems Esthetics’, 
Artforum, September 1968, accessed 12 September 2014, 
https://artforum.com/inprint/issue=196807&id=32466&pagenum=5].  
681 Interestingly, what Burnham proposed was a curatorial model of thinking about art. ‘The 
priorities of the present age,’ Burnham wrote,’ revolve around the problem of organisation’ 
[Burnham, ‘Systems’]. Burnham’s core conceptual assertions were based on his 
appropriation of cybernetic Systems Theory for art. At the core of Systems Theory is an 
interest in relationships between objects and not in the objects themselves, where the 
relations form the extent of any given system. For Burnham, a system is ‘“a complex of 
components in interaction,” comprised of material, energy, and information in various 
| 227 
 
 
late 1960s exemplified a transient cultural stage, defined by a move away from ‘an 
object-oriented to a system-oriented culture.’ 682  What characterises Burnham’s 
model and the aesthetic attitudes that it brought to the fore is an engagement in the 
way things are done and not with things alone. I am interested in Burnham’s thinking 
as a starting point for this chapter as it explicitly anticipates debates about aesthetics, 
as well as emerging critical discourses about creative paradigms, that dominate in the 
twenty-first century. Today, as Adelaide Morris stresses, ‘[w]hat we see and do is 
conditioned by a technoenvironment of digital computers, cell phones, PDAs, video 
games, email, networked chat rooms, networked archives, and ubiquitous online 
banking and commerce.’ What prevails, however, is a certain disjunction between 
practice and the means of conceptualising it; ‘what we think,’ Morris observes, ‘is 
conditioned by concepts developed, for the most part, in a world of print.’683 This is a 
trajectory that also manifests itself in literary studies and the arts more broadly. 
However, as Hayles argues, this inherent affinity of criticism with print culture has 
not previously been recognised and the issue is only surfacing as a result of the 
growing prominence of digital culture. For Hayles, the need ‘to develop vocabularies 
and concepts appropriate to coded media that recognize their specificity’ makes for 
an urgent project for the twenty-first century.684 I have already touched upon similar 
problems concerning the inadequacy of traditional categories of authorship, 
originality, and creativity to thinking through contemporary experimental poetics in 
the context of my reading of transcription as a poetic practice. Building on this 
discussion specifically in relation to the disjunction that Morris and Hayles both 
foreground, this chapter represents an attempt at developing a more relevant model 
of thinking about contemporary poetics as an iterative project by means of engaging 
with representative practices in computer generated poetry.  
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Poetics: Contexts, Technotexts, and Theories, eds. Adelaide Morris and Thomas Swiss 
(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2006), 2.  
684 N. Katherine Hayles, ‘The Transformation of Narrative and the Materiality of Hypertext’, 
Narrative, 9.1. (2001), 21.  
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4.1. WRITING AND TECHNOLOGY: ‘A NEXT STAGING’ 
 
As discussed earlier in this thesis, I see exercises in contemporary 
experimental print literature as indicative of an attitude towards texts as an essence 
of technology. In this chapter, however, I intend to focus on the direct interplay of text 
and technology and the resulting aesthetic practices and attitudes, here presented as 
another instance of iterative writing. Currently evolving, the field of computer-
generated literature struggles with an amalgamation of terms and concepts, often 
used interchangeably, while generic distinctions are not always explicit. Morris and 
Swiss, for example, discuss a range of contemporary electronic literature practices 
under the umbrella term of New Media Poetics. John Cayley describes writing 
emergent in the new media context as networked and programmable, the term 
‘electronic literature’ is propagated by Electronic Literature Organisation, while Loss 
Pequeño Glazier favours ‘e-poetries’ or digital poetics. While the field I focus on here 
is eclectic and generically diverse, the texts discussed have in common a characteristic 
commitment to systems and processes, an interest in how things are done rather than 
the things themselves. As Nick Montfort and Stephanie Strickland stress, ‘electronic 
literature and digital art need to be studied by operating them, examining not only 
their outputs but also their interfaces.’685 My focus on electronic writing resides in a 
similar understanding of its dynamics and a related interest in the possibilities of 
writing by iterative means that electronic environments create.  
Key to my argument is a recognition that although examples of computer 
generated poetics might seem like a simple remediation from a printed page to a 
computer screen, the texts are built on a much more complex model of creative 
production. As Glazier emphasises,  
it is important to note that that digital poetries are not merely print 
poetry repositioned in the new medium. Instead, e-poetries extend the 
investigation of innovative practice as it occurred in print media, 
making possible the continuation of lines of inquiry that could not be 
fulfilled in that medium.686  
 
Electronic literature offers, to quote Morris, ‘a new order of writing,’ 687  or, as 
Strickland describes it, a ‘next staging’ rather than a recapitulation, on-screen, of 
                                                             
685 Nick Montfort and Stephanie Strickland, ‘cut to fit the toolspun course: Discussing 
Creative Code in Comments’, Digital Humanities Quarterly, 7.1 (2013), accessed 12 May 
2014, 
http://www.digitalhumanities.org/dhq/vol/7/1/000149/resources/source/000149.html. 
Hereafter CTF. 
686 Los Pequeño Glazier, Digital Poetics: The Making of E-Poetries (Tuscaloosa: The 
University of Alabama Press, 2002), 26. 
687 Morris, ‘New Media’, 9.  
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earlier experimental poetry methods and techniques.688  The confluence of avant-
garde and new media thinking that transpires in both Glazier’s and Strickland’s 
statements is characteristic of current approaches towards computer-generated 
writing and, hence, of particular relevance to this thesis. Alan Golding, for example, 
points to the contemporary rise of ‘our first immaterial avant-garde.’ 689  Morris 
distinguishes between critical approaches to first and second generation electronic 
literature, to associate the latter (of particular relevance to my argument) with 
strategies of avant-garde poetics, 690  while for Steve Tomasula the tensions that 
                                                             
688 Stephanie Strickland, ‘Poetry and the Digital World’, in Hidden Agendas: Unreported 
Poetics, ed. Louis Armand (Praha: Literaria Pregensia Books, 2010), 224.  
689 Alan Golding, ‘Language Writing, Digital Poetics, and Transnational Materialities’, in 
New Media Poetics: Contexts, Technotexts, and Theories, eds. Adelaide Morris and Thomas 
Swiss (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2006), 250. Questions of materiality are at the 
centre of debates about digital texts and objects. And while the notion of the immateriality of 
the digital text is not discussed in this thesis, it is an important consideration that also 
contributes, I suggest, to an interest in thinking about text as process, event, and 
performance rather than as a self-contained object. The unique ontologies of data as text 
posit challenges to established notions of authenticity and originality, with a propensity to 
think of a digital text as immaterial. Alan Liu, for example, sees immateriality as a textual 
condition of post-industrial culture [Alan Liu, ‘Transcendental Data: Toward a Cultural 
History and Aesthetics of the New Encoded Discourse’, Critical Inquiry, 31 (2004), 49-84]. 
Marie-Laure Ryan talks about the digital medium as an arrangement of ‘largely immaterial 
semiotic objects’ [Marie-Laure Ryan, ‘Cyperspace, Cybertexts, Cybermaps’, Dichtung 
Digital: A Journal of Art and Culture in Digital Media, 2004, accessed 10 September 2014, 
http://www.dichtung-digital.org/2004/1/Ryan/index.htm]. More recent debates on 
materialities of the digital text problematise this thinking and point to a recognition that, as 
Matthew G. Kirschenbaum puts it, ‘nothing in this world is ever truly immaterial’ [Matthew 
G. Kirschenbaum, ‘The .textual Condition’, in Comparative Textual Media: Transforming 
the Humanities in the Postprint Era, eds. N. Katherine Hayles and Jessica Pressman 
(Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2014), 58]. This more ambiguous take on 
materialities of the digital sphere finds its manifestations in a number of recent creative 
projects. A propensity to rematerialise the immaterial digital textual object is an emerging 
interest among authors of the immaterial avant-garde. Examples of the attitude include: 
Kenneth Goldsmith’s Printing out the Internet project, a crowdsourced installation 
committed to printing all of the Internet; Nick Montfrot’s #! (2014), a volume of short poetic 
texts printed alongside code that generated them; Isac Bertran’s code {poems} (2012), a 
poetry volume collating a selection of poems by coders, where the printed texts are the 
executable code itself; or all works published by Traumawien, an independent Vienna-based 
publisher focusing on rematerialised digital texts transformed into print publications. This 
interest in materiality of the digital is also reflected in the rapid rise to prominence of media 
archaeology as an independent discipline. For studies in the field see for example: Jusi 
Parikka’s What is Media Archaeology (2012), the work of Lori Emerson at Media 
Archaeology Lab at the University of Colorado Boulder, or Nick Montfort’s The Trope Tank 
at the MIT.  
690 Morris’s taxonomy builds on Hayles’s, as developed in her Writing Machines (2002). The 
first generation electronic literature includes hypertext literature composed between 1985 
and 1995, i.e. Michael Joyce’s afternoon, a story (1987), Stuart Moultrop’s Victory Garden 
(1991), and Shelley Jackson’s Patchwork Girl (1995). As Morris explains, many of the first-
generation texts were composed in Eastgate Storyspace (a tool for hypertext writing), and 
published on disks marketed in book-like folders. Joyce’s, Maultrop’s, and Jackson’s texts 
were, typically, narrative, with an element of interactivity. They were, as Hayles suggests, 
‘more like books than they were like second-generation electronic literature […] they 
operated by replacing one screen of text with another, much as a book goes from one page to 
another […] first-generation works left mostly untouched the unconscious assumptions that 
readers of books had absorbed through centuries of print. They were a brave beginning, but 
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characterise electronic literature today point to inherent affinities between this new 
mode of writing and the historic avant-garde:  
electronic literature is always about the now. The opposition to its own 
technical obsolescence gives electronic literature natural affinity to the 
historic avant-garde with its marginalization by, and opposition to 
commercial culture; its inherent rejection of markets as the arbiter of 
artistic value; its efforts to stretch the bounds of form and though. Its 
embrace, in other words, of its cyborg nature.691 
 
Texts explored in this chapter most explicitly evoke earlier experiments in procedural 
writing, works of Fluxus or Ouilpo’s investigations into artificial restrictions of 
literature. Earlier experiments in such programmable, constraint and rule-based 
poetry seem to have anticipated the possibilities of contemporary technologies and 
can be seen as an earlier iteration of contemporary coding practices, as discussed later 
in this chapter.  
Seen as such, the genealogy of digital poetics can be traced to the twentieth 
century experimental poetic practice. But, to reiterate Strickland’s point, electronic 
literature should not simply be considered an avant-garde by other, technological 
means. It includes a wide range of methods and approaches, exemplifying an 
aesthetic attitude that is inherently its own and a manifestation of the particular 
cultural-technological moment.  It is a ‘new staging,’ in a new technē of poetry 
working, to paraphrase Peter Middleton, at the limits of the technologies of language, 
in a field of expanding technological possibilities.692 What distinguishes electronic 
                                                             
only a beginning’ [Hayles, Writing Machines, 37]. The shift towards the second generation 
electronic writing is a result of the growth of the Internet and of the development of 
increasingly sophisticated programming software that allowed a move beyond Storyspace. As 
Morris explains, the second generation electronic literature relies on HTML, Java, and Flash, 
among others, programmes that combine verbal elements with capacity for incorporating 
and manipulating graphics, animation, and sound. ‘Second generation electronic texts tend 
to be compressed, multi-layered, and time-driven,’ Morris points out, ‘closer to Mallarmé 
than Balzac, more like Dickinson than Frost, riders in a posse that includes such enduring 
outlaws as Stein’s Tender Buttons, Joyce’s Finnegans Wake, the concrete and visual poetry 
of Augusto and Haraldo de Campos, Bob Brown’s “Readies,” John Cage’s mesostics, and 
OULPO’s “potential literature”’ [Morris, ‘New Media’, 14]. 
691 Steve Tomasula, ‘Code Poetry and New-Media Literature’, in The Routledge Companion 
to Experimental Literature, eds. Joe Bray, Alison Gibbons, and Brian McHale (London and 
New York: Routledge, 2012), 484.  
692 Peter Middleton, Distant Reading: Performance, Readership, and Consumption in 
Contemporary Poetry (Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 2005), 145. 
Strickland’s understanding of electronic literature as the ‘next staging’ builds on Peter 
Middleton’s argument in Distant Reading (2005). For Middleton, there is a clear affinity 
between poetry and technology; ‘poems work at the limits of technologies of language.’ The 
role of code in electronic literature could be read as an example of poetic technē, alongside 
prosody, the use of print layout, the use of fonts, paper, or recordings. Middleton’s ‘distant 
reading’ should not be confused with the notion of distant reading as used in digital 
humanities with references to big data approaches to machine reading (in contrast to human 
activity of close reading). While Middleton is interested in affinities of poetry and 
technology, and changing practices of reading in a very broad sense, digital humanities 
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literature today from earlier forms of experimental poetics is, according to Strickland, 
a certain sense of textual agency that derives from the technologies it relies on:  
digital poetry does things rather than says things […] it often requires 
that one operate it like an appliance or play it as one would an 
instrument or a game. Sometimes, what it generates or displays is 
unpredictable and irreproducible – […] it reflects, and reflects upon, 
worlds not by describing them, but by building them.693  
 
This is an attitude grounded in an algorithmic logic and evocative of Burnham’s 
systems aesthetics. As Andrew Goffey explains, there is a link between algorithm and 
action. A construction of any algorithm is a result of an implementation of a controlled 
series of steps to accomplish a task. As Goffey puts it, ‘[a]lgorithms do things, and 
their syntax embodies a command structure to enable this to happen.’694 Constructed 
of algorithms, digital poetry relies on an execution of such processes.  The 
commitment to doing things with words that characterises the digital environment 
presupposes a space particularly adequate to poetic exploration, a space of a turn. 
Poetry, or poiēsis, from the Greek term ποιέω, ‘to make,’ is inherently process driven 
– poiēsis is making, and, as Glazier observes, electronic space is a space of poiēsis – a 
space of making.695 To address the models of writing and authoring texts that such 
context encourages, I focus here on acts of making, the process, rather that the thing 
made, or the text generated, to discuss the possibility of defining authorship in the 
context. Following Glazier, what is investigated here is not simply an idea of a digital 
work as an extension of a printed poem, but rather ‘the idea of the digital poem as the 
process of thinking through this new medium, thinking through making.’696  
This chapter, although dealing with digital poetics, does not propose a digital 
humanities project. Instead, it engages in aesthetics of speculative computing, as 
conceptualised by Johanna Drucker. Drucker differentiates between the field of 
digital humanities and what she describes as speculative computing. Digital 
humanities relies on the use of computational methods to engage with the materials 
of humanities. In a digital humanities project, data mining can be applied, for 
example, to attribute authorship, assess a characteristic semantic feature of historical 
language use, or even – to pick one titillating example – to rank letters between Emily 
Dickinson and Susan Huntington in terms of erotic language. 697  The analytic 
                                                             
understanding of distant reading is limited to big data analysis. For an analysis of the latter, 
see Franco Moretti, Distant Reading (London: Verso, 2013). 
693 Strickland, ‘Poetry,’ 224-225.  
694 Andrew Goffey, ‘Algorithm’, in Software Studies, ed. Matthew Fuller (Cambridge, MA: 
The MIT Press, 2008), 17.  
695 Glazier, 5.  
696 Ibid, 6.  
697 See Matthew Kirchenbaum’s applications of NORA project: Matthew Kirschenbaum, C. 
Plaisant, M. N. Smith, L. Auvil, J. Rose, B. Yu, and T. Clement, ‘Undiscovered Public 
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capabilities of new technologies provide new means of sourcing content and a model 
for ways of authoring and organising texts in novel ways.  It is an attempt at expanding 
the field of reading practices as well as the possibilities of iterative writing to juxtapose 
quantitative information and hermeneutic approaches to text. While new possibilities 
are created with the introduction of big data into humanities projects, there is a sense 
of reductionism in the thinking that dominates digital humanities as a discipline. As 
Drucker puts it,  
if digital humanities activity were reduced to a single precept, it would 
be the requirement to disambiguate knowledge representation so that 
it operates within the codes of computational processing.698  
 
The practices of digital humanities ‘tend to lock users into procedural strictures. Once 
determined, a data structure or content model becomes a template restricting 
interpretation.’699 Current methods dominant in the field are inflexible, deterministic, 
and driven by the pressures of technological exigencies. Speculative computing is 
formulated as a response to the state of digital humanities and an attempt at exploring 
the possibilities of finding space for humanities thinking in the field of computing. 
The speculative project is premised on the conviction that, to quote Drucker, ‘logical, 
systematic knowledge representation […] is not sufficient for the interpretation of 
imaginative artefacts.’ 700  Recognising the divergence in the ‘digital’ and the 
‘humanities’ thinking, the goal of speculative computing is to ‘challenge the 
conceptual foundations of digital humanities through aesthetic provocation.’701 What 
Drucker is particularly interested in is ‘the event of interpretation in a digital 
environment’702 where interpretation is always seen as a ‘differential play.’703 Such an 
approach resides in what Drucker describes as ‘interpretation as deformance,’ a 
model that ‘torques the logical assumptions governing digital technology,’704  and 
hence emerges as a manifestation of the sort of thinking that triggers an aesthetic 
turn.  
                                                             
Knowledge: Mining for Patterns of Erotic Language in Emily Dickinson's Correspondence 
with Susan Huntington (Gilbert) Dickinson’, Digital Humanities conference, 2006, Paris. 
Sorbonne, 5th September 2006, 252-255.  
698 Johanna Drucker, SpecLab: Digital Aesthetics and Projects in Speculative Computing 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2009), 5. Hereafter SL.  
699 Johanna Drucker and Bethany Nowviskie, ‘Speculative Computing: Aesthetic 
Provocations in Humanities Computing’, in A Companion to Digital Humanities, eds. Susan 
Schreibman, Ray Siemens, and John Unsworth (Blackwell Reference Online, 2004), 
accessed 17 July 2014, 
http://www.blackwellreference.com.ezphost.dur.ac.uk/subscriber/uid=42/tocnode?id=g97
81405103213_chunk_g978140510321332.  Hereafter SC.  
700 SC. 
701 SL, xi.  
702 Ibid, xiv.  
703 Ibid, 8.  
704 Ibid, 25.  
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As a field of inquiry preoccupied with epistemology and interpretation, 
speculative computing, similarly to digital humanities, inevitably evokes the 
theoretical questions of deconstruction, postmodernism, or critical cultural studies. 
Parallels are frequently drawn between, for example, hypertext and Deleuze’s 
rhizomes, with digital text emerging as a new space of deconstructive thinking. 
Similar sensibilities are echoed in computer software and deconstructive writing, 
both characterised by the propensity for text defined by a condition of its mutability. 
For Landow, for example, new media today offer means of testing deconstructive 
theory. 705  ‘When designers of computer software examine pages of Glas or Of 
Grammatology,’ Landow writes, ‘they encounter a digitalized, hypertextual Derrida: 
and when literary theorist examine Literary Machines, 706  they encounter a 
deconstructionist or poststructuralist Nelson.’ For Landow, the similarities and 
recognitions emerge ‘because over the past several decades literary theory and 
computer hypertext, apparently unconnected areas of inquiry, have increasingly 
converged.’707 But, while a convergence of theory and computing is apparent, Jay 
David Bolter suggests, deconstruction only articulates what electronic writing is not; 
‘we still need a new literary theory to achieve a positive understanding of electronic 
writing.’708 Speculative computing can be seen as an attempt at addressing the gap. 
However, as Drucker stresses,  
speculative computing is neither a rehash of poststructuralist theory 
nor an advanced version of either dialogic or dialectical approaches. 
Speculative computing is grounded in a serious critique of 
mechanistic, entity-driven approach to knowledge that is based on a 
distinction between subject and object […] Speculative computing 
proposes a generative, not merely a critical attitude.709 
 
Following Drucker, I am interested here not so much in the emergence of new 
electronic environments but in ways of ‘thinking differently about how we know what 
we know’710 that such technological change encourages: thinking differently at the 
Iterative turn, about technology as essence, about technology as a means of changing 
                                                             
705 Paul Delany and George P. Landow (eds.), Hypermedia and Literary Studies 
(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1991), 6.  
706 Landow refers here to Ted Nelson’s Literary Machines (1980), now a formative text in 
software studies and hypertext scholarship. In Literary Machines Nelson offers an extensive 
theory of ‘hypertext’ and discusses his Project Xandau (first hypertext, funded by Nelson in 
1960). Characteristically, Literary Machines is an attempt at transforming a traditional book 
into a hypertext itself. The text is non-linear and chapters can be read in any order [George 
P. Landow, Hypertext 3.0: Critical Theory and New Media in an Era of Globalisation 
(Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2006), 1]. 
707 Ibid, 1.  
708 Jay David Bolter, Writing Space: The Computer, Hypertext, and the History of Writing 
(Hilldale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1991), 166.  
709 SL, 21.  
710 Ibid, xii. 
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ontologies of creativity, and not technology as a data processing machine. I consider 
this chapter to be an exploration in alternative creative and critical avenues produced 
in a transitional technological moment. This chapter attempts to bring together 
concerns raised in Chapters 1, 2, and 3 in order to consider the preoccupations with 
iteration at the postproduction moment through a discussion of the technologies that 
incite the contemporary turn in aesthetics. The technological thinking foregrounded 
here offers a means of exploring opportunities to develop alternative ways of 
addressing familiar models of creative writing.  As such, what I propose is an aesthesis 
of the Iterative turn, a means of engaging ‘basic questions about knowledge and its 
representation, and interpretative acts and the values assigned to them within a 
cultural frame.’711 While there is an inherent sense of cultural authority ascribed to 
computational media that stems from claims to objectivity and the formal logic in 
computational operations – in mathesis – this chapter focuses on the ways in which 
such objective forms of information and knowledge production provoke subjective 
interpretation and encourage experimentation with familiar models of creativity and 
authorship.  
 
4.2. NICK MONTFORT AND STEPHANIE STRICKLAND, SEA AND SPAR BETWEEN 
 
One text that lends itself particularly well to speculative thinking is Nick 
Montfort’s and Stephanie Strickland’s Sea and Spar Between (2010). As Montfort 
and Strickland describe it, Sea and Spar is a poetry generator, an example of code 
poetry, or computation poetics, to use the authors’ term, but one that Montfort and 
Strickland consider ‘as something that is related to, but distinct from, a typical digital 
humanities project.’712 My interest in Sea and Spar resides in its speculative nature 
that is evoked in Montfort and Strickland’s statement. Similar poetry generators rely 
on a set corpus and a programme that organises the textual data to generate poetry 
when run in a browser. Although code poetry and poetry generators are proliferating 
today, with work by J.R. Carpenter, Nathan Walker, Judd Morrissey, or María 
Mencía, to name just a few, I consider Sea and Spar particularly interesting and 
important because of the authors’ dedication to forging a new model of creative 
practice and critical writing that can be associated with computing by speculative 
means. As such, Sea and Spar emerges as a critical and creative project that the same 
time that reverberates most explicitly with the overarching concerns of this thesis. 
                                                             
711 Ibid, xiii.  
712 CTF. 
| 235 
 
 
Sea and Spar is iterative, both because of the computational logic behind it 
and the nature of its poetics. As Drucker explains, ‘the very foundations of digital 
media […] are procedural, generative, and iterative.’713 As discussed in Chapter 1, 
Poster also points to the propensity for iteration implied in a digital text, always 
inherently dependent on its repetition. Hence, the digital environment offers a 
creative framework that encourages creativity by iterative means. Sea and Spar, and 
code generated poetry more broadly, can, in fact, be seen as a literal manifestation of 
Derrida’s notion of writing, always inherently repeatable: ‘the possibility of repeating 
and thus of identifying the marks is implicit in every code, making it into a network 
[…] that is communicable, transmittable, decipherable, iterable for a third, and hence 
every possible user in general.’ For Derrida, ‘to write is to produce a mark that will 
constitute a sort of machine which is productive in turn, […] offering things and itself 
to be read and to be rewritten.’714 The machine of Sea and Spar is the code. And code, 
as Alan Sondheim suggests, ‘tends to repeat.’715  
On the level of code, the text of Sea and Spar relies on processing of a data set, 
on creation of syntactical structures, and a relevant interface. As Montfort explained, 
it was originally written in Python but implemented in JavaScript and HTML with 
canvas, a format more easily engaged with online, hence more readily rewritten and 
repeated.716 The code comprises a set of algorithms and commands; instructions that 
dictate the process of organising data to generate poetry. The data set here is formed 
from syllables, words, and short phrases. What makes the use of data of particular 
interest to my argument is the fact that the database of Sea and Spar is composed by 
iterative means, using language from Emily Dickinson’s poems and Herman 
Melville’s Moby Dick. Unlike data mining projects, such as Flarf and Twistori, 
mentioned in Chapters 1 and 3 respectively, reliant on trawling the Internet for 
language, Sea and Spar Between engages with a finite dataset of Dickinson’s and 
Melville’s corpus, to create new poetry. ‘This generator,’ as Montfort explains, ‘is 
deterministic […] Instead of randomly drawing a poem from a distribution, Sea and 
Spar Between defines a very large fixed, two-dimensional space of stanzas.’717 The 
literary data incorporated here does not comprise all of Dickinson’s work and the 
entirety of Melville’s novel. Only a selection of words and short phrases is 
                                                             
713 SC.  
714 SEC, 8.  
715 Alan Sondheim, ‘Codeworld’, in Contemporary Poetics, ed. Louis Armand (Evanson, Ill: 
Northwestern University Press, 2007), 289. 
716 Nick Montfort, ‘XS, S, M, L: Creative Text Generators of Different Scales’, A Technical 
Report from The Thorpe Tank, THORPE-12-02, January 2012, accessed, 25 April 2014, 
http://thorpe-tank.mit.edu.  
717 Montfort, ‘XS,’ 10.  
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incorporated into the code for the programme to combine into stanzas. The range of 
textual data was pre-selected by means of quantitative analysis of the source material 
to isolate an array of short phrases, primarily Melville’s, common nouns from 
Dickinson’s poems, and a selection of syllables that are used by either. As Strickland 
and Montfort explain, the words, phrases, or syllables were deemed typically 
Dickinson’s or typically Melville’s on the basis of tracking usage counts with frequency 
analysis tools. The stanzas derived from this dataset rely on clearly defined patterns 
set, as the authors explain, ‘in order to recall or exaggerate stylistic elements of the 
source texts.’718 Sample stanzas read:  
how to withstand the huskpot course 
 nailed to the spar 
loop on 
 artless rise and walk719 
 
 
turn on 
 for noteless is the sun 
One rose one ear one mind one year 
 pierless rise and sing – 720 
 
Montfort and Strickland describe the work as a means of defining ‘a space of 
language populated by a number of stanzas comparable to the number of fish in the 
sea, around 225 trillion […] [It] defines an immense lattice of stanzas.’721 Each stanza 
can be identified and located by two coordinates, equivalents of latitude and 
longitude, ranging from 0:0 to 14992383:14992382.722 ‘Each time the program is 
run,’ Montfort and Strickland explain, ‘the reader is deposited at a random location 
                                                             
718 CTF. This experience of randomness of the sea of stanzas and the related impossibility of 
a repetition implicit in the reading experience seem to mirror Melville’s narrative. Like 
Melville’s Captain Ahab, on his endless quest defined by an impossibility of a repeat 
encounter with the whale, Montfort and Strickland’s reader struggles with the uncontrollable 
excess of text. Here an iteration of a source creates a text that defies straightforward 
iterations. It points to the characteristic structure of iteration, where any possibility of 
repetition is contingent on the impossibility of repetition of the same.   
719 Nick Montfort and Stephanie Strickland, Sea and Spar Between, accessed 12 August 
2014, http://nickm.com/montfort_strickland/sea_and_spar_between/, 1898276:5422519.  
720 Montfort and Strickland, Sea and Spar, 10110332:7918144.  
721 CTF. 
722 As such, the text of Sea and Spar is always contained in a single plateau and hence can be 
described as Deleuze and Guattari’s ideal book: ‘the ideal for the book would be to lay 
everything out on a plane of exteriority […] on a single page, the same sheet’ [Gilles Deleuze 
and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Brian 
Massumi (London: Continuum, 2010), 10. Hereafter ATP]. 
| 237 
 
 
[…] the reader is thus deposited “at sea,” located in a poem.’723 Here, the reading 
experience seems evocative of the Heideggerian ‘throwness’ (Verfallen), where every 
attempt at engaging with the text is an enactment of what Derrida (reading 
Heidegger) describes as ‘the endless plunge,’ one that ‘throws you back onto the river-
bank, on the brink of another possible immersion, ad infinitum.’724 Programming Sea 
and Spar can be seen as an attempt at programming such an endless plunge, where 
the act of depositing the reader in the sea of text is defined by its correspondence to 
the technē of repetition, here defined as a calling-over to the other place. The logic of 
repetition in Sea and Spar always evokes other, iterated texts, and other places within 
the sea of stanzas, created by means of iteration. Here, the act of iteration is 
manifested as a reembodiment in a new space, and a new text, as a repetition of a 
repetition, and hence as a manifestation of the logic of the contemporary Iterative 
turn.  
This model of repetition as throwness points to a sense of an impossibility of 
repetition in chance operations. Although the number of stanzas created by the 
generator is finite, and they are not, as Montfort stresses, arranged randomly, the 
sheer volume of text provided, and the speed at which stanzas succeed each other 
every time the mouse is moved, turns each experience of engaging with the text into 
a singular reading act. It is possible to arrive at a fixed location and identify a specific 
stanza by entering coordinates in the navigation box at the bottom of the browser 
window [       Figure 46]. But to access the navigation box and control the text it is 
necessary to run the code first, it is necessary to allow for the initial, singular, random 
encounter with the text. Hence, the only possibility of repetition is, here, mechanical. 
As Derrida suggests, the recurrence of the chance event is characterised by an 
inherently mechanical repetition and ‘marks the necessity of a contamination of any 
essence [of technology] by a generalized ‘technology.’’725 Here, to repeat is to engage 
with the technics of code, with the machine that enables an act of repetition.  
As such, Sea and Spar Between is a commentary on the text and technologies 
of its production, it is a poetry machine rather than a poetry volume. To read the text 
is to operate the machine. It involves reading in an expanded field, often 
uncomfortable, overwhelming, and hard to follow, always defined by its textual 
excess. In Sea and Spar there is always more text to read, each stanza is always 
                                                             
723 CTF. 
724 Jacques Derrida, ‘Two words for Joyce’, in Post-Structuralist Joyce: Essays from the 
French, eds. Derrek Attridge and Daniel Ferrer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1984), 148.  
725 Geoffrey Bennington, ‘Derridabase’, in Jacques Derrida, Geoffrey Bennington and 
Jacques Derrida, trans. Geoffrey Bennington (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 
312-13. 
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surround by a number of other stanza. Even identifying a specific fragment returns a 
plethora of text, the pre-selected stanza is always only experienced in a sea of text with 
no clear end or beginning. Every move of a mouse sets the text in motion, there is no 
way of attempting and purposely navigating the text without triggering what Montfort 
describes as ‘a trembling, rapidly updating image.’ 726  It creates an illusion of 
randomness that is, in fact, entirely determined by the machine. Echoes of Deleuze’s 
view of text as ‘language [that] trembles from head to toe’727 are evoked here. For 
Deleuze, stuttering – a manifestation of language that trembles – is a means of ‘poetic 
comprehension of language,’ 728   a manifestation of style, where stuttering is not 
associated with one’s speech but rather with making the language stutter. Deleuze’s 
writer – and similarly Montfort and Strickland – is a stutterer in language for whom 
‘words no longer exist independently of the stutter which selects and links them 
together through itself.’729 In Sea and Spar, the act of authorship involves curatorial 
decisions that trigger stutter, setting the syntax of code in the process of becoming a 
stuttering, trembling text. And, according to Deleuze, it is in the stutters that 
innovation and change take place; ‘creative stuttering is what makes language 
grow.’730 It is the stutter that opens space for alternative means of conceptualising 
authorship for code generated poetics. Driven by the logic of Deleuzian stutter as a 
space of creative exploration, the engagement with quantitative analysis emerges here 
as a tool of new poetic possibilities, raising novel literary questions rather than a 
complete project in its own right. Here, data analysis is transformed into a method of 
speculative computing rather than an extension of the digital humanities. In 
Sondheim’s words, it ‘extends language into new unchartered territories.’ 731  A 
characteristic conflation of computation and poetics emerges, pointing to a clear 
correlation between code, its iterative nature, and the approach to creative writing 
that interests Strickland and Montfort, with the dynamics of iterative technology 
echoed in the poetry it generates.  
                                                             
726 CTF. 
727 Gilles Deleuze, ‘He stuttered’, in Essays, Critical and Clinical, trans. Daniel W. Smith and 
Michael A. Greco (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 109.  
728 Ibid, 109.  
729 Ibid, 107.  
730 Ibid, 111.  
731 Sondheim, ‘Codeworld’, 289.   
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       FIGURE 46: NICK MONTFORT AND STEPHANIE STRICKLAND, SEA AND SPAR BETWEEN 
 
The fact that the text is executed in Java is not insignificant here. In 
explanatory notes to the code (a text in itself important, as discussed later in this 
chapter), Strickland and Montfort list all files that comprise the sea_spar.js, the 
JavaScript that runs Sea and Spar. Alongside index.html, reading.html, and style.css, 
the authors include canvastext.js – a file containing the font. The canvas is not created 
by Montfort and Strickland but instead appropriated, with minor alterations, from a 
script available in the public domain. 732  Such borrowing, altering, and reusing 
existing code, to create new content is a standard code writing practice. Code is 
written to be used, made accessible to encourage its appropriations.  Unused, it 
becomes obsolete and fails to serve its purpose. Code, then, should be seen as an 
inherently networked text, one that, to borrow from Bruno Latour, ‘elicits networks 
of actors,’ 733  always contingent on the possibility of its iteration in a networked 
                                                             
732 CTF.  
733 Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 129. Thinking about texts as networks defined as 
such is a foundational notion behind Latour’s Actor-Network-Theory (ANT). ANT is 
concerned with simultaneously mapping relations that are material, i.e. between things, and 
semiotic, i.e. between concepts. This theory is an attempt at defining how such complex 
material-semiotic systems operate as a whole, an approach also evoked in Montfort and 
Strickland’s project. While in Latour’s approach equal agency is assigned to human and non-
human actors, thinking about writing code in Sea and Spar is primarily focused on human 
activity, distributed, networked, open access, but never purely mechanistic. However, the 
conflation of natural and computer languages so prominent in Montfort and Strickland’s 
approach can be seen as an extension of the ANT logic. What is of particular relevance in the 
context of my discussion is the possibility inscribed in Latour’s network of the constant 
production of meaning that comes from the inside rather than from the outside of a text that, 
just like Sea and Spar is a dynamic entity, a performance perhaps (as discussed later in this 
chapter) and a source of its own critique. As Latour puts it: ‘each of points in the text may 
become a bifurcation, an event, or the origin of a new translation […] It qualifies its 
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environment. jQuery is as a particularly telling example, illustrative of thinking 
behind modes of authorship propagated by the code writing community. jQuery is a 
free, open source library of JavaScript that provides fragments of pre-written code 
samples. As Nathan Walker explains, while some developers write in Java, most 
engage in what Walker describes as ‘patch writing,’ using and reusing code already 
available in databases such as jQuery. ‘It is rare,’ Walker stresses, ‘that you would 
write from scratch.’734 What emerges is an alternative model of ownership for open 
source culture, not bound to individualism but perceived in a pluralistic manner. 
Here, the conditions of creative production are established in a collaborative process, 
regardless of the familiar property models. Creative practice in the open source 
environment does not rely on categories of originality in copyright sense, i.e. on the 
author as the origin of a work, but on an open, networked, participatory process of 
production. Here, the work does not necessarily have a single source but is always a 
result of the coming together of a complex actor-network of interlinked agencies.  
Characteristically, the Sea and Spar code is licenced as copyrighted but free 
software. It is set up as such, Montfort and Strickland explain, so that ‘authors and 
programmers can take from it anything they find useful’ in the same manner that the 
two authors appropriated and remixed Moby Dick and Dickinson’s poetry.735 The free 
software is offered, to cite Montfort, ‘with the hope that poets and programmers will 
use some or all of it.’736 There is not only a permissiveness but an expectation of reuse, 
reappropriation, and recyclying that is inherent in the models of authorship assumed 
in the code writing community. This iterative, open source thinking also translates, I 
suggest, into a characteristic approach towards authorship and creativity with respect 
to code generated poetics. The same attitude towards writing by means of rewriting 
is taken on the level of technical and creative outputs, with laws of code transforming 
into laws of creativity broadly conceived. Creative writing by means of coding, in 
turning into a form of open source poetics that not only allows for but is contingent 
on exchange and remix of material, foregrounds contemporary exigencies of arriving 
at alternative thinking about models of creative production and originality. Here the 
figure of the author is reconceptualised as Latour’s actor-mediator of iterated content. 
In this context, iteration both on the level of code itself as well as with respect to 
incorporated data sets, becomes a standard practice of computer generated writing 
                                                             
objectivity, that is, the ability of each actor to make other actors do unexpected things […] A 
network is not what is represented in the text, but what readies the text to take relay of actors 
as mediators’ [Latour, 128-30].  
734 Nathan Walker, ‘Transitional Materialities and the Performance of JavaScript’, 
Performance Research, 18.5 (2014), 64.  
735 CTF. 
736 Montfort, ‘XS’, 11.  
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rather than a transgressive experiment in appropriation. 737   This is writing in a 
Derridean sense, where 
every sign, linguistic or nonlinguistic, spoken or written […] can be 
cited, put between quotation marks: in so doing it can break with every 
given context, engendering an infinity of new contexts in a manner 
which is absolutely illimitable.738 
 
For Derrida, ‘the possibility of repeating […] is implicit in every code, making it into 
a network […] that is communicable, transmittable, decipherable, iterable […] for 
every possible user.’739 This possibility of further iterations is inscribed into the code 
of Sea and Spar Between. As Montfort and Strickland stress:  
if someone was to replace our words and phrases with new text, a 
generator with a similar appearance and similar functioning, but with 
a new vocabulary, would be defined. That is, it is practically possible 
to create a new generator a remix or appropriation of this one, by 
replacing only the data in this section. If this is done, and the code is 
not otherwise modified, the system will assemble language in the same 
way, but it will work on different language.740  
 
The iterability of texts in a digital environment differs, however, from the iterative 
nature of an analogue text in that the digital source is never fixed and stable but 
always changing, always fluid. Writing in the digital domain always produces a text 
that is unfinished. The model of writing that Montfort and Strickland put forward 
                                                             
737 Unsurprisingly, iteration and remixing are particularly prominent among the code poetics 
community. Going beyond an interest in reusing open source code or literary texts as data, 
remixes of poetry generators themselves are currently proliferating. Nick Montfort’s Taroko 
Gorge (2009) is a good example. Like Sea and Spar Between, Taroko Gorge is a poetry 
generator created as a result of Montfort’s visit to Taroko Gorge National Park in Taiwan. 
Since its publication, the Taroko Gorge generator has generated a number of new poetry 
generators created by appropriating and altering Montfort’s code, e.g. Scott Rottenberg’s 
Tokyo Garage (2009), a poetry generator about Tokyo; J.R. Carpenter’s Gorge (2010), a 
piece of gastronomic excess, ‘on food, consumption, decadence, and desire’ [J.R. Carpenter, 
‘Gorge’, Luclysoap.com, 26 May 2010, accessed 02 July 2014, 
http://luckysoap.com/lapsuslinguae/2010/05/gorge/]; ‘Along the Briny Beach’ and 
‘Whisper Wire’, both also by Carpenter; and works by Maria Engberg, Mark Sample, Eric 
Snodgrass, and Talan Memmott, among others. Carpenter’s appropriations are particularly 
interesting here as they form an ongoing creative exchange between Montfort and Carpenter. 
In 2008, Montfort created three short Python programmes, ‘The Two’. The first one was 
modified by Carpenter into ‘Excerpts from the Chronicles of Pookie & JR’ (2009) and 
subsequently used to generate texts for her book, Generation[s] (2010) (the epigraph to 
Generation[s] reads: ‘Only one rule: no new text’ [J.R. Carpernter, Generation[s], (Vienna: 
Traumawien, 2010]. The third was a cooperative project, engaging Montfort and Carpenter 
and building on the first. Self-conscious about the models of authorship that define the field 
of code poetics, Andrew Plotkin’s ‘Argot Ogre, OK!’, anther appropriation of Taroko,  poses a 
meta-textual commentary on the proliferating remixes of Montfort’s generator in a form of a 
meta-remix. Potkin’s generator automatically remixes all of its appropriations. The source 
code, with Plotkin’s explanatory notes, is developed in a format evocative of Montfort and 
Strickland’s CTF [Andrew Plotkin, source of http://eblong.com/zarf/argot-ogre-ok.html, 27 
September 2011, accessed, 27 September 2014, http://eblong.com/zarf/argot-ogre-ok.html]. 
738 SEC, 12.   
739 Ibid, 8.  
740 CTF. 
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evokes the iterability of the machine as ‘a sort of machine […] offering things and itself 
to be read and to be rewritten.’741 This juxtaposition of the inherent alterity of text in 
the digital environment and the process of authoring a new text assembled by the 
system that Montfort and Strickland point to, should be seen, I suggest, as a 
foundation of thinking about the dynamic of iterative authorship of code poetics.    
 
4.3. WRITING: AN ASSEMBLAGE 
 
The reference to writing by means of ‘assembling language’ is significant and 
evocative of what I see as a broader tendency in digital poetics, where writing takes 
the form of a Deleuzian assemblage. An assemblage is an arrangement, or a process 
of arranging and fitting together, from French agencement, Deleuze and Guattari’s 
original term as used in A Thousand Plateaus. In line with Deleuze and Guattari’s 
argument, an assemblage should be understood as ‘every constellation of singularities 
[…] selected, organised, stratified – in such a way as to converge.’742  As Graham 
Livesey explains, assemblages, as conceived of by Deleuze and Guattari, are complex 
constellations of objects, bodies, expressions, qualities and territories that come 
together for varying periods of time to ideally create new way of functioning.743 An 
assemblage is contingent. It undergoes constant alterations. An assemblage – and, 
similarly, a code generated poem – emerges from an arrangement of elements that 
form an entity that can be diagrammed. Here, the diagram can be likened to the code 
itself. It is an explanation that charts the arrangement of the assemblage, a map of the 
function of the assemblage. A characteristic relationship between the code and the 
text it generates emerges from this conceptual framework, where code can be thought 
of as a map and the generated text as a related plateau.  
The map, as defined by Deleuze and Guattari, is a means of fostering 
connections:  
the map is open and connectable in all of its dimensions, it is 
detachable, reversible, susceptible to constant modification. It can be 
torn, reversed, adapted to any kind of mounting, reworked by an 
individual, group, or social formation.744 
 
The code, then, is the map, one that in its fluid, open source, iterative multiplicity 
gives directions to and generates a plateau or the interface. A map, Delezue and 
Guattari explain, is that which has to be constructed and produced and, similarly to a 
                                                             
741 SEC, 8.  
742 ATP, 448.  
743 Graham Livesey, ‘Assemblage’, in The Deleuze Dictionary, ed. Adrian Parr (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2010), 18.  
744 ATP, 13.  
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Java file, it is always reversible and modifiable. A map, and like a map, code, is always 
in a process of becoming – becoming the map, and becoming the plateau that it 
generates ad infinitum. As Delezue and Guattari describe the concept, a plateau is a 
multiplicity connected to other multiplicities, or, perhaps, a space of the immense 
lattice of stanzas that Montfort and Strickland’s generator returns. Each plateau, and 
similarly, the stanzas of Sea and Spar, ‘can be read starting anywhere and can be 
related to any other plateau,’ 745  as a plateau typically has no culmination or 
termination points.  The ‘trembling, rapidly updating image’ 746  of Sea and Spar 
embodies a plateau understood as ‘a continuous, self-vibrating region of 
intensities.’747 What Montfort and Strickland’s plateau forms, then, is an assemblage 
of fragmented stanzas governed by a logic of code, or a map, an arrangement that 
forms a rhizomatic and fragmentary whole.  
But for Deleuze and Guattari an assemblage should not be seen as a fixed 
arrangement of elements that constitute it. Rather, similarly to an open source code 
and related poetic forms, ‘assemblages are in a constant state of variation, are 
themselves constantly subject to transformation.’748 Their mutability contributes to 
an open system, as Massumi describes it, constantly metamorphosed, constantly 
becoming. Literature seen as an assemblage (and Deleuze and Guattari do recognise 
it as such) is a space of emergence and experimentation, a space of a turn (‘the map 
[…] is entirely oriented towards experimentation’).749 This is writing that is ‘always a 
measure of something else. Writing [that] has nothing to do with signifying, it has to 
do with surveying, mapping, even realms that are yet to come.’750 As Manuel DeLanda 
puts it, an assemblage is a ‘space of possibility,’ it contains potential for novel 
transformations.751 As such, there are inherent affinities between a formulation of an 
assemblage and a possibility of literary innovation. An assemblage typically brings 
about new means of expression, new realisations, and organisations, it is, as Deleuze 
and Guattari put it, ‘a veritable invention.’752 For Simon O’Sullivan, it brings about 
the possibility of something new. 753  ‘The assemblage,’ according to Livesey, ‘is 
                                                             
745 Ibid, 24.  
746 CTF. 
747 ATP, 24.  
748 Ibid, 90.  
749 Ibid, 13.  
750 Ibid, 5.  
751 Manuel DeLanda, A New Philosophy of Society: Assemblage Theory and Social 
Complexity (London: Continuum, 2006), 14.  
752 ATP, 447.  
753 Thinking of code understood as such firmly positions Montfort and Strickland’s project in 
the Deleuzian framework. Like Deleuze and Guattari, Montfort and Strickland posit an 
attempt at reconfiguring perceptions of reality in a creative manner, offering tools and 
strategies to help construct creativity differently (for a discussion of Deleuze and Guattari’s 
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destined to produce a new reality, by making numerous, often unexpected 
connections.’754 This commitment to innovative thinking foregrounded in a system of 
creating by means of assembling is of particular significance here. It is echoed in 
Montfort and Strickland’s approach towards their system of writing in Sea and Spar 
as a speculative exploration in possibilities of arriving at a new discourse for a new 
creative environment. It becomes a paradigm of writing for the Iterative turn.755  
The Java file operates as a form of an assemblage: it assembles the data, i.e. 
Dickinson’s and Melville’s text, the code, both Montfort’s and the appropriated 
fragments, to create one, coherent script. But the Java file that generates Sea and 
Spar is also an attempt at forming an assemblage of discourses, combining the 
language of code, with a reflective critical commentary to arrive at a hybrid model of 
writing that conflates the attributes of the technological and artistic investigation. 
Characteristically, the java script of Sea and Spar was originally published with brief 
technical comments, to offer instructions and assistance for anyone who might want 
to reuse and modify the code. This is a standard practice and coding languages allow 
for an inclusion of comments that are not readable by a machine, and hence do not 
affect the execution of code. In HTML, for example, writing anything within ‘<!—
TEXT –>’ will be legible in the html file but will not return any results when the code 
is run. Similarly, in Java, comments are demarcated by any of the following: ‘/*,’ ‘/**,’ 
or ‘//.’ The Sea and Spar code, published in 2010 as ‘cut to fit the toolspun course: 
Discussing Creative Code in Comments’, builds on the original programme and the 
comment function of coding languages to arrive at a potential, speculative model of 
criticism of literary works written in code. ‘cut to fit’ is a hybrid form of an essay, 
written in the Java file itself but published in a journal. By utilising the possibilities 
of the comment function, Montfort and Strickland include an expanded range of 
notes, some practical – the familiar instructions on the technicalities of code; some 
reflective – taking a form of an essay addressing general issues of code poetics, Sea 
and Spar specifically, as well as the kind of critical thinking that the project 
encourages. All comments are placed between the lines of the actual, functional code 
that generates Sea and Spar. Here the human activity of reading takes place, literally, 
                                                             
alternative strategies of conceptualising reality see Simon O’Sullivan, Deleuze and Guattari: 
Thought Beyond Representation (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). 
754 Livesey, 19.  
755 This is a logic evocative of earlier preoccupations of L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E poetry. As 
Barrett Watten explains, L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E identify the need for certain ways of making 
poetry, ‘they propose an interpretative context (aesthetic, cultural, political) by which it can 
be read; and they devise reading strategies for new forms of poetry. The genre of poetry is in 
this way predicated on the positivity of its reference, poetry, as it explores parallels of 
meaning and construction. Poetics at the same time involves a distancing or renegotiation of 
the practice of poetry’ [Watten, 339]. 
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between the lines of the machine readable text. In this approach, Montfort and 
Strickland foreground the increasingly blurring boundaries between artificial and 
natural languages by replacing the familiar ‘.doc’ file with a ‘.js’ file.  
The interpretation written into the code is inherently speculative, 
characterised by the recognition that ‘interpretation takes place from inside a system, 
rather than from outside.’ As Drucker explains,  
speculative approaches make it possible for subjective interpretation 
to have a role in shaping the processes, not just the structures, of 
digital humanities. When this occurs, outcomes go beyond descriptive, 
generative, or predictive approaches to become speculative. New 
knowledge can be created.756  
 
In its speculative approach, the project is an attempt at creating, to borrow Drucker’s 
terms, ‘parameter-shifting,’ ‘open-ended,’ ‘inventive’ capabilities of writing and 
criticism,757 reconceptualised for the Iterative turn. The method is applied, Montfort 
and Strickland explain, ‘to open up new literary questions and to identify new poetic 
possibilities, not, for instance, to determine authorship or support any kind of 
statistical analysis.’758  Here code writing turns into a form of speculative, critical 
writing. ‘cut to fit’ is an attempt at creating a space where the natural language and 
language of code both carry meaning but where code assumes significance not limited 
to its functionality. There is a characteristically Oulipian attitude expressed in this 
approach. For Oulipo the potential of constraint is more important than the 
constraint itself and, most importantly, ‘a text written according to a constraint 
describes the constraint.’ 759 Similarly, the self-reflexive nature of writing code and 
discussing its nature at the same time is at the core of Montfort and Strickland’s 
project. Whether executed on paper or in a Java file, the text here is dependent on an 
application of an algorithmic constraint, by devising and implementing a system 
simultaneously, creating and reflecting on the creative process at the same time.  Seen 
as such, the contemporary technology, again, realises as an increasingly ubiquitous 
practice what earlier avant-gardes experimented with in abstract terms. This return 
to, and appropriations of, the constraint as a methods of experimental creative writing 
                                                             
756 SC. 
757 Ibid. 
758 CTF. 
759 Jacques Roubaund, ‘Introduction: The Oulipo and Combinatorial Art’, in Oulipo 
Compendium, eds. Harry Mathews and Alastair Brotchie (London: Atlas, 2005), 42.  
Constraint as a writing technique is, as Jan Baetens and Jean-Jacques Poucel explain, ‘a self-
chosen rule (i.e. different from the rules that are imposed by the use of a natural language or 
those of convention); it is also a rule that is used systematically throughout the work […] 
both as a compositional and a reading device. Constraints are not ornaments: for the writer, 
they help generate the text; for the reader, they help make sense of it’ [Jan Baetens and Jean-
Jacques Poucel, ‘Introduction: The Challenge of Constraint’, Poetics Today, 30.4 (2009), 
613]. 
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today is a hybrid iteration of the earlier avant-garde methods and attitudes, of the 
characteristically Oulipian emphasis on poeisis as making or building. Here, again, in 
a manner characteristic for the Iterative turn, an attitude, reiterated, becomes form.  
Understood as such, Sea and Spar emerges as an autopoietic avant-garde 
project, 760  a system capable of maintaining itself, defining its own actions and 
behaviours and, hence, based on the production not of (digital) objects but of a new 
kind of language. It articulates itself in such a way as to suggest its commitment to 
shifting perspective that also requires a change in writing and established models of 
authorship. As an exercise in autopoeisis, ‘cut to fit’ offers a broader statement on 
current critical approaches to analysing codework. Although the juxtaposition of 
writing code and writing poetry is now an established creative paradigm, the 
discourses about experiments in code poetics tend to make a distinction between the 
operational language and the poetic language. As Mark C. Marino stresses, ‘while we 
examine programming architecture and admire modularity and efficiency, the study 
of computer code does not currently emphasise interpretation, the search for and 
production of meaning.’761  The latter is reserved for humanistic fields of inquiry, 
engaged with the natural language in a subjective, often ambiguous manner. ‘Even 
when aesthetics intervene,’ Marino stresses, ‘they come in a form of calls for stylistic 
clarity for more efficient modification and development.’762 Coding understood as a 
digital machine designed solely to generate an interface is antithetical to autopoietic 
thinking; it is, as Jerome McGann argues, an allopoietic system.763  Montfort and 
Strickland’s project recognises the limitations of such a binary approach to transform 
the logic of code and of poetry, both converging in a subversive, generative autopoietic 
machine.764  Thinking speculatively, their project is, to borrow from Drucker, ‘the 
                                                             
760 The notion of autopoeisis has typically been applied in systems theory (briefly mentioned 
earlier in this chapter) and hence is a manifestation of a broader shift towards process rather 
than object oriented inquiries key to my discussion of writing code.  
761 Mark C. Marino, ‘Critical Code Studies’, Electronic Book Review, 4 December 2006, 
accessed 14 May 2014, 
http://www.electronicbookreview.com/thread/electropoetics/codology. 
762 Ibid. 
763 Jerome McGann, ‘Marking Texts of Many Dimensions’ in A Companion to Digital 
Humanities, eds. Susan Schreibman, Raymond Georg Siemens, and John M. Unsworth 
(Blackwell Reference Online,  2004), accessed 19 September 2014, 
http://www.blackwellreference.com.ezphost.dur.ac.uk/subscriber/uid=42/tocnode?id=g97
81405103213_chunk_g978140510321319. While autopoietic forms derive meaning from 
within themselves, allopoeitic forms take their meaning and from outside themselves.  
764 I borrow the notion of the autopoietic machine from H.R. Maturana’s and F.J. Varela’s, 
Autopoeisis and Cognition (1980). As the authors explain, an autopoeitic machine ‘is a 
machine organised […] as a network of processes of production (transformation and 
destruction) of components which: (i) through their interactions and transformations 
continuously regenerate and realise the network of processes (relations) that produced them; 
and (ii) constitute it (the machine) as a concrete unity in space in which they (the 
components) exist by specifying the topological domain of its realisation as such a network’ 
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substantive manifestation in poetic forms [that] shows the workings of the 
mechanisms as it enacts, unfolds.’765 In Sea and Spar the focus is not on code that is 
literature or literature made of code, but rather on code as a cultural text in its own 
right that requires its own methods of interpretation, and a new set of categories of 
authorship, creativity, and originality. The creation of a hybrid discourse turns into a 
Deleuzian becoming of language as becoming other, not a discourse of code or 
criticism but rather a completely new language. ‘cut to fit’ is an exploration in writing 
in what Delezue and Guattari describe as a chromatic language, not formed out of a 
cipher or unfamiliar code but rather one that ‘placed a public language system of 
variable in a state of variation.’766 The signifying structure of Sea and Spar can be seen 
as a manifestation of chromaticism. Its elements, like elements of a chromatic 
language, are placed in continuous variation, altered, iterated, and inherently 
iterable, ‘in an operation that will perhaps give rise to new distinctions.’ 767  The 
creative process here evokes an exploration in possibilities of transformation – the 
possibilities of the turn.  
For Montfort and Strickland, ‘the most useful critique is a new constitution of 
elements.’768 The reconceptualisation of source code to incorporate critical comments 
opens possibilities for a development of not just individual texts but a new discursive 
field of criticism, where comments can be edited, manipulated, deleted or added not 
just by the authors themselves, but by other authors, critics, editors, or curators 
bringing forth new assemblages. Such practice significantly problematises any 
possibility of thinking about poetics in line with traditional categories of singular 
authorship. It produces, to cite Montfort and Strickland, ‘a widely distributed new 
constitution’ 769  that should be conceptualised according to similar, distributed 
models of authorship that are yet to be formulated, at least within literary studies. 
Here, authorship relies on expanded concepts of agency (such as Actor-Network 
Theory) to contribute to a concept of creativity that becomes a form of social 
interaction in an open source environment, based on a view of shared textual 
ownership that challenges the institution of the author and copyright.  
 
 
 
                                                             
[H.R.Maturana and F.J.Varela, Autopoeisis and Cognition: The Realisation of the Living 
(Boston: D.Reidell Publishing Company, 1980), 78]. 
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766 ATP, 107.  
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4.4. WRITING IN A STATE OF AUTHORSHIP 
 
There is a tendency – one also exhibited in this chapter – to talk of ‘reading’ 
code, and of ‘writing’ it that grows out of an inherent association of the language of 
programming with natural languages and their systems of signification. But there is 
also something paradoxical about writing a critique of code as a traditional essay, in 
both language and form that do not accommodate the signifying system of code itself. 
Montfort and Strickland’s project can be seen as a means of addressing this paradox. 
There is a danger, the authors seem to suggest, in applying the familiar categories of 
writing (of poetry, of code) to code poetics, a danger of falling into a form techno-
determinist theory of poetics. Neither simply a manifestation of code nor a 
straightforward poetic project, code poetry is an attempt at drawing attention to the 
thresholds of languages that constitute both. It is a form that invites reflection on 
implications of the overlap of technology and literature for notions of authorship, 
creativity, and originality that emerge. Monftort and Strickland’s approach adopted 
in the ‘cut to fit’ acknowledges the challenges of conceptualising contemporary 
models of creativity and authorship and grows out of a recognition of the emergent 
signifying system that contributes to poetic thinking at the postproduction moment. 
Montfort’s and Strickland is not, I suggest, a contribution to proliferating debates on 
whether it is possible to read code, or interpret it in a manner similar to natural 
languages.770  Instead, it is an experiment in critical methods of approaching this 
expanded poetic field.  
What emerges is a form of ‘heuretics’ of reading and writing in the digital 
environment. Devised by Gregory L. Ulmer, ‘heuretics’ is a means of manifesting the 
logic of invention, it enables assimilation of theory into the humanities by means of 
artistic experiment. While heuretics ‘functions at the same level of generality as 
“hermeneutics,”’771 the focus of heuretics is on the making, on the process, rather than 
on interpretation that is of primary interest to hermeneutic thinking. ‘Heuretics,’ 
Ulmer explains, ‘contributes to what Barthes referred to as “the return of the 
poetician” – one who is concerned with how a work is made.’772 Primarily interested 
in the making of an electronic text, Montfort and Strickland can be considered such 
poeticians engaging in a heuretic project. Their concerns, similarly to Ulmer’s, do not 
conclude with ‘analysis or comparative scholarship’ but rather are explored in a 
                                                             
770 Key arguments in the debate tend to be published by Electronic Book Review. Contributors 
include Mark C. Marino, John Cayley, Rita Raley, Florian Cramer.  
771  Gregory Ulmer, Heuretics: The Logic of Invention (Baltimore: The John Hopkins 
University Press, 1994), 3. Hereafter H. 
772 Ibid, 4.  
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manner characteristic of heuretic project, ‘in preparation for the design of a 
rhetoric/poetic leading to the production of new work.’773 The same commitment to a 
formulation of a new, speculative discourse that is also generative, pervades Ulmer’s 
and Montfort and Strickland’s projects, with Ulmer’s thinking offering a possible 
framework for interpreting the logic of invention behind Sea and Spar as a process of 
a turn. 774 By favouring questions of making over those of meaning, Montfort and 
Strickland’s experiment emerges as a self-contained and self-reflective record of the 
dynamic of invention, recounting the method of the work in the process of making it, 
leading to its formulation as a rhetoric and a poetics at the same time, evocative of 
similar attempts at writing and theorising iteration by iterative means in Goldsmith’s 
work. In a heuretic gesture, Montfort and Strickland use the method that they are 
inventing while inventing it.775  
Computer-mediated environments seen as a space of heuretic exploration 
facilitate what Bill Seaman describes as states of authorship.776 Seaman’s notion is 
grounded in processes of mediated interactivity and user participation as a form of 
assumed authorship, where user engagement enables performance under a 
temporary state of authorship. But I would like to suggest that such thinking about 
authorship can also be adopted to describe creative paradigms behind code poetics 
and iterative writing more broadly. The state of authorship is a result of what Seaman 
describes as ‘inter-authorship,’ an interaction with operative elements of a system, 
similar to a network of texts, here the pre-written Java file, texts of Dickinson’s and 
Melville’s that constitute Sea and Spar. Creating in a state of authorship is not a 
straightforward, singular act of authorship that produces a text but rather a 
conceptual and at the same time generative dialogue with textual objects negotiating 
disparate structures of signification, somewhat evocative of Gysin and Burroughs’s 
Third Mind model. Relationships of texts and authors that contribute to a creative 
process under the state of authorship can be described as rhizomatic, to remain in the 
                                                             
773 Ibid. 
774 Ulmer’s engagement with theory is also important here: ‘the relevant question for 
heuretic reading is not one guiding criticism (according to the theories of Freud, Marx, 
Wittgenstein, Derrida, and others: What might be the meaning of an existing work?) but one 
guiding a generative experiment: Based on a given theory, how might another text be 
composed?’ [H, 5]. This is an approach that echoes the assumptions of Drucker’s speculative 
project, applied here as a framework for understanding the relationship between text, theory 
and technology; ‘neither as a rehash of poststructuralist theory nor an advanced version of 
either dialogic or dialectical approaches […] a generative, not merely critical attitude’ [SL, 
21]. 
775 This statement is a paraphrase of Ulmer’s claim: ‘Part of working heuretically is to use the 
method that I am inventing while I am inventing it’ [H, 17]. 
776 Bill Seaman, ‘Emergent constructions: re-embodied intelligence within recombinant 
poetic networks’, in Digital Creativity: A Reader, eds. Colin Beardon and Lone Malmborg 
(London: Routledge, 2010), 140. 
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Deleuzeian framework, and evocative of Deleuze and Guattari’s understanding of the 
notion of the state.  Rhizomes and, similarly, writing at the Iterative turn, oppose any 
possibility of an idiosyncratic, centralised authorship. Thinking of writing as 
rhizomatic creates a possibility of moving beyond the singular, Romantic model of 
authorship, towards an open source, distributed system of writing. In any rhizomatic 
structure, any point can be connected to anything other; code can converge with 
critical literary discourse, fragments of Dickinson’s poetry with Melville’s text, 
Goldsmith’s criticism with LeWitt’s manifestos, or, for that matter, with any other 
text. A rhizome, as O’Sullivan puts it, ‘implies a contact and movement between 
different milieus and registers, between areas that are usually thought of as distinct 
and discrete.’777 For Deleuze and Guattari, ‘the rhizome connects any point to any 
other point, and its traits are not necessarily linked to traits of the same nature; it 
brings into play very different regimes of signs, and even nonsign states.’ 778  A 
rhizomatic form of authorship is non-hierarchical, governed by principles of 
connectivity that allow for the exchange, collaboration, and appropriation so 
characteristic of code writing communities, but echoed in all models of iterative 
writing discussed in this thesis. In a rhizomatic system of textual relations all 
elements are interconnected but also interchangeable. Substituting fragments of 
code, or the corpus of Dickinson’s poetry, for another code or another poetic text is 
possible, and can be done by anyone, in line with Deleuze and Guattari, ‘defined only 
by their state at a given moment – such that the local operations are coordinated and 
the final, global result synchronised without a central agency.’779 Writing by such 
collaborative, networked means should be seen as inherently creative. ‘It can 
produce,’ O’Sullivan suggests, ‘surprising compatibilities and novel synthesis […] the 
making of connections in this sense might be understood as a key modality of 
creativity in general.’780  
In a state of authorship, what is created, perhaps, is neither literature nor code 
but a statement in Foucault’s understanding of the term. Foucault’s statement is ‘that 
which enables […] groups of signs to exist, and enables […] groups or forms to become 
manifest.’781 To return to the Deleuzian analogy, the statement can be seen as that of 
a map, that which enables and generates a plateau, the code of Sea and Spar Between 
                                                             
777 O’Sullivan, 17. 
778 ATP, 23.  
779 Ibid, 19. Such understanding of structures of authorship and creativity as rhizomatic 
stands in direct opposition to what Deleuze and Guattari describe as aborescent systems; 
hierarchical, with singular centres of significance and subjectification [ATP, 18], as 
manifested in traditional, established models of authorship.  
780 O’Sullivan, 17.  
781 AK, 88. 
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that triggers the interface of poetry. ‘The statement,’ Foucault explains, ‘is that which 
situates […] meaningful units in a space in which they breed and multiply,’782 in the 
sea of stanzas that Montfort and Strickland’s generator produces. The coexistence of 
the code and its interface is, then, governed by the logic of a statement, defined by ‘the 
relations between an object language [that of the interface] and one that defines the 
rules [the language of code].’783 But these do not exist in a simple binary relationship, 
they do not operate as two separate, disparate textual entities. It is their 
interdependence that is crucial to defining the creative paradigm behind poetry 
generators such as Sea and Spar, and, I suggest, can be explained most explicitly by 
defining the nature of writing digital poetics as writing Foucauldian statements. Code 
and its interface remain always inherently linked and co-dependent. Code is always 
inscribed into an interface, the interface always relies on iterations of the code. The 
two can be thought of, perhaps, as a manifestation of a differential repetition of the 
same, always connected, always ‘part of a network of statements.’784 For Foucault,  
every statement is specified in this way […] a statement always belongs 
to a series of a whole, always plays a role among other statements […] 
There is no statement that does not presuppose others; there is no 
statement that is not surrounded by a field of coexistences, effects of 
series and succession, a distribution of functions and roles.785  
 
A statement, seen as a networked system of generating meaning, emerges as an 
enunciative system particularly fitting the algorithmic, networked digital 
environment that determines the authorial, structures of computer generated poetics.  
But thinking about writing in terms of Foucauldian statements where code 
poetics is concerned also needs to take into consideration Deleuze and Guattari’s 
interpretation of the notion. As Brian Massumi points out, Deleuze and Guattari’s 
‘statement’ closely follows Foucault’s.786 But what Deleuze and Guattari’s approach 
foregrounds, is a distributed, multiple nature of networked environments. For 
Deleuze and Guattari,  
there are no individual statements […] Every statement is a product of 
a mechanic assemblage, in other words, of collective agents of 
enunciation (take “collective agents” to mean not peoples or societies 
but multiplicities).787  
 
                                                             
782 Ibid, 100.  
783 Ibid, 99.  
784 Ibid.  
785 Ibid.  
786 Brian Massumi, ‘Notes on the Translation’, in A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, trans. Brian Massumi (London: 
Continuumu, 2010), xix.  
787 ATP, 42.  
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Evocative of the dynamic, the range of texts, be it poetry or code, comprising Sea and 
Spar calls to mind Deleuze and Guatari’s principle of multiplicity. The assemblage of 
discourses here is not a commentary on the texts appropriated. Instead, the 
amalgamation of voices and different forms of writing – the multiple – is also 
substantive. A text formulated by iterative means assumes an independent, singular 
status, but its singularity is always multiple, always networked, always distributed. 
Sea and Spar embodies an assemblage that characteristically does not rely on a 
relationship between the elements that comprise it as its subjects or objects. Instead, 
it emerges as a result of a rhizomatic network of multiplicities, or ‘multiplicities of 
multiplicities forming a single assemblage, operating in the same assemblage.’788  In 
other words, the corpus of Dickinson’s poetry used by Montfort and Strickland forms 
a multiplicity, the data mined text of Melville’s Moby Dick is a multiplicity, the code 
written by Montfort and Strickland and the appropriated canvas should be seen as 
such as well; each multiple and substantive but at the same time forming a single 
assemblage of Sea and Spar. As a manifestation of this multiplicity, the structure of 
authorship becomes problematic and defies any possibility of its unambiguous 
assignation. Rather it has to be conceived of as a product of a collective agent of 
enunciation. An author of a statement is not an individual, as Foucault comments. A 
statement ‘is a particular, vacant place that may […] be filled by different individuals.’ 
Governed by a dynamic so characteristic of open source writing, ‘it varies – or rather 
it is variable enough to be either, to persevere, unchanging, through several sentences, 
or to alter with each one.’789  
But such an assertion removes the author working in line with the open source 
principles from their work. In the context, the output is only considered as a product 
of a mechanic assemblage with no determined authorship. Within such a framework, 
the categories of authorship fall back on themselves and distributed, networked texts 
turn into authorless works. One way to avoid such superfluous thinking is by drawing 
a distinction between authorship and states of authorship as a possible framework for 
conceptualising the collective agency behind Sea and Spar without devaluing the 
status of the open source author. Writing in the state of authorship is a condition of 
creativity that assumes a break from familiar models of literary production to arrive 
at a new system of enunciation as a possible logic of the Iterative turn.  In an 
assemblage, as Deleuze and Guattari explain, ‘operation of significance and 
proceedings of subjectification […] are distributed, attributed, and assigned […] the 
collective assemblage is always […] the constellation of voices, concordant or not, 
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from which I draw my voice.’790 Writing as a form of assemblage enables an inherently 
iterative text to be actuated. Writing as an assemblage is writing in a state of 
authorship, where writing takes place, to return to Montfort and Strickland, in ‘a 
widely distributed new constitution,’791 where authorship is always distributed and 
always iterative.  
 
4.5. JAVA: A PERFORMANCE 
 
If authorship of code is assembled, variable, distributed, and understood on 
the basis of networks of co-existences that contribute to creation of statements in a 
state of authorship, then any possibility of formulating a model of authorship cannot 
rely on its assignation. Instead, it can only be understood on the basis of actualisation 
of statements, on the basis of what the statements do. As Foucault puts it, statements 
‘can exist and are analysable only to the extent that these […] have been 
‘enunciated.’’792 Running code, a process of transforming the JavaScript of Sea and 
Spar into its interface, can be thought of, I suggest, as an iterative act of enunciation. 
Enunciation, as Foucault explains, takes place when a group of signs is emitted. In 
other words, a code is enunciated when it is run, repeating the code every time the 
JavaScript prints an interface, or emits the signs that form the stanzas of Sea and 
Spar, assembled out of a data set. It is only when the act of enunciation takes place 
that the code generated poem can be analysed.  
If understood as such, the authorship of a code-generated poem can only be 
ascribed to an ambiguous enunciating subject. In this context, the act of enunciation 
is a result of a distributed mode of open source authorship, an expression of a 
collective assemblage of enunciation, as opposed to a singular act of authorship; a 
manifestation of an individual enunciation that grows out of singular concerns.793 As 
such, it has to be conceptualised as an autopoietic mechanism, which, as McGann 
explains, ‘cannot be separated from those who manipulate and use [it].’794 Within 
                                                             
790 ATP, 93.  
791 CTF. 
792 AK, 100.  
793 If read as such, code poetry can be seen as a minor literature, in line with Deleuze and 
Guattari’s understanding of the term. Minor literature relies on collective assemblages of 
enunciation, as opposed to major literature that is representational and a product of 
individual concerns [see: Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Kafka: Toward a Minor 
Literature, trans. Dana Polan (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2003]. 
Hence, code poetics becomes, similarly to Goldsmith’s conceptual project, a space of 
subversion, an avant-garde copyright loophole where standard categories of creativity do not 
apply. 
794 Jerome McGann, The Textual Condition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1991), 15.  
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such a creative framework authorship emerges as a process rather than as a means of 
representation. A transformation of code into poetry, of a map into a plateau, only 
takes place when the code is executed, under circumstances that make the 
enunciation possible, an approach evocative of the conceptual logic, with its 
propensity to favour context over content as a source of meaning.  
Deleuze and Guattari, echoing Foucault, consider a statement that is not 
enunciated, similarly to a code that is not executed, as one that has no purpose, nor 
meaning. A statement, Deleuze and Guattari suggest, does not exist ‘outside of 
circumstances that do not only give it credibility but make it a veritable assemblage.’795 
Similar thinking is manifested in the programming notion of ‘secondary notation,’ a 
concept indicative of machine execution of code as its primary principle. ‘Secondary 
notation’, as used in programming, refers to visual cues used by code writers that are 
not part of the formal notation – the syntax of the coding language itself. Examples 
include the position of statements within a code file, the use of indentation, or colour 
to make particular fragments of code more easily legible to a programmer. Secondary 
notation does not return any results when the programme is run, it does not affect the 
act of computer reading and is solely intended to support the human activity of 
reading code. Secondary notation can be thought of as a digital equivalent of 
Goldsmith’s nutritionless act of writing. The notion foregrounds the dynamic of 
engaging with code poetics in an interesting manner. Here, the focus is on computer 
rather than human reading of the Java file, on the moment of enunciation that 
becomes synonymous with running code and the process of generation of meaning – 
the poeisis of code (its making) – rather than the static text of the JavaScript itself. 
Hence, it is only when code is run, that writing takes place. In a state of authorship 
writing should be understood as a constant negotiation of the relationship between 
code and its interface, writing as ‘a network of productive forces that facilitate the 
connection and creation of an encounter (a ‘becoming other’).796  
However, if a statement-code only exists when it is enunciated then it can be 
said to always only exist ‘eventally,’ perfomatively, in the process of its actualisation. 
This commitment to process rather than representation inherent in code generated 
poetics is an integral feature of performance and the perfomative. 797  In fact, the 
                                                             
795 ATP, 91.  
796 Constantine Verevis, ‘Cinema’, in The Deleuze Dictionary, ed. Adrian Parr (Edinburgh: 
University of Edinburg Press, 2010), 49.  
797 Thinking about text as a manifestation of process rather than as a straightforward 
representation is evocative of Deleuze and Guattari’s wider project. As O’Sullivan explains, 
‘Deleuze and Guattari’s writing can itself be positioned as an experiment in thinking 
differently, ‘beyond’ representation. Their […] projects […] offer us a ‘new image of thought’, 
one in which process and becoming, invention and creativity, are privileged over stasis and 
recognition’ [O’Sullivan, 2]. 
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condition of enunciation that Deleuze and Guattari describe is reminiscent of J. L. 
Austin’s model of a performative utterance. According to Austin, linguistic utterances 
make statements but also perform actions. As Austin suggests, to say something is to 
do something. ‘To name the ship is to say (in the appropriate circumstances) the 
words 'I name, &c.' Similarly, ‘when I say, before the registrar or altar, &c., 'I do', I am 
not reporting on a marriage: I am indulging in it.’ 798  The performativity of such 
statements is synonymous with the conflation of saying and doing; ‘to utter the 
sentence (in, of course, the appropriate circumstances) is not to describe my doing 
[…] it is to do it.’799 The performative utterance is not a description of an event or an 
action, it is the performing of the action or event through words. But, as Austin 
repeatedly stresses, an utterance can only be considered performative in a relevant 
context, if the necessary linguistic and social conditions are met, i.e. when a statement 
is enunciated, an approach explicitly echoed in Deleuze and Guattari’s as well as 
Foucault’s projects.  
If coding is associated with process, with doing but also enunciating the 
action; if an instance of running code is a manifestation of simultaneous saying and 
doing what it says, then coding, and code generated poetry, should be seen as a 
performative project. In a system of generating text and meaning constructed as such, 
communication takes place as a speech act: as a result of ‘the production or an 
issuance of the symbol or words or sentence in the performance of speech act.’800 
Building on Austin’s notion, Searle’s ‘speech act’ refers to the ways in which speaking 
or writing can be said to do something as well as to be something or say something, it 
is writing that performs an act. The dynamic of speech acts, I suggest, is echoed in the 
way programme code performs an action. An algorithm can be interpreted as a speech 
act. The command to run code transforms the static line of code into a performative 
statement, into a speech act, that is a manifestation of the implementation of the 
process, it declares and simultaneously generates, for example, a line inclusive of two 
short syllables selected from Montfort and Strickland’s corpus. As such, writing code 
can be described as writing speech acts, or perhaps, more adequately statement-acts, 
to return to the original terminology developed in this chapter. It produces hybrid 
utterances – actualised in a state of authorship – that conflate the propensity for the 
statement rather than a sentence with Austin’s and Searle’s performative thinking.801  
                                                             
798 J.L Austin, How to do things with words: The William James Lectures delivered at 
Harvard University in 1955 (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1962), 6. 
799 Ibid.  
800 John R. Searle, Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1969), 16.   
801 Characteristically, Deleuze and Guattari use the term ‘statement-act’ in A Thousand 
Plateaus and point to ‘immanent relations between statements and acts.’801 This affinity 
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To understand the dynamic of writing code-generated poetry it is necessary to 
think about the creative process that governs the state of authorship, where writing is 
synonymous with the possibilities of organising statement-acts. A computer, or a 
browser, does not create the words that comprise the stanzas of Sea and Spar. 
Instead, it performs an act of selection of words from a data set. The act of selection 
constitutes the event of writing according to the iterative model of creative 
production, where curation and processes of moving information are key. Here, a new 
system of enunciation emerges, in which writing is associated with iterations of 
statement-acts, or, in Foucault’s terms, a statement-events.802  When a corpus of 
statements – the static code – is transformed into a statement-act or statement-event 
as enabled by the system of its enunciability – by its performance in a browser – it 
causes, in Foucault’s words, ‘a multiplicity of statements to emerge as so many regular 
events.’803 Statements formulated on the level of code, performed as acts, generate 
new statements on the level of the interface. As an assemblage of statements, code 
becomes also an assemblage of performances; ‘a general system of the formation and 
transformation of statements.’ 804  It is a Foucauldian archive of a multiplicity of 
performances that simultaneously enables their performance, enacted each time a 
page is loaded, each time the JavaScript is enunciated. This new system of 
enunciation in the expanded, digital field implies that, as Hayles puts it,  
the poem ceases to exist as a self-contained object and instead 
becomes a process, an event brought into existence when the 
programme runs on the appropriate software loaded onto the right 
hardware. The poem is “eventalised,” made more an event and less a 
discrete, self-contained object with clear boundaries in space and 
time.805 
 
4.6. PERFORMANCE SCORE AND THE ITERATIBILITY OF CODE 
 
Hayles’s description of what I have been discussing as acts of enunciation in 
terms of the ‘eventalisation’ of a poem foregrounds a crucial distinction between the 
temporalities of writing code and the event in which the writing is actualised; its 
enunciation as an event of writing. As Hayles notes, in electronic poetry, the time of a 
                                                             
between stating and acting yet again foregrounds the performative nature of a statement, not 
as a tool of communication but as a vehicle of moving information, from the static code, to 
its dynamic interface, a process evocative of similar principles of writing transcription as an 
act of organising information.  
802 AK, 129.  
803 Ibid, 130.  
804 Ibid.  
805 N. Katherine Hayles, ‘The Time of Digital Poetry: From Object to Event’, in New Media 
Poetics: Contexts, Technotexts, and Theories, eds. Adelaide Morris and Thomas Swiss 
(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2006), 181-82.  
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poem can be considered to consist of the time of writing, the time of coding, the time 
of production/performance, and the time of reading […] writing and coding become 
distinct and often temporary separated events. 806  Hence, a distinction has to be 
drawn between writing code and generating code on the screen, between writing and 
the event of writing, or perhaps between writing a script (in computer programming 
and performance sense of the word) – a score – and its performance. This is a crucial 
trajectory that shifts my discussion of code writing as a performative act to discussing 
code as performance. While a clear distinction has to be drawn between the notions 
of the performative and performance, the two are inherently interlinked. As Austin 
explains, the term performative derives from ‘perform,’ ‘it indicates that the issuing 
of the utterance is the performing of an action – it is not normally thought of as just 
saying something.’ 807  Performative acts are those which are actualised in 
performance. As Erika Fischer-Lichte explains, ‘[p]erformativity results in 
performances or manifests itself in the performative nature of acts.’808 Performing, 
Richard Schechner suggests, is ‘“showing doing” […] pointing to, underlining, and 
displaying doing.’809 Running code can be seen as just that, it is a display of the 
underlying text and process that realises itself in and as performance.  
When considered in line with this logic, code, I suggest, assumes a form of 
non-theatrical but scripted performance,810 where running code always relies on a 
repetition of a script. Hence, the distinction between the time of writing and the event 
of writing, one that can also be approached as a manifestation of an interplay of script 
or score and a performance in which it is enacted, resonates with the characteristics 
of authorship model that emerges. Nathan Walker draws affinities between poetics of 
code, and JavaScript in particular, and a score for performance. Walker’s discussion 
revolves around issues of performance of sound, sound poetry, and the sound of 
language, evocative, as Walker suggests, of the principles of L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E 
poetry. Although Walker’s focus differs from Montfort and Strickland’s, his reference 
to JavaScript as a performance score is both interesting and relevant here. Building 
                                                             
806 Hayles, ‘The Time’, 182-83.  
807 Austin, 6-7.  
808 Erika Fischer-Lichte, The Transformative Power of Performance: A New Aesthetics, 
trans. Saskya Iris Jain (London and New York: Routlege, 2008), 29.  
809 Richard Schechner, Performance Studies: An Introduction (New York: Routledge, 2006), 
28.  
810 While debates about digital media in performance have been proliferating in recent years, 
these tend to focus on new media in theatre, dance, performance art, installations, as well as 
born digital performance art. Recent publications include: Steve Dixon’s Digital 
Performance: A history of new media in theatre, dance, performance art, and installation 
(2007) and Carolyn Guertin’s Digital Prohibitions (2010), among others. The relationship 
between performance and digital textuality lacks similar coverage, although some work in 
this area has been carried out by ELMCIP (Electronic Literature as Model of Creativity and 
Innovation in Practice project), and published by Performance Research journal.   
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on Walker’s understanding of the dynamic of Java scripting, I want to suggest the 
structure of authorship of Sea and Spar Between can be successfully explained when 
its code is considered as a manifestation of John Cage’s score for performance, or an 
Event score, and related Fluxus experiments. While broader preoccupations of 
L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E poetry are also valid in the context of Sea and Spar,811 what I 
am particularly interested in here is the focus on the score as a set of instructions to a 
performer – characteristic of both Cage and Fluxus (and George Brecht in particular) 
– and the way in which it reverberates in Montfort and Strickland’s approach to 
writing their JavaScript.  
The underlying commitment to exploring the affinities between writing and 
process finds its manifestations in both code poetics and Fluxus scores. These are 
short, instruction-like texts proposing one or more actions that, as Liz Kotz explains, 
can be read as ‘music scores,  visual arts, poetic texts, performance instructions, or 
proposals for some kind of reaction or procedure […] as tools for something else, as 
script for performance, project, or production.’812 They developed from Cage’s work 
in 1950s. But while Cage’s performance scores focused on the possibilities of 
organising sound, Brecht’s Event scores 813  translate the attitude and methods of 
musical notation to explore means of scripting what he called  ‘the structure of 
experience.’814 It is Brecht’s proposition of an Event, as a model of thinking about 
                                                             
811 See footnote 755 in this chapter.  
812 WTBLA, 61. 
813 The term ‘event’ appeared in Brecht’s work already in its early stages. And while it is 
initially linked to Cage’s notion of music as ‘Event in sound-space’ [George Brecht, Notebook 
I, June-September 1958, ed. Dieter Daniels and Herman Braun (Köln: Walter König, 1991), 
4] and reflected in Brecht’s early musical analyses, it is later expanded to a broader idea of an 
event in space-time. Even with the change of focus, Brecht’s event refers to an occurrence, 
but its instance is not limited to sound. This shift is also reflected in the alteration in 
spelling: from ‘event’ to ‘Event’. This is a trajectory explained by Brecht himself, in an 
interview with Dieter Daniels:  
Dieter Daniels: […] the concept of ‘events’ takes a very interesting 
development in [your notebooks]. It is mentioned the first time in a quotation 
of John Cage ‘Events in sounds-space’ […] and you use the word ‘event’ 
according to its sense in the dictionary, and then slowly almost unremarked 
the word ‘event’ gets more and more specific – until its finally the word ‘Event’ 
with a big E.  
George Brecht: Yes, like in Towards Events, the title of the show at the 
Reuben Gallery. [Brecht, Notebook I, unnumbered endnotes].  
My spelling in this section reflects Brecht’s. Where Brecht’s later events are 
discussed, these are referred to as ‘Events.’ 
‘Towards Events: An Arrangement’ that Brecht refers to in the interview was Brecht’s first 
public exhibit. The show comprised objects accompanied by instructions to be performed. As 
Kotz points out, originally written as performance instructions, Brecht’s scores were also 
displayed in gallery settings as standalone works. This is an attitude, I suggest, that in an 
interesting way anticipated the contemporary propensity to curate literary objects already 
discussed earlier in this thesis.  
814 George Brecht, Notebook II, October 1958-April 1959, ed. Dieter Daniels and Herman 
Braun (Köln: Walter König, 1991), 107. 
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scripting or authoring process, broadly conceived, rather than Cage’s performance 
scores composed in the much more specific context of musical performance (even if 
his understanding of music is non-traditional) that I see as a particularly striking 
antecedent of the performative approach that underpins code-generated poetics.815 
However, Cage’s thinking is foundational with respect to performance scores and his 
4’33’’ (1952) in particular remains relevant in the context. As Kotz puts it ‘4’33’’ 
inaugurates the models of the score as an independent graphic/textual object, 
inseparably words to be read and actions to be performed.’816 Understood as such, 
the score assumes what Kotz describes as an operational function, ‘in which the 
notation no longer describes what we hear but what we do.’817 The same logic informs 
code generated poetics, and it is worth considering Cage’s 4’33’’ before focusing on 
the juxtaposition of Fluxus scores and contemporary code poetry, as a text that offers 
a model for both.  
Composed as a piece of conceptual music and originally rendered in 
traditional notation, 4’33’’ also exists as a text score, rendered entirely in words and 
numbers (the so called Tacet edition, which reads: ‘I/Tacet/II/Tacet/III/Tacet’ (‘tacet’ 
from Latin ‘it is silent’) [Figure 47]. As Kotz explains, this quality of 4’33’’ makes it 
more readable and more accessible. Montfort and Strickland’s ‘cut to fit,’ I suggest, 
engages in a similar project. The relationship between the JavaScript and its interface 
can be seen as that between the score and its performance, as conceived of by Cage, 
where, as Kotz puts it, ‘the musical notation [and similarly code] ceases to be a system 
of representation and instead becomes a proposal for action.’818 The same concerns, 
as discussed in relation to notions of enunciation and performativity, inform the 
dynamic of code. A performance of 4’33’’, and a performance of Sea and Spar 
Between, ‘is a structured experience […] that occurs in relation to a written 
inscription.’819 By breaking down the lines of the script with extensive comments, the 
authors transform the unfamiliar language of code into a hybrid and experimental but 
legible and comprehensible text. This shift from musical notation to text, from code 
to natural language, serves as a destabilising tool used to foreground words that are 
                                                             
815 Thinking about Montfort and Strickland’s project through and in the context of Fluxus is 
particularly fitting, I suggest, not only because of certain affinities of form that can be drawn 
but because of an attitude towards creativity that they share. As Ken Friedman put it, ‘Fluxus 
has been a […] a forum of invention. Fluxus has been an intermedia activity, crossing the 
boundaries of art forms and moving over the boundaries of art entirely to do something 
interesting in the world.’ [Ken Friedman, ‘Editorial in Two Voices’, Performance Research, 
7.3 (2002), 1]. A similar commitment to unconventional thinking beyond the familiar media, 
discourses, and paradigms of writing is at the core of Sea and Spar Between. 
816 WTBLA, 62.  
817 Ibid, 17. 
818 Ibid.  
819 Ibid, 27.  
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conventionally marginal in both systems. In both Cage’s score and in the JavaScript 
of Sea and Spar the natural language assumes a primary role, it is not of the order of 
secondary (musical, computational) notation, but rather functions as a primary 
material. Notation here is given a functional and aesthetic autonomy, as Kotz puts it, 
‘an autonomy that open[s] the door for the scores, instructions, or snippets of 
language to themselves be the work.’820 In a similar manner the code of Sea and Spar 
is the work, and the method of its execution can be seen as an adaptation of Cagean 
notation function.  
 
FIGURE 47: JOHN CAGE, TYPEWRITTEN SCORE OF 4'33'' 
Writing poetry by algorithmic means eliminates from the compositional 
process many of the properties typically considered literary, or poetic, in the same 
way that Cage stripped his music of melody, harmony, rhythm, and, as 4’33’’ shows, 
even notes, to reconceive music as ‘the organisation of sound.’821 If read in line with 
Cage’s methodology, an act of writing code can be thought of as a means of organising 
                                                             
820 Ibid, 48.  
821 Ibid, 13.  
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language, organising statements, and a process of authoring a poem by other means. 
The carefully designed but flexible and alterable scripting of process, in both Cage and 
Montfort and Strickland, accounts for writing a very specific type of performance, as 
Kotz puts it, ‘by no means a formless “anything that happens,” but the activation of a 
text.’822 Kotz’s description of Cage’s performance in an interesting manner evokes the 
characteristic trajectories of code and its manifestations online. A text that is activated 
is a text that is eventalised in the moment of its enunciation, a text that is run in a 
browser to generate an interface in a moment of its machine performance. To use 
Lawrence Halprin’s terminology, a Cagean score, just like code, is as ‘a scoring 
mechanism’ used to plan future events. ‘Scores,’ Halprin argues, ‘are notations which 
use symbols to describe process over a period of time […] Scores are devices for 
controlling events, for influencing what is to occur.’823 Halprin’s understanding of the 
event as that which can be pre-scripted foregrounds the structure of meaning 
production typical of code and at the same time evokes my discussion of the iterability 
of the event in the context of transcription writing in Chapter 3. The juxtaposition of 
the two inherently iterative practices foregrounds, I suggest, the distinct structures of 
authorship that inform transcription and code writing respectively. In both, texts 
emerge as a result of a singular, unrepeatable iteration of that which has already been 
written.  A code-generated poem, or a Cagean performance, has always already begun 
before the code is run, before the score is enacted. Code is a re-enactment or a 
repetition of a script. As such, code as a performance score can be seen as a 
manifestation of both that which it will do when it is enunciated and that which it can 
do, as an exploration of the process and its inherent possibilities, similarly to a 
performance score, ‘influencing what is to occur.’ 824 As Cox suggests, this trajectory 
is inscribed into the etymology of the word ‘programme.’ From the Greek 
programma, a programme is a written notice to the public, ‘it indicates a procedural 
way of doing things […] “program” is a description of a future event and a set of 
instructions used to execute a specified task.’825  
As an inscription of a programmed event, code, then, can be seen as a 
manifestation of the ‘already-said’ as described by Foucault. For Foucault, all 
discourse is based on the ‘already-said;’ ‘not merely a phrase that has already been 
spoken, or a text that has already been written, but a ‘never-said’ […] a writing that is 
                                                             
822 Ibid, 27.  
823 Lawrence Halprin, The RSVP Cycles: Creative Process in the Human Environment (New 
York: George Brazillier, 1969), 5.  
824 Ibid.  
825 Geoff Cox, Speaking Code: Code as an Aesthetic and Political Expression (Cambridge, 
MA: The MIT University Press, 2012), 41.  
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merely the hollow of its own mark,’826 the never-said of discourse as a secondary 
notation of discourse. As Foucault explains, ‘it is supposed therefore that everything 
that is formulated in discourse was already articulated in that semi-silence that 
preceded it, which continues to run obstinately beneath it, but which it covers and 
silences.’827 The same structure of a multi-layered textuality that characterises code 
writing and the event that it generates is evoked here: code as a performance score 
understood as the ‘semi-silence’ that precedes its enunciation that ‘continues to run 
obstinately beneath it’ when the code is actualised.  
As an enactment of a score, or a manifestation of the Foucaultian ‘never said,’ 
all meaning is always rehearsed, running a code, performing a Cagean score, always 
assumes a form of a repetition of the ‘already-said.’ But this is not to say that an event 
of writing or an event of performance can be unambiguously scripted and repeated. 
The logic of the event, as explained in Chapter 3, also applies here. An event is always 
singular, it is always unexpected and so it is that which cannot be programmed. The 
paradox that emerges as a result of the convergence of the notions of the ‘already said’ 
and the event can, however, be reconciled if discourse – as discussed by Foucault, and 
by analogy, code and performance scores – are considered as and when they occur, in 
the singular instances of their enunciation.828 In other words, each act of iteration of 
the score, should be considered individual, unique, and irreducible, as ‘an 
unrepeatable event,’829 as a text that, in the process of its enunciation is eventalised, 
to return to Hayles. In such a context, the unrepeatability of the event resides in the 
nature of the event itself, where the event of running the code bears characteristics of 
a live performance, where each act, although repeating the pre-scripted scenario, 
remains inherently singular, where each repetition of the score is marked by its 
différance.  
This is a characteristic feature of liveness, as discussed by Peggy Phelan. For 
Phelan, performance only exists in the present, ‘performance cannot be saved, 
recorded, documented […] performance’s being […] becomes itself through 
disappearance.’ 830  The singularity of each instance of running code can be best 
understood, I suggest, as a manifestation of a live enactment of a performance score, 
in line with Phelan’s assertion. For Phelan, performance is nonreproductive. 
Similarly, a performative speech act is characterised by the impossibility of its 
                                                             
826 AK, 25. 
827 Ibid. 
828 Ibid.  
829 Ibid, 100.  
830 Peggy Phelan, Unmarked: The Politics of Performance (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1993), 146.  
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repetition, ‘each reproduction,’ as Émile Benveniste explains, ‘is a new act.’831 This 
trajectory is echoed in code’s structural reliance on a continual re-enactment of its 
JavaScript. A code-generated poem can only be enunciated by means of repetition, if 
and when the script is run in a browser. But, each time the code is run, the script is 
repeated, repeated but not reproduced. Each iteration of the code of Sea and Spar 
Between deposits the user/reader at random within the sea of stanzas, accounting for 
an individual, singular experience of the generated text as a manifestation of a certain 
sense of site specificity, or perhaps what could be more accurately described as an IP 
(Internet Protocol) site specificity, contingent on the here and now of the specific user, 
their browser, location, and technical specifications in the moment of running code, 
where each iteration produces a singular performance, a differential repetition rather 
than a repetition of the same.  
If understood as such, any statement is both unrepeatable and endlessly 
repeatable. The enunciation of code is different every single time. The difference by 
which the repetition is marked is both concomitant to where, in the sea of stanzas, the 
user is deposited, to the material aspects of experiencing the code (i.e. screen 
resolution and size, speed of the Internet connection, the browser used), as well as to 
any subsequent developments of the code itself. Running code that has been altered, 
in which, for example, the data set has been replaced by a new corpus of appropriated 
literary texts, will require performing exactly the same process that will render 
distinct results. Unlike a traditional, printed book, in which such significant 
alterations would be marked by a publication of a new edition, a ‘book’ written in a 
state of authorship will morph fluidly and without overt acknowledgement of any 
changes that alter its content. Any alteration will only become evident under the 
condition of the encounter, when the reformulated statement is enunciated. The 
challenge of defining the creative and authorial paradigm of such texts stems from 
their complex, fluid but iterative texture. Where in the case of transcription writing 
any attempt at repetition alters the fixed and stable original source, in the case of code 
poetics the source itself is in a constant state of becoming, inherently and infinitely 
alterable, becoming poetry over and over again, in Deleuze and Guattari’s words, 
‘reassembling the event, installing oneself in it as in a becoming’832 each time code is 
run. The differential nature of repetition here resides both in the process of repetition, 
as described in Chapter 3, and in the complex nature of the source, in the dynamic 
structure of the statement. ‘Instead of being something said once and for all – and 
lost in the past […],’ Foucault explains,  
                                                             
831 Émile Benveniste, Problems in General Linguistics, quoted in Phelan, Unmarked, 149.  
832 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, 111. 
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the statement [and, similarly, a JavaScript] […] enters various 
networks and various field of use, is subjected to transferences or 
modifications, is integrated into operation and strategies in which its 
identity is maintained or effaced […] Whereas an enunciation may be 
begun again or re-evoked, and a (linguistic or logical) form may be 
reactualized, the statement may be repeated – but always in strict 
conditions.833  
 
Repeated, but not reproduced. This logic of code as performance interpreted as an 
inherently iterative act echoes Derrida’s thinking.  As Phelan puts it, for Derrida, the 
performative enacts the now of writing in the present time. But this enactment of 
writing is always inherently iterative; according to Derrida, without iterability, or 
citationality, ‘there would not even be a “successful” performative.’ 834  The 
performativity of code resides in its iterability. For the code to be run, the data set has 
to be repeated, all the algorithmic commands performed and executed anew every 
time the script, and like a script, a performance score, is actualised, each time 
circumstances of enunciation arise.  
This understanding of authorship, writing, and performance in terms of an 
event as a singularity that can never be repeated without alteration reverberates in 
Brecht’s ideas about the relationship between score and performance. The 
transformation of Cage’s take on the event is where Brecht’s project becomes so much 
more relevant to code poetics than the wider oeuvre of John Cage. As Anna Dezeuze 
explained, Brecht operated a twofold transformation of Cage’s understanding of the 
event; ‘on the one hand he focused on the single ‘event’ rather than the combination 
of ‘events’ in Cage’s compositions, and on the other hand, he expanded Cage’s 
definition to encompass any activity, whether it produces sound or not.’835 The key 
feature of an event in Brecht’s approach derives from his understanding of an event 
as that which occurs in time and so can only be isolated from the field of experience 
through notation, organised by means of an ‘Event score’ that takes a form of verbal 
instructions for performance. While for Brecht a score could take a form of a card with 
a few lines of text, in the digital environment it is transformed into lines of code in a 
‘.js’ file, both, in a very similar fashion offering instructions and direction, or as Brecht 
put it, ‘a signal preparing one […] for an event to happen in one’s own now.’836 This 
approach towards scripting process is not dissimilar from the logic of programming. 
Brecht’s Three Telephone Events (1961), for example, sets out three scenarios: ‘When 
                                                             
833 AK, 104-05.  
834 SEC, 17. 
835 Anna Dezeuze, ‘Brecht for Beginners’, Papers of Surrealism, 4 (2005), 2.  
836 George Brecht, Notebook VII, March-June 1961, unpublished manuscript, The Gilbert 
and Lila Silverman Collection, Detroit, quoted in Julia Robinson, ‘Maciunas as Producer: 
Performative Design in the Art of the 1960s’, Grey Room, 33 (2008), 66. 
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the telephone rings, it is allowed to continue ringing’, ‘When the telephone rings the 
receiver is lifted and replaced’, ‘When the telephone rings, it is answered.’837 The 
equivalent in JavaScript is the ‘if’ function of code syntax. It is this approach to 
language that is inseparable from action or process that I see as indicative of and 
anticipating developments in contemporary code poetry. Like Cage or Fluxus 
performance score, code is a written both as a text in its own right, and as a tool for 
something else, a script that generates a text on a computer screen, a script for a 
digital performance.  
Gascia Ouzounian explains Brecht’s performance of an Event score as an 
arrangement of an object or objects.838 A realisation of a score entails performing by 
means of arranging or ordering objects but also interacting with this arrangement, ‘in 
one’s own now,’ as it is eventalised and encountered. Brecht’s Three Chair Events 
come to mind as an example evocative of this dynamic. Exhibited in 1961 as part of a 
group show Environment, Situations, Spaces (Six Artists) at the Martha Jackson 
Gallery in New York, three chairs were shown in different places in the space of 
exhibition, broadly conceived. A white chair under a spotlight in the gallery, as Brecht 
explained, ‘presented […] very theatrically, like a work of art;’ a black chair in the toilet 
(‘I have the impression that no one noticed that it was part of the exhibition,’ Brecht 
admitted); and a yellow one just outside the entrance of the gallery (‘the most 
beautiful event happened to the yellow chair […] when I arrived there was a  woman 
wearing a large hat comfortably sitting in the chair and talking to a friend’)839 [Figure 
48]. In the score for Three Chair Events [Figure 49], Brecht identifies an act of sitting 
on a chair as an ‘occurrence.’ But an event set out as such, framed by ambiguous 
exhibition and para-exhibition spaces, only occurs as it is noticed by the visitor, as a 
staged encounter, an incident that is pre-scripted. It is the relationship between the 
score and its realisation point that come to the fore in this exhibit. Here, the event 
only takes place at the moment of an encounter with its manifestation, as a form of 
‘an incident.’ This understanding of the relationship between the score, the event, and 
their manifestation is echoed, I suggest, in the dynamic of code. Code as a performed 
statement-event only occurs as it is enunciated and encountered, its performativity is 
expressed not only in the instance of running the code, but also in noticing the 
                                                             
837 George Brecht, Three Telephone Events, in The Fluxus Performance Workbook, eds. Ken 
Friedman, Owen Smith, and Lauren Sawchyn (Performance Research e-publications, 2002), 
23.  
838 Gascia Ouzounian, ‘The Uncertainty of Experience: On George Brecht’s Event Scores’, 
Journal of Visual Culture, 10.2 (2011), 208.  
839 George Brecht, interview by Irmeline Lebeer, in An Introduction to George Brecht’s 
“Book of the Tumbler on Fire”, ed. Henry Martin (Milan: Edizioni Multipla, 1978), 87.  
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instance of its performance, in the same way finding Brecht’s chair should be 
considered an event.  
 
FIGURE 48: GEORGE BRECHT’S YELLOW CHAIR, THREE CHAIR EVENTS AT MARTHA JACKSON 
GALLERY, NEW YORK, 1961 
 
FIGURE 49: GEORGE BRECHT, THREE CHAIR EVENTS, PERFORMANCE SCORE 
 
As such, an Event score, and similarly code, not only structures occurrences 
but also experiences of those events. As Brecht puts it, ‘music isn’t just what you hear 
or what you listen to, but everything that happens […] Events are an extension of 
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music.’840 Running code as the event of writing is an extension of writing. Code, then, 
should be thought of as a post-Cagean, post-Fluxus score, as a score in an expanded 
field that is open to appropriating and interpreting anything as performance. The 
questions that Sea and Spar triggers are evocative of Fluxus concerns and the Fluxus 
attitude more broadly. Sea and Spar and Fluxus scores and performances alike fall 
outside of any single media, art, or literary category, as a result raising questions that 
have to do with the role of art/literature and the artist/writer, with how art is made, 
presented, and received, but also, as Elizabeth Armstrong explains, ‘they […] have to 
do with the boundaries of art – how these are determined and by whom.’841 There is a 
sense in the works of Fluxus of an emerging models for distributed authorship that 
challenge the familiar notions of creativity at the Iterative turn. 
Both the Event score and JavaScript as a score for performance are defined by 
what Kotz describes as a ‘structural reliance on continual reenactment,’842where the 
emergence of an event implies both its repetition and an iteration of a score. The 
singular nature of each generated event, be it a Fluxus performance or a coded event 
of writing, permits rather than prevent its iterability. This is the dynamic of repetition 
characteristic of live event and performance. Writing and subsequently running code 
can be said to rehearse the performative act, where the invisible text of the code, the 
Foucaultian ‘never-said’ of the ‘behind-the-scenes’ layers of textuality is brought to 
the fore. As Alice Rayner puts it,  
the code is necessary but unavailable except as a symptom; alien to life 
in three dimensions, but present; the media of community that has no 
place and exists only each time it is iterated; […] The iterations of code 
are performances without theatre.843 
 
Hayles explores this dynamic by discussing differences in reading experiences of 
analogue and digital texts. As she explains, reading a book involves engaging with a 
text that exists in the fixed form prior to the moment when reading commences. 
Reading a book engenders an experience very unlike that of reading a text in the 
digital environment. As Hayles explains, an electronic text does not exists anywhere 
in the form in which it is realised on the screen and encountered by the reader. ‘In 
this sense,’ Hayles argues, ‘electronic text is more processual than print; it is 
                                                             
840 Ibid, 84. 
841 Elizabeth Armstrong, ‘Fluxus and the Museum’, in In the Spirit of Fluxus, Elizabeth 
Armstrong and Joan Rothfuss (Minneapolis: Walker Art Centre, 1993), 14.  
842 WTBLA, 65.  
843 Alice Rayner, ‘Everywhere and Nowhere: Theatre in Cyberspace’, in Of Borders and 
Thresholds: Theatre, History, Practice, and Theory, ed. Michael Kobialka (Minneapolis, 
MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 299. 
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performative by its very nature.’844 The text that is encountered as it is enunciated in 
the performance is not the text that is authored, the script is not simply repeated – as 
would be the case in the more tradition theatre performance for example, that relies 
on a repetition of lines of a play – but it generates a particular act, a particular text 
that follows the instruction of the score, it repeats is but does not reproduce it. The 
process that takes place in the digital environment, and, similarly, in a Brechtian 
enactment of an Event score, still relies on a repetition of the original, or perhaps 
originary text, but this repetition derives from its transformation rather than a 
repetition.  
Zen for Head (1962) can be cited as an example representative of the attitude 
so pervasive in the generic and creative categories of Fluxus work. Performed by Nam 
June Paik in 1962 during the first Fluxus festival, Zen for Head was Paik’s 
interpretation of a composition by La Monte Young. Young’s 1960 score directed the 
performer to ‘draw a straight line and follow it.’845 In the 1962 performance, Paik 
dipped his head, hand, and necktie into a bowl of ink and tomato juice and dragged 
them along a length of a sheet of paper, stretched on the floor [Figure 50]. As Elizabeth 
Armstrong puts it,  
this piece […] began as a composition, took the form of a performance, 
and ultimately was preserved as an object in the Museum Wiesbaden 
[…] Paik’s performance created an object that might be called a 
painting. But none of these terms satisfactorily describes Zen for 
Head, which falls outside any single media category or art historical 
moment.846  
 
The same terminological challenges and issues with generic qualifications that come 
to the fore in Fluxus performance characterise the debates surrounding contemporary 
developments in code poetry. The ambiguous status of Zen for Head is a result of the 
‘collaborative’ authorship that shaped it. But the structure of authorship, I suggest, 
should be associated here not with the attribution but rather with its distribution, 
with Fluxus creative paradigms anticipating the open source thinking that 
characterises code writing practices today. The same quality of ‘openness’ that 
translates into subversive models of writing and alternative means of conceptualising 
creativity pervades both  Montfort and Strickland’s and Fluxus projects, also 
interestingly evoked in terminological parallels. The tendency to appropriate and 
recycle dictated by open source principles in code writing communities in Fluxus 
                                                             
844 N. Katherine Hayles, My Mother was a Computer: Digital Subjects and Literary Texts 
(Chicago, Ill: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 101.  
845 La Monte Young, ‘Composition 1960 no. 10’, in An Anthology of Chance Operations, eds. 
La Monte Young and Jackson Mac Low (New York: MELA Foundation, 1963), non pag. 
846 Armstrong, ‘Fluxus,’ 14.  
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takes the form of what Brecht referred to as an open system. An open system, unlike 
a closed one (i.e. a traditional narrative recorded in a form of a printed book), does 
not end, is always in flux, always in a state of becoming. It does not generate a finished 
work but rather offers a means of activating a process, yet again foregrounding the 
fluidity and ambiguity of making and not the thing made.  
 
 
FIGURE 50: NAM JUNE PAIK, ZEN FOR HEAD (1962) AT FLUXUS FESTSPIELE 
NEUESTER MUSIK IN WIESBADEN 
 
An interesting convergence of open source paradigms and system aesthetics 
transpires in Brecht’s notion of the open system.  In fact, Brecht seems to have been 
aware of systems theories as early as 1959,847 and, as Dezeuze observed, his notes 
suggest he was, just like Burnham, interested in cybernetic models. Brecht’s thinking 
                                                             
847 Brecht makes a reference to the ‘open system’ in his Notebook compiled between April 
and August 1959 [George Brecht, Notebook III, April 1959 – August 1959, ed. Dieter Daniels 
and Herman Braun (Köln: Walter König, 1991), 118]. There is also a mention of ‘systems’ in 
Notebook II (page 65), and a reference to readings in the field of cybernetics in Notebook V 
[George Brecht, Notebook V, March-Nov 1960, ed. Herman Braun (Köln: Walter König, 
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in relation to systems theories focused on a preoccupation with what he describes as 
‘points’ at which ‘randomness intersects order, knowledge, control, open systems,’ 
each a ‘reference frame’ that can be arranged.848 As Dezeuze suggest, the Event scores 
might have emerged as such points, in which all five reference frames intersect. And 
the JavaScript of Sea and Spar can be read as a manifestation of a similar attitude. It 
is an attempt at arranging and organising an open system in which randomness of 
navigating the extensive corpus of text converges with order and control of the pre-
scripted operation. Here, conflated knowledge of poetics and programming form a 
unified reference frame, defining and simultaneously questioning the possibility of 
apprehending the creative reality that generates it. Seen as such, Sea and Spar 
emerges as an example of what Brecht describes as ‘borderline’ art that problematises 
the modes of apprehension of ‘reference frames.’ It is formulated in the open (source) 
system as art ‘dissolving into other dimensions,’849 where paradigms of authorship 
inevitably challenge the familiar structures that operate within a closed system. This 
is an inherently speculative approach which also foregrounds a similar sense of 
openness associated with innovation at a cultural turn.850 As manifestations of and 
triggers for such speculative, generative, borderline art, both open source and open 
system not only allow for but assume a propensity for iteration, modification, and 
distribution rather than attribution as paradigmatic features of a creative process and 
as a means of exploring the limits of authorship in what emerges as a new field of 
(aesthetic) possibilities. 851  Here, attitudes characteristic of an open, networked 
environment are evoked in a corresponding experimental form.     
This approach to writing formulated as a convergence of aesthetic and 
cybernetic thinking can, in fact, be seen as a manifestation of a more widespread 
attitude in the creative scene at the time. Both Dezeuze and Kotz link Brecht’s thinking 
to Umberto Eco’s poetics of the open work that emerged as an attempt at theorising 
radical poetics. The Open Work (1978) is relevant here as a text and an approach to 
creativity that resonates with a commitment to a kind of ‘openness’ that manifests 
itself clearly in Fluxus and, today, code poetry. As Dezeuze explained, what Eco 
theorised was a relationship between a static or closed order and one that escapes the 
control of the order, the latter associated with chance, indeterminacy, events, and 
                                                             
848 Brecht, Notebook V, 157.  
849 Ibid, 74.  
850 As described by Drucker, ‘speculative approaches seek[s] to create parameter-shifting, 
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851 I paraphrase here George Brecht’s ‘Statement’, in Off Limits: Rutgers University and the 
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mobility.852 The notion of open work is a manifestation of attempts to create works 
that subvert the familiar categories of creativity and in their ambiguity allow for a 
plurality of interpretations. The Brechtian Event score and, similarly, a JavaScript 
file, are characterised by the same openness Eco described, as dynamic forms always 
negotiating ‘the dialectic movement between form and openness,’ which, as Eco 
explained, ‘determines the limits within which a work can accentuate its ambiguity 
[…] while keeping its existence at work.’853 The discourses of open work, systems 
aesthetics, or open systems that provide a context for the late 1950s/1960s 
experimental work in the arts point to affinities between ideas about art and writing 
as a system but one that is primarily interested in the exploration of its own 
possibilities, in an autopoietic logic of invention. As Brecht, Kaprow, and Watts 
describe it, the ‘new advance guard’ in the United States was characterised by ‘a 
general loosening of forms which in the past were relatively closed, strict, and 
objective, to ones which are more personal, free, random, and open.’854  
This pervasive sense of openness, however, should be seen as more than an 
attempt at experimentation with form, to be reconfigured as a manifestation of a 
certain neo-avant-garde attitude that surfaces anew in the neo-neo-avant-garde of 
code poetics.855 What transpires, then, is a model of an avant-garde for the twenty-
first century that, as discussed in the context of transcription poetics, relies on 
iterations of attitudes that become form, and where the understanding of the 
emergent contemporary poetic paradigms is synonymous with a reiteration of both 
the earlier avant-garde attitude and form at the same time. The difference between 
                                                             
852 Anna Dezeuze, ‘‘Open work,’ ‘do-it-yourself- artwork and bricolage’, in The ‘do-it-
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854 George Brecht, Allan Kaprow and Robert Watts, ‘Project in multiple dimensions’ in Off 
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855 Debating code poetics as an iteration of Fluxus attitude as well as form is a particularly 
valid manifestation of Fluxus thinking. Fluxus, in fact, has been described as an attitude 
rather than a unified movement or group. As Owen F. Smith explained, ‘Fluxus is historically 
complex and philosophically difficult to define. This very ambiguity is, however, an aspect of 
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interrelated ideas about culture, politics, and society explored earlier in the twentieth 
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but to change the way people perceived the world and cultural differentiations’ [Owen J. 
Smith, Fluxus: The History of an Attitude (San Diego: San Diego State University Press, 
2011), 1, 3]. And, I suggest, the Fluxus attitude can be seen as manifesting itself anew in the 
context of digital poetics today, and in Montfort and Strickland’s approach exemplified in 
Sea and Spar Between, with its attempt to reformulate means of writing poetry and criticism 
in the expanded, digital field.  
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the approach to the re-appropriation of the avant-garde gesture in transcription and 
code poetics can be seen as a distinction between the Duchampian readymade or 
Warhol’s paintings and the Fluxus performance. While in transcription poetics the 
iterated text assumes the static form of a readymade, code’s iteration of the 
appropriated material is realised in its performance that escapes similar fixity. Both, 
however, are evocative of a pervasive efforts to reconfigure familiar paradigms of 
creativity and authorship in response to their particular cultural moments. This 
openness that characterises Fluxus thinking and today echoes in the open source 
standards of writing not just code but also poetry should, then, be seen as an openness 
of and towards paradigms of creativity and authorship that takes on an increasingly 
collaborative, distributed form.  
As Julia E. Robinson explained, for Fluxus the score’s value resided in its very 
inscription of collectivism;  
the score was an ideal device for defetishzing artistic practice because 
it reanimated (and even scripted) the relationship between the work 
and the audience. Rejecting work of “art” as finalized, static objects, 
the primary function of the Fluxus score was to compose relationships 
between subjects.856  
 
The same collective thinking about authorship that rejects singular agency and the 
fetish of the author as a Romantic genius is characteristic for code-generated poetics. 
With code written to be repurposed, reused, and adapted by other poets and 
programmers, the attitude reverberates clearly with Fluxus approach to writing 
scores and their performances. As Ken Friedman explained, ‘the fact that many 
Fluxus works are designed as scores, as works which can be rehearsed by artists other 
than the creator’ is not only a characteristic of Fluxus, but, for Friedman, ‘the key 
concept in Fluxus.’857 Similarly, it is the open access thinking that, I suggest, should 
be considered the defining feature of the creative practice behind code generated 
poetics. The structure of its authorship, evocative of the modalities of Fluxus 
performances, can only be explained as a process of creation of an Event score. As 
Robinson put it,  
by defining the work of art through the condition of complete 
contingency – refusing the foreclosure of singular authorship or 
singular, ideal performace let alone an object – the event score exists 
as a new matrix through which  to read artistic investment, and one 
which demands to be read with reoriented or revisited theoretical 
approaches.858 
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Armstrong points to an interest in and commitment to exploring the status of artistic 
media and their ambiguous, changing nature that comes to the fore in the Fluxus 
project and can be seen, I suggest, as an antecedent of Sea and Spar. Fluxus, as 
Friedman pointed out, ‘evolved around a conscious use of model making and 
paradigm formation,’859 an approach evoked in Montfort and Strickland attempt at 
arriving at a new form of writing criticism. Higgins’s notion of intermedia illustrates 
the attitude explicitly. Developed in his 1966 ‘Statement on Intermedia’, the concept 
offers an alternative means of interrogating traditional art forms at the particular 
cultural moment, characterised by the breakdown of familiar categories of art and a 
dissolution of conventional forms. The difference between the acts of Cage, Fluxus 
and Montfort and Strickland is that of their respective technological means but the 
logic behind them remains strikingly similar.  
 
4.7. ELECTRACY: TOWARDS A BOOK TO COME 
 
The debates about performativity, communication, and language are well-
rehearsed, but they acquire new significance in the context of the expanded literary 
field of code poetics at the Iterative turn. Characteristically, performativity is seen as 
that which produces change; it brings into effect consequences of actions. As Derrida 
explains, the performative ‘produces or transforms a situation, it effects.’ 860 
Conceptualising code as performative can be thought of as transformative in the sense 
that Derrida points to, it transforms the situation of poetics to accommodate 
alternative models of authorship and creativity that emerge in the new, digital 
environment. The difficulty of defining the paradigm of authorship for an electronic 
text resides in its inherently rhizomatic structure. It is the convergence of the 
considerations about technology and poetics, functionality, process, its execution, 
and aesthetic outcomes – of the disparate reference frames, to return to Brecht’s 
terminology – that forms the framework for reframing writing in the expanded digital 
field. These complexities cannot be accommodated by the familiar literary categories 
and, hence, require a transformed situation. In code poetry, functions of reading, 
execution and use, as well as performance are heavily interdependent. And, while in 
an analogue environment, performing a text is not the same as reading it, those 
distinctions become blurred as a result of the transformation of literary production 
online, where the possibility of reading a text is increasingly contingent on its 
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performance. What this framework offers is a way of moving discussions of digital 
poetics away from the literary debates toward the field of performance theory. Such 
an approach advances, I suggest, a model of conceptualising code writing by means 
of an authorial framework that allows for alternative take on the creative practice.  
As Mark Amerika explained, today ‘writing is becoming ever more 
performative in a network-distributed environment.’861 The context encourages an 
emergence of distributed forms of authorship, its performativity shifts the dynamic 
of creative practice, prompted by ‘the logic of invention’862 as defined in Ulmer’s 
heuretic project. Reading and writing in this context should be seen as an emergent 
creative paradigm that can be explored as an exercise in electracy rather than literacy. 
For Ulmer, electracy is a manifestation of the logic of invention in the current digital 
moment, a transition from one established aesthetic paradigm to another. The move 
towards electracy and away from more familiar models of literacy is, according to 
Ulmer, a repetition of the similar transition from orality to literacy; one triggered by 
the proliferation of digital technologies, the latter by the invention of alphabetic 
writing. ‘Electracy […] is being invented not to replace […] orality and literacy […] but 
to supplement them with a third dimension of thought, practice, and identity.’863 The 
methodology behind this invention is driven by the logic of iteration and hence of 
particular relevance to the broader project put forward in this thesis. If electracy is a 
principle of innovation, then innovation should be defined as a repetition of an 
attitude adopted in a new technological context, one that inevitably includes a new 
experience of thought and, as a result, of new creative paradigms for a new cultural 
turn. It engages, as Groys puts, ‘the revaluation of values [as] the general form of 
innovation’864 to anticipate the possibilities of writing under changing conditions of 
writing.  
Electracy grows out of Ulmer’s heuretic project and as such encourages a 
certain processuralisation of engaging with texts. It relies on turning aesthetic 
attention not to the text itself, not to data alone, but to the dynamic behind it. It leads, 
as a result, to reading and writing that combines both process and data by conflating 
the aesthetic sensibilities and objects with those of technē, or utility. ‘The argument 
is,’ Ulmer stresses, echoing Drucker, ‘that the disciplines of Arts and Letters have as 
much to contribute to the essential formation of electracy as do science, engineering, 
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863 Gregory L. Ulmer, ‘The Learning Screen’, Networked: a (networked_book) about 
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computing, and related technical fields.’865 But this reconeptualisation of thinking 
about means of knowledge, information, or literary production moves beyond 
disciplinary boundaries not in an interdisciplinary fashion but by means of creating 
new systems of thought and models of writing. Electracy emerges out of a recognition 
that, when it comes to digital writing – a system of textual production that creates 
events rather than objects – we need to think about, read, and interpret not just the 
text that is generated on the screen, but also actively engage with what happens to the 
text and how the process is formulated. The reading and writing of the digital text 
requires, as Simanowski put it, ‘a shift from a hermeneutics of linguistic signs to a 
hermeneutics of intermedial, interactive, and processing signs,’ 866  or perhaps to 
Ulmer’s heuretics, foregrounding the process over the text produced. Sea and Spar, 
and code poetics more broadly, relies on hereutic gestures in order to arrive at 
relevant means of conceptualising the methods of this emergent model of creativity 
that requires a convergence of technological and poetic thinking by new, speculative 
means.  
Just as Kittler declared in 1995, today ‘we still don’t know what our writing 
does.’867 Seen as a speculative exercise in electracy, Montfort and Strickland’s project 
can be read as an attempt at understanding the possibilities of the written text today. 
It is an exploration in the process, the methods behind it, and the possibilities of 
engaging with the emergent models of iterative writing in the context of the 
technological environment that triggers the turn towards iteration itself. 
Understanding writing code poetics as a manifestation of electracy allows for an 
alternative, speculative approach to authorship and creativity. Authorship 
conceptualised as such facilitates writing generated by an open (access) system of 
enunciation in a constant state of becoming: becoming other text by means of 
manipulation of the source, but, also, in an act of its enunciation: becoming poetry, 
over and over again, in an infinitely iterative act, every time the code is run. As a 
repetition of an earlier avant-garde project, and a repetition of Dickinson’s and 
Melville’s text, Sea and Spar emerges as an example of a particularly characteristic 
contemporary attitude towards writing the avant-garde at the Iterative turn. Similarly 
to Erasure and Transcription, this mode of contemporary experimental poetics 
assumes iteration as an aesthetic dominant, as both a form and an attitude. 
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This thesis, by focusing on the iterative forms that respond to the new cultural 
situation, presents a condition of emergence. As Vilém Flusser puts it, ‘a changing 
consciousness calls for a change in technology, and a changing technology changes 
consciousness.’ 868  Erasure, transcription, and code-generated poetries are all 
determined by and in turn determine such processes of change. The notion of 
iteration is a way of describing the kind of thinking that incites the most recent set of 
technological and aesthetic transformations and, at the same time, a critical 
framework for interrogating their outcomes. It is a process, caught up in the midst of 
change, in a process of becoming an aesthetics, in a state of transformation from 
literacy to electracy, and, hence, implicitly imperfectly formed. As such, iteration is 
indicative of an ongoing task of writing the contemporary turn. 
 The category of ‘the contemporary’ itself has been extensively debated in the 
last decade. The contemporary in the arts replaces both the ‘modern’ and the 
‘postmodern’ as the aesthetic manifestation of the now. The contemporary, as this 
thesis has attempted to show, is iterative. Although such unequivocal historicism does 
not do justice to the complexities of the processes of cultural transformation, it 
reflects a characteristic thinking that informs the aesthetic tendencies of today. As 
Katy Siegel explains, a ‘sensitivity to the present’ is a feature of the contemporary. At 
the same time ‘our estimation of the present is accompanied by a heightened and 
more imaginative awareness of the past.’869 This attitude is clearly manifested in the 
proliferating tendency to repeat texts, concepts, and attitudes of historical avant-
gardes discussed in Chapters 2, 3, and 4 as an expression of the contemporary 
aesthetics, often adapting texts or practices of artists and writers previously 
overlooked as they did not fit the narrative of modern or postmodern art, e.g. Johnson 
and Phillips with their erasures. As Perloff observes, ‘with the climate of the [twenty-
first] century […] we seem to be witnessing a poetic turn from the resistance model of 
the 1980s to dialogue – a dialogue with earlier texts or texts in other media.’870 Today, 
‘Inventio is giving way to appropriation […] the new sentence […] has been replaced 
by citational or documentary prose, drawn from a variety of source texts.’871  
Seen as such, iteration becomes a way of conceptualising contemporary 
innovation in creative practice. It presents a possibility, an exploratory condition of 
culture that anticipates the next staging, in a new technē, of writing after the end of 
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writing.872  It anticipates the possibilities of the book to come. But the book that 
materialises at the Iterative turn interrogates the paradigms of the book, instead of 
reaffirming them. It is a Derridean book,873 gradually divorced from the familiar book 
both in terms of form and content. Its transformation is not informed, however, by 
the all too familiar debates about the death of the book; rather, it stems from an 
altered condition of creativity. This contemporary book, reconceptualised as the book 
to come, assumes, as Derrida explains, a form of a text, ‘not corpus or opus […] but 
[an] open textual process […] offered on boundless […] networks, for the active or 
inactive intervention of readers turned coauthors.’ 874  It is a book that shows ‘an 
extreme capacity for rapture,’875 it engenders change and invites novel thinking about 
familiar categories. It is a perverse book that forms a perverse library876 to come, but 
a book nevertheless.  
Hence, iteration as a creative paradigm is a means of looking to the future of 
creative practice, to engage with writing as à venir of writing. This is writing that is 
both open to the possibilities to come and a manifestation of an open system of 
writing in the expanded field. This sense of looking to the future is implicit in the idea 
of the Iterative turn, born out of a need to devise categories for thinking the 
contemporary and the future of writing that it anticipates, to understand the creative 
condition that goes beyond ‘the closure of the book.’877 It is, to borrow from Groys, an 
exercise in ‘the revaluation of values as the principle informing cultural innovation.’878 
The strategy of innovation at the Iterative turn pertains to a shift ‘in the boundary 
separating the valorised, archived cultural tradition,’ 879  a transformation in the 
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boundary between the copy and the original to ‘dissociate the word original from its 
partner genius.’880  
In his 1993 manifesto, Mark Amerika declared the birth of the artist as a 
parasite, sampling from everything and bringing in the future as a realm where 
‘creating a work of art will depend more and more on the ability of the artist to select, 
organise, and present the bits of raw data.’881 We are now living in the future, the 
future of uncreative production and unoriginal writing, the future emerging at the 
Iterative turn. ‘We are early in this game,’ Goldsmith writes,  
still, it is impossible to predict where it’s all headed. But one thing is 
for certain; it’s not going away. […] The art of managing information 
and re-presenting it as writing […] is […] a bridge, connecting the 
human-driven innovations of the twentieth century literature with 
technology-soaked robopoetics of the twenty-first century.’882  
 
While the notion of iteration does not resolve the creative and critical struggles of the 
contemporary moment, it is as an opening. It is as this transitional site of possibility 
that iteration gains prominence today, to emerge as a creative paradigm for the 
current aesthetic turn.  
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